

IS ART DEAD FOR HEGEL?

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In both the *Phenomenology of Spirit*¹ and *The Philosophy of Fine Art*² Hegel's schema places art within the realm of Absolute Spirit in the august company of religion and philosophy. However, Spirit is hierarchically articulated and art resides as the first, or lowest, moment of that ordering. Due, in part, to this ranking within Spirit, Benedetto Croce charges that Hegel's discussion of art is trapped within the logical exigencies of Hegel's system and is, therefore, overly rationalistic and hostile to art. These are credible criticisms. Croce's claim is even stronger, for he claims that Hegel's analysis of the importance of art sounds art's death knell. Recent literature, however, seeks to defend Hegel against his critics' charge of supra-rationalism. Although there are textual references which justify Croce's indictment of Hegel's discussion, it will be argued here that in concentrating on the word of Hegel's text and ignoring the "spirit" of Hegel's dialectical system, Croce inadvertently misrepresents Hegel's position. To this end, therefore, this essay seeks to resolve the question, "Is Art Dead for Hegel?"

Croce is at his strongest in his *Aesthetic*³ when he contextualizes the work of aesthetic theorists. Of Hegel and his contemporaries he asserts:

Hegel places Art in the sphere of absolute Spirit, together with Religion and Philosophy, and in this he regards Kant, Schiller, Schelling and Solger as his precursors, for like them he strongly denies that art has the function of representing the abstract concept or Idea. Hegel's whole philosophy consists in the affirmation of the concrete concept, unknown to ordinary or scientific thought. (298)

Although Hegel does in fact consider speculative philosophy consonant with scientific thought, and art no less so in this regard, he does maintain that up to this time art had proved illusive to scientific attempts at dissection. But this is not art for

Hegel, and so Croce moves to what constitutes art. He notes that for Hegel:

The Idea is the content of art: its sensible and imaginative configuration; its form: two elements which must interpenetrate and form a whole, hence the necessity that a content destined to become a work of art should show itself capable of such transformation. (299)

So Croce correctly identifies that the dialectical infusion of one element with another makes up the whole of what is art for Hegel.

The work of art, for Hegel, represents the concrete embodiment of imaginative idea with the sensuous manifestation within the art work itself. Croce further claims that Hegel follows Kant in that "the aim of art lies in itself, in presentation of truth in a sensible form; any other aim is altogether extraneous" (301). This sensible presentation of truth does not come from nothingness. Rather:

'No successful work of art can issue from light and careless imagination.' It is a delusion of fancy that poet and painter need nothing beyond intuitions: 'a true poet must reflect and meditate before and during the execution of his poem.' But it is always understood that the thought of the poet does not take the form of abstraction. (299)

Thus the thought of the poet takes the form of a concrete sensuous representation in the work of art. Hegel maintains that once the art work has been created, it no longer has aims outside itself, but rather has become an object that is self-contained or in and for itself. Even this does not capture Hegel's complete vision of art, but this is sufficient groundwork to begin the discussion.

Croce is correct when he says that Hegel makes the claim that art is dead for us. In *The Philosophy of Fine Art* Hegel contrasts the role art played in ancient societies to that which it played in the society of his contemporaries. He says:

The type peculiar to art-production and its products fails any longer to satisfy man's highest need. We are beyond the stage of reverence for works of art as divine, and objects deserving our worship. (*Fine Art 12*)

Moreover, as Croce correctly identifies, this obviously suggests that art has been transcended (or superseded) by both religion and philosophy in Hegel's system. Even so, Hegel recognizes the importance of art. In what we might loosely consider a "hermeneutic" sense he says:

. . . in works of art . . . nations have deposited the richest intuitions and ideas they possess; and not infrequently fine art supplies a key of interpretation to the wisdom and religion of peoples . . . This is an attribute which art shares in common with religion and philosophy, the peculiar distinction in the case of art being that its presentation of the most exalted subject matter is in sensuous form, thereby bringing them nearer to Nature and her mode of envisagement, that is closer to our sensitive and emotional life. (*Fine Art 9*)

Thus we discover that there is some positive view of art within Hegel's conception; but in an even stronger passage, which supports Croce's view, Hegel also says of art and its capacity to convey truth to us that:

. . . however we may explain the fact it certainly is the case that Art is no longer able to discover that satisfaction of spiritual wants, which previous epochs and nations have sought for in it and exclusively found in it, a satisfaction which, at least on the religious side, was associated with art in a most intimate way. (*Fine Art 12*)

Obviously, Hegel considered that art in his day no longer maintained the station in the life of his people and his society that it had done for the ancients, but, in itself, is this enough to justify Croce's vigorous assault against Hegel's analysis of art's ability to convey truth?

