In his article, “Anti-Luck Epistemology and the Gettier-Problem,” Duncan
Pritchard sets out to defend his modal account of luck (Pritchard 93-111). In this
view, lucky events are those which obtain in this world, but which fail to obtain in
a wide-class of nearby possible worlds in which the initial conditions are set.
Pritchard provides several reasons for why we should accept the modal view over
its competitors, the control view and the probability view. Chiefly, he argues, the
modal theory of luck 1) allows for degrees of luck, and 2) associates luck with risk.
I will attempt to argue against this claim by suggesting that the probability theory
of luck is better able than the modal theory to meet these challenges, and that it
better handles exemplary cases of luck like those brought up by Pritchard.
Pritchard begins by outlining what is meant in advocating for the modal theory
of luck. The brief sketch he provides, which is consistent with his account
elsewhere, tells us that lucky events are those events which obtain in this world,
but do not obtain in a wide-class of nearby possible worlds in which the same
initial conditions are set (Pritchard 96). For instance, he says, our winning the
lottery is a lucky event because in almost all nearby possible worlds we would fail
to do so. In the same way, if we imagine a person who is almost struck by the bullet
of a sniper bent on assassinating them (say it came within an inch of them), this
person is surely lucky, as the bullet would probably have struck them in a wideclass of nearby possible worlds. In this way, Pritchard argues, the modal account seems to capture our intuitions about luck in what we would take to be exemplary
cases of it. Yet, what other theories are on offer to compete against the modal
account?
