

ABSTRACTS

McTaggart's Synthetic A Priori Principle of the Dissimilarity of the Universe

Gary L. Cesarz

The dissimilarity of the Diverse is McTaggart's version Leibniz's "Identity of Indiscernibles" and serves as one of the fundamental principles of his pluralistic idealism. The present essay is a brief examination and defense of the principle as a genuine synthetic *a priori* truth. In the course of my examination, C.D. Broad's criticism of McTaggart's principle is reviewed and critiqued with a view to raising doubts about Broad's over-all treatment of McTaggart's philosophy and, it is hoped, rekindling a new interest in McTaggart's systematic thought.

The Ordinary View of Perception

Houghton Dalrymple

Common-sense realism, which is the ordinary view of perception, is contrasted with Lockean realism and naive realism.

Common-sense realists and Lockean realists are agreed that perceptions and perceived objects are different things and that the perceived objects are the causes of the perceptions. However, the Lockean view that the perception of objects is derived from the direct perception of sensory states is not a part of the common sense scheme. And the Lockean claims that experiences of primary qualities resemble primary qualities but experiences of secondary qualities do not resemble secondary qualities are meaningless from the standpoint of common-sense realism.

Naive realists affirm and common-sense realists deny the identity of perception and perceived object. However, in both views the qualities perceived are qualities of external objects, and the awareness of the objects is not based on the awareness of anything else.

Qualities that are discovered by means of the senses are defined in terms of sensory states that are caused by features of the objects perceived, but the quality terms refer to the causes, not to the effects. A sensory state provides information about reality only if the cause of the sensory state is the normal cause for that kind of sensory state.

The Emerging Paradigm in Environmental Philosophy

Lawrence Howe

The first part of this paper discusses the metaphysical debate that has been stimulated by biocentrism in the attempt to exact a new paradigm for environmental philosophy. In contrast to anthropocentrism which regards nature as instrumentally valuable, biocentrism seeks to establish a holistic paradigm which supports the view that nature is intrinsically valuable. The metaphysical posture of biocentrism is presented as an attempt to overcome the Cartesian paradigm of mechanistic materialism that has supported anthropocentric attitudes toward nature. The second section argues that biocentrism may not represent a fully developed paradigm, although it does typify a transitional period in the way some philosophers are beginning to evaluate our most basic assumptions about man's place in nature. It concludes that the emerging paradigm supporting biocentrism represents a "critical period," to use Khun's expression, in the history of paradigm development.

Ethics: Derived or Evolved?

Linda L. Kraeger

In *The Brothers Karamazov*, Ivan is said to hold that without belief in both God and immortality, nothing in the world would make anyone love other human beings. There exists no law of nature that human beings should love, and "if there is and has been any love on earth up to now, it has come not from natural law but solely from people's belief in their immortality, . . . so that were mankind's belief in its immortality to be destroyed, . . . any living power to continue the life of the world would at once dry up in it. Not only that, but then nothing would be immoral any longer, everything would be permitted. . . ." Furthermore, according to Ivan's argument, evil doing would be acknowledged as the most necessary and intelligent solution.


Ivan confuses a pre-human physical order of nature with a full-blown, pre-human moral order. There are physical facts the individual must take into consideration before acting. Ethical codes do not come into being inside a celestial library or council but rather in direct contact with the physical world and the human world of desires and wants. Ethics has much to do with the consequences of behavior on wants and desires, without which a so-called moral order would be pointless. In the traffic of passions, loves and desires, moral order can serve to enhance the enjoyment of life and to prevent the flow of traffic from turning into chaos. The community often affixes its own consequences to behavior just because it cannot count on an amoral nature to carry out sufficient justice or to emit the desired mercy.

