

THE PEPPER-CROCE THESIS AND
DEWEY'S "IDEALIST" AESTHETICS

Thomas M. Alexander

Of Art as Experience, Monroe Beardsley has said, "It is, by widespread agreement, the most valuable work on aesthetics written in English (and perhaps in any language) so far in our century".¹ A similar estimate was made shortly after the publication of the book when Stephen Pepper said, "I am personally convinced that Art as Experience is one of the four or five great books on esthetics, and is a classic though but five years old".² Yet it was Pepper who raised what was to be the greatest critical challenge to the book, claiming that it presented a confused welter of pragmatic and idealist notions. The charge was taken up and expanded by Benedetto Croce. Subsequent critics have upheld the charge, so that it was repeated as late as 1970.³

The importance of this issue exceeds a mere critic's war over a secondary topic in Dewey's philosophy. One does not have to read far in Dewey's mature works to discover that the concepts of art and the aesthetic experience lie at the very core of his position. For Dewey, art is the culmination of nature, the highest resolution of the dualisms infecting man's relation to the world or to his fellow men.⁴ Just as the art of a civilization is the ultimate judgment upon it, so is an aesthetics the ultimate test of a philosophy.⁵ For Dewey, science can only be properly used or understood when viewed as an art of achieving human goods.⁶ Finally, such scholars as Kestenbaum and McDermott have shown the current relevance of Dewey's aesthetics to phenomenology and to contemporary culture.⁷ Consequently, any criticism which calls the coherency of Dewey's aesthetics into question, brings doubt upon the consistency and contemporary value of his whole philosophy as well.

In this paper, I suggest that the "Pepper-Croce thesis" is fundamentally based upon that element of Dewey's philosophy which he calls the "pervasive qualitative whole". When one examines this idea, however, not only does it prove to be present in Dewey's "instrumentalist" writings and central to his philosophy of experience, but is seen to combine major themes in the philosophies of James and Peirce. Though the specific arguments raised by Pepper, Croce, and others cannot be examined here, it is suggested that only by misunderstanding what Dewey means by the "pervasive qualitative whole" can it be viewed as an inconsistent intrusion of idealism into his philosophy.

Stephen Pepper was working out a pragmatic aesthetics when Art as Experience appeared. Though he found he agreed with Dewey on many points, he states, "I was also amazed to find Dewey saying many things...contrary to the spirit of pragmatism--things which an organic idealist would have said and which I should have thought Dewey would rather have bitten his tongue than to have said...".⁸ Pepper concluded that the idealist side predominated and wrote Aesthetic Quality to present a purified pragmatic aesthetics.

Pepper's assessment that Dewey was "reverting to Hegelianism in his later years"⁹ seemed to confirm Croce's own reading of the book. Croce,

however, did not see two incompatible doctrines intertwined in the book. Instead, the work presented a coherent idealist aesthetics--curiously similar to that expounded by "some Italian authors"--and so contradictory to the rest of Dewey's philosophy. Croce insinuated that Dewey had done little more than to restate the main insights from Croce's *Estetica*, albeit with a new "freshness and spontaneity". This encouraged Croce that the truth of his philosophy was being demonstrated, and he urged Dewey to drop his "Anglo-Saxon empiricism", to forget the "fanaticism and emptiness" of his Hegelian masters, and to ally himself with the new idealists.¹⁰

Pepper was primarily distressed with Dewey's remarks about the aesthetic experience "being integrated through its inner relations into a single qualitative whole".¹¹ This seemed identical to the idealists' position of one organic whole being constituted through internal relations. Dewey's description of the development of an experience from a vague emotion to a concrete, objective expression seemed to echo "the very chorus voiced by Schelling, Hegel, Bradley, and Bosanquet".¹² Pepper clinched his argument by citing the following passage from *Art as Experience*:

The undefined and pervasive quality of an experience is that which binds together all the defined elements, the objects of which we are focally aware, making them a whole. The best evidence in such a case is our constant sense of things as belonging or not belonging, a sense which is immediate.¹³

Pepper concluded that "the vital kernel of a new esthetics struggles to grow...but is finally mulched under a rich layer of organicism".¹⁴ This passage, however, contains a synopsis of most of the key elements which will be discussed: a pervasive quality which itself is ineffable yet which unifies the objects of consciousness, which is present as a sense of rightness or wrongness, a sense of immediate meaning.

