

ABSTRACTS

On The Road To The Good: Philosophical Ascent In The Republic And The Symposium

Anne-Marie Bowery

In this paper, I begin with the observation that Plato embeds several of his dialogues within a narrative context. Then, I argue that Plato uses the reported narrative frame of these dialogues to symbolize the philosophical journey to the Good. In fact, the narrative frame is more than symbolic; it supplies a mechanism by which the reader can travel to the Good. To illustrate this link between the narrative frame and the philosophical journey, I examine passages from two Platonic dialogues. In the *Republic*, I analyze the philosophical ascent out of the cave to the Good (514-517c). In the *Symposium*, I look at the soul's ascent to the beautiful itself (209a-212a). Both passages portray the process of acquiring philosophical insight as a journey. After establishing this metaphor, I examine the opening scenes of both dialogues (*Republic* 327a-328b, *Symposium* 172a-174e). Each dialogue begins with a reference to a trip along a road. This physical expedition of the interlocutors foreshadows the subsequent philosophical travels of their souls. Analysis of these passages will offer insight into Plato's pedagogical motivation for using a narrative frame in some of his philosophical dialogues. Basically, the narrative frame serves a dual function. It reduces the reader to aporia, the necessary starting point for philosophical reflection. In addition, the narrative frame illustrates the importance of acquiring knowledge of the forms.

Holism For A Pluralistic Society

Robert Evans Ferrell

The continued frustration in attempts to universalize medical treatment and certainty of continued cutbacks in future health benefits call into question certain aspects of the contemporary philosophy of medicine. When these ethical problems prove insurmountable, alternative medical philosophies gain popularity. More than a return at the theoretical level to some form of vitalism, this increased attention to alternative medical philosophy reveals a virtue ethics compatible with the new

economic world order characterized by reduced access to orthodox treatment as well as the ideology of atomized, independent, individualism defined as responsible autonomy.

The most serious attempts to broaden Western medical philosophy to account for the mind-body problem have consisted of the attempt to incorporate phenomenological approaches in order to deal with the one-sidedness of a medical theory relying almost completely upon a mechanistic, curative (as opposed to wellness oriented) approach. The argument for holism suggests that such approach only compounds the ethical and economic problems.

Replacement of the mechanistic model with the view of the human being as energy system suggests vast untapped potential resources and powers useful in healing. An emphasis on self understanding and self awareness results from placing responsibility on the person seeking health and reduction of the role of healer to mere facilitator. This process is moved to a dynamics emphasizing self-regulating process prior to the necessity of intervention with curative, therapeutic treatment.

Thus, an alternative philosophy of holism promises increased potential in healing as well as a middle path to the dilemma of socialism opposed to exclusive availability.

A New Logic For A New Morality

William C. Kiefert and John F. Miller, III

Prejudice, anger, hatred, and violence have a *logical* source: Aristotelian logic. Plato's assumption that *all classes have a single essence or form* underlies Aristotelian logic and can be blamed, intellectually, for the immorality which we justify in the name of "reasonableness" and "rationality."

Aristotle's Law of Identity implies that *all human beings share the same human nature*: hence, everyone should be alike. Those who are different are unnatural or non-human. The Law of Non-Contradiction gives Aristotelian logic its polarizing *either/or* nature, the source of conflict and opposition. The Law of Excluded Middle justifies ranking classes according to a *hierarchical either/or* scale. Such *either/or* reasoning divides, separates, and alienates us from our fellow human beings.

Wittgenstein, Kierkegaard and Camus, Jonas Salk, Ruth Benedict, Erich Fromm, Abraham Maslow, and Buckminster Fuller were among Aristotelian logic's critics. Moreover, discoveries in contemporary physics challenge the Platonic as-

sumption of Aristotelian logic: light may be described in two different and apparently mutually exclusive forms. The same is true of human nature.

A new logic of *Coexistent Forms* is proposed: when two different and apparently mutually exclusive forms logically describe the same class, we need new laws: the *Law of Diversity*, the *Law of Complementarity*, and the *Law of Inclusive Middle*.

The new logic will allow us to accept others *in* their differences and ultimately *for* their difference, as we enter into dialogue with them, in love.

