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I count myself lucky to be a member of a society as supportive as the New Mexico Texas Philosophical society and to have colleagues willing to volunteer their time toward making *Southwest Philosophical Studies* successful.

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We Are Who We Were: A Case for Understanding History through the Lens of Personhood

Anthony Cashio
The University of Virginia's College at Wise

Presidential Address

I: Charleston, South Carolina

On June 17, 2015, a young man walked into a prayer service at Emanuel A.M.E. Church in Charleston, South Carolina and opened fire slaying nine people. The murders, we found out, were explicitly racially motivated. "I have to do it," the gunman was quoted as saying before he fired. "You rape our women and you're taking over our country. And you have to go" (Ellis). Across the country communities confronted the horror of these events with the question: "what kind of *person* could do such a thing?" In the aftermath of the attack, journalist began to uncover photos of the shooter posing with the Confederate battle flag and making claims about starting another Civil War. Quickly the confusion and hurt over the attack turned into outrage about the history and values represented by the Confederate battle flag. Newspapers and websites were filled with debate about the flag and its history.[1] Many saw the celebration of the Confederate battle flag, especially the fact that it was (and is) still flown over many state capital buildings, as a reminder and glorification of America's cruel racial history. Defenders, on the other hand, held (and still hold) the old position that the confederate flag is a Celebration of southern heritage, not a declaration of hate.

Despite the contentious nature of the disagreement, both sides seemed to agree that it was the *history* of what the flag represented that was the important issue. Both sides of the debate over the history of the Confederate flag agreed on two implicit premises: 1) that history is a defining feature of a community and its members, and 2) that history can be morally evaluated. The murders in Charleston

are an extreme case that demonstrates that a person's relationship with a specific historical narrative is one of the main determining factors of the values, and thus actions, that constitute personhood and the morality of a community. While this might seem like a fairly innocuous insight, when the actions of a person lead to killing, mutilation, and enslavement of other persons, the relationship between personhood and the moral effects of history is certainly worth exploring.

The tragedy in Charleston presents a case study of a more general philosophical idea: History forms and informs our thought and values by showing how the past is revelatory of the present and the possibilities available to the future. It reveals how those values both create and embed the person in moral communities. Our personal and communal values are informed by and infused with history. To the extent that being a person involves acting in the world as a valuing creature, all of our moments are full of and trained by our history. By turning to our own histories, we can have a richer understanding about *why* we value *what* we value. That is, by looking to the history of a community we can ask not only why we think something is good or just, but also whether or not we *ought* to think that way.[2]

I contend that the ability to think and act within a narrative historical framework is a defining characteristic of personhood. While many approaches to the philosophical position called personalism make a similar argument, by emphasizing the dialogical relationship between personhood and history the hope is to open many new and fruitful veins for analysis. Exploring the historical dimensions of personhood and the personal dimensions of history illuminates three key points: First, history is a key to understanding the temporal structure of personhood. Second, the historical nature of a person's relationship to their communities is fundamental. Any being that operates within a history will likely understand themselves as a part of a community, though not reducible to that community. And finally, drawing on the previous points we have a tool for the evaluation of the moral dimensions of the study of history.

Today I aim to accomplish three things. First, I want to discuss, in broad strokes, the philosophical position known as personalism. Personalism, as I will try to demonstrate is a philosophy of relationships that avoids the reification implicit in both collectivism and individualism. It provides groundwork for understanding a person's deep relationship to their communities and vice versa. Next, I will explore the narrative function of history in understanding the temporal dimensions of personhood. Through an analysis of history, we can both understand and respond to the legacy of our inheritance as members of the moral community. Third, examining the importance of history to community and persons leads to an analysis of the relationship historical between narrative and moral values. It is through influence of narrative structures that we can judge a given history as uplifting or diminishing, good or bad, helpful or unhelpful.

II: Why Personalism? Which Personalism?

As a philosophical approach, personalism is uniquely situated to assess the relationships between history, community, and personhood and provides the groundwork for the development of a moral evaluation of values expressed and perpetuated by a community. Personalism is an insightful and powerful philosophy providing the groundwork of many of the important social and political movements such as the American Civil Rights movement. Sadly, personalism does not currently have a celebrated or influential place in much academic work. (I confess that one of my goals today is to not only explore some of the more important relations between personhood and history, but to introduce and/or sell you on personalist philosophy.) Given personalism's historical and social influence and its explanatory power, it is a philosophy that deserves more academic consideration that it usually receives.[3]

