

ABSTRACTS

Native American Attitudes Toward Scientific Inquiry

William H. Austin

Cases of Native opposition to archaeological or anthropological research are misconstrued when equated with the "creationism" of Christian fundamentalists. The issue typically is not the scientists' theories but research practices that involve either desecration of sacred things or places, or the illicit quest for knowledge reserved for spiritually qualified tribal members. Native views on these matters are not uniform; some see value in cooperative inquiries. But fundamental differences in attitude toward nature and knowledge remain.



Dewey and Nietzsche: A Deep Embrace of the World

Stephen Bagwell

With "Dewey and Nietzsche: A Deep Embrace of the World," I show John Dewey's call for a history of morals, "A complete answer to the question would involve the writing of a history of morals that would set forth the conditions that have brought about contempt for the body, fear of the senses, and opposition of flesh to spirit," was answered by Friedrich Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morals*. I emphasize the genealogical sympathy of Dewey and Nietzsche concerning generative aesthetics, engaged experience and the shared rejection of world denying morality. I return to Dewey to offer *A Common Faith* as a practical, naturalized tool for transforming Nietzsche's solipsistic critique into a powerful social directive.



The Hypothetical Imperative

Joe Barnhart

Against Kant's view, I set forth the position that morality has its source not only in desires, but also in the hypothetical imperative. Hence, moral rules and principles are instrumental. Goodwill is rooted in the sustained desire for others' happiness and freedom. Once it becomes clear that moral rules and regulations are hypothetical imperatives, the conjecture that moral rules and laws have evolved over the centuries becomes plausible. Hypothetical imperatives gain strength just because they are hypothetical and connect with facts of the social and physical environment. Though human morality has animal sources, the evolution of new moral practice, rules, and principles must be explained. My paper conjectures that morality's circle has expanded and extended over the centuries. This is in part because of arguments from facts and the appeal to consistency. Locke's *Letter Concerning Toleration* provides an example.

Kant's ideal of respect for everyone as an end rather than an instrument only has evolved slowly. The conclusion that it is motiveless is an egregious mistake. Duties emerged in the process of giving weight to some desires (which might be the weakest in some cases) over others. Special circumstantial codes of behavior evolved to facilitate the behavior of the community or profession built around common goals. Instead of contending that virtue is its own reward, I argue that without a network of virtues, few of the rewards and benefits that we hold dear would survive.



The Disappearance of Consciousness in Modern Materialism Houghton Dalrymple

Most contemporary philosophers are monists, and most of these monists are materialists. In this paper I trace the progressive elimination of consciousness in materialist theories of human nature.

Behaviorism in its two principal modern forms tries to explain behavior without referring to inner processes of any kind—mental or physical. In its simplest form, Watsonian behaviorism, mental events are identified with overt behavior—anger with striking, itching with scratching and so on. The alternative dispositional theory would turn all mental predicates into dispositional predicates explaining how a person would behave under certain circumstances. The theory has been more successful in explaining such things as character traits and abilities than it has been in explaining conscious states. Both forms of behaviorism dispense with consciousness. This is obvious in the case of the Watsonians, but it is less obvious in the more sophisticated dispositional theory. Since dispositions are distinguished from their manifestations, perhaps there is room for conscious states in the dispositions. But this is an illusion. If there were room for the conscious state it would have to be in the basis of the disposition, but according to Ryle, the principal exponent of the theory, a disposition does not have a basis.

Identity theorists recognize that behaviorist theories are inadequate to account for conscious states like sensations or thoughts. Inner processes are required to supplement their explanations. The inner processes are thought to be brain processes, which are identified with conscious states. However, the conscious states soon drop out of the picture, leaving only the brain processes to supplement the behaviorist explanations.



