

## ABSTRACTS

### THE “BEST” EXPLANATION FOR DIVERSITY IN MORAL JUDGMENTS

Audrey L. Anton

Gilbert Harman argues that the diversity of our moral judgments is evidence that moral relativism is more plausible than objectivism. I consider Harman’s reasons for this claim and conclude that his argumentation is flawed. I hold that an appropriate characterization of objectivism shows an objective account to be equally capable of explaining this phenomenon. If we consider constructed frameworks in light of agents’ abilities to make choices based on a plurality of reasons, we see the absurdity of a demand that a morally objective world be void of such diversity. Not only would such a world have some diversity of moral judgments, but it would seem to have as much as we experience today. In conclusion, I argue that the diversity of moral judgments is not evidence for or against either position, and should no longer be considered in this debate.



### RETHINKING WITTGENSTEIN: AN EMOTIONAL ENGAGEMENT WITH THE WORLD

Susana Badiola

This paper explores Robert Solomon’s notion of an emotional engagement with the world through the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein. This concept, rooted in the existentialist tradition, helps us see Wittgenstein’s legacy on the subject of emotions in a different light. Against behavioristic interpretations of this legacy, which rest predominantly on Wittgenstein’s attack on the private language argument, this paper traces an understanding of emotions in Wittgenstein’s early and later writings as personal commitments to our worldview.



### HUMEANISM, COMPATIBILISM, AND THE PROBLEM OF SUPERHUMAN ABILITY

Annemarie Butler

In “Humean Compatibilism,” Helen Beebe and Alfred Mele offer an interpretation of Humeanism about laws of nature with an aim of using its distinctive features to revitalize an objection to Peter van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument. In brief, van Inwagen claims that if determinism is true, then because agents cannot change the remote past or the laws of nature, it follows that what an agent does is not “up to” her. Beebe and Mele point out that because Humean laws ontologically depend on states, laws do not metaphysically bind actions; instead an agent is “able” in some sense to change laws of nature. But the problem of superhuman ability arises: on the view of laws and abilities they consider, an ordinary human is “able” to move her body faster than the speed of light. This seems absurd. To mitigate the absurdity, Beebe and Mele introduce what

they call “b-ability” which distinguishes between human and superhuman abilities. In this paper, I argue that b-ability does not help the compatibilist object to the Consequence Argument because at the time of acting an agent is not b-able to perform either of two competing actions. The account that Beebe and Mele describe does not yield new advantages, but instead is a version of the traditional compatibilist analysis of “could have done otherwise”.



## ON THE CONCEPTION OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE WORK OF SOME RECENT LATIN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS

Gabriel R. Camacho

In recent years, some Latin American philosophers have based their thought on postmodern conceptions of knowledge. Among these thinkers is the Colombian Santiago Castro Gómez, whose work argues for what he refers to as a Foucault-influenced “critical ontology of the present.” One of the more notable ideas that he holds is his view of knowledge as being not something natural, but, rather, historically and socially constructed. This view is, of course, now widely held in contemporary Latin American thought among philosophers and academics in various fields. In this essay, I would like to challenge this postmodern epistemology. I intend to argue against relativism and other notions of social constructivism endorsed by Castro Gómez. I will apply several arguments made against these views developed by the philosophers Paul Boghossian and Thomas Nagel, among others. My aim will be to show that Castro Gómez’s project is built on a less than solid foundation. I will conclude with a discussion of what this means for the ongoing debate regarding Latin American philosophical identity.



## HOW TO BE AN ANTI-ANTI-REALIST: MACKIE’S FAILED ARGUMENT(S) FOR MORAL ANTI-REALISM

Nathan Colaner

J. L. Mackie’s position is that reason and argument decide against the theory of moral realism and for the theory of moral anti-realism. He produces at least four arguments in support of his thesis, namely the arguments from metaphysical queerness, epistemological queerness, supervenience, and relativity. In this paper I will argue that the former three arguments fail *qua* independent arguments, because they all essentially depend on the argument from relativity. They could be valid arguments if the argument from relativity holds, which goes against Mackie’s intention of producing four independent arguments. I then show that the argument from relativity is not really an argument as he intends, but merely a reaffirmation of his position. The result is that Mackie’s goal of showing moral realism to be unreasonable is unsuccessful.



