

HETEROTOPIAS, METALOGICS, AND ORDER: THE
PHILOSOPHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF SAMUEL DELANY'S
TRITON

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ABSTRACT

Samuel Delany's novel, *Triton*, is a highly imaginative, innovative, and entertaining view of the future which presents both an unusual structure--a juxtaposition as well as blending of both fictional, non-fictional, and philosophical elements--and an unusual purpose--the creation of what its author terms "an ambiguous heterotopia." By means of and within the context of this heterotopia, Delany challenges our assumptions about gender, identity, and the classifications that result from their linking, and such challenging reveals the philosophical significance of the text. The *Triton* novel's concern with gender is contained within Delany's larger concern with order and with the processes by which humans perceive and create order. Both form and content of the work provide the reader an opportunity to experience a reality in which, as Michel Foucault would say, "the mode of being of things and the order that divided them up before presenting them to the understanding [is] profoundly altered." Related to Delany's notions of order is that of metalogics, defined in the novel as any reasoning process deviating from strict, deductive logic. Linked to other philosophical elements in the text, metalogics represents the method by which the reader must approach *Triton* to understand its contour and import. Fictionally, *Triton* offers a broader range of

possibilities for "generating data" than would a traditional fictional enterprise; philosophically, *Triton* generates a way of thinking about gender, about identity, about order, and about their interrelation that marks it, as one critic has asserted about Delany's work in general, as the "best controversy-provoking-science fiction in its written forms."

HERESY UNDER THE MEDICAL MODEL

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ABSTRACT

The medical model has pernicious consequences when extended to the realm of beliefs and ideas. It labels heresy as contamination to be exterminated and the agent of heresy as defilement to be expelled from the camp. Sidney Hook, distinguishing heresy from conspiracy, would remove the latter from the academic community but encourage the thriving of heresy. Plato seemed to have used the medical model, thinking of philosophy as a purification process. This model encourages the treatment of error as a contamination of the social and political body, heresy having no use and treated as a pollutant.

PRIVACY AND THE RIGHT THEREIN

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ABSTRACT

The discussion of certain rights has long been a salient topic to many philosophers. Most rights are derived from a transaction or a constitution. This paper suggests that privacy derives its source from a natural human condition. This condition is what I term the core of humanness. This core is composed of uniqueness, self-interest, autonomy, and dignity. Surrounding this core lies an area of conflicting interests. This is the area of permeation. In this area the interests of individuals and of society are balanced based on the circumstance. Past the area of permeation, we find the realm of the public's interest in information. The balancing that occurs at these levels take into account intention, reasonableness, and relationship of two entities in conflict.

In terms of rights, two types of rights exist: general and specific. A general right is always present for the individual unless he engages in a transaction or a relationship. This is a natural right which can only be violated when we choose to engage in situations that might make us vulnerable. A specific right occurs when one chooses to enter into a transaction or a relationship. Based on the situation, one may waive a portion of his or her right to privacy. A specific right to privacy protects what has not been waived. A specific right suggests privacy in a certain context.

NATIVE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY:
ITS PRESENT AND PERENNIAL VALUE

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ABSTRACT

Native Americans have been largely neglected in academic circles, with a few exceptions, and their philosophies have been almost completely ignored.

However, because of the author's personal background with an Indian tribe, he has been especially interested in studying the truth, value, and relevance of American Indian thought.

A difficulty with such studies appears to result from the wide variety found among Native Americans. Among the three hundred tribes are quite diverse histories, customs, traditions, and cultural achievements. Yet the area where most unanimity exists seems to be precisely that of philosophy--with many ideas and values widely shared by members of different tribes.

Finally, after an examination of some reasons for the importance of a consideration of viewpoints alternative to traditional Western thought, a number of American Indian philosophical positions are presented.

THEY WILL: A REPLY TO RADFORD ON
'I WILL, IF YOU WILL'

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ABSTRACT

This discussion note deals with Colin Radford's analysis of the expression 'I Will, If You Will' (*Mind* vol. 93 Oct. 1984, pp. 577-583) in the context of a two-party conversation. Each individual utters the remark, and it seems that they have agreed that *they will* (hence the title of the paper). But the statement logic (*SL*) analysis of the brief conversation yields a paradox:

For $(q \rightarrow p)$ and $(p \rightarrow q)$ yields $p \leftrightarrow q$ but not p and q . But it is only p and q which expresses the agreement between A and B that they will. For $p \leftrightarrow q$ is true when neither A nor B will! Our intuitive understanding of A and B's conversation is not preserved by our attempt to translate it into a notation which employs the material conditional ' \rightarrow '. (p. 577)

The origin of the puzzle is in Radford's formalization of the sentences. He wants us to abstract 'I will' when A says it *and* when B says 'you will' as 'p'; plus the statement to which A hopes B will assent with uttering 'I will' *and* A would express as 'you will' as 'q'. Such extensive cross-referencing produces a structural

vagueness where 'p' and 'q' take on multiple roles--the two roles above. In *SL*, cross-reference impedes truth-functionality.

The only way to capture the phenomenon of cross-referencing and to preserve truth-functionality is to abstract the conversation into predicate logic (*PL*). Several strategies are discussed, but one in particular emerges as the best--the pronominal cross-referencing conditionals employing a universal quantifier to cover the domain. A possible candidate is the following sentence uttered by a third party:

C: If anyone will, those two will.

Or if uttered by A or B: If anyone will, we will.

Conditionals like these two have a pronominal cross-reference from the consequent back to the quantity term in the antecedent. In *PL*, pronominal cross-reference is accomplished by letting one quantifier bind several variables. Hence, the above conditional uttered by C would be simply rendered as '(w) (Ww--"Ww)' is the best abstraction of A and B's agreement, where the variable 'w' represents A and B in a two member domain in the process of instantiation. Also, we have no puzzle, and 'our intuitive understanding' (Radford's phrase) is preserved in translating the conversation into a notation which employs the material conditional.

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