

## ABSTRACTS

### Partial Explanation And Dinosaur Extinction

William H. Austin

Many controversies – for example, the ongoing debate as to what caused the extinction of the dinosaurs – concern the merits of ostensibly competing explanations for some phenomenon or set of related phenomena. It is useful in such cases to ask whether the putative rivals really are mutually exclusive, or whether they might stand as partial explanations of the phenomenon, at least compatible and perhaps combinable into a (more nearly) complete explanation. So it is worth exploring how an explanation might be “partial” and how partial explanations might be related.

Much confusion in controversies over explanation stems from failure to specify exactly what why-question is being answered. An explanation might be complete in the sense of being an adequate answer to a specific why-question, and partial in the sense that that specific question is only one of several we want to ask about the phenomenon in question. Even as an answer to a specific question, an explanation will be partial if it only actually answers a different, less specific version of the question. Since why-questions are often elliptically formulated, two identically-phrased questions might in fact be distinct. Carl Hempel and Bas van Fraassen have suggested some analytic tools for making such distinctions explicit. In this paper, some of this analytic machinery is elaborated, illustrated with reference to an old story about Willie Sutton, and applied to the case of dinosaur extinction. Van Fraassen’s notion of “contrast classes” – i.e., that “why X” always needs to be spelled out as “why X rather than Y or Z or ...” – is particularly helpful.

### Logical Alternatives

R.E. Ferrell

Not a few, in these troubled times, have expressed a desire for a new kind of logic. While this is probably best described as wishful thinking, it is, perhaps not an unwarranted reaction to the widespread nihilism and dismissal of foundational

basis for our culture. This suspicion of foundation has been exaggerated into a perceived anti-rationalism and even lumped with the irrationalism of fascism. Investigators concerned with limitations of the logic of identity and non-contradiction, as a result, are often reduced to the camp of the enemies of reason. This occurs in spite of the realization that Aristotle himself did not consider logic a separate branch of study but thought of it as an *organon* or tool to right thinking from sound principles in a systematic fashion.

An area open to change would seem to be that of derivation of grounds or principles. Ordinarily disregarded as unreliable, analogical reasoning was suggested by Alfred North Whitehead as a complementary and necessary aspect of understanding to offset the deadeningly dogmatic aspect of formal logic.

The concept of aesthetic ordering or organic logic was developed by Jose Vasconcelos over fifty years ago. The concept of aesthetic ordering was furthered through the efforts of A. C. Graham to explicate the correlative basis of Chinese cosmogony and, by extension, to show its necessary function in all reasoning, including analytic approaches.

A comparison of aesthetic ordering with logical ordering finds the former to be a means of consideration in which there are only unique, insistent particularities which cannot be systematically substituted for, but are viewed through concrete disclosure with a creative, holistic approach moving from the universal to the particular. On the other hand, logical ordering tends to be like a plan, an abstract, top down approach with assumed interchangeability of members, assumed to be in conformity and viewed from the perspective of particular moving toward universal. An evaluating gesture finds complementarity rather than confrontation to be the most fruitful stance.

### Jacques Maritain: Person-Centered Political Theory And Immigration Rights

John Haddox

The range of philosophical concerns of Jacques Maritain was unusually far-reaching. Over the years his many publications extended from theoretical treatments of metaphysical and epistemological themes, through examinations of the nature of scientific knowledge and of aesthetic values, to studies of practical socio-political issues. Further, in the latter area he examined a variety of topics including the character and role of the individual and the person in a socio-political context,

and concerning the nature of the body politic, the common good, and civil authority.

In his examination of these topics Maritain always avoided establishing absolute or definitive positions and he was ever-concerned with actual realities of persons and socio-political institutions. Yet, except for a moving treatment in a chapter of his *Reflections on America*, he considered issues of international immigration only marginally.

However, Maritain's person-centered socio-political theory in which social order involves plurality and diversity within a proportional community seems to be quite relevant to such issues as how laws of the United States (and also of nations like Germany, England, and France – among others) have been employed to determine the character – especially the ethnic composition – of immigrant streams; or of how laws have supported the exclusion of aliens due to their political beliefs, statements, or associations; or of how laws have restricted social benefits even to legal, tax-paying, non-citizen immigrants. Here all of these issues are considered.

## The Consistency Of Kant's Concept Of Substance

Monte Ransome Johnson

Substance is a central concept in Kant's "system of principles," finding application in all three Analogies of Experience. In addition to the first *Critique*, ample reference to the term [*substanz*] is made in *The prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* and *The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*. Nevertheless, commentators are often skeptical about the consistency of Kant's formulation of the concept, one going so far as to blame "Kant's indecision as to exactly what he wished to say about substance" (Wolff 1963, p. 248). There are at least two charges of inconsistency leveled at the account of substance: 1) Kant's conception of substance is different in various works (Allison 1983); 2) Within the same work, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant has different conceptions of substance which he treats as one (Wolff 1963, Britan 1978, Wilkerson 1976).