Nietzsche On Free Will And Becoming

Michael J. Matthis

In this paper I examine Nietzsche's treatment of the concept of free will, of which he is highly critical. Nietzsche's objections to the concept of free will, one that traditionally involves the will's location within a self that perdures throughout and underlies the activity, essentially commanding it, does not make Nietzsche move closer to what is traditionally called determinism. In fact, the free will thesis derives essentially from the same ontological presuppositions as determinism, assuming a certain logical determination of each thing within what I, adapting from Nietzsche, term the "ontology of Being." This determination in free will works to preserve the self in being throughout, preventing any essential difficulty to movement, which is why the movement appears to be free, to follow automatically from a command. Such a determination has its roots in the principle of identity, which logically immobilizes each being or thing within itself, making any kind interpenetration between things inconceivable and therefore making causal efficacy impossible. Nietzsche is critical of the causal inefficacy of free will, then, because of the pretensions of free will to being *causa sui*, when in fact free will merely "accompanies" events, being essentially identical with such occurrence, giving the illusion of having brought the event about unproblematically. Free will then cannot effect itself or anything else, because it is paralyzed within the principle of identity, and this causal inefficacy involves the ontology of being throughout. Genuine efficacy, power, or the possibility of *causa sui* occur only at the level of becoming, or the "ontology of becoming," but such efficacy or power must first occur in confrontation with the essential impotence, powerlessness, of being.

Dual Aspect Theory Of Mind In The Light Of Existentialism And Emergence Theory

William Springer

To say or imply that mental states (consciousness) are a property of neural networks makes those states ontologically subordinate in some sense. The minimum that is implied is that they do not have the ontological standing that neural networks do.

I attempt to make clear that it can be shown that vision is a mental state, that it has ontological standing and that there are no legitimate grounds for giving it (and by implication any other mental state) any less ontological standing than is given to neural networks. This is little more than a restatement of any of the traditional dual aspect theories of mind, making the issue of ontological standing prominent. Consciousness, in a word, is as real as body.

By placing this ontology of mind/body into a developmental context (either evolutionary – or individual growth) it is difficult if not impossible to escape the conclusion that mental states come to be by a fundamental transformation of non-living into living conscious reality.

A sensitive phenomenology of vision shows that visual consciousness is visual being-in-the-world and that if it is "organic" in any sense it is not organic in the way that physiological events are.

Human being-in-the-world is characterized by being involved in countless empirical entities and events that cannot conceivably be investigated by the natural sciences. They are not physical entities, and yet they are as "natural" to human beings as any other entities in nature. Such entities and events are all those that possess almost purely intersubjective existence – moral activity, judicial entities and activities, political entities and events, artistic entities and events, economic entities and events such as money and property and their transactions, all sports and games, and so on. Human reality is not physical.

Moreover, my being-in-the-world and all that comes with it is an *emergent* reality as surely as my being-in-the-world was the development of what before had been inanimate matter. That emergent reality, me, is as corporeal as it is mental. When I came into the world I did not come from somewhere else. I came to be. And what I came to be is far more properly called a being whose being is to be in the world than a body. What is it like to be a body only? I have no idea, or rather it is patently a nonsensical sentence once it is understood what it means to say that it is like something to be any conscious living being.

The Last Days Of Socrates: An Invitation To Philosophy

Quentin Taylor

This paper is intended for the instructor of philosophy who seeks an effective means of stimulating a genuine interest in the life of the mind among his or her students. To this end I suggest beginning the introductory philosophy course with the Platonic dialogues collectively known as "The Last Days Of Socrates" – the *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, *Crito*, and the death scene from the *Phaedo*. This recommendation has less to do with the ancestral primacy of Greek philosophy in the West than with certain intrinsic features of the writings in question. Chief among these is accessibility. Each work is brief, and almost entirely free of technical language and philosophical jargon. Moreover, the dialogue form, combining elements of personality, drama, and conversation, is well-suited to engage the attention of the reader. Third, the dialogues introduce the student to the "Socratic method," a species of philosophical reasoning that aims to "uncover" the essence or truth of things. Finally, there is the colorful character of Socrates himself, whose eccentric behavior, provocative views, and ironic sense almost guarantee a strong response from the reader. In conjunction these facets of the dialogues in question provide a compelling reason for employing "The Last Days Of Socrates" in the first days of the introductory course.

