

CAN POSTMODERNISM CLAIM TO BE TRUE?

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In the face of the postmodern juggernaut, there are those who quickly slam on the brakes. Or to change the metaphor, many are still packing the dikes to stem the flood. The most common objection is relativism and a related, but more esoteric, charge of self-referential incoherence. This, I suspect, is the more serious charge in the long run because it reveals inconsistency from within and not from without. Thus, the problem is that postmodernists assert that there are no non-contextual truths, truths not relative to a particular socio-historical milieu. The often unguarded implication is that no universal truths can be had. However, these claims themselves appear for all the world themselves to be universal truths about the human condition, raising the obvious question, "Can postmodernism claim to be true?"

In the face of this charge, postmodernists have sounded a most feeble and diverse cacophony.¹ Many refuse to deal with it altogether, simply ignore the charge, and go on. Some may add that such concerns are precisely what they are trying to avoid and that addressing them only gives the wrong kind of encouragement. Others deny the charge of relativism but quickly go on to reaffirm postmodern historicist principles without explaining why the charge should be denied. In short, one is struck by the luxuriant abundance of claims to self-contradiction and incoherence by opponents, matched only by the spare landscape of responses.

As one might imagine, the resulting impression is one of ships passing in the night more than a warm gathering at a friendly harbor. The rich and critical dialogue represented by the Platonic tradition, which has been reinvigorated by Hans-Georg Gadamer, goes wanting.² Voices cry out but usually past each other. There is proximity but more like back-to-back than face-to-face—or perhaps more like "in your face." As one sympathetic to the postmodern turn, I nevertheless see that the postmodernists, like partners in a dysfunctional relationship, have contributed to the paucity of dialogue by their refusal, their evasion, and their reluctance to engage the issue.

The ensuing aura of relativism has frightened away would-be supporters who otherwise are proponents of many of the themes of postmodernism. Probably the most intriguing of these are feminists, who also typically emphasize the contextual nature of knowledge and the dangers of foundationalism and objectivism. Nevertheless, while having so

much in common with postmodern distinctives, feminists characteristically fear that abandonment of universal truth claims cuts the ground out from under their critique. As Susan Hekman, one of the few ardent feminist proponents of postmodernism, observes, "Nearly all [feminists] assume that postmodernism entails anarchy, nihilism, and relativism."³ So what should have led to formidable allies has hardly any supporters.

My proposal in this paper, therefore, is to argue for a direct response to the charges of relativism and reflexive incoherence and to indicate what direction it should take. After first offering reasons why the charge of incoherence should be taken seriously, I will delineate the nature of a fruitful response and then illustrate in the work of three related feminist thinkers how such a proposal will facilitate genuine dialogue rather than the current filibustering.

The Charge of Incoherence

As a first reason why postmodernists should take the charge of recursive incoherence seriously, it hardly takes a critic to note that the postmodernists frequently base their approach on universal claims, just the kind of universal claims that they purport to rule out. Commonly the postmodern position is buttressed by declarations that no metaphysics of presence is possible, that all knowledge is interlaced with power, and that no one can rise above their historical situation. In the words of what many consider the postmodernist manifesto, Jean-François Lyotard's "The Postmodern Condition," postmodernism is "incredulity towards metanarratives."⁴ By and large, Lyotard's lead has been followed. Both friend and foe take postmodernism to rule out comprehensive, universal, God's-eye views of reality. This appears, however, to be a statement about a general fact, a truth about the human condition, if you will. To continue with Lyotard, he asserts that complete commensurability is impossible.⁵ An astonishing example of this insouciant inconsistency occurs in Hekman, speaking of Michel Foucault:

Foucault argues that the Enlightenment's universalizing conception of knowledge was, from its inception, misconceived. Like any other knowledge/power discourse, Enlightenment discourse is historical and contextual and, hence, its claim of universality was, from the outset, fraudulent. It follows that it is futile, as some contemporary theorists claim, to attempt to reconstitute that discourse, to reformulate the Enlightenment project.⁶

The futility of the claim to universality appears, for all intents and purposes, to be a universal claim about all discourse being historical and contextual!