The Shape of the River: Shifting Grounds in the Affirmative Action Debate Lynne Fulmer

This paper considers shifting moral grounds in the affirmative action debate from the more common deontological, backward-looking view that leads to many difficulties and may not send the message we really want to society. Instead it argues that we might

profitably shift to a forward-looking Utilitarian stance. The argument takes its foundation from William Bowen and Derek Bok's new book: *The Shape of the River: Long-Term Consequences of Considering Race in College and University Admissions*, and contends that the forward-looking stance of Utilitarianism may prove more fruitful in defending affirmative action policies in college and university admissions than might have been supposed by those who are used to thinking of issues in justice from a deontological view. Buttressed by the impressive empirical case developed by Bowen and Bok, there seems to be a clear case in favor of affirmative action in admissions. Less certain, however, is the applicability of this analysis to cases of preferential hiring, although this is due to a lack of empirical data and not a problem in theory. The argument, however, suggests that divisiveness on this issue might be reduced by further empirical research and contends that before we pass judgment on policies involving race we should become aware of the "shape of the river": the important details about the lives that are affected.



Why Be Immoral? Linda Kraeger

Ovid Demaris's *The Last Mafioso* (New York: Times Books, 1980) about the notorious "Jimmy the Weasel" Fratianno highlights the hardship that gross immorality exacts. Demaris quotes Fratianno's positive, though inadvertent, references to moral behavior. Why then do members of the mafia adopt a lifestyle rife with violence? Fratianno warned Roselli that their world of money and power might seem attractive at first, but would later prove treacherous and lonely.

Fratianno longed not only for friendship, but also for a life exemplifying the Golden Rule. Some might consider him a contemporary Thrasymachus, pretending to practice the Golden Rule to manipulate those less resourceful than himself. However, when the police put Fratianno's brother in the Lincoln Heights jail, Jimmy flew into a rage. "This guy ain't never done nothing in his whole life. He ain't got no police record. Why don't you *treat him like a human being*" (71, emphasis added)? Fratianno grasped the Kantian ethic for at least one family member and thought that innocent human beings had a right to decent treatment.

Plato might say that Fratianno possessed deep-seated memories of the good. More importantly, Fratianno steadily became disillusioned with the criminal life and its associates. He glimpsed a legitimate life better than his. *The Last Mafioso* contains many passages that demonstrate Fratianno's awareness of goodness in society. Plato's Thrasymachus holds that human conventions have no real basis in nature. Fratianno's life of crime, however, suggests that loyalty, promise keeping, and respect for others formed the fabric of society. His criminal society lacked sufficient bonds to make living reasonably enjoyable. Why be immoral?

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Pangloss, Pollyanna, Probability and Personality
 Robert Reeves

Pangloss represents philosophical optimism, which need not inspire a good mood. Pollyanna stands for the claim that a good mood is beneficial to the personality. I argue that her claim is false, because it requires that she be happy in inappropriate situations, and cannot recognize that they are inappropriate, so must be dishonest—and honesty is an element in the genuinely happy personality. A theistic Pollyanna who is cheerful in the hope of heaven is to be pitied rather than censured, but exhibits the same inappropriate behavior, “wagering” not dishonestly but on ambiguous evidence.

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An Environmental Consciousness Through Gender
 Rebekah Ross-Fountain

Currently, we live in a society structured partly on the oppression of women and the domination of nature. The linkage of women, nature, and the body and the current social alienation from the natural stem from Judeo-Christian and Cartesian thinking that foster patriarchal institutions. Our current social situation requires us to address gender as a concept and the environmental crisis. Addressing these crucial issues of our times means recovering our body/mind experience and realizing our earthy significance. I want to argue that a feminist appropriation of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception provides the possibility of leaving behind the alienation and destruction of hierarchical dualistic thinking. Transforming Merleau-Ponty’s embodied cogito frees us from the thinking that has influenced social conceptions of women and nature. In reforming thinking, we will consequently reform the styles of living that currently compose our society.