This paper was written out of a concern to show that Kant's concept of substance is consistent both within the first *Critique* and throughout the other works.

The interpretation of the paper is as follows: Material nature is known through formal relations. One of these relations is subsistence-inherence. The Understanding hypostatizes the first element of this relation as substance and understands its correlative, *viz.* the inherent, as merely a mode of substance. Because substance is

only a hypostatization out of a formal relation applied to material nature, it has no application outside of an experience of matter (i.e., it has no application to souls or gods). In other words, matter is required to give objective validity to the concept of substance. The nature of substance is thus intrinsically material. For example, it is possible to measure the quantum of substance in nature by measuring the amount of matter. The hypostatization of substance, and limits on how it can be thought to exist as matter, are critical aspects of the necessary conditions of experience. The Analogies, which investigate such conditions, thus extensively refer to both concepts, substance and matter. Among the principles arrived at in the Analogies are the permanence of substance and the conservation of its quantum in nature – matter. Principles such as this contribute to a consistent concept of substance as subject and substratum which Kant invokes in the first *Critique*, *Metaphysical Foundations*, and the *Prolegomena*.

## A Modern Symposium: In Praise Of Love

John F. Miller, III

This modern "Symposium" employs contemporary authors to eulogize love. Our Phaedrus was Aldous Huxley: "Charity is the root and substance of morality."<sup>1</sup>

Our Pausanias was Carl Jung. Two doctors play Eryximachus. Thomas Moore: "Most, if not all problems brought to therapists are issues of love. It makes sense then that the cure is also love."<sup>2</sup> Bernie S. Siegel: "The ability to love oneself ... enables one to improve the quality of life."<sup>3</sup> "Grief, feelings of failure, and suppression of anger, produce oversecretion of these same hormones, which suppress the immune system."<sup>4</sup> Loving oneself provides an antidote.<sup>5</sup> "Happy people generally don't get sick."<sup>6</sup>

Our contemporary Aristophanes was Erich Fromm: "In love the paradox occurs that two beings become one and yet remain two."<sup>7</sup> Rainer Maria Rilke played Agathon: "To love is mankind's chief task."<sup>8</sup> Nels Ferre, playing Socrates, explained that Spirit, the Personal, and Love were the fundamental categories:

What is, is defined in terms of love; being ... is understood through love, not love through being.<sup>9</sup>

Inmost to reality is Love. Love is the nature of what is ultimate ... The Spirit also is, but the Spirit is colored and focused as Love.<sup>10</sup>  
We conclude with Bertrand Russell as our Alcibiades.<sup>11</sup>

## Notes

1. *The perennial Philosophy* (1970), 92.
2. *Care of the Soul* (1994), 14.
3. *Love, Medicine, & Miracles* (1988), 4.
4. *Ibid.*, 68.
5. *Ibid.*, 69.
6. *Ibid.*, 76.
7. *The Art of Loving* (1989).
8. *Letters to a Young Poet* (1984).
9. *The Universal Word: A Theology for a Universal Faith* (1969), 41.
10. *Ibid.*, 119.
11. The opening two paragraphs of Russell's *Autobiography: The Early Years: 1872-World War I*.

## A Bayesian Analysis Of Strategies Used In Evolutionary Biology

David Wýss Rudge

Allan Franklin (1986, 1990) has developed a philosophy of experiment, a list of strategies used by scientists to establish that the results of experiments are "valid" in strong contrast to the claims of David Gooding, Trevor Pinch and others who stress sociological aspects of scientific endeavors. In this paper I test whether Franklin's model developed in the context of high energy physics, makes sense of the strategies H.B.D. Kettlewell used in his famous investigations of the phenomenon of industrial melanism in the peppered moth, *Biston betularia*. I conclude that many of the strategies Kettlewell used do fit Franklin's model, and establish further that three additional strategies not on Franklin's list may also be explicated with reference to Bayes' theorem. (A copy of this talk is located at <http://www.utdallas.edu/orgs/ntpa/proceedings/Rudge/>; a manuscript under this talk is now available from the author, who may be contacted at: [rudge@snaefell.tamu.edu](mailto:rudge@snaefell.tamu.edu))