Richard Rorty, perhaps the best North American parallel to the French poststructuralists, with whom postmodern is most commonly identified, asserts, "What we cannot do is to rise above all human communities, actual and possible. We cannot find a skyhook which lifts us out of mere coherence—mere agreement—to something like 'correspondence with reality as it is in itself.'"⁷ He backs this common postmodern assertion with a variety of linguistic and sociological arguments. He also helpfully suggests that the best we can do is to start from where we are and in the encounter with others to weave their beliefs together with ours.⁸ Nevertheless, he, too, appears, with his forceful "cannot," to be making a universal statement about what is or is not possible in human communities. Yet he sometimes castigates anyone making statements about what can or cannot be done.⁹ In short, it is not difficult to find plenty of evidence that the postmodernists are guilty as charged of inconsistency.¹⁰

A second reason for dealing with the problem of inconsistency is that one would suppose that if incoherence is blissfully admitted, some reason for rejecting coherence as a standard is implied. However, there is little evidence for such an argument. A person would expect to find some plausible account of why postmodernists need not concern themselves with self-referential incoherence. Such an argument might go like this: "The charge of incoherence, like any statement, is meaningful only within a certain context, or form of life. However, I am proposing a very different form of life and a very different context, one in which such a charge lacks meaning."

Even if it were offered, several significant problems arise with such a response. One is that it would be very difficult to provide the "thick description" necessary for such a form of life—and few try, much less come close. As mentioned before, the typical response is not to deny the problem of coherence but to ignore it or evade it. A second is that the postmodern emphasis on the holistic nature of language itself relies on a certain consistency or coherence in order for language to be possible.¹¹ A third problem is that coherence is itself central to the postmodern's claims. Consider three of the most significant postmodern options: poststructuralism, hermeneutical philosophy, and neo-pragmatism. Jacques Derrida's deconstruction by its very nature relies on a degree of coherence to provide a prospect for deconstruction. While the lack of final coherence is the tool that Derrida uses to pry apart any conceptual structure, a degree of coherence is

required in order to have something to deconstruct. Without minimizing the differences, the same could be said for other major French poststructuralists like Foucault and Lyotard, who criticize but nevertheless deal with epistemes and metanarratives. The hermeneutical philosophy exemplified above all by Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur relies on the “fusion of horizons,” horizons that themselves are roughly coherent perspectives. As Gadamer argues, it was precisely the Enlightenment that thought it could start completely anew without some consistency with tradition and history. And Rorty’s neo-pragmatism itself assumes consistency within a tradition. This is why truth claims may make little sense across traditions. They are incoherent in light of one’s own “coherent” discourse.

The use of coherence among postmoderns makes all the more striking the fact that the charge of incoherence has not seriously been engaged; and no reason appears to consider it trivial. Rather, on postmodernism’s own terms at this point, it is a serious charge that, if left unanswered, threatens to deconstruct postmodernism itself.

A third reason why postmoderns need to engage the problem of incoherence is more serious. In light of postmodern claims, the specter of relativism is in large part a chimera. It arises in large part only if one has maintained that a transcendental, objectivist foundation is necessary in order for truth claims to be meaningful. But if such high standards are not necessary, one has less to fear from fallible, inexact, perspectival truth claims. Dislodged from such objectivist assumptions, postmodernists should not be concerned about truth claims sounding too objectivistic any more than they are worried about absence, situatedness, or narrative as sounding relativistic. In fact, their reticence about truth perhaps betrays a modernist hangover rather than a necessary postmodern implication. This is precisely the objection that Sandra Harding, one of the feminists we will consider, has against the postmodernist’s reluctance to deal with the categories of universality, objectivity, and truth.¹²

A fourth consideration that may appear argumentatively suspect, but only to modernist ears, is a rhetorical one. Failure to consider one’s audience and to deal with their main reason for dismissal is rhetorically foolish. Given the common appeal to rhetoric as a model for the postmodern paradigm change, that is, that knowledge claims function more along the lines of traditional rhetoric than of an ahistorical, impersonal syllogism, such a tactic is odd.¹³ It, too, makes the postmodernists, like the modernists, appear to speak beyond their history, beyond their audience, beyond their context. Contrary to postmodern assumptions, they seem to be speaking

from some transcendent perspective that addresses no one in particular.