Instead of using such idealist terminology, like "inner relations" or "pervasive qualitative whole", Pepper believed that one should emphasize the element of aesthetic experience which Dewey called the "fusion" or "funding" of experience in an intensely vivid "seizure", which is a pure qualitative heightening without mediating internal relations or sense of an organic whole. Here lay Dewey's true pragmatic aesthetics.¹⁵ But Dewey explicitly rejected such a notion in *Art as Experience*. The phase of the emotive fusion or seizure is the first, crude, macroscopic phase of an experience. Dewey says that "Not only is it impossible to prolong this stage of esthetic experience indefinitely, but it is undesirable to do so".¹⁶ Intelligence must mediate experiences if it is to secure intrinsic qualities and imbue them with meaning. For Dewey, there is a world of difference between a mere isolated sensual spasm and aesthetic experience.

Croce tried to substantiate Pepper's claims by pointing out a number of specific points which they held in common: expression is not sheer emoting, the aesthetic experience is a development of ordinary experience, the subject of an artwork is not its substance, etc. Croce main-

tained that Dewey could only consistently hold these doctrines by agreeing with Croce that "Nothing can exist separate from knowing".¹⁷ Because Dewey rejected this--and had indeed attacked Croce in *Art as Experience* on this point¹⁸--Croce claimed that Dewey was led into "vicious circles and positivistic tautologies".¹⁹

Dewey's responses to Pepper and Croce were terse, testy and unfruitful. If anything, Dewey seemed to substantiate their charges of inconsistency by admitting that the views expressed in *Art as Experience* had nothing to do with his instrumentalism. "I not only did not write *Art as Experience* as an appendix to or application of my pragmatism...[but not] in subjection to any system of philosophy".²⁰ This wild statement, which was intended by Dewey to show that he had not forced the empirical facts of aesthetic experience into a preconceived philosophy as had Pepper and Croce, entirely evaded the issue of whether *Art as Experience* was consistent with his general position, or even related to it.

Neither critic was dissuaded from his charges by such tactics. Pepper repeated the accusation in 1969, and in 1952 Croce replied in a scathing article which, bristling with wounded Latin pride, attacked Dewey's whole philosophy. Croce concluded with the maliciously ironic charge that "empirically and pragmatically Dewey cannot overcome the dualism of mind and nature".²¹ This was only possible, said Croce, by idealistically regarding nature as an expression of Spirit.²² This fine retort was lost on Dewey, who had died shortly before the article appeared. Croce, himself, died a couple of months later.

The controversy was taken up in 1970 by George H. Douglas, who concluded Pepper and Croce were correct. Surprisingly, Douglas included *Experience and Nature with Art as Experience* as a deviation from Dewey's instrumentalism. Pointing out further similarities between Dewey and Croce, Douglas speculated that the only reason Dewey could not embrace Croce's position was that "Dewey never wanted to cut himself loose from the philosophy which had made him a great public figure and for which he is still best known".²² Douglas thought that Dewey and Croce were closest in their conception of expression as an activity. Croce's theory that Spirit fuses inchoate sensations into distinct objects of perception or expressive intuitions,²⁴ was identical, according to Douglas to Dewey's position that ideas and objects of experience are practical constructs of intelligence. Douglas failed to note, however, that because Croce held a sharp dualism between theory and practice, expressive intuitions and their constituting activity are purely internal. Practical activity is incidental, even "impure" for Croce.²⁵

Yet, the term "intuition", which is the fulcrum of Croce's philosophy, is also used by Dewey, providing perhaps the closest point of similarity between the two thinkers, though this resemblance has been ignored by every critic. Dewey speaks of intuition as follows:

