

## ABSTRACTS

### DARWIN'S ARGUMENT

William Austin

At the beginning of the last chapter of the *Origin of Species*, Darwin describes his book as "one long argument." The argument is long because it works by building a cumulative case, showing how a wide range of facts converge in pointing to the probable truth of his theory. Among the various ways of building a cumulative case, the argument pattern or genre known as "inference to the best explanation" is the one that Darwin employs. The basic idea of "inference to the best explanation" is that we have good reason to think that a general hypothesis *H* is true if (1) there is a wide range of facts that are understandable on the *supposition* that *H* is true, while rival hypotheses leave them perplexing, and (2) there are no (or far fewer) facts that *H* leaves anomalous and that alternative theories neatly account for.

Darwin's *H* is that species originate and acquire their distinctive traits through a process of "descent with modification through natural selection" from ancestors of different species. The rival hypothesis with which he compares his *H* is that each species is distinctly and specially created to fit its particular environment. (For the most part, his arguments tell equally well against Lamarck's theory that the environment directly induces adaptive responses.)

Darwin marshaled an array of facts in biogeography, geology, anatomy, embryology, and other areas, for which his theory provides the better explanation. A representative sample of them is reviewed here.

Darwin devoted the early chapters of his book to showing that his hypothesis met the essential requirements to be a legitimate candidate in the best-explanation competition. To do that, by the standards of the philosophy of science of his time, he had to show (1) that his variation-and-selection mechanism is in principle *capable* of producing the effects it is supposed to explain, and (2) that it is already *known* to exist and produce *some* effect, *or* that it is clearly analogous to some known cause with known effects. That is why he emphasized the analogy between natural selection and the artificial selection practiced by animal breeders, and why his text contains many hypothetical scenarios as to how a given trait *could* have been produced. Darwin did not claim that these scenarios themselves show the truth of his theory. Their role is to show that his hypothesis is a genuine scientific *possibility*. The argument for its *probable truth* is the best-explanation argument.



## PROLEGOMENA TO TAKING ANIMAL RIGHTS SERIOUSLY

C. Lynne Fulmer

The animal rights/animal welfare debate has become an important contemporary ethical debate. Despite its importance and the volumes of pages it has engendered, it seems that this debate ought not to be a model for resolving other moral dilemmas for it is fraught with ambiguities and a serious lack of precision about the language of rights.

The paper explores some confusions in meaning that arise in the area of the significance of having rights and difficulties that arise when we examine what it means to have and exercise a right and determine what capacities are required to say that something has a right. It concludes that there is little agreement in what philosophers call rights. The proponents or opponents are frequently addressing different questions and using rights and other concepts in different ways. If we are going to take animal rights seriously we ought to be using the language of rights in a more precise way. Such prolegomena seem critical to the success of taking animal rights seriously. This paper is not intended as the prolegomena themselves, but as demonstrating the need for such measures.



## A NEO-KANTIAN DEONTOLOGICAL ETHICAL THEORY

Gilbert Fulmer

Two forms of ethical theory are “consequentialist” and “deontological.” They differ in how they decide whether acts are morally good or bad. Consequentialist theories refer to consequences: good acts are those that have good consequences; bad acts are those that have bad ones. Utilitarianism is the most influential contemporary consequentialist theory: good acts maximize pleasure and minimize pain for all. Deontological theories decide rightness or wrongness by the intrinsic nature of acts. The theory of Immanuel Kant is the most famous. But an ongoing problem is how to relate the two.

This paper offers a theory that does so. A generalized principle of ethics that underlies deontological ethics may be called the “principle of prima facie equality”: treat persons as equals unless there is a morally relevant difference that justifies unequal treatment. Kant’s First and Second Formulation of the Categorical Imperative can be derived from this.

From the Second Formulation, “treat persons as ends, not mere means,” can be derived prima facie Utilitarianism: maximize pleasure and minimize pain unless doing so violates a more important moral principle. Most moral conflicts can be resolved by this principle, and the commonly cited flaws in utilitarianism will be covered by the Second Formulation from which it is derived.