The Costs Of A Causal Conception Of Explanation

Mariam Thalos

According to the causal conception of explanation, the explanation of an event lies in its causal antecedents. A corollary of this conception is the principle that the explanation of a *collective* of events can be nothing more than an explanation of each event in the collective, hence a collection of lists of causal antecedents, one list for each event in the collective. I shall argue that this conception of explanation is incapable of subsuming certain explanatory principles, like the principle of natural selection (the survival of the fittest) and the variational principles known to physics. The reason is that the formula prescribed by the causal conception for explaining collectives of events does not allow for recognizing events or chains of events

which do not contribute causally to the events to be explained. Hence it does not allow *nonactual* chains of events to be brought to attention; and this bringing to attention of nonactual chains or scenarios is required by the principle of natural selection in Darwinian theory, as well as by the variational principles of physics. Hence the causal conception of explanation is inadequate.

A competing, and more adequate, conception of explanation is the Humean conception, according to which the primary subjects of explanation are collective of events, rather than individual events. This conception does not prescribe the recitation of causal antecedents only, hence does not prohibit the calling to attention of nonactual chains of events.

REVIEWS

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Nietzsche as Cultural Physician

Daniel R. Ahern

University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995

212 pp.

Ahern's book examines Nietzsche's unsystematic, often epigrammatic approach to philosophy from a point of view that is historically near the center of some of our more important systematic and non-epigrammatic philosophies. This point of view is that of the human individual and culture as an organism, an integrated, balanced whole that is governed by a coordinating center, the purpose of which is to find and preserve health for the organism and avoid decay and death, and by analogy to promote well-being and justice and avoid unhappiness and injustice. There is nothing really new or surprising about such a view of society or of persons; it is an established and perhaps central paradigm in our understanding of such matters. Nietzsche's thought, on the other hand, seldom claims our attention for reasons of its being typical, normal, at the center, and so on. We go to Nietzsche, in fact, usually to be provoked, to hear an always new, untimely, and discordant voice, one that often shrieks, but one that does so with its own poetic control and own form of clarity.

On the other hand, we go to commentaries on Nietzsche, which are plentiful, to give our ears a rest, or to try to gauge Nietzsche's thought from a reflective whole that we feel may be present in his work but which needs to be articulated in less shrill or angular terms. Finding this whole, or pattern and development, in his thought in such a way that does not compromise its vitality or its tensions is a task that has eluded more than one aspiring commentator in the past. Unfortunately Ahern's book falls victim to this difficulty by imposing an order without really integrating his thought, of demanding a pattern of it instead of molding and blending a pattern to fit into the contours and difficulties of Nietzsche's original outlook. And this is especially unfortunate in this case, because Ahern's style of writing is itself lively, almost Nietzschean, in spots, and his acquaintance with Nietzsche's vast body of writing, published and unpublished, is impressive.

The problem possibly is that Ahern seems not to be as familiar as we would like with the natural law tradition that he seeks to incorporate or find within Nietzsche's thought, therefore not understanding Nietzsche's complex and usually adversarial relation to such a tradition. Care needs to be taken, then, that the history of this tradi-

tion be first articulated and then applied, and this demands that the commentator be something of a philosopher, one who creates a system along with Nietzsche, rather than imposing one that Nietzsche for good reason would find questionable.

Ahern focuses much attention on Nietzsche's idea of an "order of rank" of values, and finds therein a teleological pattern of thought that indeed is present in some sense and in some places. Traditional teleological, non-mechanistic philosophies abound with the view that humans have a nature that corresponds to a necessary pattern, to universals, needing to be developed through ethical and social relations and actions, and in this view there are to be found orders of rank among values and persons. Here, too, the model of health and decay fits comfortably within such a system. While Nietzsche with great regularity does utilize this notion of health and decay to characterize various ideals and to stigmatize various deformities, we must remember that Nietzsche's thought contains tensions and dichotomies that are not there as a result of inattention or philosophical ineptitude, but which go back to Nietzsche's predilection for Heraclitus and the priority that he places on becoming over being.

Clarity therefore is not gained in an exposition of Nietzsche to the extent that this tension in his thought is relaxed or eliminated, and while Nietzsche speaks often of an order of rank that invites a naturalistic interpretation, he speaks with equal force of the human as a creature who has no fixed nature, as the being that is always a question to himself. The health model is itself based on a success model of values and purposes and does not fit without enormous, probably conflicting, qualifications into the tragic outlook on the world that marks Nietzsche's philosophy from the beginning through his later theme of eternal recurrence, an outlook that is not to be replaced but to be affirmed, in his view. The real philosopher as "cultural physician" *par excellence* is Plato, and while Ahern contends incongruously (but necessarily for the success of this thesis) that for Nietzsche "life is not absurd" (p. 41), Nietzsche furiously attacks Socrates for reading life as Plato would, as organic, coherent, and governed by a hierarchy of values amenable to reason.