Personalism is an approach to philosophical problems that takes the category of "person" as primary. There are many different versions of personalism but in general there are a few points of commonality. As Jonas Mortensen aptly notes, personalism holds to the ideas that, "Humans are relational … humans are beings that engage … humans have inherent dignity" (Mortensen 16).[4] One of personalism's strengths, Joseph Selling notes, is that it relies upon a description of the person that is culturally and historically contextualized (Selling 60ff). As such, personalism is "continuously open to new experience and insight" (61).[5] By giving supreme value to the person, a personalist philosophy fights against any attempt to reduce or objectify the personal subject to an impersonal object. This demand, that all persons be granted the dignity and respect that they deserve, is, perhaps, the greatest contribution of any version of personalism.[6]

Personalism is not usually systemic or doctrinal philosophy, but rather a unique philosophical approach and style. Personalist philosophical positions can be found in the American philosophical tradition, the European tradition, and has a long history in Eastern, particularly Indian, thought. All approaches begin with the premise that it is the person, as a philosophical concept, that is the foundation for ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, politics, and so on. The personalism I am drawing on today is particularly influenced by the French Catholic thinkers Jacques Maritain and Emmanuel Mounier. With its emphasis on the fundamental dignity of the person, personalism is often associated with religious traditions. I hold however that there is nothing necessarily religious about personalism. The vision of community and person I am articulating aims to reflect a more secular vison.

Personalist philosophies usually present analysis on two levels. First, it articulates what it means to be a person. Second, it explores some of the consequences of this understanding of personhood. What then is a person? The term "person" is often used to distinguish human life from animal life.[7] This is the

idea that there is something unique or sacred about human life that sets it spiritually apart from other forms of existing. I side with many other personalists that this is a misunderstanding of what we connote by the term "person." Mounier argues:

> There are not, then, stones, trees, animals—and persons, the last being like mobile trees or a more astute kind of animal. The person is not the most marvelous object in the world, nor anything else that we can know from the outside. It is the one reality that we know and that we are at the same time fashioning from within. (Mounier xvii)

"Person" is also often used synonymously with "human." This too is misleading. "Human" refers to a biological reality while "person" refers to a way of being in the world. Most, if not all, humans are persons, but the term "person" is not necessarily for humans alone. Finally, we often think of person as synonymous with "individual" in a Lockean sense. This claim, that the person is ontologically and ethically distinct from all other forms of existence, is also antithetical to most forms of personalism.[8]

I will here use "person" or "personal" as a designation for (1) A type of relationship and (2) The type of existence capable of having these relationships. A person is recognized through at least three relationships: The self-relationship, the other-relationship, and the community-relationship. First, a person is capable of recognizing their own personhood. This subjective awareness is the core of the self-relationship. The ability for subjective self-awareness does not mean that the person is always, or ever, self-aware only that they could be capable of understanding themselves as a person. That is, a person could understand themselves as a being with unique interests, values, and relationships as more than just an object in the world. In their confrontation with their own existing, a person struggles to comprehend the meaning, order, and purpose of that existing. Through this grappling with their own personhood the person finds themselves. We can recognize along with Mounier that a person "is the living activity of self-creation, of communication and of attachment, that grasps and knows itself, in the act, as the *movement of becoming personal*" (Mounier xviii). The inter-subjectivity of the person is necessary but not sufficient for personhood. Indeed, an incomplete view of a person reduces personhood to only this subjectivity. Many philosophies recognize the importance of this self-relationship while failing to recognize that the person, through that the very self-relating of the self to the self, always contains the persons' relationship to others. In the "I" we do not find Cartesian solipsism but the whole universe.

This other-relating is the second personal relationship. A person is one that recognizes the personhood of the other. And in turn, has their personhood recognized by the other. This relationship, the struggle and striving to both recognize and be recognized by others is the key to a personalist ethic. Martin

Buber's distinction between the "I-It" and "I-thou" is a paradigm example of this type of other-relationship. The "I" for Buber is never spoken alone. It is either the "I" that recognizes an object, an "it," or, it is an "I" that recognizes the fully unique subjectivity of the other, the "thou" or "you." Objective relationships of the "I-it" are natural and necessary for functioning in the world. However, when we encounter others through an "I-it" relationship we objectify them and in so doing objectify ourselves.[9] Genuine personal relationships do not reduce others to mere objects but recognize them as full struggling beings. Objectifying others, treating them only as means to our ends, objectifies the self. We can only truly have ourselves as persons when we open ourselves up and encounter others in the deep complexity of their own personhood. The first relationship, self-relating, can only really happen through having personal relationships with others. And the personal relationship can only occur between persons that achieve personhood through their relationships. Depersonalizing others, reducing them to objects; seeing them only as providing a service; or reducing them to their race, social status, religion, etc. causes genuine harm to all. It depersonalizes not only the other, but also the one doing the depersonalizing and diminishes the complexity, possibility, and availability of values in the communities in which those persons live, work, and find meaning.