A Test of Wittgenstein's Thesis About Contradiction and Trisection

Ivan L. Little

This paper shows that Wittgenstein's attitude toward contradiction seems to have been long-standing. Contradiction as a logical construction appears to close down the realm of facts for him: so when he studies geometrical proofs of impossibility, such as arbitrary angles cannot be trisected with ruler-compass, he finds an "element of prediction, a physical element" in them, and declares them to be unusable as predictions. This stricture applies then to H.S.M. Coxeter's proof against trisection: An enneagon cannot be drawn with ruler-compass. If an arbitrary angle can be trisected, so can one of 60° ; but in this case an enneagon can be drawn.

A test of Wittgenstein's thesis is carried out in Figs. 1,2,3. In Fig. 1 the three concentric circumferences, C1, C2, C3 are drawn by using the radius of C1 (designated by 'u' in Fig. 1) as the measuring unit for all radii and C-lengths. This method determines that $C1 = 1/3(C3)$, and that $C2 = 2/3(C3)$. Now it is assumed that if the Cs are cut by the 60° central angle, AOB, the arcs thus formed will have the same ratios as the Cs, i.e., $\text{Arc 1} = 1/3(\text{Arc 3})$, and $\text{Arc 2} = 2/3(\text{Arc 3})$. This assumption is confirmed by the fact that $\text{Arc 1} = 1u$, $\text{Arc 2} = 2u$, and $\text{Arc 3} = 3u$. That these ratios hold for the arbitrary angles in Figs. 2 and 3 (no longer in u-lengths), is proved below in that if Arc 2 is bisected for small angles and quadrisected for the large ones, trisections lengths are provided for Arc 3. Note that an enneagon can be drawn in C3, Fig. 1.



On the materiality of Anaximander's "Infinite"

John F. Miller III

The finite requires an Infinite Origin; the definite, and Indefinite Principle; the mortal, an Immortal Cause; life and consciousness, a Divine Source; the temporal, an Eternal Cause. This first Case, itself Divine and the most rarefied material and the very field of Space, yet *immanent* in and *interpenetrating* all things, like Heraclitus' *logos*, guides and steers the evolution of all things, though law, as Chaos becomes Kosmos. The Unformed, *to apeiron*, provides, in some mysterious way, the elements from which all else is formed. Implicit in *to apeiron* are the seeds of Heraclitus' Logos, Anaxagoras' Nous, Plato's Receptacle, Plotinus' One, Hegel's Geist, Tillich's Ground Being, Einstein's "Energy" of which mass is but an expression. How rich is Anaximander's legacy!

Anaximander's *arche* is the "Mother" from whose metaphorical "womb" all Existence is "given birth." Anaximander's *to apeiron* resembles the Orphic cosmological egg, the maternal power of Infinity, which expresses itself as the Many; and like the Egyptian Nun, Hesiod's Chaos, the Hindus' *akasha* as well as in the Vedic concept of *matritamah* (the most maternal), and Plato's Receptacle, has both a *material* and a *spatial* characterization.

But *gradations* of matter are found in the Egyptian Hermetic tradition, India's Vedic tradition, in Greece's own Orphic and Pythagorean traditions, as well as with Socrates and Plato. Only mistaken interpretations understand Anaximander's *to apeiron* as simply *physical* material.

Is Faith A Virtue?

Scot Miller

Faith is regarded as a theological virtue in the Christian tradition. Aquinas defined faith as a divinely infused habitual cognitive activity having only (the Christian) God as its proper object and salvation as its proper end. The traditional conception has three main problems. First, it appears to be a parochial virtue when placed in the pluralistic context of competing religious traditions. Second, it has been used to justify prejudice and intolerance of non-believers. Third, it comes into conflict with the demands of reason. Faith can be retrieved as a contemporary virtue when it becomes detached from its metaphysical commitments. Once liberated from its onto-theological attachments, the virtue of faith becomes the openness to the truth which is found beyond the bounds of reason.