Ahern's emphasis on the organic, on order and priorities of values, does indeed have some relevance to Nietzsche, but unless Ahern can show how this goal-oriented, health-seeking version of Nietzsche can avoid reduction to a one-sided systematics, then Nietzsche's views cease to be complex and become merely confused. We need not reduce Nietzsche's thought to an echo of that of Plato, or of Hegel (see Kaufmann), or to being a precursor of analytical philosophy (see Danto) for it to gain our respect. Such an attempt, in fact, only makes Nietzsche less worthy of our consideration, and this should not be the fate of so significant a thinker.

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A Future for Socialism

John E. Roemer

Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1994.

178 pp.

As a major figure in the mathematical reconstruction of Marx's economics and analytical Marxism in philosophy, John Roemer has been working at the intersection of philosophy, politics, and economics for the past two decades. His project in this book is clear: to formulate the broad outline of a market socialism alternative to contemporary capitalism that is feasible under current economic conditions and thus could serve as the next step in a program of political reform. This is especially welcome at a time when even the nominally socialist parties of the West seem to have accepted their own obituaries.

Roemer's essay is divided into fifteen sections along with a technical appendix. Appropriately, the first section is devoted to a brief discussion of "what socialists want." According to Roemer, the moral vision of socialism is rooted in egalitarianism; socialists are committed to "equality of opportunity, for (1) self-realization and welfare, (2) political influence, and (3) social status" (p. 11). No effort is made to rank these items, but Roemer's own emphasis seems quite clearly to be on welfare, conceived economistically in terms of utility. This characterization of socialism is critical in setting the direction for the rest of the essay, a point I shall return to later.

From here, Roemer surveys the evolution of the idea of market socialism over the last sixty years. These sections serve as a useful introduction to the socialist calculation debate that began in the 1930s, most notably with a series of exchanges between Friedrich Hayek and Oskar Lange. According to Roemer, we are now at the fifth stage in this debate, where socialists have abandoned their commitment to public ownership of firms and accepted the necessity of market mechanisms in the setting of industrial prices. Despite these concessions on the part of its defenders, Roemer argues that market socialism remains a viable alternative, for advanced capitalist societies themselves have developed legal and institutional arrangements that can be used to solve the design problems of market socialism.

Roemer advocates a piecemeal approach to social reform based on a realistic assessment of society that takes people as they actually are. In keeping with this spirit, he proposes a model of managerial market socialism consisting of a coupon-based stock market, financing and monitoring of firms by public banks, and the sheltering of firms from state interference so that they are allowed to fail. As in capitalist markets, firms would maximize profits and be run by managers chosen by a board of directors, but ownership of those firms exceeding a specified size would be evenly distributed throughout society, though smaller firms would re-

main privately owned. Every adult citizen would be given a fixed number of coupons, and the stock of publicly-traded firms could be purchased only with these coupons, with individual investors receiving dividends in accordance with their investments. Share prices would then be used to monitor the performance of individual firms. Roemer argues that these innovations, which are to be introduced within the basic framework of the mixed economy of welfare-state capitalism, would dramatically reduce economic inequity and "public bads" (such as pollution), while at the same time preserving the dynamic efficiency of the market mechanism.

While there is much value in the concrete details of Roemer's model, it suffers at the outset from its characterization of what socialists want. It is certainly the case that egalitarianism is an important element within the socialist vision, but it should not be taken as the defining one. Instead, socialism is better conceived of as the demand for the extension of democracy from the political realm to the socio-economic; in other words, socialists want social democracy.

This is not merely a matter of sterile polemics, but a point of some consequence. First, it has significant implications for questions of institutional design. If workplace democracy (i.e., the extension of democratic forms of decision-making to the sphere of production) is the fundamental demand of socialists, then labor-managed firms are clearly preferable to those that are organized along more traditional, hierarchical lines. Further, as a matter of practical politics, it is difficult to see how a call for a coupon-based stock market, however egalitarian in construction, could inspire a movement for social change. On the other hand, the demand for democracy and the associated right to have some say and measure of control over the major social decisions affecting one's life has in the past and continues to this day to be a rallying cry for popular movements challenging illegitimate power and privilege. This issue has become all the more pressing given the way in which the globalization of the economy has strengthened the hand of capital at the expense of labor. Finally, Roemer makes a serious conceptual mistake when he separates political influence from self-realization. Clearly, the public exercise of one's reason in the political process, sufficiently broadened to include the workplace, is a central part of "the development and application of an individual's talents in a way that gives meaning to life" (p. 11), and an enriched conception of democracy captures this.