Croce maintains that in Hegel's analysis art is incapable of conveying truth, since in Hegel's treatment art is transcended, or superseded, by religion and philosophy in the realm of Absolute Spirit. Since art occupies the initial moment of Absolute Spirit, in a long but telling passage, Croce asserts:

In a greater degree than any of his predecessors Hegel emphasized the cognitive character of art. But this very merit brought him into a difficulty more easily avoided by the rest. Art being placed in the sphere of absolute Spirit, in company with Religion and Philosophy, how will she be able to hold her own in such powerful and aggressive company, especially in that of Philosophy, which in the Hegelian system stands at the summit of all spiritual evolution? If Art and Religion fulfilled functions other than the knowledge of the Absolute, they would be inferior levels of the Spirit, but yet necessary and indispensable. But if they have in view the same end as Philosophy and are allowed to compete with it, what value can they retain? (302)

Intuiting a hostility toward art in this schema, Croce goes on to compare Hegel with another philosopher, Plato, who speaks of the ancient fight between art and philosophy. Here Croce finally tolls the death knell of art for Hegel's view, proclaiming:

But as the Greek philosopher, in obedience to the presumed command of religion, did not hesitate to condemn the mimetic art and the Homeric poetry he loved, so the German refused to evade the logical exigencies of his system and proclaimed the mortality, nay, the very death, of art. (302)

But is this right? Are the logical expressions of Hegel's system such that they proclaim the death of art? Or rather is the fault that Croce decontextualizes segments of the discussion and attributes to Hegel's dialectic a linear, overly "scientific" misrepresentation of that dialectic?

Before rebutting Croce's criticism, it will be useful to examine more closely the outline of Hegel's discussion of art

and its unfolding as Idea and as history. In both the *Phenomenology* and *The Philosophy of Fine Art*, Hegel places art at the initial stage of Absolute Spirit, eventually sublated by religion and philosophy. But the discussion of the development of art itself unfolds in three stages: the Symbolic, the Classical, and the Romantic. In this discussion we must bear in mind that although we are able to discuss elements of Hegel's thought in separation from the others in one sense, that is, in an abstract theoretical sense, in another there is never a possibility of extracting one aspect of his system from the others without doing great violence to the system as totality, which is in fact the manner in which Hegel conceived it. There is this constant and complete fusion and mutual interpenetration of all the elements within Hegel's vision. Croce seems aware of this element, but he never seems to employ it with the rigor required for Hegel's vigorous dialectic.

The progression of the development of the stages of art are congruent with, or rather indicators of, the degree of self-consciousness that the people of various civilizations (as a whole and not as individuals in particular) have acquired. These stages loosely correspond to the stages of phenomenological development of human consciousness as found in the *Phenomenology*: consciousness, Self-consciousness, and Reason.

The first stage of art, that associated with consciousness, is the stage of Symbolic Art. This is the realm of the immediate grasp of what is exterior to oneself, or, in Hegelian terms, the grasp of an externality in which human consciousness becomes aware of the profound nature of its own existence in the presence of God. Yet, at this stage, human consciousness is unable to express this profound nature in any form adequate to the Concept of this relation. This conscious awareness is a defective way of knowing. Henry Paolucci maintains:

When God is experienced as unfathomable mystery or annihilating necessity or outpouring love, artistic expression must either fall short of or transcend the reciprocal adequacy of content and form . . . Falling short of such adequacy, artistic expression is symbolic. . . .⁴

According to Hegel, then, art which must give expression of this vague and inadequate conception of consciousness' view of its place in the world through symbolic representation develops in the following manner:

. . . first, the origin of artistic creation proceeds from the Idea when, being itself still involved in defective definition and obscurity, or in vicious and untrue determinacy, it becomes embodied in the shapes of art. As indeterminate it does not as yet possess in itself that individuality which the Ideal demands. Its abstract character and one-sidedness leaves its objective presentment still defective and contingent. Consequently this first type of art is rather a mere search after plastic configuration than a power of genuine representation. (*Fine Art* 103)