Similarly, a fifth factor that counts toward engaging the issue also derives from rhetoric: the timing is right. Initially, the impetus in the modern-postmodern debate was towards stressing the differences between modernism and postmodernism. There was indeed a danger that any mention of universal truth would be misconstrued in an objectivist vein. In that light, the reticence of the postmodernists on this issue was understandable and perhaps rhetorically advisable. On the other hand, at this juncture such delaying tactics serve to discourage interest rather than encourage it. Enough has been written about postmodernism (perhaps too much!) to provide a common understanding. The broad strokes have been laid down; now it is time for the nuances. Even Lyotard urges that postmodernism is aptly named in that it is modern in significant ways. A simple either-or has never been the issue between modernism and postmodernism. Another factor in the timeliness of dealing with this issue is that terms that are not always comparable are thrown around and conflated. Objectivity is used synonymously with objectivism.¹⁴ Classical foundationalism is allied with any sort of foundationalism. An interest in truth is equated with indubitable, final truth—truth with a big *T* as it were. Universality is identical with an ahistorical, Archimedean point.¹⁵ The problem is that once one looks closer, postmodernists themselves call these equations into question, thus opening the door for a new look at the meaning of “universal truth claims.”

It is possible now more than before to explore more precisely the possibility of a postmodernist approach to universality without being misunderstood. If, as Toulmin argues, paying attention to the “timely” is one of the distinctive marks of the postmodern over against the modern, the time is right to deal with postmodern’s perceived problem of self-referential incoherence.

A Postmodern Response

What then would a postmodern conception of universality look like? The first aspect of dealing more directly with the charge of lacking any truth claim is frankly to make one, in other words, frankly to make a universal assertion. Implicit in postmodern arguments are claims that “this is the way things are.” For example:

- Human beings are inherently situated in history and cannot rise to a God’s eye point-of-view.
- Human beings are irreducibly linguistic and interpersonal beings.

- Human beings' worlds are socially constructed. Truth is inescapably linked with power and absence.

Rather than offering convoluted attempts to deny that these are what they appear to be, I will argue that the more promising avenue of response is boldly to acknowledge them as universal truth claims—but in a postmodern context.

The second aspect of dealing with the concerns against postmodernism is consequently to face head-on the self-referential dilemma. One may argue, as Gadamer does for example, that the transcendental conditions of human knowing imply that all human understanding is hermeneutical, historically situated, and subject to personal judgment—including this claim itself.¹⁶ It is of course the latter clause that postmodernists neglect, but nothing inherent in most postmodern proposals precludes such a move.

Like any other human assertion of knowledge, one can freely acknowledge that the claim “All human knowledge is historically situated” is itself historically situated—and furthermore revisable, fallible, and perspectival. One can acknowledge that such universal descriptive claims might not make much sense at all in a very different cultural milieu and are quite dependent on the western matrix. It may be that one has to enter a similar gestalt even to evaluate such a claim. Obviously, one would acknowledge that such a claim is incomplete and surely related to the play of power in ways conscious and unconscious. It is part of a narrative with a history—not a claim to stand outside all stories, all places, and all times. These caveats do not disqualify its “universal intent,” to use the phrase of Michael Polanyi.¹⁷ It is a kind of “wager,” to use the word of Ricoeur, a wager that if others enter sufficiently into the form of life in which such a claim is enmeshed, allowing for an inevitable fusion of horizons, the claim will stand up to others’ scrutiny.¹⁸ Surely it will be revised, but the wager is that it will not be revised so much as to be unrecognizable. To use Ludwig Wittgenstein’s language, the inevitable rough edges to any concept allow for its repeated application and extension but can maintain enough overlapping similarity so as to retain meaningful use in different contexts.¹⁹ A “family resemblance, at least, should remain.”²⁰

It is important to recognize that such a universal truth claim can avoid many of the “objectivist” or “modernist” trappings. It is not required that one be absolutely certain about it before one can “know” anything else. It is not, therefore, necessarily foundationalist in the classical sense. It neither requires Cartesian clarity and distinctness, nor Cartesian indubitable certainty. Most postmodernists offer a plethora of evidence, epistemological,

anthropological, and sociological, for their claims, but they are not evidentialist in that the evidence requires such a claim and only such a claim. What is sorely needed in the present debate between modernists and postmodernists, I maintain, is such a chastened conception of truth claims.