## THOMAS SCANLON’S CONTRACTUALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF AGGREGATION

R. Andrew Kelso

One of the appeals of a consequentialist theory of morality is that in some situations it prescribes a very clear and precise course of action. The principle of utility, for example, gives a succinct prescription for action in a situation where the alternatives are between saving one person and saving two people, all other factors being equal. This is because reasons for choosing one alternative over another are aggregative; the amount of harm prevented is critical to its justification. For some theories, however, it is not as easy to justify saving two rather than one. Thomas Scanlon’s contractualist theory in *What We Owe to Each Other* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap P of Harvard UP, 1988) seems to have this problem because it is based on reasons that individuals would have for rejecting certain principles, which, in situations such as the one mentioned above, means that the individuals on either side have the same reasons for rejecting principles that would allow them harm, and these reasons are not aggregative.

Scanlon recognizes the difficulty: “The problem is, however, that contractualism appears to go too far in the opposite direction, disallowing any appeal to aggregative benefits even in cases in which the right thing to do does seem to depend . . . on the number of individuals who would be so affected (230, my emphasis).” He notes that a principle that allows the rescuer to save either one or the group could be rejected by one of those in the group on the grounds that it doesn’t take into account the value of his life (because it does not change what the rescuer should do if he were absent). Scanlon then argues that a new principle that requires the rescuer to save the greater number could not be reasonably rejected because it recognizes the value of each life equally, so the additional person tips the balance to the group.

Shelly Kagan (“The Additive Fallacy,” *Ethics* 99, 5-31) argues that “tiebreaking” justification, which he calls the “additive assumption,” should be rejected. This is exactly what Scanlon is relying on for his new principle: that the justification for a principle depends upon the net balance of positive and negative reasons. Kagan rejects this because contrast arguments show that an isolated factor can be morally relevant in one situation and not in another, but the same factor ought to be relevant in all situations. Scanlon admits his new principle makes this assumption but responds that he believes his case is an exception. I disagree because the morally relevant factor in this case is the life of the additional person, and a contrast case can show that this factor is morally relevant in some cases and not in others. If Kagan is correct, then Scanlon needs to provide alternative justification for his new principle.



## SPECIESISM, UTILITARIANISM, AND THE PROBLEM OF MORAL CALLOUSNESS

Audrey McKinney

In his early writings on animal liberation Peter Singer challenged readers to find ethically relevant distinctions between human and non-human animals and argued that moral consideration accorded to persons, when unaccompanied by the moral consideration of relevantly similar non-humans, is a sign of speciesism, the unjustified privileging of humans over members of other species. I reprise some of Singer's arguments and expose and explore difficulties that arise from his effort to provide a utilitarian grounding for his claims. I suggest a reformulation of Singer's position that abandons the utilitarian framework but emphasizes the relevance of the recognition of suffering in moral decision-making.



## THEORETICAL IDENTITY, REFERENCE FIXING, AND BOYD'S DEFENSE OF TYPE MATERIALISM

Don A. Merrell

A most ingenious argument against Kripke's criticisms of the mind-brain identity theory is found in Richard Boyd's "Materialism without Reductionism: What Materialism Does not Entail." Here Boyd answers "Kripke's Challenge." As the reader will recall, Kripke challenges materialists to come up with an explanation of the apparent contingency of the theoretical identity "Pain = C-fiber firings." He argues that this challenge cannot be met, pointing out that the apparent contingency of this identity cannot be explained in the same way as the apparent contingency of "Heat = Molecular Motion"; and Kripke claims that there is no other explanation for the apparent contingency of "Pain = C-fiber firings."

Boyd thinks that Kripke is suffering from imaginative myopia regarding which terms in the identity "Pain = C-fiber firings" are likely to be mistaken with their epistemic counterparts. Boyd will argue that it is enough to show that we could confuse the phenomenon denoted by the theoretical term with some other possible phenomenon which manifests itself in the way that firing C-fibers do in this world, without those manifestations being actual cases of firing C-fibers. If this can be done, then perhaps Boyd has shown that we can explain away the apparent contingency of "Pain = C-fiber firings" and perhaps the identity theory of mind is safe from Kripke's neo-Cartesian argument. But, I submit, Boyd fails and the failure rests on a mistaken view about how we fix the reference of neurological states (like C-fiber firings). Boyd, it seems, has confused cases where we recognize the presence of C-fiber stimulation with cases where the reference of C-fiber firing is fixed. This dooms his defense of type-materialism from Kripke's neo-Cartesian argument.