Things, objects, are only focal points of a here and now in a whole that stretches out indefinitely. This is the qualitative "background" which is defined and made definitely conscious in particular objects and specified properties and qualities. There is something mystical associated with the word

intuition, and any experience becomes mystical in the degree in which the sense, the feeling, of the unlimited envelope becomes intense—as it may do in the experience of an object of art... Intuition, in short, signifies the realization of a pervasive quality such that it regulates the determination of relevant distinctions or of whatever... becomes the accepted object of thought.²⁶

Thus, Dewey claims that intuition is of the pervasive qualitative whole, is intensified in art, and is regulatory of objects of consciousness. Croce seems close to this when he speaks of intuition as "the undifferentiated unity of the perception of the real and of the simple image of the possible".²⁷ Consequently, Dewey seems closest to idealism when he speaks of this pervasive qualitative whole, which is now described as intuited, making Dewey's aesthetics even more deceptively close to Croce's position than Dewey, Croce, or Douglas suspected.

However, upon examination, Dewey's concept of the intuited pervasive qualitative whole appears in his instrumentalist writings, and is explicitly connected by Dewey with Peirce's category of Firstness and James' theory of the fringe and felt relations. Moreover, this concept is crucial to two of the most important ideas in Dewey's aesthetics: that the aesthetic experience is inherently, immediately meaningful, and that art is the paradigm of communication, the full expression of man's social nature. Whatever the similarities between Dewey and Croce, there are important differences, not the least of which pertains to these central ideas of Dewey. Intuitions, for Croce, are internal products of spiritual activity, for Dewey, they signify an objective bond of organisms and environment, i.e., intuitions are of situations, and prior to any internal-external dualism. They bespeak a shared experience as well as a transaction of doing and under-going activity and passivity. Whereas Croce separates aesthetic intuitions from intellectual concepts, Dewey relates them functionally so that the aesthetic experience will be a result of the art of intelligence, funded with meaning as well as feeling. Dewey indeed defines art as "the mode of activity that is charged with meanings capable of immediately enjoyed possession".²⁸

But there seems to be a contradiction in Dewey's idea of "immediate meaning", for meanings are means, instruments, relations, and as such are discursive, mediating, not immediate. "Genuinely to think of a thing", states Dewey, "is to think of implications that are no sooner thought of than we are hurried on to their implications".²⁹ Dewey even contrasts the discursive nature of relations to the immediate nature of quality: "Quality is quality, direct, immediate, and undefinable. Order is a matter of relation, of definition, of placing and describing".³⁰ Qualities for Dewey are "terminal and exclusive"³¹ of everything else. They alone have intrinsic value.³² Dewey emphatically states the aesthetic experience is non-cognitive. "It cannot be stated too strongly", insists Dewey, "that what is not immediate is not aesthetic",³³ and "Immediacy of existence is ineffable".³⁴

The answer to this paradox seems to lie in what Dewey once said to

Russell, "From one angle, almost everything I have written is a comment on the fact that situations are immediate in their direct occurrence and mediated and mediating in the temporal continuum constituting life experience".³⁵ The union of qualities and relations, in other words, is somehow resolved for Dewey by referring to his idea of situation. To another critic he said, "I point out that in my general doctrine about judgment and verification situation is the key word, and that a situation is held to be directly and immediately qualitative".³⁶ Significantly, Dewey began his response to Pepper by stressing this point: "Mr. Pepper in his comments on my esthetic theory makes words like coherence, whole, integration, etc., the ground of his criticism rather than situation".³⁷ Unfortunately, Dewey did not elaborate on this.

Situations, for Dewey, are states of affairs, determinate temporal events, which are about something and are developing. Each situation is distinguished by its own unique, immediate, pervasive quality. As Dewey states in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, "it is to be remarked that a situation is a whole in virtue of its immediate pervasive quality... The pervasively qualitative is not only that which binds all constituents into a whole, but it is also unique; it constitutes in each situation an individual situation, indivisible and unduplicable".³⁸ In other words, the pervasive quality makes a situation that situation, and constitutes the unity and context of the situation as well.