## Dynamical Models Of The Mind And The Semantics Of Mental Representations

Robert D. Rupert

A naturalistic approach to the study of mental representation suggests a certain method: we begin by scrutinizing our best examples of representation-using cognitive systems, i.e., human beings, attempting to understand what mental representation amounts to in such central cases. Upon setting out this methodological framework, I argue briefly for the two following claims: (1) The dynamical systems-based approach to cognition offers the most promising view of the nature of mental representations as they exist in humans, particularly with respect to the individuation of representations and their introduction into the cognitive system; and (2) On a dynamical system-based view of the individuation and the acquisition of mental representations, individual representations are more tightly bound to their causal histories than has been recognized in the philosophical literature. Claim (2) has significant implications for the debate over the viability of a causal semantics for mental representations. Because of the tightness of the connection between the identity of a mental representation and its conditions for introduction, effectively criticizing a causal theory of reference for mental representations appears more difficult than it has sometimes been thought. If the conditions for the introduction of a mental representation overlap sufficiently with the reference-fixing conditions hypothesized by a causal theory of reference, then thought experiments which separate these two conditions by stipulation risk becoming moot, at least from the naturalistic standpoint. I conclude that theories of content for mental representation that focus on the subject's actual history hold more promise than many have thought.

## Miracles

Joseph D. Stamey

In philosophical discussions of religion, the term "miracle" is sometimes taken to include in its definition the implication of a violation of a law or laws of nature. William Abraham's "classical" definition of "miracle" and his arguments against definitions that do not include "violation of a law of nature" are examined. Two accounts of incidents from the Jewish Scriptures (and Christian Old Testa-

ment) and two from the New Testament frequently held to be miraculous are analyzed with the conclusion that these at least do not involve claims to violation of laws of nature but do involve claims to being significant of a relation to powers that transcend those of the individuals or groups reporting the events. Further, it is argued that claims of any events violating laws of nature are misplaced and incoherent.

## Firstness And Freedom – The Relation Of Reality To Peirce’s Category Of Pure Feeling And Kantist Practical Judgment

Thomas Urban

This paper inquires into the relation of Peirce’s category of Firstness to our sensible understanding of reality and human freedom. The question is whether that category of *pure feeling* is real, i.e., a concrete presentation and direct apprehension of relation in the appearing world and whether the same is universal by way of posing an unavoidable human concern and factor in our reckoning of sound and practical judgment.

The idea that this issue is correlative with one’s grasp and real enjoyment of freedom is gleaned from the aesthetic of Kant’s critical philosophy. There one can imagine a gathering of sufficient evidence to argue a leap beyond the artifactual and often myopic vision of Kantist formalism, one that would also eclipse conventionalized thinking.

The advantage for attempting this leap lies in securing *real* possibilities for conceiving undistorted, pleasurable disclosures of the free human self, a presentation of encounterable being spiritually determined, tastefully opened to view. The inclusion of feeling in judgments which allow this kind of determination and opening provides thinking a *living* measure of precision in practical judgment and performance. Presently this precision is lost in the technocentricities of virtual truth, the nominalist game. To deny the reality of this relation is to deny the reality of a sublime beauty that appears to all in moments of overwhelming intuitive clarity which come by simply finding oneself alive, in the world. A free self is by itself overwhelming in this show of character. Its call – a determined drift toward the universally good and pleasurable, to the vision and sensibility of independent well-being and community, a way of being toward which we *ought* to feel and know as kin – the only human Self we can ever know for certain, a *true* moral self.

## The Empty Question Argument And Personal Identity

Xiaomei Yang

Parfit claims that personal identity over time is indeterminate in some cases from a Reductionist point of view, and the question of who is who in those cases is empty (this claim can be called the empty-question thesis, or the E-thesis). Parfit’s argument for the E-thesis (the Empty Question Argument) is this:

(1) If the question of personal identity over time is not empty, then there should be no case where we cannot determine whether or not the persons in question are the same person. (2) There are such cases. (C) So, the question of personal identity sometimes is empty.

The premise (2) of this argument relies on two hypothetical examples: the case of the combined spectrum, and the case of fission. Parfit provides two arguments to show that the two hypothetical cases establish the E-thesis. I argue that the two arguments fail to show that the question of personal identity is empty from a Reductionist point of view, and hence the Empty Question Argument fails. One of the premises of the argument based on the case of the combined spectrum states that it is impossible to draw a nonarbitrary line in the case of the combined spectrum between the cases in which the resulting person is me and the cases in which the resulting person is someone else, unless nonreductionism is true. I show that this premise is false: The argument based on the hypothetical case of fission relies on an assumption that the bodily continuity does matter with respect to personal identity, for there is a difference between our attitude towards the future person when bodily continuity is present and our attitude towards the future person when bodily continuity is not present.

