Though the notion of vulnerability is considered traditionally to have negative
connotations,1 several scholars in the last couple of decades have offered important
reassessments of it, arguing that it plays a crucial role to live a virtuous life in many
respects. For instance, MacIntyre (5) contends that our vulnerabilities qua human
beings to different types of afflictions (e.g., hunger, thirst, illness, bodily or mental
injury, etc.) are intimately connected to human flourishing when he writes that ‘the
virtues that we need if we are to develop from our initial animal condition into
independent rational agents, and the virtues that we need, if we are to confront and
respond to vulnerability and disability both in ourselves and in others, belong to
one and the same set of virtues.’ In addition, McCoy (ix) argues that, because
vulnerability “strengthens interpersonal bonds within a community,” it is therefore
a “necessary component of living a rich and authentic human life in community.”
The general goal of my paper is, echoing the views put forth by MacIntyre and
McCoy, to offer a defense of the notion of vulnerability as a crucial element needed
to live a virtuous human life for Plato.2 My strategy to do this consists in examining
a passage from Plato’s Phaedo (89d1-91c3) where Socrates accepts his
vulnerability to misology and to other threats (in particular, to error and, if he is
indeed mistaken, to death). This passage, which is often overlooked because
commentators tend to focus on other parts of the dialogue (for instance, those that
present Socrates’ arguments for the immortality of the soul), is nonetheless
important because it casts light on an important challenge to the practice of elenchus, which has for Socrates a crucial moral dimension since the elenchus is
the main tool that allows us to attain moral excellence in the care of our souls.
Indeed, in this passage, Socrates acknowledges that, given the specific
circumstances in which he finds himself (with Simmias and Cebes having voiced
strong objections to the thesis that the soul is immortal as his execution
approaches), he is “in danger of not having a philosophical attitude” and of
becoming a misologue.