Situations which contain interacting events, have "tighter and looser ties", as Dewey puts it. Since situations develop, these ties or relations have temporal reference. The aesthetic experience, which is experience par excellence, is an event which develops into an intensely unified, organized situation which achieves consummatory realization. The pervasive quality is so evident that it becomes consciously manifest as unique, characterizing the experience as an experience. Thus, though the situation is internally mediated, diverse, related, and has a temporal development, qua situation it has a qualitative unity and immediacy. Because the situation is ultimately defined through a single pervasive quality, it has significance and worth on its own account. Qualities are ultimates, as was noted. Because there is a unifying, ultimate quality to a situation, it has an intuited, felt, or "had" character. In its immediate occurrence it is ultimate, though it may develop into another situation.

Situations, therefore, contain their relations. Relations are internal to the situation. For Dewey, the discursive, mediating, or relating of intelligence always occurs within, and to some extent is guided by, the enveloping qualitative unity of the situation. Importantly, this is stressed in his logical writings. For example, in the Essays in Experimental Logic, Dewey says, "the intellectual element is set in a context which is non-cognitive and which holds within it in suspense a vast complex of other qualities... [The factors and qualities hang together; there is great variety among them but they are saturated with a pervasive quality... [This is] just what is meant in non-philosophic discourse by 'an experience'".³⁹ The use of the term "an experience" is a significant anticipation of its development into the central concept of Art as Experience. The temporal, functional develop-

ment of experience is as much a fundamental concept of Dewey's instrumentalism as of his aesthetics.

It is because quality defines and unifies a situation that inquiry can occur. Dewey often pointed to the "qualitative thinking" of the artist as "an intensification of a characteristic of all thought".⁴⁰ Objects, events, meanings arise within a context; they are defined by the situation. Though the pervasive quality characterizes the entire situation and its objects, it is not itself an object, or a member of the class of objects of the situation. As Dewey states in his article, "Qualitative Thought", "The situation as such is not and cannot be stated or made explicit. It is taken for granted, 'understood', or implicit in all propositional symbolization. It forms the universe of discourse ...".⁴¹ The present situation may pass into an object of reflection, but then it becomes a member of another situation. This is why Dewey speaks of the situation as "intuited" or "ineffable". If it were known, it would be an object of reflection; it would not be then the quality of the situation but a quality in the situation. This is also why Dewey insists on the non-cognitive nature of aesthetic experience. He is not rejecting that there are meanings or relations in the experience, but he is emphasizing that they are dominated by a unifying quality which has become so intense as to be consciously felt. Even in rational inquiry there is this non-cognitive context which, even though it may be only dimly felt or subconscious, determines the objects of consciousness or meanings as belonging and agreeing or as conflicting and jarring.

The source of the concept of the pervasive qualitative whole in Dewey's writings goes back to the beginning of his instrumentalist period in 1906. His article, "The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism",⁴² argued that all cognitive experience occurs within a non-cognitive context which is controlling. Every experience has a unique "concrete quale" which makes it just that experience, which is felt as being just so. "To grasp this aspect," states Dewey, "is to see what the empiricist means by... the element of control".⁴³ Because the experience is as it appears doubts and beliefs arise within the experience genuinely, and so can stimulate inquiry and experimentation. It is interesting to note that this article sparked a long critical controversy which anticipated many of the charges Pepper, Croce, and others would raise against Dewey's aesthetics. Importantly, Dewey defended himself by arguing that immediate empiricism in no way denied a mediated aspect of experience, but provided a basis for it.

The idea that the qualitative context establishes a realm of discourse which is, itself, ineffable is anticipated in the introduction to the Essays in Experimental Logic. Dewey there contrasts "infinity words" like "experience" and "situation" with "zero words" like "type-writer", "me", and "consciousness". The former "serve to remind us of the vast, vague continuum... this taken-for-granted whole".⁴³ The latter denote the discriminated objects and relations which arise within experience. Dewey adds, "The word 'experience' is... a notation of an inexpressible as that which decides the ultimate status of all which is expressed; inexpressible not because it is so remote and transcendent, but because it is so immediately engrossing and matter of course".⁴⁵

It is evident then that Dewey's concept of the pervasive qualitative whole plays a role throughout his philosophy, though it is most fully articulated in his mature period. Though it has affinities with Dewey's idealism and Hegel's philosophy, the origin lies in James' Principles of Psychology, in the discussion of the fringe of consciousness and relations as felt. It is also present in Peirce's concept of Firstness, which Dewey explicitly adopted. Whatever the connection of this notion with idealism—which Dewey never entirely repudiated—it is first and foremost a brilliant synthesis of themes central to pragmatism.