## NIETZSCHE ON THE FACT AND FICTION OF CAUSATION

Edward R. Moad

In light of Nietzsche's famous doctrine that "all driving force is will to power, that there is no other physical, dynamic, or psychic force except this," the many skeptical, even eliminativist, aphorisms that can be found scattered throughout his books regarding causation stimulate interest in the question over how these two positions fit together. How does Nietzsche conceive causation that leads him to reject the notion while simultaneously postulating a "driving force" in the will to power? The aim of this paper is to investigate Nietzsche's position on causation, and in particular his account of the origin of our concept of it. I show that this position actually plays a role in his arguments for the doctrine of Will to Power. Finally, I discuss a problem inherent in Nietzsche's account of the origin of our concept of causation and offer a suggestion as to the best way (for a Nietzschean) to resolve it.



## ART, MEMORY, AND HISTORY: REFLECTIONS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ART AND HISTORY

Grazia Peduzzi

This paper, originally written for a conference whose theme was "Art Remembers," explores some questions concerning the relationship between art and history. Is remembering a fundamental feature of art? And how is it related to its aesthetic value? In which ways is the remembering of art different from the remembering of history or the remembering of other historical artifacts?

Some art explicitly remembers through an embodiment of historical situations and events. However, works of art like all other human artifacts, including historical accounts, happen in history and "have historied natures" (the expression is borrowed from Margolis' *What, After All, is a Work of Art?*).

In this sense, both works of art and historical accounts are human and cultural artifacts, and as such, they are part of the human, historical world. "Remembering" is, in this view, an essential feature of works of art. They do remember, even if this is not in the intention of the artist, because they are situated and embedded in history.

In the tradition of aesthetics, such view of the historicity of art has often been perceived as a threat to the basic assumption of its universality. My paper addresses this controversy, claiming that the denial of the historicity of art amounts to denying its artifactuality.



## WHY IS MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY NOT PART OF THE HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY?

Bill Springer

In *The Story of Philosophy*, Will Durant says that one of the valid criticisms of his first edition of the book was that it was incomplete. “[T]he total omission of Scholastic philosophy was an outrage, forgivable only in one who had suffered much from it in college and seminary, and resented it thereafter as rather a disguised theology than an honest philosophy.” I believe that Medieval philosophy is entitled to something like such an apology and acknowledgement from contemporary Western philosophy. I am also fairly certain that such an apology will never be forthcoming. In this essay I merely provide a few examples of the sorts of considerations that lead me to make the aforesaid declaration. One of the greatest obstacles for Scholasticism to get a fair hearing is a) philosophy in the West has become accustomed to ignoring it, and customs are hard to change, b) the philosophy of the Schoolmen is inextricably entangled with Catholicism. But for a philosopher not to be able to dismiss custom as irrelevant, and not to be able to discern when religious entanglements are philosophically prejudicial and when they are not is his/her failing and not that of Medieval philosophy. I think it unfortunate for philosophers to remain completely innocent of Medieval philosophy, for I believe no one will fail to learn something important by examining that period with respect and attention. C.S. Peirce regarded Duns Scotus as the greatest metaphysician that ever lived, Heidegger wrote his *Habilitationsschrift* on that same Medieval thinker, and there should be no doubt that Aquinas and Ibn Rushd have written some of the most astute commentaries on Aristotle that there are. It would be naïve to think that in a single brief monograph I can do much to remedy this situation. All I intend to do is to get the reader of my essay to say “Hey, how come Medieval Scholasticism is not part of the history of Western philosophy?”



## A RAWLSIAN ANALYSIS OF THE INSTITUTION OF TENURE

Lee Stauffer

This paper considers whether the institution of tenure can be morally justified. Most justifications of tenure are utilitarian in nature. However, objection recently made to tenure assert that it “produces a class of specially advantaged employees.” This will require an egalitarian analysis such as that of the late John Rawls.

Rawls considers an inequitable distribution of rights and duties just, “only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society.” In order to determine if tenure is just according to Rawls, it is necessary to (1) consider what constitutes the society of a university, (2) what compensations or rights and assignments of duty exist within the university society as a necessary part of that society’s functioning, and (3) who within that system of compensations and responsibilities is least advantaged.

It is determined that the university community consists of the administration, faculty, students, and staff. The inequitably distributed rights that the university provides these individuals with are (1) economic compensation, (2) prestige, (3) autonomy of action or the denial of this right and the resulting alienation of labor, (4) space and equipment, (5) job security and, possibly, (6) freedom of speech. The only inequitably distributed duty is found to be workload.