# THE EPISTEMIC ROLE OF THE MAYA CONCEPT OF *KINH* AND THE NAHUATL CONCEPT OF *XOCHITL*

Juan Ferret

This paper traces the epistemic roles of the Maya concept of *kinh* as represented by the symbol of a flower and concept of *xochitl* (flower) in Nahuatl poetry. Specifically, the claim will be that in Mesoamerica the concept of flower, besides designating many correlated cycles of existence, carries significant epistemic meaning. Understanding and harnessing the power of flowers becomes the best means for achieving knowledge.



## CICERO ON MAGNANIMITY IN *ON DUTIES*

Brian Harding

It is often taken for granted that the virtue of magnanimity was unproblematic in antiquity and only the rise of Christianity, with its emphasis on humility, caused the virtue to be more critically examined. This paper challenges that view by examining Cicero's account of the virtue in *On Duties*. It argues that Cicero's discussion of magnanimity is much more critical of the virtue than typical accounts of antiquity would suggest. The paper begins by briefly considering some quotes from David Hume regarding the difference between ancient magnanimity and Christian humility. It then points to the fissures and disagreements amongst the ancients elided in Hume's account by discussing the difference between Greek and Roman accounts of virtue. Following this, for the bulk of the paper, focus is on Cicero's account of magnanimity in *On Duties*. In that text, Cicero presents magnanimity as a virtue, but also notes that the most magnanimous person of his day is the tyrannical (in his eyes) Julius Caesar. The magnanimity of Caesar serves to raise a number of issues regarding magnanimity that previous accounts, e.g., Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, leave out, particularly the association with ambition and the problems and threats to justice this ambition can create. Magnanimity is not the unqualified good for Cicero that it is to Aristotle. This suggests that by Cicero's time—long before the rise of the Church—philosophers had reason to be suspicious of magnanimity.




## CAN I BELIEVE *P* AND *NOT P*? THE PROBLEM WITH CONTRADICTORY BELIEFS

Cliff Hill

I have to admit that within this paper I am taking a very counter-intuitive position. I claim that people do not and cannot have contradictory beliefs of the form  $p \wedge \sim p$  in an epistemic context. Any time one asserts that she or he believes something of the form  $p \wedge \sim p$ , that person is making a mistake about her or his own beliefs. A considerable number of well-established philosophers have argued for this view, such as Ruth Barcan Marcus, W.V.O. Quine, Donald Davidson, and in a weaker sense, Jaakko Hintikka. Strangely, there have been few that argue against these very counter-intuitive positions of denying

contradictory beliefs. Roy Sorensen (*Vagueness and Contradiction*) took up the challenge to defend the intuitive position that people have contradictory beliefs. While I think Sorensen makes an excellent case for his position, I think his argument fails. People do not have beliefs of the form  $p \wedge \sim p$  in an epistemic context.

In order to argue this I must look to another debate, the one concerning the Law of Non-contradiction (LNC), sometimes called the Law of Contradiction or Principle of Non-contradiction. (I will use the ontological definition of the LNC which comes from J. C. Beall: "No 'being' can instantiate contradictory properties.") The LNC has been rejected by many notable philosophers such as Graham Priest and J. C. Beall. Sorensen tries to hold onto the notion that people can and do have contradictory beliefs and the LNC holds. I argue that it is untenable to claim (1) that the Law of Non-Contradiction holds and at the same time maintain (2) that people can and do have contradictory beliefs. If one accepts (1) then they have to reject (2).



## **MISUNDERSTANDING: A CONCERN FOR CAUSAL THEORIES OF MENTAL CONTENT**

Charles Lassiter

Causal theories of mental content claim that some thought token  $a$  means  $x$  if and only if  $a$  lawfully covaries with the presence of  $x$ 's, and misrepresentation occurs when a thought token fails to meet this condition. In this paper, I argue that (1) misunderstanding and misrepresentation are different phenomena, so an answer to one does not imply an answer to the other, and (2) causal theories cannot provide a solution to the problem of misunderstanding; on the causal theory, the meaning of a contentful state is exhausted by that state's causal links to the world and the meaning of a representation of a state that can suffer from misunderstanding is not exhausted by the state's causal links to the world. After addressing some potential problems with the argument, I close with a brief suggestion about what a theory of content should include to account for misunderstanding.