At this point, a more straightforward defense is in order. The claim that all knowledge claims are historically situated is a general or universal claim that is itself historically situated, fallible, and revisable. Such claims, while important, do not claim too much. They are certainly not all-comprehensive metanarratives. They are not foundational in the sense that, if they were contested, other, more specific, knowledge claims would be out of order. Thus philosophy, which would still have a special place in considering and debating such claims, would not be the necessary foundational discipline. Contrary to what Rorty says, however, philosophy would still have a place, namely, in debating the kinds of claims that people like Rorty make about humans not being able to make other than historical, contextual, and pragmatic truth claims. Such universal claims therefore need not come first, à la Descartes, nor need they be certain, clear, or distinct. It is precisely the postmodern context that allows for them nevertheless to be valid, whereas the modern paradigm would relegate them to the realm of the non-cognitive, perhaps the poetic, à la logical positivism.

Postmodernism and Feminist Epistemology

Since the claims I have made are themselves fallible and contestable, it may be helpful to show in some specific contexts how they can illuminate and further constructive discussion. One of the most interesting conversation partners of postmodernists are feminists. Many have pointed out the similarities of their critiques against the Enlightenment, framed by feminist literature in terms of patriarchy but similar in many respects to postmodernist critiques of objectivism and foundationalism. Furthermore, their alternatives are often quite similar to those of the postmodernists. Feminists, too, appeal to the situated character of all knowledge, its ideological character, and the importance of the linguistic and social world. Hekman puts it well:

The similarities between the two movements . . . are striking. Feminism and postmodernism are the only contemporary theories that present a truly radical critique of the Enlightenment legacy of modernism. No other approaches on the contemporary intellectual scene offer a means of displacing and transforming the masculinist epistemology of modernity. This fact alone creates a bond between the two approaches.²¹

On the other hand, feminists have by and large been loathe to embrace postmodernism, sometimes being outright antagonistic. Hekman herself surprisingly concedes, “No major feminist critic of science has explicitly embraced postmodernism.”²² Their concern is the same as many others. They fear that its relativism and deconstruction of the modernist conception of truth undermines the possibility of critique, in their case feminist critique of patriarchy. If there is no truth, how can there be deception? If there is no right, how can there be the wrong of patriarchy? If there is no subject, certainly no universal feminine subject, how can one speak of empowering the female subject?

In order to indicate the superability of these objections, what I propose is to take three leading feminists who represent three major feminist alternatives. One of their major differences lies in their differing attitudes toward postmodernism, which cloud the actual similarity in their proposals. I will attempt to show that it is just the lack of distinctions such as I have made that tends to conceal their real similarities and highlight their differences.

Seyla Benhabib, working out of the critical theory of Jürgen Habermas, is very helpful to the concerns of this paper in that she explicitly argues for a “situated” or “interactive” universalism.²³ Such a universalism would be historically situated, fallible, and self-referentially coherent.²⁴ She begins with Habermas but severely modifies his thought in more historical, less transcendental direction.²⁵ She then relates this view to what she calls a weak version of the postmodernists.²⁶ More precisely, she argues that if such a “weak reading” of the postmodernists is possible, it would be compatible with her view of interactive universalism. On the other hand, her “hard reading” of the postmodernists is a response to the ambivalence of many postmodernists and failure forthrightly to deal with the issue of universality. So she regards them, according to this reading, as relativistic, inconsistent, and perhaps nihilistic. She reveals her preference for the latter reading when she wonders in the end whether “as feminists we can adopt postmodernism as a theoretical ally” because of its negative tendencies.²⁷ If, however, such negative tendencies are, as I have argued, a modernist Trojan horse within the postmodernist camp, her position of “situated universalism” is essentially the same as the “postmodern universality” described above.

