In his paper “Rational Resolve,” Richard Holton raises two questions about
resolutions: first, the descriptive question of how they work, and second, the
normative question of whether it is rational to persist in them. Holton answers the
latter, but he leaves the former question alone, assuming that resolutions work.
However, central to Holton’s account of rational resolve is the idea that resolutions
“entrench” a previous rational decision, that any rationality in obedience to
resolutions gets its rationality from some previous source. Because Holton
assumes the descriptive account of this previous source, the origins of his argument
remain blurry. The aim of this paper is to outline the foundation Holton assumes,
and to give a descriptive account of how and why resolutions work.
In order to give this account, I will argue that Holton is wrong to claim that
resolutions add no extra features of rationality and will instead propose that
resolutions add a multiplication or magnification feature, one dependent on the
reason the resolution is based upon. I will argue that this extra feature of resolution
works by an agent knowingly entering into a test of will—a test of will that I will
show cannot be escaped.
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