## REVIEWS

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### *Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy*

R.W. Sharples

London and New York: Routledge, 1996

xiv + 133; index

Sharples' work on Hellenistic philosophy attempts something fairly new in the presentation of post-Aristotelian Greek and Roman thinkers. His aim is to offer a systematic interpretation of the various schools that arose during the decline of Greece and the rise of Rome in the ancient world from roughly 323 B.C. to 200 A.D. He is not content simply to report the principal doctrines of the Epicureans, Stoics and Sceptics, but considers them in the critical give and take of philosophic engagement. Hellenistic philosophers, Sharples holds, are more than merely transitional thinkers standing between the ancient and medieval periods. He intends to show that many of the ideas of the Hellenistic period have a currency relevant to the modern world.

Until recently, many texts on Hellenistic thought were content to "report" the teachings of an Epicurus or a Zeno without much in the way of philosophically engaging them. Interpretation of the texts took the form of commentary concerned with offering a reasonably coherent fit among the characteristic doctrines within each of the various schools. This began to change in the present century. The past twenty-five years has been especially fruitful given the works of, among others, Rist (1969), Long and Sedley (1987), Annas (1993), Nussbaum (1994) in particular, and now Sharples.

However, most texts on the period focus on particular aspects: e.g., Annas and Nussbaum concentrate on moral teachings of the period, Rist on the Stoics. Sharples, though, takes on the complete philosophical position of each of the dominant schools and critically examines each by arguing for and against their specific tenets. Thus, he deals with the epistemologies, metaphysics, psychological and social theories, and the ethical doctrines of the Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics. (The Cyrenaics and the Cynics receive only passing discussion.) In regard to the distinguishing ideas of each school, the content of Sharples' work is consistent with what one finds in the works of other writers on the period; he does not offer new information or texts on the schools.

What makes Sharples' work important is not that he is presenting something

new on the Hellenistic philosophers; rather, it is how he presents the well-known doctrines. This he accomplishes by means of a different format in organizing and discussing the divisions of each school. Most studies devote a chapter or set of chapters to sequentially describing all of the divisions of a single school, then pass on to rival schools in succeeding chapters. Sharples, however, divides his chapters along topical lines. This allows him to treat, e.g., the Epicurean and Stoic metaphysics together in the same chapter in order to assemble and contrast relevant texts in a more convenient manner. Thus, Sharples' book is divided into chapters on epistemology, metaphysics, psycho-psychology, and ethics in which he contrasts one school with another, and relates the conclusions of each to modern issues.

This new format, being one of the unique features of his work, has both advantages and drawbacks. The advantage of this format is two-fold. As mentioned above, it is partly for sake of convenience. But it is more; for it facilitates the reader's efforts to compare and contrast the specifics of the teachings of each school. More importantly, this format allows for focus on the details of one division of a philosophic position in order to highlight how that division serves as the foundation for another. For example, in the chapter on epistemology, Sharples discusses the Epicurean doctrine of "non-contestation" wherein a "requirement of reason" is held to be legitimate since it is not "contested" by experience. There he introduces the atomic swerve in the void to illustrate the distinction between what reason requires to explain motion and our sensory awareness of motion. Later, in the chapter on metaphysics, atoms and void are again discussed with regard to the internal consistency of atomic theory as a response to Zeno's paradoxes. Throughout these discussions, though, the question as to whether the materialism of the Epicureans can serve as a foundation for their ethics looms in the background, hinted at in numerous parenthetical remarks. When one eventually arrives at the chapters on psychology and ethics, atomic theory faces some weighty criticisms, some with modern sounding themes commonly brought against contemporary attempts to reduce mind to body. It is noteworthy that Sharples neglects neither Aristotle's criticisms of Democritus' original version of the theory, nor the inconsistency between positing an original, singular swerve in the atomic flow to allow for human will and the countless acts of human choice. Moreover, this illustrates Sharples' intent to serve as interlocutor and engage the Hellenistic thinkers in philosophic exchange.

The disadvantages of Sharples' approach are certainly outweighed by its advantages. Nonetheless, they should be mentioned. In the first place, the format requires that Sharples insert numerous postponements of the full statement of a given thesis or criticism. This requires the reader to do precisely what Sharples was trying to avoid, namely, skip around in the text to find the complete statement

of a thesis or its criticism. Furthermore, the notices of postponement, whether parenthetical or not, interrupt the flow of Sharples' prose.

Still, Sharples' work is welcome and to be highly recommended. It would serve well as a primary text in introductory level courses on ancient philosophy in general and Hellenistic philosophy in particular. It also would serve well as a useful secondary text in advanced courses in the same areas. As Plato and Aristotle have remained living philosophical options from which we moderns continue to draw insight, Sharples has done much to bring the Hellenistic period back within our reach as a source on which we can draw.

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***Democracy's Discontent:  
America in Search of a Public Philosophy***

Michael J. Sandel

Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996.

xi + 417 pp.