Next, the paper considers how each group within the university ranks in terms of these rights and duties. It is found that the staff is clearly the least advantaged group within the university. If the institution of tenure is just, it must thus bestow some advantage on this group.

It is then shown that the institution of tenure increases the prestige of those universities which have it. This, in turn, increases the amount of money available to the university and even though the percentage of this money paid out to staff is embarrassingly low, institutions with tenure nevertheless tend to pay staff better as universities without tenure. Thus, given Rawls principles, tenure is found to be just.

The paper concludes by suggesting that equity could also be insured by granting tenure to staff. However, it is noted that this is extremely unlikely to occur.



## BERKELEY ON THE NATURE OF IDEAS

Paul Wilson

Perhaps no other philosopher from the Modern period stirred as much controversy as Bishop George Berkeley (1685-1753). Berkeley’s name is closely associated with the theory of idealism, the thesis that only minds and ideas exist. Berkeley’s idealism, which was in response to the earlier work of John Locke, was the end result of an attack on Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Whereas Locke maintained that primary qualities existed in matter, Berkeley would argue that both of Locke’s so-called primary and secondary qualities were mind-dependent. A radical thesis, there has been much scholarly discourse about Berkeley’s doctrine of ideas, namely, what ontological status Berkeley’s ideas have. Some Berkeley scholars, such as Turbayne, have tried to reconcile apparent contradictions in Berkeley’s ontology such as the assertion that minds are distinct from ideas with the assertion that ideas exist only in the mind.

In this paper, I attempt to make explicit the tenets of Berkeley’s idealism. I begin by discussing the definition of the Berkeleyan “idea” and the Berkeleyan substance “mind” in their various interpretations. Secondly, I discuss the Berkeleyan idea as it adheres to his metaphysics with an eye toward alleged contradictions. Finally, I examine the thesis of idealism as to whether the argument against matter can withstand scrutiny.



## DESIRES, FACTS, AND REASONS FOR ACTION

Desheng Zong

The claim that no desires can be reasons for action has gained popularity in recent discussion concerning the issue of reasons for action. Several prominent philosophers have argued for this extreme view. I believe that the view is mistaken, and offer in this paper an argument that shows why it must be rejected. More specifically, my argument goes something like this: (1) Most philosophers believe that (good) reasons for action are facts. For example, if I had a reason for leaving a burning building, then my reason for leaving the building would be that the building was on fire. (2) Moreover, many philosophers believe that the awareness of a second party's having a certain desire can be reasons for action. For example, the awareness that someone wants some more bread at the table is a reason for passing him the basket. (3) But awareness of second-party desire is awareness of certain facts that are true of the person in question, and in this regard, it differs little from awareness of one's own desires, or what is true of oneself as far as desires are concerned. What this means is that, barring further reasons for rejecting facts about oneself regarding desires as reasons for action, things that are true of oneself and things that are true of a second party as far as desires are concerned should be given equal chance as candidates of reasons for action. (4) It might be argued that, in the case of second-party desires, if they provide us with a reason for action at all, it is due to the fact that we have reasons for giving the desires themselves the considerations due them, not because the fact that so and so has such and such desires somehow obligates us to honor it. I believe that this claim is unsustainable and offers examples where facts about one's own and others' desires constitute reasons for action, not because the desires are themselves legitimate ones but simply due to the fact that the things that are true of ourselves and others provide reasons for action. (5) Still, it might be said that one's desire to eat and the fact that one has this desire to eat are two very different things, so even if what has been said so far is correct, that does not show that desires can be reasons for action. I argue that, in the context of practical reason at least, the distinction amounts to little, for the desires that really matter are desires whose existence we are aware of and thereby can play a role (or no role to play) in our deliberation.



## CONTRIBUTORS

**Bill Austin** is Professor of Philosophy at The University of Houston. His specializations are philosophy of religion, philosophy of science, inductive logic, and decision theory. He has both a BD and a PhD from Yale University.

**Dave Beisecker** is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. His research focus is primarily on the philosophy of mind and language.

**Aaron Champene** is currently working toward a PhD at the University of Arkansas, where he received an MA. His dissertation focuses on the reductionism/non-reductionism debate in the epistemology of testimony. In addition to epistemology, he has interests in ethics and environmental ethics.