As is well known, Dewey often found Peirce had anticipated ideas which Dewey developed independently. Dewey quickly acknowledged and used Peirce's ideas as he discovered them, and Firstness is a case in point. The year after Art as Experience appeared, Dewey wrote an article defending the coherency of Peirce's theory of quality or Firstness. Firstness is "sheer totality and pervading unity of quality in everything experience... Considered in itself, quality is that which totally and intimately pervades a phenomenon or experience rendering it just the one experience which it is. Of course then it is 'ineffable'".⁴⁶ It has "unity and totality, wholly independent of the complexity of its 'components'..."⁴⁷ Dewey concludes his defense by stating, "Personally I believe this to be sound doctrine".⁴⁸ Thus, Firstness, like Dewey's pervasive quality, is a "monadic suchness" of experience, occurring as feelings or being had, and which is "immediately present" and "indescribable".⁴⁹ It is the primary category of experience.

But this alone does not account for pervasive quality as a realm of discourse or as exercising a regulatory influence on thought. How can it give a sense of immediate meaning, so vital to Dewey's aesthetic theory? Here is where Dewey uses James' ideas of the fringe of consciousness and doctrine of felt relations. In Experience and Nature, Dewey refers to the fringe as a regulatory context. "Even our most highly intellectual operations depend upon [feeling qualities] as a 'fringe' by which to guide our inferential movements. They give us our sense of rightness and wrongness, of what to select... and of what... to ignore among the multitude of inchoate meanings that are presenting themselves".⁵⁰ James, himself, said that "The most important element of these fringes is... the mere feeling of harmony and discord...".⁵¹ But Dewey objected to the term "fringe" because

The "fringe" of James seems to me a somewhat unfortunate way of expressing the role of the underlying qualitative character that constitutes experience—unfortunate because the metaphor tends to treat it as an additional element instead of an all-pervasive influence in determining other contents.⁵²

Dewey also eliminated the subjectivistic tone of James' discussion, making it the felt quality for an objective situation which permeates every element immediately. For Dewey, "The larger system of meaning suffuses, interpenetrates, colors what is here uppermost; it gives [facts] sense, feeling as distinct from signification".⁵³

This use of "sense" is important for Dewey. Sense is sensed and makes sense. It is distinct from sheer feeling or cognitive signification. It is not vague or indefinite, as the pervasive quality is, for it has a recognized reference. Unlike signification, it has an immediate, inherent meaning.⁵⁴ The field of experience or the situation ranges from a bright focus of consciousness to an immediate context to a vaguely felt outlying field. The focus is the tensive center, the point of need, the context is the spatio-temporal "neighborhood" and the outlying field is the stable world, the system of meaning embodied in habit. Sense is what is present in the focus, it is a "focus of immediate shining appar-ency".⁵⁵ Yet, Dewey notes, "In the experience, and in such a way as to qualify even what is shiningly apparent, are all the physical features of the environment...and all the habits and interests...of the organism..."⁵⁶ Sense then, is an immediate awareness of meanings or relations. There is sense in a situation because relations can be felt, as James said. It was this insight which allowed James to evade the dilemma of empiricism and idealism. Dewey accepted this and saw it best illus-trated in aesthetic experience.