This latest book by Harvard political philosopher Michael Sandel continues the critique of deontological liberalism that he began in his earlier *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, though with a different focus. Here Sandel takes aim at the embodiment of rights-based liberalism in the political institutions and practices of contemporary American society, or what he terms the "Procedural Republic."

In Part I, "The Constitution of the Procedural Republic," Sandel provides a philosophical account of contemporary liberal theory and an analysis of current political discourse and practices as its concrete expression. The philosophical center of liberalism is a commitment to the priority of the right over the good, which requires that individual rights not be sacrificed to achieve some general good and that the specification of these rights not be based on a particular overarching conception of the good life. This view is grounded in a voluntarist conception of freedom as the capacity of the agent to choose his or her own ends and is accompanied by a conception of the self as unencumbered by any ties or obligations she or he has not chosen. According to liberal theory, the state is to be neutral with regard to different substantive conceptions of the good life for human beings. As the basis of our current self understanding, philosophical liberalism has produced a "procedural republic" in which political liberals and conservatives are restricted to increasingly sterile debates about the fairness of different procedures rather than the

substantive goods of practices and outcomes.

In contrast to the liberalism that now dominates political theory, Sandel seeks to revive civic republicanism and its attendant formative project. For the civic republican tradition, freedom is not the capacity of unencumbered selves to choose their own ends, but consists in the participation of concretely-situated selves in self-governing communities. The state, then, ought not to be neutral, but instead ought actively to promote those virtues necessary for self government.

In Part II, "The Political Economy of Citizenship," Sandel delineates the civic republican elements in American political history up to their demise in the second New Deal. According to Sandel, civic republicanism was a standard part of our political discourse from the founding of the Republic, through the Free Soil movement and early labor agitation, until well into the Progressive Era. As is suggested in the title of this section, consideration of the impact of economic arrangements on the formative project was a major feature of American political discourse throughout this period. Civic republicans consistently maintained that the economy ought to be structured so as to form a citizenry suited for self-government. Wage labor was criticized on the grounds that the economic dependency it involved was incompatible with the independence that was an essential prerequisite of active citizenship (a point that Kant makes in the *Rechtslehre*, I might add).

Sandel argues that the eclipse of civic republicanism in American politics was produced by two factors: first, a shift of self-identification from one's role as a producer to one's status as a consumer, and second, the Keynesian revolution in fiscal policy. The former led to a diminution of concern with the role of workplace relations in the formation of civic identity and virtue and an increased emphasis on fairness in both the pricing of goods and the distribution of income, whereas the latter allowed the federal government to remain neutral on the content of specific desires and instead focus on their totality in the form of aggregate demand.

In his concluding chapter, Professor Sandel examines our current political crisis in terms of our residual republican yearnings and sketches the outlines of a reform effort intended to disperse sovereignty among both local communities and international institutions in the face of the slow decline of the nation-state. It is these final comments that are the least satisfying. Despite Sandel's efforts to argue for the possibility and desirability of a civic republican reconstruction, this reviewer is left with the gnawing feeling that the tide of history is simply running against such an effort and that, for all its merits, the civic republican project is too much the expression of a nostalgia in the face of globalization at the loss of tightly integrated communities and the coherent communal identities they once provided.

Sandel's effort to shift our focus from our status as consumers to our role as citizens is laudable and certainly relevant to the discussion of numerous policy initiatives, such as, for example, proposals for school vouchers. Further, he has

performed an important service by calling attention to civic republican arguments about the centrality of the structure of the workplace to the formation of an active and competent citizenry. But what is striking is the lack of attention paid to the possibilities for and importance of democratic restructuring of firms within the global market economy. Given the critical impact of economic developments on communities at all levels, civic republican aspirations will remain unrealizable so long as economic power is concentrated in forms that are organized along authoritarian, hierarchical lines. This suggests that, in the modern world, democratic socialism has superseded civic republicanism.

All in all, however, this is an outstanding book and ought to serve as a model for political philosophers seeking to engage contemporary events in a historically informed manner.

Kevin E. Dodson  
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### ***Religious Experience and Religious Belief***

George Wall

New York: University Press of America, 1995.

viii + 340 pp.

Until recently, the philosopher who wanted to defend religious experience as a possible avenue of knowledge about God had to take on an almost insurmountable burden of proof. All that changed with the publication of William Alston's *Perceiving God* (Cornell University Press, 1991), a powerful defense of the rationality of belief based on religious experience. Wall's book is an attempt to expand on Alston's accomplishment, exploring areas Alston left untouched or underdeveloped. In particular, Wall is interested in defending religious experience from the challenge posed by naturalistic explanations. The first chapter sets the stage for the inquiry to follow by explicating an epistemological position represented by Alston, Richard Swinburne, and (although Wall doesn't mention him) Alvin Plantinga. According to this position, it is respectable to accept the deliverances of basic belief-forming mechanisms; how things seem is a good guide to how things are. This status of prima facie justification holds provided no defeaters are operating to override that justification. Wall's exposition of Alston may have been hurt by his desire to present it simply and get on with the main line of inquiry, but for whatever reason, he presents Alston's view somewhat inaccurately. To give just one example, Wall presents Alston's account of self-support as a third "evaluative test"