Underscoring this point in the *Phenomenology* Hegel goes on to say that this kind of understanding exhibited as representative symbolization is often manifest in the innocence and tenderness of what Hegel calls the vegetative religions, but it soon takes a new form. Shape in this form of art for Hegel is immediate and is represented as a thing and, ". . . the indwelling God is the Black Stone drawn forth from its animal covering and pervaded with the light of consciousness" (*Phenomenology* 428). Spirit here is the divine Light of this nation's spirit, which is to say the consciousness of the nation's identity, but as an external identification. This form of representation is incomplete and inadequate because:

. . . first, the Idea here only enters into consciousness in *abstract* determinacy or indeterminacy: and, secondly, by reason of the fact that the coalescence or import with embodiment can only throughout remain defective, and in its turn also wholly abstract. (*Fine Art* 104-5)

Hegel claims that the inadequacy of the symbolic stage of art lies in the fact that it has not achieved an appropriate level of self-reflectiveness. The Idea, which is to say the self-identity of the thought of this Idea with itself, is abstractly conceived and

not internalized as a view of itself. The adequate level of self-reflectiveness is met in the classical stage of art.

The significance of the classical form of art is that the artists in this historical context are able to externalize the concrete Idea in a concrete spiritual form of adequate expression, that is, ". . . the human form . . . is alone the visible phenomenon adequate to the expression of intelligence" (*Fine Art* 106). The proper essence of art is the identity of meaning and shape for Hegel, and as T. M. Knox says, classical art is the true manifestation of art for Hegel because ". . . it achieves the complete coincidence of content and form which symbolic art only seeks."⁵ The classical form of art recognizes the identity of humanity with the divine; but this form of art too is defective because classical art still sees the God as some form of externality. God is still other than a human manifestation as human. According to Hegel, the classical type of art is limited because:

the classical type. . . sets up the perfected coalescence of spiritual and sensuous existence as adequate confirmation of both. As a matter of fact, however, in this fusion mind itself is not represented agreeably to its *true notional concept*. Mind is the infinite subjectivity of the Idea, which as absolute inwardness, is not capable of freely expanding in its entire independence, so long as it remains within the mould of the bodily shape, fused therein as in the existence wholly congenial to it. (*Fine Art* 107)

Thus the classical form of art still views its own spirit as something inward and has not been able to recognize its own divinity in the external representation of its God-like divinity as other. This divinity becomes worshiped as the lordly power in which the people disappear and cult worship develops.

The Cult of the religion of this simple, amorphous essence gives back to its votaries, therefore, in general merely this: that they are the people of their god, who secures for them only their enduring existence and their substance as such; not, however, their actual self which, on the contrary is rejected. (Hegel, *Phenomenology* 436)

It is precisely in this aspect that the classical form of art exhibits its lack. So long as the human spirit remains in this "infinite subjectivity" mankind is unable to transcend into the unity of the human spirit with the divine. Which brings us to the realm of transcendence, the Christian characterization of art, which Hegel calls the romantic stage.

In the *Phenomenology*, there is the fusion of the discussion of art and religion. This is so because in the representation of these religio-artistic expressions the people themselves did not make this separation of art and religion. They have only been able to express their religious convictions, or rather, feelings, in this sensible artistic form; and conversely, they are only able to give manifestation to their highest artistic productions in this religious or spiritual form. Moreover, in these artistic shapes, human consciousness represented the divine as something other.

However, in this romantic stage of art, the human spirit is able to transcend this separation of the meaning of art with its shape. Romantic art is able to do this because it has introduced the element of thought into itself, that is, that thought is the unity of the Idea with itself in its concrete sensuous representation. Hegel says:

If, then, in this way the unity of the human and divine nature, which in the previous stage was potential, is raised out of this immediate into a self-conscious unity, it follows that the genuine medium for the reality of this content is no longer the sensuous and immediate existence of what is spiritual, that is, the physical body of man, but the *self-aware* inner life of *soul itself*. (*Fine Art* 109)

Thus Christianity, in its realization of the human God in the body of Christ, is able to remove the separation and the otherness of divinity and self.