With that said, Roemer's book is still a good read as it provides a useful and provocative introduction to the literature on market socialism.

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John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism

Alan Ryan

New York: W.W. Norton and Company

448 pp.

Among the profusion of merits in Alan Ryan's *John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism* is the readability of his prose. His accessible style makes this a useful read for both scholars and the intelligent, interested, but not philosophically technical, casual reader. This is not meant to undermine the philosophical import of the text. The elements to be praised in Ryan's book are not limited to the accessibility of this professionally crafted and articulated work, but extend to the real service Ryan does for the public at large by situating this most "American" of philosophers into a wider philosophical context as a philosopher for all time, perhaps particularly for our time. He is not responsible for the resurgence of interest for Dewey's thought, but Ryan does articulate many of the reasons why Dewey's star rises in the philosophical firmament. Ryan does not accomplish his task slavishly, though the care and genuine admiration he has for Dewey as a person and as a philosopher emerges in every chapter. This book, too, plays themes in a number of different keys: biographical, philosophical, and social and political.

As an interested reader in Dewey, but not someone devoted to Dewey scholarship, I was aware of a few anecdotes about him but not informed about the general tenor of Dewey's life. So, items like his movements from Johns Hopkins to the University of Chicago, and from there to Columbia University were familiar. His participation in the commission held in Mexico City investigating the Soviet charges against Trotsky and the anecdote concerning Dewey's participation in a march for women's suffrage wielding the sign "Men Can Vote: Why Can't I?" likewise cover well-known ground for those who have had even limited knowledge of Dewey. Yet elements such as his marriage to Alice Chipman, herself an intellectually powerful person, the deaths of their two sons, Frederick and Gordon, the impacts of their deaths on the marriage, and submersion of Alice's own professional aspirations as Dewey's rose, and her subsequent embitterment, were unfamiliar biographical tidbits placing flesh on the bones of the philosopher. Additionally, elements of Dewey as a man of honor and high ethicality are evident in Dewey's defense of Russell after Russell had been sacked by the City College of New York, in spite of the fact that Russell had, on numerous occasions, savaged Dewey philosophically. Dewey's public character is solid, but Ryan makes the interesting observation that, for a philosopher who placed so much emphasis on the social, Dewey was a remarkably private person.

Philosophically, Ryan hits the high marks of Dewey's pragmatism and never makes the claim that his analysis will engage in any extensive and technical ex-

egesis. However, given such a caveat, Ryan still expresses a genuine philosophical sensitivity to Dewey's positions on the importance of and emphasis on experience, his rejection of absolute formulations, his flexible interpretation of what most people regard as truth, and the experimental and practical aspect that Dewey believed necessary to all philosophical inquiry. Ryan is able to make his exposition in a responsible manner without bogging down in a forest of details. Moreover, Ryan illustrates these philosophical elements showing their merits or demerits as a matter of philosophical practice and consistency, but, perhaps even more importantly, showing how these various philosophical stances had practical impact on philosophy, the country, and the times, whether pro-actively and positively or from a more reactive and sometimes negative position.

Dewey's political and social stances permeate every section of this book. His various positions with regard to World Wars I and II as well as his political activism between them display a person whose philosophical, moral, political, and social lives are all in concert, as contrasted with Ryan's indication of the seeming separation between Russell's philosophy and Russell's political postures. Ryan's advancement of Dewey's liberalism is a welcome reminder to us in an age where liberalism seems beset by the high tide of American conservatism that Dewey's voice very often sounded a solitary note, that this figure standing at the apex of liberalism often found it very lonely in those mountainous climes. Everyone is aware of Dewey's single-minded defense of democracy; this needs no elaboration here. Ryan makes apparent that Dewey's brand of liberalism was not so much interested in individual rights, though Dewey was not wholly insensitive to these needs, as it was concerned with a balance between individuals and a socially connected and cohesive community. This balance can be achieved, in Dewey's formulation, by intelligent, democratic problem-solving, an aspect often illustrated by Dewey's theories on education, for example. However, Ryan justifiably criticizes Dewey's abstract approach, noting that Dewey often calls for social, democratic solutions for problems without offering any kind of program for the implementation of such ideals.