**Gilbert Fulmer** is Professor of Philosophy, Texas State University–San Marcos. His specializations are philosophy of religion, ethics, and evolutionary metaphysics.

**Lynne Fulmer** did her graduate work at Rice University. She is on the faculty of Texas State University–San Marcos where she pursues her interests in ethics, critical thinking, Wittgenstein, Whitehead, and linguistic philosophy.

**Craig Hanks**, a fifth generation Texan with degrees in philosophy from Texas A&M and Duke Universities, is Associate Professor at Texas State University–San Marcos. His work focuses on American pragmatism, critical theory, and philosophy of technology.

**Charles Harriman** is a newly-retired Professor of Philosophy at the College of Santa Fe. His expertise is in theories of language and in the divisions and connections between art and science.

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**Andy Kelso** will receive his PhD from the University of Arkansas in May 2007. His dissertation is a view of physician-assisted suicide from a Kantian perspective, and his interests include other areas of medical ethics and ethics generally.

**Linda Kraeger** is a retired Professor of English at Grayson County College in Denison, Texas. Her specialties are in world literature and novel writing. She has an MA in literature and a PhD in Creative Writing.

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**Lee Stauffer** is Associate Professor of Philosophy at New Mexico Highlands University in Las Vegas, NM. Her specializations are the philosophy of science and comparative philosophy as applied to the ancient world. At present, her main professional interest is in the area of Native American philosophy.

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**Desheng Zong** received his PhD in Philosophy from Tulane University and is Assistant Professor at Utica College, New York. He specializes in ethics, philosophy of action, and Zen Buddhism.

NEW MEXICO-WEST TEXAS  
PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY

54<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting  
College of Santa Fe, Santa Fe, New Mexico  
April 11-13, 2003

**Friday, April 11**

7:30-10:00 p.m. Registration and Social Hour

**Saturday, April 12**

**Session 1A: Thomas Urban (Northwest College, HCC), Chair**

8:00-8:35 - **Bob Galloway** (Southern Illinois U) Unworking the Work of Injunctive Community:  
Sensing the Social with Jean-Luc Nancy

8:35-9:10 - **Edmund Moad** (U Missouri) Nietzsche on the Fact and Fiction of Causation

9:10-9:45 - **Dennis Rohatyn** (U San Diego) The Subjective Turn

**Session 1B: Joseph Barnhart (U North Texas), Chair**

8:00-8:35 - **Danny Scoccia** (NMSU) Belief in Psychological Egoism is Epistemically  
Self-Defeating

8:35-9:10 - **Desheng Zong** (Central Michigan U) Desires, Facts and Reasons for Action

9:10-9:45 - **J. Craig Hanks** (Texas State) On Why Technoscience and Democracy Are Compatible  
and Mutually Supporting Practices: Habermas Responds to Hickman

**Coffee Break 9:45-10:00 a.m.**

**Session 2A: William Springer (UTEP), Chair**

10:00-10:35 - **C. Lynne Fulmer** (Texas State) Prolegomena to Taking Animal Rights Seriously

10:35-11:10 - **Andrew Kelso** (U Arkansas) Thomas Scanlon's Contractualism & the Problem of  
Aggregation

11:10-11:45 - **Audrey McKinney** (Texas State) Speciesism, Utilitarianism and the Problem of  
Moral Callousness

**Session 2B: Gil Fulmer (Texas State), Chair**

10:00-10:35 - **David Meeler** (Winthrop U) Rawls v. Habermas: Implementing Models of Public  
Debate

10:35-11:10 - **Lee Stauffer** (NM Highlands U) A Rawlsian Analysis of the Institution of Tenure

11:10-11:45 - **Jeffery Tillman** (Wayland Baptist U) Combining Toulmin, MacIntyre, and Rawls to  
Construct a Model for Practical Moral Arguments

**Noon Recess 11:45 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.**

**Session 3A: Scot Miller (Hardin-Simmons U), Chair**

1:00-1:35 - **Hal Thorsurd** (NM State U) Socrates' Refutation of Protagoras: A Pragmatic Inconsistency

- 1:35-2:10 - **Charles Hobbs** (Southern Illinois U) Significance of the Inconsistency between the *Apology* and the *Crito*  
 2:10-2:45 - **Dwayne Tunstall** (Southern Illinois U) Evaluating Rhetoric & Writing Again: Analyzing *Phaedrus* 259e-279c.