## **AUTHORSHIP AND ARTIFACT IN KIERKEGAARD'S *BOOK ON ADLER***

Stephen Leach

Of all of Kierkegaard's many and varied books, one of the most significant is surely his book on A.P. Adler (*The Book on Adler*, Princeton: Princeton UP, 1998). It is also one of the least read, due in part to the fact that it was unpublished, existing for many years only in draft among his copious *Papirer*. It is, he tells us, a book that "deserves to be read" (244). If this omission from his canon were simply due to accidental circumstances, such as the author's premature demise, it would seem a simple matter for publishers to rectify this posthumously. Unfortunately, this particular text is formally problematic, and in an interesting way: it is in a very real sense not a single text, but a multiplicity of texts competing for our attention, and that alone gives rise to a philosophically interesting problem, as well as presenting a remarkably tangled knot for any would-be editor to

unwind. I believe Kierkegaard in this work has left us an inheritance that requires us to reflect seriously on the very nature of texts in general, as well as, I will argue, providing us clues for solving some of the paradoxes to which it gives rise, in the form of an implicit, intriguing, and strenuous sketch for an ethico-aesthetic theory of authorship itself. If my understanding of this theory is accurate, it will also show why the book on Adler was unpublished not accidentally, but essentially, as Kierkegaard's theory would require it. Rather than viewing its unpublished, perhaps unpublishable, status as an imperfection, I will argue that this status is perfectly in keeping with the essence of the book itself.



## CAUSATION BY OMISSION VS. DAVID HUME

Michael Morales

Given Hume's criteria for analyzing causation in general, we should be able to accommodate causation by omission, cases when the omission or absence of a factor in the causal chain is said to cause a certain event, and the presence of the said factor would have produced an opposite effect. He later developed another analysis for causation, which seems to deny that there is such a thing as causation by omission. I maintain that (1) there is, in fact, causation by omission and (2) that both of Hume's analyses are not sufficient to accommodate all cases of causation by omission, and, hence, not sufficient as analyses of causation to be general accounts of causation.



## PLATO'S *PHILEBUS*: VIRTUE, NECESSITY, AND THE GOOD

Nathan Poage

In the *Philebus* Plato argues that the good human life requires a mixture of knowledge and pleasure (22a). The good is complete, perfect, and self-sufficient (20d-e). Furthermore, once one understands that something is good then one will pursue it for its own sake (20d7-10; Rep. 505d-e; Irwin 332). Plato uses these characteristics to test various candidates for the human good. If a prospective ingredient lacks one of these characteristics then it is disqualified as an account of the complete human good. In this paper I follow and defend Cooper's account of the good in the *Philebus* as a *peras-apeiron* combination by reference to the *Theaetetus* and I show how Cooper's account extends to an account of true and false necessity and the affective responses (the emotions) (40e). While Plato doesn't work out all the details about true and false necessity in the *Philebus*, his sketch is suggestive of how such an account would go. This paper proceeds in three stages. First I summarize and defend Cooper's account of the good as a *peras-apeiron* combination. Secondly I extend his account to a Platonic distinction between true (salubrious) and false (pernicious) necessity. It is my contention that the *Philebus* and other later dialogues (such as the *Theaetetus* and *Statesman*) provide three clear examples of this distinction. The hedonist (and alternately the enemies of *Philebus* (44b-d)) believes that one can only have pleasure with pain. The practical man believes that one can only have knowledge with ignorance and the "tough-minded realist" believes that one can only be effective through sacrificing virtue. Plato's

distinction between types of necessity allows us to deny all three of these claims. Finally, I respond to a potential objection to my account of true and false necessity found at Phil. 39e-40a. Here, Plato claims that the just man is loved by the gods while the unjust man is hated by the gods and so suffers under false beliefs. I argue that this passage does not, in fact, constitute an objection to my account and is most plausibly interpreted as suggesting that the just man resembles the gods while the unjust man fails to resemble the gods.



