In a famous passage in the Apology, Socrates tells the jury:
As a result, I became hateful to him and to many of those present; and so,
as I went away, I thought to myself, “I am wiser than this man; for neither
of us really knows anything fine and good, but this man thinks he knows
something when he does not, whereas I, as I do not know anything, do not
think I do either. I seem, then, in just this little thing to be wiser than this
man at any rate, that what I do not know I do not think I know either.”
(21d)1
Nowhere in the entire Platonic corpus does Socrates say “I know that I do not
know,” still, it is hard not to feel a certain sympathy with commentators who worry
that there is at least a tension lurking here.2 The reason I mention Socrates is
because my own thinking has backed me into a similar corner. I have argued for
the thesis that philosophers are often wrong when they think they have justified
belief about their preferred philosophical thesis. I call this position ‘skepticaldogmatism.’ Unlike the ancient skeptics, skeptical-dogmatism does not recommend mere suspension of belief, it recommends that you disbelieve many
philosophical theses. That is, for many philosophical disputes, you should believe
your preferred position is probably wrong. The obvious problem—and parallel
with Socrates—is that it seems I should think that skeptical-dogmatism is probably
wrong. Extricating myself from this philosophical pickle is the goal of this paper