Ryan's is a fine book and a necessary read for those interested in Dewey, in a renewal of liberal politics and a rebirth of the ameliorative confidence in progress and the future as outlined in Dewey's pragmatic liberalism.

Kenneth Buckman
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Eros in a Narcissistic Culture:

An Analysis Anchored in the Life-World

Ralph Ellis

Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996

265 pp.

This book is grounded on the simple premiss that we often better understand a thing when it fails to function properly than when it does. Building on ample evidence that eros is a problem in the modern world, Ellis argues that such failures enable us to grasp its meaning at a much more concrete level. In the process, Ellis affirms that an adequate understanding of love is central to a sustainable human project which is, in his view, not merely constituted by and constitutive of the individual, but constitutive socially.

In support, Ellis offers two reasons: 1) eros is essential to the makeup of conscious beings, and 2) failure to reach a coherent understanding of eros leads to a corresponding misunderstanding of ourselves. Such misunderstanding is the origin of the destructive tendencies of modern culture. Supporting these reasons sets up the two sections of the book, one descriptive of the experience of eros and the other explanatory of the erotic failure of modern culture. Ellis' intriguing arguments are breath-taking in the scope of their analyses, which range over a wide variety of fields.

Ellis argues that the essence of narcissism is self-preoccupation induced by anxiety. A self-preoccupied culture provides at best an inhospitable and at worst a corrosive climate for love, because it systematically undermines the conditions for authentic self-development. In service of his position, Ellis develops a broad-based and interdisciplinary critique of the atomistic individualism of modern culture. While a familiar subject to many, Ellis' analyses and arguments are worth taking seriously and so, critically.

Part One, "A phenomenology of the Experience of Eros" is, as it promises, a phenomenological analysis of eros that carefully avoids relying on theoretical assumptions about eros to proceed directly from the life-world toward a description and explanation of the meaning of eros. Ellis recognizes that his position is open to criticism from many different directions, and is careful to consider objections before developing his argument. First responding to modern psychology, he argues that eros cannot be reduced to need or drive reduction. Eros includes a psychic dimension. To explore this psychic dimension Ellis draws on the work of E. Levinas and T. Reik to argue that eros is an experience of both compassion (a caring about a needful other) and admiration (being admired by the other). While these two dimensions stand in an irreducible tension, Ellis argues that both are present in the transformative experience of eros. If humans are essentially interactional forms of

being, and if human consciousness consists in a complex pattern of activity rather than a static, thing-like entity, then the love relationship is the most powerful interactional vehicle through which the self achieves or attempts to achieve the transformations needed to actualize its potential as a dynamic rather than static conscious being. In fact, the notion of a static conscious being is, Ellis argues, a contradiction in terms.

Consciousness must be "pulled out of itself" by means of transformative events of which intense love relationships are the prime examples, in order to feel "fully alive," to avoid a sleepwalking form of existence or a sense of merely treading water. The need to achieve such self-transformation through an interpersonal experience structured in the way that eros is structured is prevalent in diverse cultures, yet its near universality cannot be explained as derivative from a reductive sexual drive analogous to hunger or thirst. On the contrary, transformative erotic love, by contrast to simple sexual attraction or desire for sexual gratification, must be understood in terms of a dimension of the life of conscious beings that is poorly grasped by the contemporary social sciences.

Part Two, "Eros in its Broader Existential and Cultural Context," explores the meaning of the breakdown in our understanding of love. Ellis shows how society is structured to fragment the consciousness of its members into mutually isolated compartments, so robbing each member of the opportunity to achieve the unity needed for a coherent self. Thus, the problems of narcissistic disturbance and the breakdown of existential meaning are two different aspects of the same phenomenon, and a culture (like ours) whose extreme competitiveness fosters exaggerated narcissism will both exacerbate the problem of existential meaninglessness and diminish the capacity to experience eros, because the meaning of the experience of eros is essentially tied up with the problem of achieving a sense of existential meaning in life. Exaggerated narcissism prevents one from engaging in the kinds of interactions needed to be pulled out of oneself into this kind of transformation. Thus modern culture even, while liberating itself from sexual prudery, represents a failure of eros, because its fragmentation cannot support the self-creating project of love.