for doxastic practices, in addition to internal and external consistency (p. 24). Alston denies that it has that status. If a practice avoids massive internal and external inconsistency, Alston thinks that is enough to make it rational to engage in that practice. The presence of significant self-support makes the case for rationality even stronger, but its absence does not make its claim to rationality weaker. After all, our practices of deduction and induction do not exhibit self-support. Part of the problem is that Wall has misunderstood what significant self-support is. A practice does not enjoy significant self-support if it "delivers what it promises." (p. 24) According to Alston, sense-perception exhibits significant self-support if, by the use of the practice, we can come to predict and control our environment, and also come to understand why the practice is reliable. Lots of respectable practices don't have any results of that kind. However, these misunderstandings don't do any harm to Wall's general program.

Chapters two through six consider various naturalistic explanations for religious experiences, which, if they were true, would count as overrides. If we know that an experience can be explained completely by psychological factors, for example, that gives us reason to suppose that the experience is not veridical or at least that it does not confer its usual prima facie justification on resulting beliefs. Here Wall is at his best, taking an admirably empirical approach to the question. Although he makes heavy weather of what counts as an explanation (and why not? It's a hard problem!), he goes on to show that none of the naturalistic explanations usually offered for religious experience gives us either necessary or sufficient conditions for religious experience. Among the naturalistic causes he considers are social conditioning, desire (conscious or unconscious), and emotional crisis. For each proposed natural cause, Wall presents a counterexample, a case of religious experience for which the proposed cause is clearly absent. There is a response to this approach that Wall doesn't seem to consider. Each counterexample he cites disproves a thesis of the form "All religious experiences are caused by C." But another possibility is that all religious experiences are caused by some natural phenomenon, but there is no one phenomenon that causes them all. Just as different perceptual errors can be caused by different factors (brain chemistry, unusual lighting, anatomical irregularities in sense organs, and so on), different religious experiences might all be delusory, but the delusions be due to different causes.

Chapter seven turns to another kind of issue. Some critics of the epistemic value of religious experience cite the nasty behavior of mystics. Some, like Jim Jones of Jonestown fame, behave in decidedly nasty ways, purportedly on the basis of what they have learned from their religious experiences. Others, while not hurting anyone else, refuse to bathe, or mutilate themselves, or otherwise engage in unhealthy behavior. Cases like these, the critic argues, show that religious experiences are not genuine, because if they were genuine, they would not have had

those effects. Wall answers, quite reasonable, that some religious experiences seem to have more salutary effects. In fact, in medieval mystical theology, the effects an experience had on the mystic were taken to be one of the primary tests of genuineness. If a mystical experience makes you proud or unsettled, it is not from God.

The last two chapters turn to the overrider systems, and to the question whether different religious practices are ineluctably inconsistent with each other. If so, the degree of rationality enjoyed by all religious systems is reduced. If they can't all be right (and external inconsistency undermines the rationality of a practice), and they are all equally rational to engage in, then it seems that none are rationally engaged in. Alston recognizes this to be the hardest problem he has to face. Rather than accept Alston's solution to the problem, Wall tries the alternate course of showing that there is no real inconsistency between the different practices. This is a bold strategy since the different religious traditions at least appear to make mutually inconsistent claims. If the Muslims are right, Christ is not a person of the godhead. If the Hindus are right, there is no afterlife. Each seems to contradict some central claim made by the others. Wall's strategy is to show that there is a shared core of defeaters that all religions make use of. All require logical consistency, and all discount experiences that lead to immoral behavior. Consequently, the different religious practices have a defeater system in common. Since a practice is in part identified by its defeater system, they are really the same practice.

In this argument, Wall commits a fallacy. As long as the different religious practices have defeaters that are inconsistent with one another in addition to the defeaters they have in common, then they are different practices. Zen Buddhism includes as a defeater that any experience that seems to be of a god is illusory. Christianity surely lacks this defeater. It is not hard to find other instances of important differences. Some sects use drugs to achieve mystical states, whereas most contemporary religions include the defeater that if an experience is caused by drugs, it is ipso facto not genuine. The fact that there is a common, consistent core does not show that the remainder is consistent.

On the whole, Wall does not succeed in his project. Nevertheless, it is an ambitious and instructive project, important parts of which are successful. While I would not say that every philosopher of religion ought to read Wall's book, I would say that anyone pursuing Alston's project of defending the epistemic value of religious experience can learn valuable lessons from it.