A debate in feminist theory has centered on the question of whether we should retain gender as a category or should we, in following deconstruction, re-create ourselves leaving gender categories behind. It is in reviewing the category and our possibility of leaving it behind that we are forced to consider natural givenness, the natural givenness of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. It is here that I will deal with dualism, women’s experiences, and ultimately an avenue to renaturalize the body. Current attitudes on the body reflect attitudes on the environment. In this paper, I show how in gendered consciousness we can reach an environmental consciousness, not in essentializing gender, but in recognizing social associations of women with the natural and in recovering our fusion with the Earth.

In order to move outside the essentialism versus constructionism debate, we must reconsider the anatomical body that postmodernism has dismissed. However, we cannot rest on essentializing versions of gendered existence. The way outside the gridlock is a

re-exploration of the cultural contexts of our lives and the natural givenness of our being. When re-exploring the intertwining of cultural and natural gendered lives, one is brought to the social issues of environmentalism. These include an understanding of the human relationship to the natural world and the moral ramifications for upholding and maintaining that relationship.

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The German-Jewess Origins of Arendt’s Philosophy
 Julius Simon

Although trained in the rigorous discipline of German academic philosophy in the 1930s, Arendt resisted identifying herself as a philosopher throughout her entire life. In fact, she introduced her last major work, *The Life of the Mind* by asserting: “I have neither claim nor ambition to be a ‘philosopher’ or be numbered among what Kant, without irony, called *Denker von Gewerbe* (professional thinkers).” What fascinates about Arendt’s work is that, her protest notwithstanding, by presenting to us “preoccupation with mental activities” she provides us with some of the most original philosophical activity of the 20th century.

My work traces the concepts of pariah and exile beginning with Arendt’s first major work, *Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess*, a biographical/autobiographical account of being a Jewish woman who desires intellectual stimulation and social solidarity. I continue that tracing through selecting material from her essays which appear in *Men in Dark Times* and finish with some considerations from her more classically defined philosophical work, *The Human Condition*. Importantly, besides becoming a first-rate philosopher Arendt had to deal with her own conditions and so, in establishing a place for herself in the world—existentially, intellectually and professionally—she had to come to terms with her gender, ethnic, intellectual and socio-political circumstances. Such coming to terms resulted in a body of work remarkable for its refreshing and challenging treatment of modern political and philosophical issues which is charged with her critical claims from and about both kinds of activities.

As I note in my essay, throughout her life she was committed to an “ongoing engagement with thinking, or ‘preoccupation with mental activities,’ in order to counteract the blind obedience of thoughtless cultural habits in favor of critical and independent thought, in favor of con-science, i.e., in favor of acting with-thinking.” She points out that, in her essays into individual performances, she presents her own mental activity which itself entailed the “public performance of demonstrating a hope for humanity revealed in her depictions of individual portraits, i.e., of human faces, and in revealing the face of humanity.” In so doing she actively fights her own sense of the fragmented nature of the modern history of human relations which, she argues, has only resulted in the tyrannies of totalitarianism—the analysis of which brought her international recognition—but has also led to the all-too-common human proclivity to dissemble and mask intentions and desires.



Reflections on Kafka's 'Allegory of the Law'
Kenneth Smith

Kafka positions a gnomic allegory at the very crux of *The Trial*. How does this tale concentrate his contramodernism (modernly grasped, his "absurdism")?