As mentioned, Susan Hekman is one of the few feminists who is enthusiastic about the alliance between feminism and postmodernism. She obviously, however, interprets postmodernism according to Benhabib’s weak reading. She finds substantial grounds for social critique in the postmodernists’ approach and does not regard them as offering a debilitating

relativism.²⁸ In fact, at certain points she describes their approach to truth in a way very similar to the universality I have described.²⁹ Still, at other places she follows them in being reluctant to address universal truth, sometimes suggesting that postmodernism and feminism means that all such claims are rejected.³⁰ In these cases, she maintains that all knowledge, and thus all politics, is therefore ineradicably local.³¹ For example, she says at one point, “The feminist critique of masculine science, if it is to be successful, must abandon objectivity along with the other trappings of Enlightenment science.”³² On the other hand, at other times, she gives a more nuanced position. She suggests that the concern for relativism is a relic of modernism and makes sense only in modernism.³³ In fact, one of the clearest places where she argues this point is with respect to Susan Harding’s thought, the next feminist we will consider. She thinks Harding’s concern about relativism shows her allegiance to modernism. As Hekman insightfully comments, “Postmodernism does not espouse ‘relativism’ as its critics claim. Rather, it calls for a redefinition of knowledge that displaces the relative/absolute dichotomy and identifies all knowledge as hermeneutic.”³⁴ It is precisely this latter point that Gadamer, upon whom Hekman explicitly relies, stresses as an explicit universal truth claim about all human understanding whatsoever. Like many other postmodernists, she makes universal truth claims, which are, to be sure, historically situated, but which she is reluctant to acknowledge. Her inconsistency and ambivalence about such claims leaves her vulnerable to the typical charge of self-referential incoherence.

Susan Harding, working out of the philosophy of science, has advocated a “standpoint epistemology” that allows for universal truth claims that are historically situated along the lines of what I have argued here. She, however, distinguishes this perspective from postmodernism, obviously giving postmodernism a hard reading.³⁵

What is significant is that all three regard some form of affirmation of truth as important, albeit in a historicized, contextualized form. The implications of relativism in the postmodernists tend to scare Harding and Benhabib away, although their epistemologies are otherwise very similar. Hekman reveals how similar postmodernism and feminist epistemology are, but shares the general postmodern tendency to be reticent about universality, thus opening herself to the charge of reflexive incoherence. Furthermore, she regards the two traditions represented by Benhabib and Harding as insufficiently radical because they are willing to affirm some kind of universality, which Hekman tends, with some ambivalence, to interpret along the lines of objectivism.³⁶ They in turn are suspicious of her

type of position because it does not affirm universality strongly enough. Yet all three converge in different ways around the idea of a historically situated universality.

Conclusion

It is not only timely but possible to conceptualize a view of universal truth claims consistent with postmodernism. This would fortify one of the most vulnerable areas of postmodern thought. This, moreover, would allow for an alliance between the three philosophical traditions represented by these three feminists that we have noted, who otherwise see themselves as rivals. All three of them make similar claims for a situated or interactive universality that is self-referentially coherent. Clearing up the confusions on this score among postmodernists thus clears up confusions in debates like theirs and makes possible a more fruitful dialogue. It is also not without significance that it allows for postmodernism to claim with good conscience itself to be true!

NOTES

¹ One of the difficulties facing discussion of postmodernism is the question of who is a postmodernist. It is a problem similar to that faced by the existentialist and the structuralist discussions. Characteristically, postmodernism is most closely identified with the French poststructuralists Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Jean-François Lyotard. On the American scene, Richard Rorty is prominent. Sometimes the hermeneutical philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur is included, as well as many others. It is unfortunate, perhaps, that movements tend to be identified most closely with some of the most extreme proponents. The problem with which I am dealing would not be so severe if thinkers were featured such as Gadamer, Jeffrey Stout, Diogenes Allen, and Stephen Toulmin.

² Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. and rev. by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd ed. (New York: Crossroad, 1991) 362-89.

³ Susan J. Hekman, *Gender and Knowledge: Elements of a Postmodern Feminism*, Northeastern Series in Feminist Theory (Boston: Northeastern UP, 1990) 131.

⁴ Jean-François Lyotard, "The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge," trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, *Theory and History of Literature*, vol. 10 (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1984), xxiv.

