Metaphysical naturalism about knowledge1 (NK) is the thesis that knowledge is a
natural kind2 as opposed to an artificial one. It is usually (but not always3
) defended
side by side with methodological naturalism, the claim that epistemology should
be carried out (to some degree) using the empirical methodology of the relevant
disciplines (usually within cognitive science). Hence, methodological naturalists
reject the routine practice of traditional epistemology—armchair philosophical
analysis.
Methodological naturalism is often a source of support for NK. If some natural
kind corresponding to our pre-theoretical notion of knowledge has been identified
by any particular science, we should be informed by its empirical results instead
of dwelling in our pre-theoretical intuitions—just as our idea of what truly
constitutes gold has little relevance after the emergence of chemistry. Someone
who holds this view in particular is Hilary Kornblith, a main proponent of NK
(Kornblith 2002, 2007). According to this view, a methodological naturalist will
pay attention to the fact that cognitive ethology uses “knowledge” as a theoretical
term and will seek to identify folk or pre-theoretical notion of knowledge with its
reference.