- I. A door symbolizes freedom, pliability to the will. This tale posits a door that might as well be a wall, implacable and obstructive.
- II. Out of what motives does this subject approach the Law? Does he suppose himself isonomous with the powers that govern his life? Or has modern order indeed mutated into something dark and cryptic, not rational or moral?
- III. *Of what* is this Law the Law? How is it binding on man? Is it implicit in it that man may supersede it, to become autonomous in his own right?
- IV. Modernity per se comprehends only *necessitarian* laws, *not* normative, teleological or moral laws. This metaphysical monochromatism has gravely depressed our grasp of what "human" can mean. *The human essence* as a brute factum has no constitutive authority as a value or moral imperative.
- V. That the Law has a door expresses man's singular or definitively human subjection to the Law *as a knowing being*. But modernity supposes that the powers implicit in knowing will liberate us from nature or divine authority, making us metaphysical exceptions or self-defining creatures. Modernity has discredited the very notion of human nature as subjection to a moral *force majeure*. Moderns, having undermined the very moral-rational stature of man, have dubious claim to any honorific title of *humanity*.
- VI. Not the Law but this individual's own impetus drew him to this door. The story itself bears indications his motives were unrighteous.
- VII. Modern world-order as essentially banausic or technocratic is a culture vacuous of resources for individual or human self-comprehension. Modern order symptomatically erupts in nihilism, i.e. illiteracy in values or norms and ineptness for self-rule. Neither natural nor divine authority is modernly intelligible, but only the autistic perspectivism of arbitrary will enclosed in its own idiotisms.
- VIII. Is the Law by which we are bound at all concerned what is good for us or in our interest? Are the humiliation and frustration of the subject of this allegory indeed integral and central to its point, to tutor his impudent Ego?
- IX. Modernity's premier principles of human personality, arbitrary will and groundless reason, imply that "Man" must be essentially a self-fabrication, a radically artificial phenomenon. But these abstractivist preconditions do not precipitate an actual or a concrete human individuality, but only a potential or self-conceivable self *self-aborted* by its very potentiality or abstractness. The matrix of modern subjectivism yields not fulfillment but only scientized chaos.



What We Mean by Practical
Tom Urban

A practical attitude of mind concerns itself primarily with the living future, and pays no regard to the dead past or even the present except so far as it may indicate what the future will be. Thus, the pragmatist is obliged to hold that whatever means anything means that something will happen (provided certain conditions are fulfilled), and to hold that the future alone has primary reality. —Charles S. Peirce, *CP 8.194, c. 1907*

This paper provides a brief account of the confusion found in contemporary thought about what we mean by practical. Specifically, it asks that we update our present understanding of practical relations, particularly the kind of logic and judgment which leads to the attainment of a practical life. The paradigm I wish to advance is by way of a discussion about three attitudes of mind. These are religious fanaticism, radical skepticism, and what I will call pragmatic realism, namely the practical attitude of Charles S. Peirce.

The position adopted is that both the fundamentalist and sceptic are not practical in their respective approaches, and that because each is found lacking, their comportment toward others is ultimately judged to be negative, privatized, antisocial. This is primarily explained by an insufficiency in the thinking of each to form a comprehensive, integrated assessment of practical relations. It is also explained by a correlative lack of vision and sound judgment. It is further claimed that all three deficiencies are absent conditions necessary to sensible disclosures of human character. Because character is so closely allied with our understanding of ethics and morality, particularly applied ethics and moral practice, the thrust for updating our public understanding is a thrust for updating our address of ethical and moral questions.

CONTRIBUTORS

William H. Austin is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Houston. He works in the history and philosophy of science(s) and the history and philosophy of religion(s).

Stephen Bagwell's article "Dewey and Nietzsche" marks the beginning of his on-going look into connections between Continental and American philosophy. His topical interests include healing the current Aesthetics/Ethics split, philosophical investigations of music, sexuality, and problems of institutions and identity. Stephen draws primarily from Dewey, Nietzsche, Bataille, Deleuze and Heraclitus for this project. Stephen received his B.A. and M.A. in philosophy from Baylor University; he is currently pursuing a Ph.D. at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale.

Joe Barnhart has published in several journals and is author of six books. He is Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies at the University of North Texas in Denton, Texas, and his fields of specialization are metaphysics, Karl Popper, and the philosophy of religion.

A graduate of the University of New Mexico, **Bryan Benham** is currently a professor at James Madison University, working on topics in philosophy of mind and applied ethics.

Elizabeth Brake recently completed her Ph.D. at the University of St. Andrews, Scotland. She is currently an Instructor in Philosophy at Auburn University, Alabama. Her primary areas of research interest are ethics, political philosophy, and feminist theory.

Kenneth L. Buckman, past president of NMWT, is an associate professor of philosophy at the University of Texas-Pan American. He has been with UTPA since 1992 and with the University of Texas system since 1990. His publishing interests include 19th and 20th century philosophy, with emphasis on Hegel and Gadamer.