On the Very Idea of Unapplied Ethics

Daniel T. Primozić

For some time philosophers have suspected and attacked the allegedly "specialized" field of applied ethics. This unwarranted contempt can be eradicated with a casual glance at the history of Western ethical theory. If we consider the theories of Plato, Aristotle, Epictetus, Augustine, Aquinas, Bentham, Mill and Dewey, we soon notice that the ideas of "pure" or "unapplied" ethics is oxymoronic, the idea of "applied ethics" is redundant and that the pure/applied ethics distinction is one without a meaningful difference. Even Immanuel Kant, the great lover of pure theory, falls prey to the temptation of applying his ethical theory to the cases of suicide, helping those in distress, lying about promises and letting one's talents "rust." Hence, "unapplied ethics" is possible only as a philosophically self-indulgent object of aesthetic appreciation

and, as such, is not what we mean when we use the term "ethics." Evidently, it never was.

An Analysis of Dworkin's "Double Counting" Argument

Patrick S. Rogers

Ronald Dworkin, in *Taking Rights Seriously*, argues that pure utilitarian theories for justifying political decision cannot work because they fail to treat persons with equal concern and respect. He further argues that the main appeal of utilitarianism lies in its "egalitarian cast." But if utilitarian theories fail to treat persons with equal concern and respect, then they are far from egalitarian. His main argument is that the main form of political utilitarianism—preference utilitarianism—leads to the inegalitarian "double counting" of some person's preferences. In this paper I examine Dworkin's arguments, H.L.A. Hart's responses, and offer my own criticism of Dworkin's argument.

Searle on Artificial Intelligence

Robert Skipper, Jr.

Workers in artificial intelligence (AI) can be distinguished in two ways: those who consider computers, or AI systems, as minds (strong AI theorists) and those who consider computers as models for understanding what it means to be intelligent (weak AI theorists). Searle, in *Minds, Brains, and Programs*, attempts a criticism of strong AI by claiming that computers are not intentional and, therefore, not intelligent.

It seems to me, however, that computers are intentional, that they do have goals and the ability to understand. But I am in a bind. It seems pretty clear that computers are not intelligent in the way that humans are, but they are, at the same time, intelligent. So, I am at odds with strong

AI, but I am also at odds with weak AI. My concern in "Searle on Artificial Intelligence" is to construct an argument against Searle and his notion that programmed computers are not intelligent, but remain sympathetic to his secondary thesis that computers cannot explain human intelligence. Programmed computers are intentional systems and are, therefore, intelligent, however their intelligence is qualitatively different from human intelligence and cannot explain it in the way workers in strong AI propose.

Movies and the Metaphysics of Mind

William Springer

My paper is a brief phenomenological ontology of the reality of movies, a reality whose *esse est percipi*—a reality that is only by being seen and heard, a reality that is by virtue of my being-in-the-world, i.e., that is as a modality of my body as subject. Crucial to the validity of this claim is to establish that there is a real difference between objective space and existential space and to identify existential space with perceptual space. Objective space is the space where stones and stars exist—it is world space. Perceptual space is only in so far as experience itself is. Perceptual space is a separate and distinct modality of real space, it is the space of mind.

My paper is an examination of the experience of watching a movie. I believe that a rigorous analysis of what is taking place when I watch a movie is particularly suitable to establishing the distinction between objective and perceptual space, and to the identifying of that perceptual space with what the existentialists called my being-in-the-world.

Running as a thread throughout the paper is the contention that the being of the movie is *my own experience* and thus "insubstantial" and therefore non-physical. It is thus appropriate to say that the movie exists mentally or spiritually just as I do, however embodied.

Must We Deconstruct?

Lee Stauffer

This paper will consider whether the deconstructionism of Derrida has merit or is fatally flawed. The emphasis in this paper will be on his early work, *Of Grammatology*, on the assumption that if serious problems exist within this text, the subsequent material based on the same assumptions is also likely to be flawed. In *Of Grammatology*, Derrida makes assertions about writing which can be understood as: (1) a purely linguistic theory, (2) a theory about symbol systems in general, or (3) a metaphysical theory.