Ellis controls his sources well. The book is lucidly written and carefully argued. This does not mean it is without problems. For example, his notion of consciousness as a "process," while correct, often gets tangled up in an unintended dualism that will satisfy neither essentialists or constructionists. But Ellis' book is thought-provoking and deserves a critical arena of discussion. Certainly its critical stance with regard to the erotic climate of Western culture is a positive contribution to investigations in many areas, including gender studies and cultural criticism.

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(Dates of publication are those of the editions received:
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William C. Kiefert, electrician, boat captain, and carpenter, has for twenty years read philosophy, psychology, and theology. He is completing a book, *The Practical Side Of Heaven*, with Dr. John Miller.

Michael J. Matthis received his doctor of philosophy degree in philosophy from Fordham University. He has published articles in *Philosophy Today*, *Man And World*, and *New Scholasticism* concerning Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, aesthetics, and ethical issues. He is currently a lecturer in philosophy at Lamar University and is working

on a book on the ontology of creativity.

John F. Miller III taught philosophy at North Texas for nineteen years. He is currently teaching at various colleges in the Tampa, Florida area.

Richard M. Owsley is professor and former chair of the philosophy department at the University of North Texas. He previously taught in the department of philosophy at Indiana University and Auburn University

Daniel Primozić received two degrees in philosophy from Southern Illinois University (Carbondale) and a doctorate in philosophy from the University of New Mexico. For the past twenty years, he has taught for the University of New Mexico, the University of Albuquerque, the College of Santa Fe at Albuquerque, Chapman University, UNM-Valencia, Albuquerque T-VI Community College, the Navajo Academy, and Del Mar College. In the fall of 1996, he moved to his home state of Illinois to join the department of philosophy at Elmhurst College.

Robert A. Reeves teaches part time at the University of New Mexico and T-VI. He is researching a book on the nature of Heidegger's "turn." He is also active in Albuquerque's oral poetry milieu.

James B. Sauer is associate professor of philosophy, St. Mary's University, San Antonio. He holds doctorates from Union Theological Seminary and St. Paul University (Ottawa). His specializations include ethics and social philosophy. His work has appeared in *Southwestern Philosophical Review*, *Humanomics*, *Revue Canadienne De La Philosophie*, and *Journal For Philosophy In The Contemporary World*.

Jerry L. Sherman has recently completed his doctor of philosophy degree in philosophy at the University of New Mexico, with a dissertation entitled *Fallen Reason And Value-Free Thought: A Christian-Platonist Account Of Nietzschean Thought And Nihilism*. He teaches at Albuquerque T-VI and the University of Phoenix.

William Springer is an associate professor of philosophy at the University of Texas at El Paso. His primary interests are the metaphysics of the body, aesthetics, philosophy of religion, and classical, social, and political philosophy. He has an existentialist orientation.

Lee Stauffer is assistant professor of philosophy at New Mexico Highlands Uni-

versity. She received her doctorate in philosophy from the University of New Mexico with specialization in comparative philosophy and the philosophy of science. In addition to publishing in philosophy, she has published nationally in the fields of linguistics, archaeology, and computer science.

Arthur F. Stewart received his doctorate in philosophy through Ken Ketner and the Institute for Studies in Pragmaticism of Texas Tech University in 1987. He is the director of Lamar University's Center for Philosophical Studies, which looks forward in 1997 to the fifth number in its visiting lecturers series and to the third number in its monograph series. Vanderbilt University Press will shortly bring out Dr. Stewart's *Elements of Knowledge: Pragmatism, Logic, and Inquiry* in its Vanderbilt Library of American Philosophy Series (Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr., Series Editor).

Quentin Taylor currently teaches history, government, and philosophy at Midland College. In 1992 he received a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Missouri in political theory, where he wrote his dissertation on Nietzsche's early thought. His publications include *The Essential Federalist*.

Mariam Thalos is assistant professor of philosophy at the State University of New York at Buffalo. She received her doctorate in philosophy from the University of Illinois at Chicago in 1993. Her areas of specialization include philosophy of science, philosophy of physics, philosophy of social science, metaphysics, and epistemology.

Emrys Westacott is assistant professor of philosophy at Alfred University (New York). He received his doctorate in philosophy from the University of Texas at Austin in 1995. He has published articles on ethics and metaphysics and is currently writing a book on relativism.

Yiwei Zheng is the 1996 recipient of the Larry Taylor Award. He is a graduate student at Indiana University, Bloomington. His papers have appeared and will appear in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* and *The Philosopher*.