Houghton Dalrymple's areas of specialization are British empiricism, philosophy of mind, and action theory. He has taught at McMurry University, Auburn University, The University of North Texas, and The University of Texas at Arlington. He now resides in Arlington, Texas.

C. Lynne Fulmer teaches philosophy at Southwest Texas State University in San Marcos Texas. She specializes in issues of ethics and justice and also critical thinking and is the current president of The New-Mexico West Texas Philosophical Society.

Gilbert Fulmer: Born San Diego, CA, 9 June 1944; BA Rice University, 1966; Ph.D. Rice University, 1972; taught at Southwest Texas State University, 1972-. Married 1971, Christiana Lynne Wilkins Fulmer. Philosophical interests: philosophy of religion, ethics, ordinary language philosophy, Hume.

CONTRIBUTORS

Emerine Glowienka is professor emerita of philosophy at the Gallup Branch Coll of the University of New Mexico. Her philosophical articles have appeared in *The 1 Scholasticism*, *Bioscience*, *Southwest Philosophical Studies*, and *Proceedings of American Catholic Philosophical Association*. Her book, *Personalization: The Moral Norm for Today*, is in publication. Her areas of specialization are in metaphysics, ethics.

Michael W. Johnson earned his B.A. in Philosophy from Hardin-Simmons Univer in 1996. In December of 1998 he earned his M.A. in Philosophy from Baylor Univer having written a critical paper on one of Nietzsche's early essays. He is currently enrolled in the Law School at the University of Texas at Austin.

Linda Kraeger teaches in the Department of Literature and Languages at Gray County College in Denison, Texas. Her areas of specialization are Dostoevsky, creative writing, and the philosophy of literature. She is the coauthor of *Dostoevsky on Evil Atonement*, and her forthcoming book is *In Search of First-Century Christianity*.

Richard Owsley came to the University of North Texas in 1963 from Auburn University. Although he retired in 1992, he continued to work on modified service five years, participating in the team-taught Great Books course (involving philosophy, literature, and history). He now teaches a wide variety of courses in the department as an adjunct. His specialties are existentialism and phenomenology, with a special focus on Heidegger. He continues to organize and hold his Heidegger Conference each year.

Robert Reeves is interested in history of philosophy, Indian philosophy, Kierkegaard and Heidegger. He teaches at Albuquerque T-VI and the University of New Mexico. He is also a (very modestly) published poet.

Rebekah Ross-Fountain is an Instructor of Philosophy at Southwest Texas State University. She is a member of the APA. Her areas of specialization include Feminist Theory and Environmental Ethics.

Jules Simon currently teaches Modern Continental Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion and general Humanities courses from the Department of Philosophy at the University of Texas at El Paso. He earned his Ph.D. from Temple University and spent significant time studying philosophy and religion at Tübingen University, Germany. His areas of specialty are Modern Jewish Philosophy and Contemporary Continental Philosophy, especially nineteenth and twentieth centuries German-language philosophy.

Kenneth R. Smith has taught at the University of Dallas, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, and the University of North Texas. His degrees are from the University of Texas at Austin and Yale. He presently writes as an independent scholar and has published two books, *Otherwise* and *Webs*.

CONTRIBUTORS

William Springer has taught metaphysics, aesthetics, Medieval and Ancient philosophy at the University of Texas at El Paso. His primary interests are in the metaphysics of mind linked to existentialism, social philosophy and the philosophy of religion.

Arthur Stewart is Director and General Editor at Center for Philosophical Studies, Lamar University. He is also the author of *Elements of Knowledge: Pragmatism, Logic, and Inquiry*, a number in the Vanderbilt Library of American Philosophy monograph series. Stewart will, in March 2001, again speak by invitation to the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) in Moscow, and will inaugurate the new Philosophy Ph.D. program at the Pontifical Catholic University of Sao Paulo (PUC), Brazil, also next year, with a doctoral seminar on C. S. Peirce and associated topics. Stewart also publishes in the journals of RAS and PUC.