Knox indicates, quite correctly, that the element which transcends the classical realm of art for Hegel in the romantic stage is the aspect of "negativity", which Hegel conceives of as never having been achieved in the classical or "Greek" stage. Knox stresses:

What Hegel has in mind here is simply that Christianity is a higher and truer religion than Greek religion. Greek religion is the "religion of art" but the content of this religion and of Greek art is defective because it does not pass beyond the classical ideal. It lacks the moment of the negative: it remains sensuous; sense has not died and then become resurrected as spirit. Consequently, romantic art is the most concrete form of art and a "higher form" of art than the Greek. (4)

Thus in Hegel's view the destruction of the sensuous, the crucifixion of the body of Christ and his eventual death on the cross and the resurrection of the dead god indicate the true determination of human spirit, that is, that its true existence lies not in the bodily or sensuous, but rather it lies in the spirit or, in other words, in the agency of the mind. In the spirit of Christianity, then, Spirit has through its human agency become self-aware, and it is only through this human agency that spirit can become aware because the human agency is Spirit itself.

Even so, Hegel makes us aware that even the transcendent aspects of both art and religion are still inadequate and must eventually be superseded by philosophy. Of art Hegel says:

In all these respects art is and remains for us, on the side of its highest possibilities, a thing of the past. Herein it has further lost its genuine truth and life, and is rather transported to our world of *ideas*. . . . What is now stimulated in us by works of art is, in addition to the fact of immediate enjoyment, our judgment. In other words we subject the content, and the means of presentation of the work of art, and the suitability and unsuitability of both, to the contemplation of our thought. (*Fine Art* 13)

Thus, once art, religio-art, or religion, transcends itself and enters the realm of thought, the truth of these spheres is itself transcended because they themselves point beyond themselves to something higher. Of art and religion he maintains, ". . . it is its true function to bring to consciousness

the highest interests of the mind" (*Fine Art* 17). The truth of art then becomes secondary to the higher form of truth representation.

But if it is the case that the truth of art has become secondary to the truth of religion and philosophy, does this bolster rather than undermine Croce's thesis? Has art then lost its capacity to be something in itself? And if art is unable to meet this philosophical demand can we speculate, along with Croce, about art's ability, "to hold her own in such powerful and aggressive company," or, whether art has been reduced to "transitory historical phases in the life of humanity"? Moreover, if Croce is correct that Hegel sounds the death knell of art, can we then sound the death knell for Hegel's theory of art, because art remains a vital and impressive force in our contemporary society? Can Hegel survive this charge of intellectualistic hostility toward art?

We might begin our rebuttal with T. M. Knox's challenge of Croce's thesis where he maintains that:

. . . we need not be surprised to find Croce saying (*Aesthetic*, Eng. tr. 2nd ed. 302-3) that the 'Aesthetic of Hegel is thus a funeral oration: he passes in review the successive forms of art . . . and lays the whole in its grave. . . . Art [for metaphysical idealism is] absolutely useless.' But if this verdict of Croce's were true, it would be very hard to explain what Hegel meant when he said that art would continue its task for thousands of years and that we would hope that it might come to perfection. (8)

So what would Croce have us make of Hegel's task for art? Would Croce have art in Hegel's system to be mere illusion or, as Hegel says, *Schein* (a word which has the sense of being a show, or pretense, or appearance, or a shining through)? Even if art were reduced to the level of show, this would not of necessity be a defect according to the Hegelian dialectic, and it is precisely this kind of inadequate conception of the Hegelian dialectic which undermines Croce's position.

Croce says of Hegel's conception, "Precisely by its form, art is limited to a particular content." (Croce 302) The implication here is that since art is limited in its ability to

apprehend truth, it is limited to partial truth and is therefore somehow a misrepresentation of truth. He says further that:

... the spirit of our modern world, more especially that of our religion and our mental evolution, seems to have passed the point at which art is the best road to the apprehension of the Absolute. (302)

He concludes, as we have seen, that art in the Hegelian sense of the term is "absolutely useless." But this formulation misrepresents the importance of the moments or stages of the progression of mind.