The New Mexico and West Texas Philosophical Society 1996 Program

Host Institution – Southwest Texas University
Conference Sessions at the Driskill Hotel in Austin, Texas

FRIDAY, APRIL 12

7:00-9:00 p.m.

Citadel Club Complex

Registration and Social Hour

SATURDAY, APRIL 13

First Session

8:30-10:15 a.m.

Citadel Room 1

Arthur Stewart (Lamar University), Chair

9:05-9:40

James Sauer (St. Mary's University)

Procedural and Contextual Justification of Moral Norms

9:40-10:15

Joe Barnhart (University of North Texas)

Plantinga's Basic Belief

Citadel Room 2

Kenneth Buckman (University of Texas Pan American), Chair

8:30-9:05

James Norris (Kansas State University)

Computers, Minds, Understanding: Language And This Kinda
Fuzzy Concept Called Intentionality

9:05-9:40

William Springer (University of Texas at El Paso)

The Dual Aspect Theory of Mind-Body in the Light of
Existentialism and Emergence

9:40-10:15

Gregg Franzwa (Texas Christian University)

Descartes, Searle, and Edelman: Ontological Assumptions

Second Session
10:30-12:15 a.m.

Citadel Room 1

- 10:30-11:05 **Joe Stamey (McMurry University), Chair**
Yiwei Zheng (Indiana University)
On Hume's Theory of Self
- 11:05-11:40 **Thomas Urban (Lamar University)**
Common Sense and Objectivity
- 11:40-12:15 **Houghton Dalrymple (University of Texas at Arlington)**
Creative Anti-Realism

Citadel Room 2

- Lee Stauffer (New Mexico Highlands University), Chair**
- 10:30-11:05 **Jerry Sherman (University of New Mexico)**
Epistemological Pessimism in Nietzsche
- 11:05-11:40 **Kenneth Smith (Dallas)**
Nietzsche's Concept of Apollonian and Dionysian
- 11:40-12:15 **Michael Mathis (Lamar University)**
Nietzsche on Free Will and Becoming

Third Session
1:30-3:15 a.m.

Citadel Room 1

- 1:30-2:05 **John Haddox (University of Texas at El Paso), Chair**
Anthony Palasota (Texas Southern University)
Legal Epistemology: The Nature of Legal Knowledge in
Connectionist and Associationist Theories of Mind
- 2:05-2:40 **Lynn Fulmer (Southwest Texas State University)**
Fetuses, Violins, and Abortion

Citadel Room 2

- William Springer (University of Texas at El Paso), Chair**
- 1:30-2:05 **Kevin Dodson (Lamar University)**
Subject and Object in Kant's Moral Theory
- 2:05-2:40 **Kenneth Buckman (University of Texas Pan American)**
The Hegelianization of American Education
- 2:40-3:15 **Robert Reeves (University of New Mexico)**
On the Completion of Being and Time

Fourth Session
3:30-5:15 a.m.

Citadel Room 1

- 3:30-4:05 **Robert Reeves (University of New Mexico), Chair**
Arthur Stewart (Lamar University)
Peirce, Popper, and Putnam: Abduction, Reason, and
Consequences
- 4:40-5:15 **Stephen Schlett (University of Texas at El Paso)**
John Dewey and Social Inquiry

Citadel Room 2

- 4:05-4:40 **Gil Fulmer (Southwest Texas University), Chair**
Anne-Marie Bowery (Baylor University)
On the Road to the Good: Philosophical Ascent in the
Republic and Symposium
- 4:40-5:15 **John Miller (Florida)**
A New Logic for a New Morality

Driskill Hotel Lounge

- 5:30-6:30 **Richard Owsley (University of North Texas), Presiding**
Annual Business Meeting
- 7:00 **Dinner followed by the Presidential Address**
Richard Owsley (University of North Texas)
Philosophy: Wit, Wonder, and Wisdom

SUNDAY, APRIL 14

Fifth Session
8:30-10:15 a.m.

Citadel Room 1

- 8:30-9:05 **Jack Weir (Morehead State University), Chair**
Lee Stauffer (New Mexico Highlands University)
Is Native American Philosophy an Oxymoron?
- 9:05-9:40 **John Haddox (University of Texas at El Paso)**
Jose Vasconcelos and Aesthetic Education
- 9:40-10:15 **Mariam Thalos (Buffalo)**
The Cost of a Causal Concept of Explanation