Dan R. Stiver is professor of theology at the Logsdon School of Theology, Hardin-Simmons University, in Abilene, Texas. He previously was Professor of Christian Philosophy at Southern Baptist Theological Seminary in Louisville, Kentucky, for fourteen years and was managing editor of the *Review and Expositor*. He has written *The Philosophy of Religious Language* with Blackwell and is currently writing another to be published with Westminster John Knox Press entitled *Theology after Ricoeur: The Contribution of Hermeneutical Philosophy to Theology*. In addition to these areas, he has expertise in the areas of theodicy and contemporary epistemology.

Thomas Urban teaches Philosophy of Knowledge for Lamar University. His doctorate in philosophy was awarded by Duquesne University in December 1993.

50TH ANNIVERSARY
 NEW MEXICO AND WEST TEXAS PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY
 CONFERENCE PROGRAM FOR APRIL 9-11, 1999
 Host Institution — University of New Mexico — Albuquerque, NM

April 10, Saturday

FIRST SESSION 8:30-10:15 A.M.

CHURCHILL ROOM I, KEN BUCKMAN (UT-PANAM), CHAIR

REBEKAH ROSS-FOUNTAIN (SWTSU) 8:30-9:05 A.M.
An Environmental Consciousness Through Gender

ELIZABETH BRAKE (Auburn U.) 9:05-9:40 A.M.
A Liberal Response to Catharine MacKinnon

C. LYNNE FULMER (SWTSU) 9:40-10:15 A.M.
The Shape of the River: Shifting Grounds in the Affirmative Action Debate.

CHURCHILL ROOM II, LEE STAUFFER (NM HIGHLANDS U.), CHAIR

ROBERT FERRELL (UTEP) 8:30-9:05 A.M.
Does Buddhism Need Reincarnation?

WILLIAM AUSTIN (U. Houston) 9:05-9:40 A.M.
Native American Attitudes Toward Scientific Inquiry

Ted Sturm (UNM) 9:40-10:15 A.M.
Beyond the East/West Dichotomy in the Philosophical Journey of Nishida Kitaro

Coffee Break 10:15-10:30 A.M.

SECOND SESSION 10:30 A.M.-12:15 P.M.

CHURCHILL ROOM I, ROBERT REEVES (UNM), CHAIR

GIL FULMER (SWTSU) 10:30-11:05 A.M.
You Can't See Through the Looking Glass: Why the Demand for Reasons in Religion Is Not Arbitrary

MICHAEL JOHNSON (Baylor U.) 11:05-11:40 A.M.
The Role of Memory in St. Augustine's Confessions

ARTHUR STEWART (Lamar U.) 11:40 A.M.-12:15 P.M.
A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God: Charles Sanders Peirce and His Gentle Fight for Religion and Science

NEW MEXICO AND WEST TEXAS PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY
CONFERENCE PROGRAM FOR APRIL 9-11, 1999

CHURCHILL ROOM II, SCOT MILLER (HARDIN-SIMMONS U.), CHAIR

- HOUGHTON DALRYMPLE (UT-Arlington) 10:30-11:05 A.M.
The Disappearance of Consciousness in Modern Materialism
- BRYAN BENHAM (UNM) 11:05-11:40 A.M.
*Ryle and the Para-Mechanical:
An Argument Against Interpreting Ryle as a Logical Behaviorist*
- BARBARA MONTERO (U. Chicago) 11:40 A.M.-12:15 P.M.
The Body Problem

Lunch 12:15-1:30 P.M.

THIRD SESSION 1:30-3:15 P.M.