Linguistically, Derrida seems to be asserting that the phonetization of writing in Western scripts has produced a "linearity" of thought leading to the law of non-contradiction, the binary character of western logic and ultimately, to a logocentric fallacy. As Derrida based this part of his theory on the work of the linguist, Gelb, whose work has been shown to be fatally flawed, Derrida's linguistic theory is likewise in error. Derrida's more general claim about the logocentric quality of symbol systems in general confuses formal and informal systems, and is thus also not supportable.

If Derrida is making the larger metaphysical claim that texts must be seen as existing only as part of a greater whole, thus presenting a sort of complementarity principle of language, his theory is still unsuccessful. His claim is certainly true in principle, but, like radical skepticism, can be shown ultimately to lead nowhere.

Contributors

Andrew Askland is an instructor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Previously he practiced law, including several years with the Public Defender Service, and served as a diplomat with the State Department, including postings to Mexico and to Bahrain. His areas of interest are political theory, philosophy of law and ethics.

Joe Barnhart teaches at the University of North Texas and is the author of eight books including *The Study of Religion and Its Meaning: New Explorations in Light of Karl Popper and Emile Durkheim*. He is currently writing two philosophical novels.

Gary Cesarz teaches at the University of New Mexico.

Houghton Dalrymple has had articles appear in *Southwest Philosophical Studies*, *Philosophical Topics* and *Contemporary Philosophy*, and has published two texts on introductory logic. His areas of specialization are British empiricism, philosophy of mind, and action theory. He has taught at McMurry University, Auburn University, the University of North Texas and the University of Texas at Arlington. He now resides in Arlington, Texas.

Kevin Dodson is Assistant Professor of philosophy at Lamar University. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst in 1991. He specializes in social and political philosophy and the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and is currently working on a study of Kant's political theory.

John H. Haddox is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas at El Paso and has published widely, mainly in the areas of Latin American and Native American thought.

Lawrence W. Howe is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of West Florida. He has published articles in the areas of metaphysics, logic and history of philosophy. Currently he is doing research in the area of environmental philosophy.

Peter Hutcheson is Associate professor of Philosophy at Southwest Texas State University. He specializes in phenomenology and has written articles in epistemology, philosophy of science, history of philosophy, and philosophy of religion.

Linda Kraeger is Instructor of English at Grayson College, Denison, Texas and is co-author of *Dostoevsky on Evil and Atonement* and "The God-Nature Relationship in Dostoevsky's Personalism" in *Scottish Journal of Religious Studies* and has authored a number of other papers dealing with themes and issues in Dostoevsky.

Ivan Little for many years until his retirement taught and was an administrator at Texas Tech University.

John Miller taught at The University of North Texas for nearly twenty years. He is living now in Tampa, Florida, and he is working on a book on the evolution of world views. He teaches occasionally with the University of South Florida and Hillsborough Community College.

Scot Miller has been an Instructor of Philosophy at Hardin-Simmons University and Adjunct Instructor at McMurry University since 1990. He is currently completing his doctoral dissertation on *Virtue in Meister Eckhart* at Boston University.

Wayne D. Owens is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Incarnate Word College. His primary interests are Contemporary Continental Philosophy and Asian Philosophy.

Richard Owsley is Professor and former Chair of Philosophy at the University of North Texas. He previously taught in the Departments of Philosophy at Indiana University and Auburn University.

Daniel T. Primozić has taught at New Mexico University at Albuquerque, Chapman University, Albuquerque T-VI and the College of Santa Fe at Albuquerque. Presently he is Program Director and Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Del Mar College in Corpus Christi, Texas.

Robert A. Reeves teaches part-time at the University of New Mexico and writes fiction as well as philosophy.

