Is there anything new to be said about the problem of evil? Theists who defend the
reasonableness of belief in both God and evil typically try to offer a plausible
theodicy, a set of reasons why God would allow or cause pain and suffering. Hick
and Swinburne offer theodicies. Some theistic critics of arguments from evil, such
as Plantinga, propound a defense, a possible state of affairs whereby God and evil
co-exist. Wykstra and Alston argue that advocates of evidential arguments from
evil such as Rowe make the overly ambitious claim to have justified belief that
some evil is pointless. They think that even justified belief (and thus also
knowledge) that some evil is pointless is beyond our ken.
This might seem to cover all possible replies theistic critics of arguments from
evil could make. Apparently, it is not. In a recent article Gabriel Citron proposes
to attack the premise about the very existence of horrific suffering instead. He tries
to undermine arguments from evil by arguing that suffering might not be real after
all. Citron thinks that this is an effective reply to all arguments from evil. Is it?