CHURCHILL ROOM I, WILLIAM S SPRINGER (UTEP), CHAIR

- STEVEN BAGWELL (Baylor U.) 1:30-2:05 P.M.
Dewey and Nietzsche: A Deep Embrace of the World
- KENNETH SMITH (Dallas) 2:05-2:40 P.M.
Reflections on Kafka's "Allegory of the Law"
- DAN STIVER (Hardin-Simmons U.) 2:40-3:15 P.M.
Re-figuring Ricoeur

CHURCHILL ROOM II, LYNNE FULMER (SWTSU), CHAIR

- MICHAEL MATTHIS (Lamar U.) 1:30-2:05 P.M.
The Power of Inquiry: A Critique of Sartre's View of Nothingness.
- JULIUS SIMON (UTEP) 2:05-2:40 P.M.
German-Jewish Origins of Arendt's Philosophy
- EMERINE GLOWIENKA (UNM-Gallup) 2:40-3:15 P.M.
On Knowing the Act of Knowing.

NEW MEXICO AND WEST TEXAS PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY
CONFERENCE PROGRAM FOR APRIL 9-11, 1999

FOURTH SESSION: PLENARY SESSION

4:00-5:15 P.M.

HUBERT GRIGGS ALEXANDER MEMORIAL SESSION
Library, UNM Dept. of Philosophy
5th Floor, Humanities Bldg., University of New Mexico

Addresses and Reminiscences in Honor of Hubert G. Alexander

KENNETH BUCKMAN (UT-PANAM), PRESIDENT, NMWTSPS, CHAIR, PRESIDING

Speakers:
GARY CESARZ (Auburn U.), JOSEPH BARNHART (UNT),
RICHARD OWSLEY (UNT), WILLIAM SPRINGER (UTEP),
LEE STAUFFER (NMHU), TED STURM (UNM);
HOUGHTON DALRYMPLE (UT-Arlington).

SOCIETY BUSINESS MEETING, 5:45-6:30 P.M., CHURCHILL ROOM

KENNETH BUCKMAN (UT-PanAm), PRESIDENT, NMWTSPS, PRESIDING
GIL FULMER (SWTSU), VICE PRESIDENT
GARY CESARZ (Auburn U.), SECRETARY/TREASURER
ARTHUR STEWART (Lamar U.), GENERAL EDITOR, SPS

ANNUAL BANQUET, COMMON ROOM II,
Saturday, April 10, 7:00 P.M.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: KENNETH BUCKMAN (UT-Pan American)
A Politics of Care

April 11, Sunday

FIFTH SESSION 8:30-10:15 A.M.

Churchill Room I, Gary Cesarz (Auburn U.), Chair

- KEVIN DODSON (Lamar U.) 8:30-9:05 A.M.
On Paternalism and the Drug Laws
- WILLIAM SPRINGER (UTEP) 9:05-9:40 A.M.
The Transcendental Aesthetic Revisited
- SCOT MILLER (Hardin-Simmons U.) 9:40-10:15 A.M.
The Phenomenal Nature of Space and Time and Their Contents

NEW MEXICO AND WEST TEXAS PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY
CONFERENCE PROGRAM FOR APRIL 9-11, 1999

CHURCHILL ROOM II, GIL FULMER (SWTSU), CHAIR

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| TOM URBAN (Lamar U) | <i>What We Mean by Practical</i> | 8:30-9:05 A.M. |
| JOSEPH BARNHART (UNT) | <i>The Hypothetical Imperative</i> | 9:05-9:40 A.M. |
| LINDA KRAEGER (Grayson College) | <i>Why Be Immoral?</i> | 9:40-10:15 A.M. |

Coffee Break 10:15-10:30 A.M.

SIXTH SESSION 10:30-11:40 A.M.

CHURCHILL ROOM I, GARY CESARZ (AUBURN U), CHAIR

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| Richard Owsley (UNT) | <i>R. C. Collingwood: Psychologism and History</i> | 10:30-11:05 A.M. |
| John Miller (Tampa) | <i>What Is Death?</i> | 11:05-11:40 A.M. |

CHURCHILL ROOM II, BRYAN BENHAM (UNM), CHAIR

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| Robert Reeves (UNM) | <i>Pangloss, Pollyanna, Probability and Personality</i> | 10:30-11:05 A.M. |
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Adjournment