## ON MILL AND THE MERELOGICAL ACCOUNT OF EMERGENCE

Esther Rosario

The mereological account of emergence has to do with parts and wholes, i.e., an object taken as a whole (at the macro-level) is composed of its parts (at the micro-level). Broad argues that the characteristic behavior of a system is determined entirely by the properties of the parts and their relations. According to Broad, the emergentist theory claims that the laws characterizing S's properties as determined by its microstructure cannot be deduced from laws concerning the parts of the system in isolation or in other relations than those found in S such that the set of the relations constitutive of S are unique. Conversely, Mill gives an account of emergence in terms heteropathic effects. I unpack what heteropathic effects are by first explaining the principle of the Composition of Forces and the corresponding principle of the Composition of Causes. Mill draws a distinction between two modes of the conjoint action of causes—the mechanical and chemical modes. Mill claims that two or more types of causes acting together produce a certain type of effect in the mechanical mode if and only if the effect type is the algebraic or vector sum of the type of effects each cause type has according to its laws as a separate causal factor. Mill defines the type of effect of two or more types of causes produced in the mechanical mode as a homopathic effect. Laws that assert causal relations among causes and their homopathic effects are called homopathic laws. The chemical mode of the conjoint action of causes, on the other hand, does not comply with the Composition of Causes inasmuch as the effect of two or more types of causes is not the sum of the effects of the causes they would have had if they were alone. Heteropathic effects are such that the reduction of an effect of several causes to the sum of the effects alone is impossible. Laws that assert causal relations between causes and their heteropathic effects are called heteropathic laws. Hempel and Oppenheim reformulate Broad's account into a relative one such that at a particular time according to the available scientific theories we are not going to be able to deduce the so-called emergent laws. I argue that Kim-style objections to emergence are targeted at the mereological (viz., Broadian) account, and that Mill's emergentism is a stronger account (viz., it is causal), but has been over-looked by the anti-emergentist challenge.



## VALUE PLURALISM ABOUT THE GOOD AND LIBERALISM

Danny Scoccia


Value pluralism about the good (“VPG”) is roughly the view that because many of the goods that figure in a flourishing life are “incommensurable,” there are many different avenues to human flourishing. William Galston has argued that this value pluralist thesis supports liberalism’s commitment to the high value of “expressive liberty.” This paper examines two of Galston’s arguments—one that claims VPG, together with the liberal principle of political legitimacy, defeats the monist justification for hard paternalist bans on bad ways of living, and another which claims that a flourishing life is impossible without “integrity”—and finds that they both fail. It argues that VPG does not justify the assignment of high value to expressive liberty.



## KANT’S ADOPTION OF THE LOCKEAN DISTINCTION BETWEEN ARCHETYPE AND ECTYPE

Ryan Showler

This paper attempts to argue that Kant’s distinction between *Urbild* and *Nachbild* (often translated as archetype and ectype respectively) is largely informed by Locke’s distinction between archetype and ectype. Locke’s use of the distinction extends to include both his representative realist account of perception of real physical objects that exist apart from our perception and ideas of modes and relations that are generated by the mind alone. Although Locke’s account of the perception of physical objects does not fit in the Kantian account of experience, Kant retains the portion of the Lockean archetype/ectype distinction that deals with the adequacy and inadequacy of ectypes. He also employs at length the Lockean notion that the mind generates its own archetypes, and that these archetypes fail to be instantiated in experience. The Kantian use of the distinction is especially important in Kant’s moral theory where reason generates an ideal of moral perfection (holiness) for purposes of systematic unity and then modifies that ideal into a secondary ideal (virtue) that takes account of the details of human nature. An understanding of this use of the distinction can serve as a defense of Kant against the standard charge of empty formalism which complains that Kant overemphasizes our obligation to abstract rules and fails to take into consideration the empirical realities of the moral life. The role of the distinction between archetype and ectype in Kant has been largely ignored partly because of a failure of translators to give consistent translations of the terms *Urbild* and *Nachbild*.