**Session 3B: Gary Cesarz** (Southeast Missouri State U), **Chair**

- 1:00-1:35 - **John O'Neal** (Rice U) Introspection, Inner Sense, and Consciousness  
 1:35-2:10 - **David Beisecker** (U Nevada-Las Vegas) Functionalism and Folk Psychology: How Mental States Earn Their Keep  
 2:10-2:45 - **Ray Rennard** (Johns Hopkins U) Narrow Functionalism and Behavior

**Coffee Break 2:45-3:00 p.m.**

**Session 4B: David Meeler** (Winthrop U), **Chair**

- 3:00-3:35 - **Gilbert Fulmer** (Texas State) A Neo-Kantian Deontological Ethical Theory  
 3:35-4:10 - **Inmaculada de Melo-Martin** (St. Mary's U) On New Moral Obligations: Are They Really Obligations?  
 4:10-4:45 - **Rebekah Ross-Fountain** (Texas State) Philosophical Counseling: Constructing the Passageway.

**Session 4B: Gary Cesarz** (Southeast Missouri State U), **Chair**

- 3:00-3:35 - **Don Merrell** (Arkansas State U) Theoretical Identity, Reference Fixing, and Boyd's Defense of Type Materialism  
 3:35-4:10 - **Glenn C. Joy** (Texas State) How is a Raven Like a Writing Desk?  
 4:10-4:45 - **Aaron Champene** (U Arkansas) BonJour's New "Old-Fashioned" Foundationalism



**MEMORIAL PLENARY SESSION HONORING OF JOSEPH STAMEY  
 AND RICHARD OWSLEY**

**Saturday, April 12, 4:45 – 5:45 pm**

**Speakers:**

- Joseph Barnhart, University of North Texas  
 Scot Miller, Hardin-Simmons University  
 Gary Cesarz, Southeast Missouri State University



**Business Meeting: 6:00-6:30 pm**

- Charles Harriman (College of Santa Fe), President  
 Thomas Urban (Northwest College, HCC), Vice President  
 Gary Cesarz (Southeast Missouri State University), Secretary/Treasurer  
 Scot Miller (Hardin-Simmons University), Editor, Southwest Philosophical Studies



**7:00 pm**

**NM-WT PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY BANQUET & PRESIDENTIAL  
 ADDRESS**

**Charles Harriman**  
 College of Santa Fe



**Sunday, April 13**

**Session 1A: C. Lynne Fulmer** (Texas State), **Chair**

- 8:00-8:35 – **Linda Kraeger** (Grayson College) Aristotle, Ambivalence, and the Great Tragedies  
 8:35-9:10 – **Kenneth Smith** (Dallas) Hegelian Modalities and Greek Philosophical Anthropology  
 9:10-9:45 – **Joseph Barnhart** (U North Texas) Can Ethics Be Both Subjective and Objective?

**Session 1B: Charles Harriman** (College of Santa Fe), **Chair**

- 8:00-8:35 – **Julius Simon** (UTEP) On Schaeffer, Heidegger, Rosenzweig, and the German Philosophies of Art  
 8:35-9:10 – **Grazia Peduzzi** (College of Santa Fe) Art, Memory, and History: Reflections on the Relationship between Art and History  
 9:10-9:45 – **Thomas Urban** (Northwest College, HCC) Pondering the Primordial: Kant Heidegger, and Practical Freedom


**Coffee Break 9:45-10:00 a.m.**

**Session 2A: Lee Stauffer** (New Mexico Highland U), **Chair**

- 10:00-10:35 – **Paul Wilson** (Texas State) Berkeley on the Nature of Ideas  
 10:35-11:10 – **William Springer** (UTEP) Why Is Medieval Scholasticism Not Part of the History of Western Philosophy?  
 11:10-11:45 – **Robert Ferrell** (El Paso CC) Hume to Deleuze

**Session 2B: Grazia Peducci** (College of Santa Fe), **Chair**

- 10:00-10:35 – **William Austin** (U of Houston) Darwin's Argument  
 10:35-11:10 – **Timothy Cleveland** (NMSU) How Not to Prove the Existence of God



**End of Conference**

*Special Thanks to Our Host Institution:*  
**College of Santa Fe**