Perhaps we can get a better understanding of the relationship between the moments of Spirit if we take another look at the relationship of the various stages of art. Paolucci illustrates that:

These [stages of art] are not for Hegel relationships of inferiority or superiority. The symbolic, classical, and romantic kinds of art are three distinctive ways of expressing artistically what is expressible also in distinctive, historically related, forms of religious worship and philosophic speculation. (Paolucci xix)

Paolucci would further insist that this lack of an inferior/superior distinction holds also for the moments of spirit. However, Paolucci's characterization must be qualified because Hegel does say that philosophy is superior to art; but it is the particular character of this superiority in which the qualification is telling and Paolucci's point is made, because philosophy's superiority is itself dependent on art.

One *can* claim that for Hegel the truth apprehended for philosophy is a higher truth than that apprehended by art, but to continue the evaluative determination of inferiority misrepresents Hegel's dialectic. Must we always have *the* best road to the Absolute, or is it the case that all roads from here lead there? Spirit and its truth are of necessity dependent on the moments of Spirit. To claim that art is inferior to philosophy is equivalent to saying that Spirit is inferior to itself. So, if there is a moment of inadequacy or show in the presentation of truth for Hegel, this does not necessarily imply a defect. Truth is

doing exactly what it should be doing. Hegel says of the relation of appearance to truth:

An appearance or show is, however, essential to actuality. There could be no such thing as truth if it did not appear, or, rather, let itself appear, were it not further true for some *one* thing or person, *for* itself as also *for* spirit. Consequently it cannot be appearance in general against which such an objection can be raised, but the particular mode of its manifestation under which art makes actual what is essentially real and true. (*Fine Art* 9-19)

This is then a crucial aspect of the dialectic which Croce fails to fully appreciate.

It cannot be against appearance in general that a criticism of this sort can be leveled. The partiality of truth is not its defect, but rather a mode of becoming. Thus if Croce were to level a criticism at all it would have to be directed toward the particular mode of manifestation of truth as art. But art does what it can within its truth. To demand more of something than that which it can be in its actuality is no criticism. Moreover, to criticize some mode of representation of truth because it is not truth in its absolute form is itself an unrealistic and a shallow claim, because absolute truth could not be for Hegel what it is in-*itself* without the particular manifestations of truths in their partiality. Even given these aspects, in what manner could we make more sense out of the following Hegelian statement?

In all these respects art is and remains for us, on the side of its highest possibilities, a thing of the past. Herein it has further lost its genuine truth and life, and [it] is . . . transported to our world of ideas [and is therefore un-] able to maintain its former necessity and its superior place in reality. (*Fine Art* 13)

Can we make other of this passage than what Croce has?

Hegel's claim is actually a fairly modest one. He only claims that art no longer performs the function in contemporary society that it did for the ancients. In *The Philosophy of Fine Art*, Hegel makes clear the modesty of this claim, saying:

. . . it certainly is the case that Art is no longer able to discover that satisfaction of spiritual wants, which previous epochs and nations have sought for in it and exclusively found in it, a satisfaction which, at least on the religious side, was associated with art in the most intimate way. (12)

Thus we can see that Croce exaggerates Hegel's claim. It is not the case that art can no longer have truth for us. In fact we see evidence of the importance of art in our lives all the time; no less so did Hegel. It is rather that art has lost the profound and integrated aspect of its importance in the fabric of contemporary society as a whole. The point is that art no longer plays the all-pervasive spiritual, religious, and political relationship of art in all societal aspects as it did "in the most intimate way" with the ancients. It is correct to say, as Croce indicates, that, "It is only a particular sphere and grade of truth which is capable of being reproduced in the form of a work of art" (*Fine Art* 11). However, to say that we no longer "exclusively" glean truth from the rosetta stone of art is not the same as saying that the truth of art is dead for us. The question obviously arises then: what was or is the role of art as a presenter of truth for Hegel?

This view as it appears in Hegel's conception of the role of fine art is fairly well distilled and articulated by T. M. Knox. He indicates that:

Hegel insists, as we have seen, that art is an intellectual activity, charged like religion and philosophy with the task of revealing the truth, although it veils the truth in a sensuous form, unlike philosophy which declares its message in plain prose, in intellectual terms, for *thinking*, not for *feeling*. But this must be a *continuing* task. (9)

But it is precisely this intellectual aspect of Hegel's conception that Croce attacks, and again he takes the words of what he reads too literally and ignores the dialectical spirit contained within them.