## CONTRIBUTORS

**Audrey L. Anton** is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Western Kentucky University. Her primary areas of research are ethics, ancient philosophy, and free will.

**Susana Badiola** is Associate professor of philosophy at Angelo State University. Her research interests include Wittgenstein, descriptive metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of language.

**Michael Barnwell** is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Honors Program Director at Niagara University. He specializes in medieval philosophy, post-medieval scholastic philosophy, and the philosophy of religion, and is the author of *The Problem of Negligent Omissions: Medieval Action Theories to the Rescue* (Brill, 2010).

**David Beisecker** is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. His research focus is primarily on the philosophy of mind and language.

**Annemarie Butler** is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Iowa State University. She specializes in Early Modern Philosophy, with special interest in the epistemology and metaphysics of David Hume.

**Gabriel R. Camacho** is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at El Paso Community College. His research interests are teaching philosophy, distance education, and logic.

**Nathan Colaner** defended his dissertation, "Other Than Omniscient: An Interpenetration and Defense of Kant's Rejection of Aristotle's Notion of Finite Reasoning," Spring 2011 at the University of Kansas. He is currently a full-time lecturer at Seattle University.

**Juan Ferret** received his PhD in philosophy of science at the University of Oregon after getting bachelor degrees in philosophy, mathematics, and physics from Gonzaga University. He now works on the problem of time and motion in metaphysics informed by the advances in quantum field theory and quantum gravity studies. Juan also researches the metaphysics of time from the classical Mayan perspective.

**Sara N. Ash Georgi** received her BA from New Mexico State University in English and philosophy in 2008. She currently works at The Huntington Library, Art Collections, and Botanical Gardens in San Marino, California.

**Brian Harding** is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Texas Woman's University. He is the author of *Augustine and Roman Virtue* (Continuum, 2008) and a number of papers in phenomenology and the history of philosophy. Currently, he is chiefly interested in the work of Martin Buber and its relevance to recent work in phenomenology.

**Cliff Hill** is a Lecturer at the University of Nebraska, Omaha, College of Saint Mary, and Metropolitan Community College. He received his master's at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln and is currently working towards his PhD at that university. His philosophical interests are focused on philosophy of science and philosophy of mathematics/logic.

**Charles Lassiter** is a graduate student at Fordham University and defends his dissertation in April 2012. His research interests are in philosophy of mind—especially extended and embodied accounts of thought and cognition—and philosophy of language, focusing on implicature, speech act theory, and intention-based accounts of meaning.

**Stephen Leach** is Associate Professor of Philosophy at The University of Texas-Pan American. His research interests include Kierkegaard and Asian philosophy.

**Michael Morales** received his MA from San Francisco State University in the Fall of 2010 with a thesis titled “Context-dependence in Scientific Representation.” His main interests are at the intersection of epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of science. He is currently an instructor at the City College of San Francisco.

**Nathan Poage** is Professor of Philosophy at Houston Community College. He is currently working on his dissertation at the University of St. Thomas on Aristotle, Avicenna, and Aquinas on the Subject Matter and Principles of Metaphysics.

**Esther Rosario** is a PhD student at Purdue University. Her research interests lie in empirical moral psychology, feminist philosophy, philosophy of psychology and cognitive science, the philosophy of biology, and biomedical ethics.

**Danny Scoccia** is Professor of Philosophy at New Mexico State University. His main research interests lie in applied ethics and social/political philosophy.

**Dan Stiver** is the Cook-Derrick Professor of Theology at Logsdon School of Theology, Hardin-Simmons University, in Abilene, Texas. He has written *The Philosophy of Religious Language: Sign, Symbol, and Story*, *Theology after Ricoeur: New Directions in Hermeneutical Theology*, and *Life Together in the Way of Jesus Christ: An Introduction to Christian Theology*.

**Christopher M. Whalin** is currently a PhD student of philosophy at Columbia University.

**Andrei G. Zavalij** received his PhD from CUNY in 2008. He is currently an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the American University of Kuwait. His research interests include history of religion, philosophy of mind, and the applicability of the experimental methods to philosophical controversies, especially in ethical theory. In addition, he works on the translation of the key texts in the twentieth century analytic philosophy into Russian.