Patrick S. Rogers received his M.A. in philosophy from Texas Tech University in 1992, and is currently pursuing the Doctoral degree in Philosophy at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. His main interests in Philosophy are in the areas of Social Philosophy (broadly construed) and Peirce. He is currently working on articles on the Political theories of Hart and Dworkin

and on the definition of "property" in Locke's political and epistemological writings.

Jerry L. Sherman is a graduate student and teaching assistant at the UNM Department of Philosophy. He is beginning a dissertation on Augustine's Christian Platonism as applied to contemporary epistemology. His MA thesis was "Value Conflict: Christian Platonism's Explanation of the Modern Tendency to Deny the Reality of Value Experience," 1991. He presented a paper, "Reason to Be Moral," at the Second annual Intermountain Regional Meeting of the Society of Christian Philosophers, Provo, Utah, March 13, 1993.

Robert Skipper, Jr. is a graduate student studying philosophy and computer science at Texas Tech University. Currently, he is doing research in artificial intelligence, concentrating on the foundations of intelligent machines. His areas of specialization are the philosophy of mind, philosophical psychology and ancient metaphysics.

William Springer is an erstwhile seminarian who lived overseas for seven years in Europe, the Middle East and South America. He teaches philosophy at the University of Texas at El Paso. His primary interests are the ontology of the human body, aesthetics and the philosophy of religion.

Joseph D. Stamey is Professor of Philosophy at McMurry University, Adjunct Professor at Hardin Simmons University and in the Course of Study School at the Perkins School of Theology at SMU, and has authored or co-authored several books, including *Exploring Religious Meaning* and *Exploring Christianity*, both published by Prentice-Hall.

Lee Stauffer holds the position of Assistant Professor of Philosophy at New Mexico Highlands University. She received her doctorate in philosophy from the University of New Mexico with specialization in comparative philosophy and the philosophy of science. In addition to publishing in philosophy, she has published nationally in the fields of linguistics, archaeology and computer science.

Arthur Stewart received his Ph.D. in 1987 through the Institute for Studies in Pragmaticism at Texas Tech University. He has taught at Texas Tech, San Antonio College, Southwest Texas State University and Lamar University. active as an author and editor, he became an Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the Department of English and Foreign Languages at Lamar in the Fall of 1991. He is the director of the Institute for Philosophical Studies at Lamar. His book

Elements of Knowledge: Introductory Lectures on Pragmatism and Philosophy of Knowledge will be published in 1994 by Kendall/Hart, Dubuque, Iowa.

Chandrashekhara Veera is a graduate student in philosophy at Texas Tech University studying for his Masters. He obtained a Master of Arts degree in Linguistics from the University of Bombay, India in 1989. His interests include Semiotics, Philosophy of Language and Linguistic Methodology. He hopes to pursue philosophy at the doctoral level in the near future.

Troy Williamson is a graduate student at Texas Tech University. He completed his baccalaureate degree in philosophy at Texas Tech in May 1992 and will complete his master's degree in August 1993. Mr. Williamson has been a member of the New Mexico & West Texas Philosophical Society for three years.

**The New Mexico and West Texas
Philosophical Society—1993 Program**

Host Institution — College of Santa Fe

Friday Evening, April 16, 1993

(St. Francis Hotel, 210 Don Gaspar Ave., Santa Fe, New Mexico)
REGISTRATION AND SOCIAL HOUR, (no host bar) 7:30—10 PM

Saturday, April 17, 1993

FIRST SESSION 8:30 - 10:15 AM

Conference Room at St. Francis Hotel

John Miller (Tampa), On the Materiality of Anaximander's "Infinite"	8:30—9:05
Troy Williamson (TTU), Socrates and Aristotle on Courage	9:05—9:40
Donald Morrison (Rice), Aristotle's Theory of Degrees of Being	9:40 - 10:15

**Acoma Room at Inn at Loretto
211 Old Santa Fe Trail**

William Springer (UTEP), Movies and the Metaphysics of Mind	8:30 - 9:05
Audry McKinney & Jeffrey Gordon (SWTSU), Love or Lust: The Puritan's Dilemma	9:05 - 9:40