The psychology underlying the bifurcation of quality and relation was exploded...by William James when he pointed out that there are direct feelings of...relations...Every work of art that ever existed had indeed already contra-dicted the theory in question. It is true that...ideas exercise a mediating function. But only a twisted and aborted logic can hold that because something is mediated it cannot, therefore, be immediately grasped.⁵⁷

This is but a reiteration of Dewey's response to Russell and his other critics from 1905 on that the concept of the mediated immediacy of situations is central to understanding Dewey's thought. It may echo Dewey's Hegelian heritage, but it is a coherent and permeating aspect of Dewey's philosophy, explicitly developed in connection with James and Peirce. It comes out most fully in Dewey's aesthetics with the concept of the pervasive qualitative whole. Dewey characterizes art as nothing so much as a sense of unified, immediately enjoyed meaning.⁵⁸ This is fully consistent with Dewey's analysis of situations, quality, relations, and sense. Moreover, it justifiably locates Dewey's aesthet-ics at the core of his philosophy. Because the aesthetic experience has meaning, it is more than a mere emotional fusion. Because quality is of an objective situation, the aesthetic experience is more than a mere internal Crocean intuition. Because art unifies experiences and meaning in a consummate, objective situation it is communication, the fullest expression of the life of the community in shared experiences.

FOOTNOTES

1. Monroe Beardsley, Aesthetics from Classical Greece to the Present (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966), p. 322.

2. Stephen Pepper, "Some Questions on Dewey's Esthetics", in The Philosophy of John Dewey, edited by Paul A. Schillp (Chicago: North-western University Press, 1939), p. 389.

3. See Edna Aston Shearer, "Dewey's Aesthetic Theory", Journal of Philosophy, XXXII, pp. 617-627; 650-664, Benedetto Croce, "On the Aes-thetics of Dewey", Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 6, 1948, pp. 203-207, reply by Dewey, pp. 207-209, Patrick Romanell, "A Comment on Croce's and Dewey's Aesthetics", JAAC 8, 1949, pp. 125-128; reply by Dewey, JAAC 9, 1950, pp. 56-58, Benedetto Croce, "Dewey's Aesthetics and Theory of Knowledge", JAAC 11, 1952, pp. 1-7, and George H. Douglas, "A Reconsideration of the Dewey-Croce Exchange", JAAC 28, 1970. Most articles dealing with Dewey's metaphysics encounter the same problems and issues, i.e., the nature of qualities, relations, and situations.

4. See Experience and Nature, 2nd edition, p. xvi and pp. 392-3 and Reconstruction in Philosophy, pp. 211-212, The Public and Its Problems, pp. 183-4, Freedom and Culture, passim, and of course, Art as Experience, especially chapters xiii and xiv.

5. See Art as Experience, p. 326 and p. 274.

6. See Experience and Nature, Chapter ix, and references in footnote 4.

7. See Victor Kestenbaum, The Phenomenological Sense of John Dewey (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1977) and John J. McDermott, The Culture of Experience (New York: New York University Press, 1975), and also the numerous recent articles on Dewey and Heidegger and pragmatism and phenomenology.

8. Stephen Pepper, "Some Questions on Dewey's Esthetics", op.cit., p. 371.

9. Ibid., p. 372.

10. Benedetto Croce, "On the Aesthetics of Dewey", pp.203-204, and "Dewey's Aesthetics and Theory of Knowledge", p. 2 and p. 5.

11. Pepper, "Some Questions on Dewey's Esthetics", op.cit., p. 372.

12. Ibid., pp. 382-3.

13. Art as Experience, p. 194; quoted by Pepper, p. 386.

14. Pepper, "Some Questions on Dewey's Esthetics", op.cit., p.386.

15. See Stephen Pepper, "The Concept of Fusion in Dewey's Aesthet-ics", JAAC 12, 1953, pp. 169-76. Pepper's concept of fusion seems al-most as faulty—at least it is different from what Dewey says in Human Nature and Conduct, for example. The problem is basically the same:

fusion for Dewey is a phase of experience whereas Pepper makes it something ultimate, occurring apart from a problematic situation. (Oddly, in Aesthetic Quality, Pepper speaks of aesthetic intuition as a balance of quality and relations (see p. 27), though Dewey's functional integration of the two is still missing. The idea of fusion comes from James' Principles, Chapter XIII, Vol. 1, p. 502.