# NEW MEXICO-WEST TEXAS PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY

59<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting

The University of Texas at El Paso

April 4-6, 2008

## Friday: 2:00-6:00pm Union East, Ray Room 309E

Moderator: Lijun Yuan (Texas State University)

- 2:00 Juan Ferret (The University of Texas at El Paso), "The Epistemic Role of the Maya Concept of *Kinh* and the Nahuatl Concept of *Xochitl*"  
Comments: Joseph Brenner
- 3:00 Alex Stewart, "Gnosticism: A Tradition Examined"  
Comments: Carlos Mariscal
- 4:00 Brian Harding (Texas Woman's University), "Cicero on Magnanimity"  
Comments: Lee Stauffer (New Mexico Highlands University)
- 5:00 Nathan Poage (Houston Community College), "Plato's *Philebus*: Virtue, Necessity and Good"  
Comments: Audrey Anton (Ohio State University)

## Friday: 2:00-6:00pm Union East, Smiley Room 310E

Moderator: Danny Scoccia (New Mexico State University)

- 2:00 Susana Badiola (Angelo State University), "Rethinking Wittgenstein"  
Comments: Michael Morales (Texas Tech University)
- 3:00 Jolanta Wrobel-Best (Houston Community College), "In Praise of Insomnia"  
Comments: Jules Simon (The University of Texas at El Paso)
- 4:00 Stephen Leach (The University of Texas-Pan American), "Authorship and Artifact in Kierkegaard's *Book on Adler*"  
Comments: Thomas Urban (Houston Community College)
- 5:00 Nikolay Tugushev, "Unveiling the Life of Feeling"  
Comments: Dan Stiver (Hardin-Simmons University)

## Saturday: 9:00am-12:00pm Union East, Elkins Room 314E

Moderator: David Beisecker (University of Nevada, Las Vegas)

- 9:00 Cliff Hill (University of Nebraska), "Can I Believe *p* and *not p*?"  
Comments: Dan Flores (El Paso Community College)
- 10:00 Joseph Brenner, "Philosophy and Metaphilosophy"  
Comments: William Springer (The University of Texas at El Paso)
- 11:00 Ron Wilburn (University of Nevada, Las Vegas), "Contextualism, Sensitivity, and Modal Circularity"  
Comments: Peter Hutcheson (Texas State University)

## Saturday: 8:00 am-12:00pm Union East, Ray Room 309 E

Moderator: Stephen Leach (The University of Texas—Pan American)

- 8:00 Robert Ferrell (El Paso Community College), "Separation of Church and State"  
Comments: Lee Stauffer (New Mexico Highlands University)
- 9:00 Carlos Mariscal, "Good Samaritan Adaptationism"  
Comments: Jolanta Wrobel-Best (Houston Community College)
- 10:00 Sara N. Ash, "The Regress Argument for Moral Skepticism"  
Comments: Lori Keleher (New Mexico State University)

- 11:00 Audrey Anton (Ohio State University), "The 'Best' Explanation of Diversity in Moral Judgments"  
Comments: Lijun Yuan (Texas State University)

**Saturday: 8:00am-12:00pm Union East, Smiley Room 310E**

Moderator: Glenn Joy (Texas State University)

- 8:00 Craig Hanks (Texas State University), "Technology, Globalization, and Medical Trials in Developing Countries"  
Comments: Nathan Colaner (University of Kansas)
- 9:00 John Haddox (The University of Texas at El Paso), "Carlos Vaz Ferreira, Moral Progress, and a Morality of Conflict"  
Comments: Gabriel Camacho (El Paso Community College)
- 10:00 Michael Barnwell (Niagara University), "Voluntary Inconsideration, Virtual Cognition, and Francisco Suárez"  
Comments: Juan Ferret (The University of Texas at El Paso)
- 11:00 Gabriel Camacho (El Paso Community College), "On the Concept of Knowledge in the Work of Some Recent Latin American Philosophers"  
Comments: William Springer (University of Texas at El Paso)

**Saturday: 1:00-5:00pm Union East, Elkins Room 314E**

Moderator: Dan Stiver (Hardin-Simmons University)