⁵ This is evident in his conception of an "agonistic" relation of language games, where there is striving with one another without any commensurating metadiscourse (Lyotard 16, 36). Second, it is implicit in the notion of "legitimation by paralogy," in which the goal is not consensus but dissension (61, 65-66). "Social pragmatics does not have the 'simplicity' of scientific pragmatics. It is a monster formed by the interweaving of various networks of heteromorphous classes of utterance" (65).

⁶ Hekman, *Gender*, 187.

⁷ Richard Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth*, Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991) 38.

⁸ Rorty 38.

⁹ Rorty, *Essays on Heidegger and Others*, Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991) 89.

¹⁰ Rorty himself notes that the French thinkers tend to make and rely on such grandiose claims. See Rorty, *Essays*, 128 (on Derrida), 174 (on Lyotard and Foucault). In turn, as we saw, he does the same thing.

¹¹ A good explanation of conceptual holism is in Hubert L. Dreyfus, "Holism and Hermeneutics," in *Hermeneutics and Praxis*, ed. Robert Hollinger (Notre Dame: Notre Dame UP, 1985) 227-47.

¹² Sandra Harding, *Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking from Women's Lives* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1991), 186.

¹³ See Stephen Toulmin, *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity* (New York: Free Press, 1990) 30-31, 186-88.

¹⁴ For example, see Hekman, *Gender*, 131. "The feminist critique of masculinist science, if it is to be successful, must abandon objectivity along with the other trappings of Enlightenment science." At other places, it is clear that she has in mind here "objectivism" and not some sense of "objectivity."

¹⁵ Again, see Hekman, *Gender*, 119. "Enlightenment epistemology aims at exploring phenomena in absolute, universal terms, ignoring the historical and social variables that determine the existence of these phenomena."

¹⁶ Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, especially xxviii-xxxii.

¹⁷ Michael Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy*, 2d ed. (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1962) 37, 145.

¹⁸ Paul Ricoeur, *Symbolism of Evil*, trans. Emerson Buchanan, *Religious Perspectives*, vol. 17 (New York: Harper & Row, 1967) 355-57.

¹⁹ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, # 71: One might say that the concept "game" is a concept with blurred edges.—"But is a blurred concept a concept at all?"—Is an indistinct photograph a picture of a person at all? Is it even always an advantage to replace an indistinct picture by a sharp one? Isn't the indistinct one often exactly what we need? Frege compares a concept to an area and says that an area with vague boundaries cannot be called an area at all. This presumably means that we cannot do anything with it.—But is it senseless to say: "Stand roughly there?" Suppose that I were standing with someone in a city square and said that. As I say it I do not draw any kind of boundary, but perhaps point with my hand—as if I were indicating a particular *spot*. And this is just how one might explain to someone what a game is.

²⁰ Wittgenstein #67.

²¹ Hekman, *Gender*, 189.

²² Hekman 131.

²³ Seyla Benhabib, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics* (New York: Routledge, 1992) 3.

²⁴ For example, see Benhabib 30-31, 42-44. She terms self-referential coherence "comprehensive reflexivity."

²⁵ She calls her position a "weak deontology" compared to Habermas' "strong deontology," Benhabib 73-75.

²⁶ Benhabib 213-25.

²⁷ Benhabib 224-25. One of her major problems with postmodernism, as is also the case with other feminists, is what she perceives to be its emphasis on "the death of the subject." In this case, too, however, it is possible to reveal, in her own words, a weak version that is compatible with feminist concerns. The two issues are allied in that reticence about appealing to universality leads to reticence about a universal category of "woman." All three of the feminists treated here elaborate such a conception in a way that could be consistent with postmodernism. Hekman defends even Foucault, the *bete-noire* on this point. (Hekman, *Gender* 175-88).

²⁸ See especially her appeal to Derrida and Foucault on this point (*Gender* 163-88).

²⁹ More than some others, she regards Gadamer as a key postmodernist. She thus follows him in his universal (!) claim that all human knowledge is contextual (Hekman 107).

³⁰ Hekman 40, 128.

³¹ Hekman 182-86.

³² Hekman 131.

³³ Hekman 163-64

³⁴ Hekman 135.

³⁵ Harding, *Whose Science?*, chs. 5-7.

³⁶ Hekman, *Gender*, 134-35, 162-62.