I analyze to what extent vagueness surrounding the meaning of “non-inevitability”
affects the theoretical cogency and practical efficacy of social constructionist
programs. My task is successful if it can explain, organize, and clarify how this
issue affects social constructionist programs and ameliorative versions of social
constructionist programs especially. Very roughly, descriptive social
constructionists ask “What is X?” or “In virtue of what social factors is X
constituted?” Given issues of social justice in particular, ameliorative social
constructionists ask “What should X be?” or “How should we alter our conception
of X?” I propose that the claim of “non-inevitability” on the part of social
constructionists has not been adequately justified: Its meaning has not been made
precise or relies too heavily on intuitions about what is social/natural,
unnecessary/necessary, and alterable/inalterable. To then defend and bolster social
constructionist programs, I propose two understandings of “non-inevitability,”
which, though somewhat course-grained are not thereby merely half-baked. The
understandings I recommend are both more substantive and precise than what has
so far been offered in existing literature.