- 1:00 Jean-Paul Vessel (New Mexico State University), "Moore's Maneuvering"  
Comments: Charles Hinkley (Alamo Community College)
- 2:00 Andrei Zavaliy (The City University of New York), "Degrees of Amoralism"  
Comments: Danny Scoccia (New Mexico State University)
- 3:00 Nathan Colaner (University of Kansas), "How To Be an Anti-Anti-Realist"  
Comments: Jean-Paul Vessel (New Mexico State University)
- 4:00 Mihailis Diamantis (New York University), "Moral Gambling"  
Comments: Glenn Joy (Texas State University)

**Saturday: 1:00-5:00pm Union East, Ray Room 309 E**

Moderator: Michael Barnwell (Niagara University)

- 1:00 Markus Glodek (The University of Texas at Austin), "Argument for Nonexistent Objects"  
Comments: Cliff Hill (University of Nebraska)
- 2:00 Christopher Whalin (Columbia University), "Endurance, Perdurance, and Personal Connectedness Criteria"  
Comments: Jennifer Noonan (New Mexico State University)
- 3:00 Dave Beisecker (University of Nevada, Las Vegas), "What 'What It's Like' Is All About"  
Comments: Tim Cleveland (New Mexico State University)
- 4:00 Charles Lassiter (Fordham University), "Misunderstanding: A Concern for Causal Theories"  
Comments: Ron Wilburn (University of Nevada, Las Vegas)

**Saturday: 1:00-5:00pm Union East, Smiley Room 310E**

Moderator: Michael Hunter (Texas Tech University)

- 1:00 Esther Rosario (The University of Texas at El Paso), "Mill and Mereological Account of Emergence"  
Comments: Alejandra Olivás-Davila (The University of Texas at El Paso)

- 2:00 Paul Wilson (Texas State University), "Are Synthetic *A Priori* Judgments Psychologistic?"  
Comments: Susana Badiola (Angelo State University)
- 3:00 Annemarie Butler (Iowa State University), "Humeanism Compatibalism Superhuman Ability"  
Comments: Peter Robinson (The University of Texas at El Paso)
- 4:00 Ryan Showler (Loyola University Chicago), "Kant's Adoption of the Lockean Distinction between Archetype and Ectype"  
Comments: Paul Wilson (Texas State University)

### **Saturday: 5:00-6:00pm Business Meeting**

Dan Stiver (Hardin Simmons University), President  
John Symons (The University of Texas at El Paso), Vice President  
Peter Hutcheson (Texas State University), Secretary-Treasurer  
Glenn Joy (Texas State University), Editor, *Southwest Philosophical Studies*

### **7:00pm-10:00pm Banquet and Presidential Address**

Dan Stiver (Hardin-Simmons University), "The Hope of Ideology: Revising Ricoeur"

### **Sunday: 9:00am-12:00pm Union East, Ray Room 309 E**

- 8:00 Andres Muro, "Pedagogies of Change: From Theory to Practice"  
Comments: Chris Bailey
- 9:00 Michael Morales (Texas Tech University), "Causation by Omission vs. David Hume"  
Comments: Hamner Hill (South East Missouri State)
- 10:00 Michael Hunter (Texas Tech University), "Baseball and Steroids"  
Comments: Ryan Showler (Loyola University Chicago)
- 11:00 Danny Scoccia (New Mexico State University), "Value Pluralism about the Good and Liberalism"  
Comments: Craig Hanks (Texas State University)

### **Sunday: 9:00am-12:00pm Union East, Worrell Hall 205**

#### **The Philosophy of William Springer**

Moderator: Jules Simon (The University of Texas at El Paso)

- 9:00 Peter Robinson, "The Beautiful in Ordinary Life"
- 10:00 John Symons, (The University of Texas at El Paso), "Some Comments on Visual Experience"
- 11:00 Christopher Whalin (TBA)  
Bill Springer (Response)

### **End of Conference**

Special Thanks to Our Host Institution,  
**The University of Texas at El Paso**  
El Paso, Texas

Local arrangements: John Symons, Jules Simon, Lorena Chavez