16. Art as Experience, p. 145.
17. Croce, "On the Aesthetics of Dewey", p. 206.
18. See Art as Experience, pp. 294-5.
19. Croce, "On the Aesthetics of Dewey", p. 206.
20. John Dewey, "A Comment on the Foregoing Criticisms", JAAC 6, 1948, pp. 207-8.
21. Croce, "Dewey's Aesthetics and Theory of Knowledge", p. 5. See Pepper "Autobiography of an Aesthetic", JAAC 28, 1970, p. 277.
22. Ibid., "[Dewey] is led to delude himself that he has overcome [the dualism of mind and nature] by means of a continuous process of nature-mind, in which the hyphen connecting the two words would provide the victory which speculative logic...resolving the external world into the internal, nature into mind...is alone capable of accomplishing". My emphasis.
23. George H. Douglas, "A Reconsideration of the Dewey-Croce Exchange", JAAC 28, 1970, pp. 503-4.
24. Ibid., p. 501; see Croce's Aesthetic (tr. Douglas Ainslie), pp. 5-6.
25. See Croce's Aesthetic, pp. 50-1, where he maintains (contrary to what one would infer from pp. 8-11) that the work of art is "always internal". This is because, as one discovers in this and the next chapter, that objectification does not imply externalization, the former is the internal activity of Spirit, the latter the external activity of the will. Practical activity is posterior to theoretical for Croce. On page 31 Croce distinguishes the pure forms of knowledge, art and philosophy from the nature sciences and mathematics which are "impure, being mingled with extraneous elements of practical origin".
26. Art as Experience, p. 193, and "Qualitative Thought", in Philosophy and Civilization, p. 101.
27. Croce, Aesthetic, tr. by Douglas Ainslie (New York: The Noonday press, 1955), p. 4.
28. Experience and Nature, p. 358.

29. Ibid., p. 118.
30. Ibid., p. 110.
31. Ibid., p. 85.
32. Ibid.
33. Art as Experience, p. 119.
34. Experience and Nature, p. 85.
35. John Dewey, "Experience, Knowledge, and Value: A Rejoinder", in Schillp, p. 546.
36. John Dewey, "Value Judgments and Quality", (1943), in Problems in Men, p. 257.
37. Dewey, "Experience, Knowledge, and Value: A Rejoinder", p. 549.
38. Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 68.
39. Essays in Experimental Logic, pp. 4-5. The lengthy introduction to this work is a concise, rich, and important summary of Dewey's instrumentalism as conceived during his early period.
40. Dewey, "Qualitative Thought", in Philosophy and Civilization, p. 103; compare with Art as Experience, p. 194.
41. Ibid., pp. 98-99; see Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 68f; "It is a commonplace that the universe of discourse cannot be a term of element within itself. One universe of discourse may, however, be a term of discourse within another universe".
42. "The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism", in The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, pp. 226-41.
43. Ibid., p. 234.
44. Essays in Experimental Logic, footnote, pp. 8-9.
45. Ibid., p. 10 (continuation of footnote).
46. John Dewey, "Peirce's Theory of Quality", (1935) in Experience, Nature, and Freedom, p. 205; see Peirce's Collected Papers I, ss. 300-22, 422-26, and 530-44.
47. Ibid., p. 209. It is significant Peirce's illustration, repeated by Dewey, is of a drama, King Lear; compare Peirce's Collected Papers I, ss. 530, with Experience and Nature, pp. 306-7.

48. Ibid.
49. Peirce, Collected Papers I, ss. 303, 310, 422.
50. Dewey, Experience and Nature, pp. 299-300; see James' Principles, Chapter IX, pp. 237-59, and XV, and Essays in Radical Empiricism.
51. William James, The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 1, p. 261.
52. "Qualitative Thought", op.cit., footnote, p. 99.
53. Experience and Nature, p. 306; Dewey explicitly relates this to James.
54. Ibid., pp. 260-1.
55. Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 7.
56. Ibid., p. 6.
57. Art as Experience, p. 119.
58. e.g., see Art as Experience, p. 212.