SECOND SESSION 10:30 - 12:15

Conference Room, St. Francis Hotel

Dennis Ronatyn (U San Diego), The Subjective Turn	10:30 - 11:05
Kevin Dodson (Lamar U), Kant's Idea of History	11:05 - 11:40

Kenneth Buckman (UTPanAm), Against the Rights of Children: An Hegelian Interpretation	11:40 - 12:15'
---	----------------

Acoma Room, Inn at Loretto

Ivan Little (TTU), A Modest Test of Wittgenstein's Thesis that Contradiction is Unusable as a Prediction that the Classical Trisection Problem Will Never Be Solved	10:30 - 11:05
Glenn Joy (SWTSU), Alternative Sets of Rules for Testing Syllogisms	11:05 - 11:40
Jerry Sherman (UNM), Algorithm and Antinomy	11:40 - 12:15

THIRD SESSION 130 - 3:15

Conference Room, St. Francis Hotel

Fred G. Sturm (UNM), Epistemology and Socio- Political Theory in the Thought of Andrés Bello (1781-1865)	1:30 - 2:05
John Haddox (UTEP), Francisco Romero's Philosophy of the Person of Culture	2:05 - 2:40
Lawrence Howe (U of W Fla), The Emerging Paradigm in Environmental Philosophy	2:40 -3:15

Acoma Room, Inn at Loretto

Daniel Primozic (Del Mar Col), On the Very Idea of Unapplied Ethics	1:30 - 2:05
Joseph Stamey (McMurry U), A Comprehensive Approach to Ethics: Rereading Kant	2:05 - 2:40
Patrick Rogers (TTU), An Analysis of Dworkin's "Double Counting" Argument	2:40 - 3:15

FOURTH SESSION 3:30 - 5:15

Conference Room, St. Francis Hotel

Houghton Dalrymple (UTArI), The Ordinary View of Perception	3:30 - 40:05
Arthur Stewart (Lamar U), Objectivity in Peirce's Pragmatism: Five Consequences of Relativism	4:05 - 4:40
Chandrashekhar Veera (TTU), The "Object" in Peirce's Semiotic	4:40 - 5:15

Acoma Room, Inn at Loretto

Richard Owsley (UNT), Georg Simmel: Modernism
and Phenomenology 3:30 - 4:05
Wayne Owens (Incarnate Word Col), Heidegger
and Ordinary Language Philosophy 4:05 - 4:40
Lee Stauffer (NMHU), Must We Deconstruct? 4:40 - 5:15

BUSINESS MEETING Peter Hutcheson, Presid. 5:30 - 6:30

ANNUAL BANQUET St. Francis Hotel 7:00 PM
Followed by Presidential Address by Peter Hutcheson
Vincent Luizzi, SWTSU, Presiding

Sunday, April 18 8:30 - 12:15

FIFTH SESSION

Conference Room, St. Francis Hotel

Joe Barnhart (UNT), Perfection Per Se 9:05 - 9:40
Scot Miller (Hardin-Simmons), Is Faith a
Virtue? 9:40 - 10:15

Acoma Room, Inn at Loretto

Linda Kraeger (Grayson County Col), Ethics:
Derived or Evolved 8:30 - 9:05
Andrew Askland (UColorado), A Justification of
Compensation to Descendants of Wronged
Parties: An Intended Analogy 9:40 - 10:15

SIXTH SESSION

Conference Room, St. Francis Hotel

Gary Cesarz (State of NM), McTaggart's Synthetic
a priori Principle of the Dissimilarity
of the Diverse 10:30 - 11:05
Robert Reeves (UNM), The Presentation of Philosophy:
Who Are We Talking to? 11:05 - 11:40
Charles Harriman (CSF), Art on the Defensive 11:40 - 12:15

ADJOURNMENT