In this paper, I argue that blame ought to be understood as a function rather than a
mental state or an activity. Any plausible account of blame must satisfy two
desiderata. First, it must be consistent with the intension of blame. In other words,
it must get the ordinary connotations of blame right. I call this the intensional
desideratum. Second, the account must be consistent with the set of instances of
what we would ordinarily identify as blaming. I call this the extensional
desideratum.
1 After discussing these desiderata in more detail, I offer an overview
of different accounts of blame’s nature. I then argue that non-functionalist accounts
of blame fail to meet one or both desiderata. Next, I argue that functionalist
accounts are better equipped to adequately meet these desiderata. It follows that
we ought to explain the nature of blame in terms of its function rather than mental
states or activities that putatively constitute blame.