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**Gilbert Fulmer** is Professor of Philosophy at Southwest Texas State University in San Marcos, Texas. He received his bachelor of arts degree from Rice University in 1966, and his doctor of philosophy degree from Rice University in 1972. He has published philosophical articles in the areas of epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and philosophy of religion.

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**Arthur F. Stewart** continues as Director and Editor at the Center for Philosophical Studies, Lamar University, in Beaumont, Texas. He received his doctor of philosophy degree in 1987 under Ken Ketner at Texas Tech University, with a dissertation on Peirce. In 1997, Stewart gave the Keynote Address to the international meeting of the American Society for Aesthetics (Santa Fe, New Mexico), and a paper to the Third International Conference on Scientific and Technical Information (Moscow, Russia), forthcoming in the Russian Journal *Problems in Philosophy*. His book, *Elements of Knowledge: Pragmatism, Logic, and Inquiry* (Revised and Expanded Edition) appeared in 1997 in the Vanderbilt Library of American Philosophy Series of Vanderbilt University Press.

**Fred Gillette Sturm** is Professor of Philosophy at the University of New Mexico. In 1963 he received a Fulbright Faculty Research Grant, Tunghsi University (Taiwan). In 1971 he was Research Fellow, New Asian College of Chinese University of Hong Kong. He is a Fellow of the Royal Asiatic Society (Hong Kong branch) and of the International Symposium on Asian Studies (Hong Kong). He is a member of the International Sinological Committee, China Academy (Taiwan); and is Honorary Professor of Foreign Languages and Literatures at Shaanxi Teachers University (Xi'an, China).

**Thomas Urban** teaches Philosophy of Knowledge at Lamar University. His doctorate in philosophy was awarded by Duquesne University in December 1993. He holds a Master's from Ohio University, Athens. Between degrees he seized the time to found and manage a successful retail music business and has taught for several universities in the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, area including Indiana, Clarion, West Virginia, and the University of Pittsburgh. Though Continental in his training, his orientation and focus is directed toward further cultivating the insights and understanding of practical American Philosophy.

**Mark Owen Webb** teaches philosophy at Texas Tech University. His research is primarily in social epistemology and philosophy of religion. His work has appeared in the *Journal of Philosophy*, *Religious Studies*, and *Hypatia*.

**Xiaomei Yang** is a doctoral student in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Nebraska.

**Yiwei Zheng** was the 1996 recipient of the Larry Taylor Award. He is a graduate student at Indiana University, Bloomington. His papers have appeared and will appear in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* and *The Philosopher*.

## **The New Mexico and West Texas Philosophical Society 1997 Program**

**Host Institution – University of New Mexico  
Conference Sessions at La Posada de Albuquerque  
Second and Copper, Albuquerque, New Mexico**

**FRIDAY, APRIL 11**

**7:00-9:00 p.m.**

**Fireplace Lounge  
Registration and Social Hour**

**SATURDAY, APRIL 12**

**First Session**

**8:30-10:15 a.m.**

**Board Room**

8:30-9:05	<b>Gary Cesarz (Auburn University), Chair</b> <b>Peter Boghossian (University of New Mexico)</b> Deweyan Inquiry And Democracy
9:05-9:40	<b>Kenneth Buckman (University of Texas Pan American)</b> Smoking, Gun Control, And The Public
9:40-10:15	<b>Thomas Urban (Lamar University)</b> Firstness And Freedom: The Relationship Of Reality To Peirce's Categories According To Kant

**Plaza Room**

8:30-9:05	<b>Scot Miller (Hardin Simmons University), Chair</b> <b>William Springer (University of Texas at El Paso)</b> Reading As A Modality Of Mind
9:05-9:40	<b>Joe Barnhart (University of North Texas)</b> Multiple Persons And The Problem Of Integrating Them
9:40-10:15	<b>Robert Rupert (Seattle)</b> Dynamical Models Of the Mind And The Semantics Of Mental Representations

**Second Session  
10:30-12:15 a.m.**

**Board Room**

- 10:30-11:05 **Joseph Stamey (McMurry University), Chair**  
**Stephen Scholz (University of New Mexico)**  
The Paradox Of Heroism
- 11:05-11:40 **Emerine Glowienka (University of New Mexico)**  
Person as "That Which Is Most Perfect In All Of Nature"
- 11:40-12:15 **John Haddox (University of Texas at El Paso)**  
Jacques Maritain: Person-Centered Theory And Immigration Rights