It is true that Hegel takes art's function as a mode which brings consciousness to the highest interests of mind. Does

this mean that Hegel has overly intellectualized art? Charles Taylor thinks that art for Hegel is a vehicle of ontological vision, claiming, ". . . Hegel is not returning to the intellectualist tradition or the view of art as mimesis. Art is a mode of consciousness of the Idea, but it is not a representation of it."⁶ Thus as a 'vehicle of ontological vision', or as a process, Taylor wants to claim that art, rather than being intellectualized and static, is a mode of becoming. But if art is to bring consciousness to mind, would not this clearly mean that art is less than an autonomous mode of consciousness? Consequently, Hegel's formulation of art's role has not escaped this intellectualist charge.

However, this characterization misses an element which Hegel does not let slip:

. . . all reality must for man pass through the medium of vision and imaginative idea; and it is only after such a passage that it penetrates the emotional life and the will. In such a process it is of no consequence whether it is immediate external reality which claims his attention, or whether the result is effected by some other way, in other words by means of images, symbols, and ideas, which contain and display the content of such actuality. Men are able to imagine things, which do not actually exist, as if they did exist. (*Fine Art* 64)

Art in the making is an immediately reflective process. Intellectual reflection is an essential, though not exclusive, aspect of the art work itself. How is it that any artist's production can avoid this reflective element? Moreover, we say of a work of art that it is 'presented.' If it is presented, it seems that it must be presented to something, or more specifically and precisely for our purposes, to some one. Hegel says with regard to this particular mode of art's being that:

Its position is of the nature, that along with its sensuous presentation it is fundamentally addressed to the mind. The mind is intended to be affected by it and to receive some kind of satisfaction in it. (*Fine Art* 48)

If this be too intellectualistic, then what could possibly count for a non-intellectualistic confrontation of the art work?

Croce seems to miss the significance of sublation or supercession in the process of the dialectic. The transcendence occurring in the element of supercession is not mere going beyond; nor is it for Hegel merely the annihilation of the truth of the preceding moment. Rather for Hegel, supercession is the going beyond a moment yet always maintaining the truth of the preceding moment. Nothing is ever lost in the dialectic; something is always gained. So for Hegel, art will never lose its truth, nor its capacity for revealing truth, for, as he says in the *Phenomenology*:

The True is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development. Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only in the end is it what it truly is; and that precisely in this consists its nature, viz., to be actual, subject, the spontaneous becoming of itself. (11)

So this claim that somehow art is dead for Hegel can only be made in so far as the Absolute is itself dead in Hegel.

Knox proffers at the end of his essay, "The Puzzle of Hegel's Aesthetics," this bit of interpretive spin:

[Hegel's] philosophy of history ends with the emphatic word *bis hieher*, has consciousness come. Consequently whatever his philosophy had done to *begreifen* the course of the world, and whatever the Spirit had revealed of itself, up to that time, the Spirit still lived and its further revelation would come first in art, and then in religion and science, and philosophy's task to *begreifen* this new world would be unceasing. (10)

Thus if the Absolute is always itself in a state of becoming and *is* only in so far as it is always becoming itself in all its moments, it would seem that a claim like Croce's that "art is dead" is (giving Croce's position its most favorable read) an unfortunate and inadvertent misrepresentation of Hegel's

position. Thus we can conclude that Hegel was neither over-rationalistic, nor hostile to art. Moreover, rather than sounding the death knell of Hegel's aesthetics, Hegel's conception seems to indicate the ever-resurrecting process of art.

NOTES

¹G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller, analysis of the text and foreword by J. N. Findlay (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979). Hereafter, *Phenomenology*.

²G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Fine Art*, trans. with notes by F. P. B. Osmatson (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1920). Hereafter, *Fine Art*.

³Benedetto Croce, *Aesthetic: As Science and Expression and General Linguistic*, trans. Douglas Ainslie (New York: Macmillan, 1972). Hereafter, Croce.

⁴Henry Paolucci, *Hegel: On the Arts*, abridged and trans. with an introduction by Henry Paolucci (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1979), p. xix. Hereafter, Paolucci.

⁵T. M. Knox, "The Puzzle of Hegel's Aesthetics," in *Art and Logic in Hegel's Philosophy*, eds. Warren E. Steinkraus and Kenneth L. Schmitz (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1975), 4. Hereafter, Knox.

⁶Charles Taylor, *Hegel* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 420. Hereafter, Taylor.