**Plaza Room**

- 10:30-11:05 **Lee Stauffer (New Mexico Highlands University), Chair**  
**Michael Mathis (Lamar University)**  
Does Descartes Need An Evil Deceiver?
- 11:05-11:40 **Fred Sturm (University of New Mexico)**  
Confucian Philosophy Of Art: Aesthetic Norms In The Thought  
Of Xunzi (Hsün Tzu)
- 11:40-12:15 **Yiwei Zheng (Indiana University)**  
On The Metaphysical Structure Of Mental Propositions In  
Ockham's Mental Language

**Third Session  
1:30-3:15 a.m.**

**Board Room**

- 1:30-2:05 **Arthur Stewart (Lamar University), Chair**  
**Hans E. Kim (Indiana University)**  
Indexical Beliefs And The Limited Accessibility Thesis
- 2:05-2:40 **Scott Kimbrough (Texas A&M University)**  
Kripke's Puzzle And The Practice Of Logical Appraisal
- 2:40-3:15 **Xiaomei Yang (University of Nebraska)**  
The Empty Question Argument And Personal Identity

**Plaza Room**

- 1:30-2:05 **Lynne Fulmer (Southwest Texas State University), Chair**  
**William H. Austin (University of Houston)**  
Partial Explanation And Dinosaur Extinction
- 2:05-2:40 **Houghton Dalrymple (University of Texas at Arlington)**  
Attacks On Psychological Explanation
- 2:40-3:15 **David W. Rudge (Texas A&M University)**  
A Bayesian Analysis Of Strategies Used In Evolutionary  
Biology

**Fourth Session  
3:30-5:15 a.m.**

**Board Room**

- 3:30-4:05 **Fred Sturm (University of New Mexico), Chair**  
**Michael D. Capistran (Houston)**  
Socrates Dialectic And The Analytic Method Of The Ancient  
Geometers
- 4:05-4:40 **John Miller (Tampa)**  
A Modern Symposium: In Praise Of Love
- 4:40-5:15 **Kenneth Smith (Dallas)**  
Human Natures: Greek Philosophical Anthropology

**Plaza Room**

- 3:30-4:05 **Dane Depp, Chair**  
**Richard Owsley (University of North Texas)**  
Rousseau Redux
- 4:05-4:40 **Kevin Dodson (Lamar University)**  
Kant On Awe And Meaning
- 4:40-5:15 **Monte Johnson (University of New Mexico)**  
The Consistency Of Kant's Concept Of Substance

**Fireplace Room**

- 5:30-6:30 **Arthur F. Stewart (Lamar University), Presiding**  
Annual Business Meeting

**Board Room**

- 7:00 **Dinner followed by the Presidential Address**  
**Arthur F. Stewart (Lamar University)**  
Realism, Nominalism, And Consensual Ignorance

**SUNDAY, APRIL 13**

**Fifth Session  
8:30-10:15 a.m.**

**Board Room**

- 8:30-9:05 **Gregg Franzwa (Texas Christian University), Chair**  
**Gil Fulmer (Southwest Texas State University)**  
Does God Do His Best? George N. Schlesinger's Theodicy
- 9:05-9:40 **Joseph Stamey (McMurry University)**  
Miracles
- 9:40-10:15 **Jerry Sherman (University of New Mexico)**  
The Politics Of Metaphysics: An Open Letter

**Citadel Room 2**

**Peter Hutcheson (Southwest Texas State University), Chair**

- 9:40-10:15 **Gilbert Fulmer (Southwest Texas State University)**  
Miracles, Consciousness, and Swinburne

**Plaza Room**

**Richard Owsley (University of North Texas), Chair**

- 8:30-9:05 **Dan Darwick (University of Buffalo)**  
What Are Concepts For?
- 9:05-9:40 **Charles Harriman (College of Santa Fe)**  
The Value Of Unfounded Belief
- 9:40-10:15 **R. Evans Ferrell (University of Texas at El Paso)**  
Logical Alternatives

**Sixth Session**

**10:30-12:15**

**Board Room**

**Charles Harriman (College of Santa Fe), Chair**

- 10:30-11:05 **Laurence Peck (Merced College)**  
Toward A Model For Understanding Power
- 11:05-11:40 **Lynne Fulmer (Southwest Texas State University)**  
Equal Opportunity: Anti-Liberal And More?
- 11:40-12:15 **Steve Hyman (Texas Tech University)**  
Socrates

**Plaza Room**

**Robert Reeves (University of New Mexico), Chair**

- 10:30-11:05 **Rob Hull (West Virginia Wesleyan University)**  
Derrida, Shapiro And Oedipus: An Aesthetic Affirmatist Critique  
Of The Postmodern Nietzsche
- 11:05-11:40 **Jim Sauer and Randy Lyle (St. Mary's University)**  
Narrative And Self: A Hermeneutic Rejoinder To Post-Modern  
Constructionism
- 11:40-12:15 **Mark O. Webb (Texas Tech University)**  
Social Epistemology And Political Critique

Adjournment