The third personal relationship is communal. A person is a member of a moral community. And, a moral community is a community of persons existing in relation with each other. This explanation is not, however, as circular as it seems. Rather, a person and the moral community are co-generative: where there is personhood there is community and vice versa. Communities help to form, sustain, and perpetuate persons. Persons in their turn form, sustain, and perpetuate community. It should be noted that while persons grow from communities and communities come from persons, neither is reducible to the other. Both the community and the person are wholes. The community is not simply a collection of individuals but is itself a unique whole with its own goods towards which it is striving. Jacques Maritain notes:

> The common good of the city is neither the mere collection of private goods, nor the proper good of a whole which, like the species with respect to its individuals or the hive with respect to its bees, relates the parts to itself alone and sacrifices them to itself. (Maritain 50-51)

The other two relationships condition and are conditioned by their communities. A community is always a community of persons and a person is always in a relationship to the self and other through the community.

Arguing along these lines most forms of personalism advocate for a communitarian political philosophy. Personalism rejects both atomic individualism that treats the individual as distinct from the community, and

collectivism which reduces the person to the will of the community. Mortensen explains this position:

> Personalism emphasizes the individual's freedom and responsibility for his or her own life while simultaneously stressing how humans can practice this responsibility only in relation to others. Conversely, community may never take precedence over the individual. (Mortensen 17)

While members of a community may contribute towards the common good, each person's ends or goals may be at odds with the communal good. This difference between communal good and individual good helps to account, in part, the actions of those like the Charleston shooter that seem to be acting against the common good.

In so far as personalism understands reality and experience through the category of "person", its fullest application would be to the universe as a whole. Emmanuel Mounier refers to this as the "Personalist universe." The universe as we know it is shot-through with personality and personhood at every level, "The person … is the one reality that we can know ... Present everywhere, it is *given* nowhere" (Mounier xvii). On Mounier's account the person is not added substance or transcendental reality underlying experience but is the embodied activity of becoming personal. This activity occurs through and is expressed in the persons relationships with themselves, others, and their community.

Mounier's understanding of personhood as an act and a process helps to situate a personalist understanding of history and community. Emphasizing the person as a being that has a history is compatible with nearly all approaches to personalism. By showing that a person is a being that operates within history we can make an important distinction between a person and an individual. Any being that works within a history will always understand themselves as a part of a community (but again, not reducible to that community.)[10] The emphasis on the historical dimension helps to explain the important moral features of the person without a necessary appeal to transcendent or religious claims. Membership in a moral community involves the recognition that our ideas, actions, desires, and values are deeply conditioned by our communal relationships. It also involves the realization that while we may be the inheritors of a moral tradition we are not limited to that inheritance. The burden of inheritance is not in mimicking the values and traditions of the community but to challenge and critique those values and in so doing grow the moral community and revitalize the communities' traditions. Unfortunately, growth is not always the result the relation between person and community, as we have seen time and again the result can be depersonalization and diminishing. As such, understanding the role of history in the construction of personal and communal narratives is one of the primary tasks of explicating a personalist ethic.

Finally, as has been demonstrated many times, personalism is a philosophy of action.[11] This is perhaps personalism's greatest strength. Personalism, as I outline it here, is compatible with many other popular philosophies while at the same time providing a point of critique against the most academic and insular philosophies that lead to a depersonalization of the philosophical project.[12] The danger with the depersonalization of philosophy is that it leads to systematic injustice—racism, sexism, and so on—in philosophy as an academic discipline and in the community at large. That is to say, personalism does not just look good on paper, but is a philosophy that encourages and even demands action. "A personalism that was content with speculation about the structure of the personal universe would belie its name," Mounier chides 97).

III: Personalist History

Following the rough sketch of personalism and personal relationships laid out here, it follows that an analysis of the ethical impact of a given historical narrative will emphasize the personal-communal relationship. The approach to history I am presenting pulls from several sources but in particular the work of both Ernst Cassirer and Alasdair MacIntyre. Odd bedfellows perhaps, but their understandings of history are quite compatible, and when taken together are consistent with a personalist philosophy. Cassirer's symbolic forms explain how history is written (literally and metaphorically) and how it functionally informs how the person and community relate. MacIntyre's narrative understanding of history provides criteria by which history can further be evaluated and deepens the ethical implications of a community's history.

An understanding of history as a symbolic form of culture relates the past to the present and the person to the community. In his *An Essay on Man* Ernst Cassirer presents a vision of history as a shared object in the memory of a culture. Following Ortega y Gasset, Cassier notes that history undermines any static view of human nature putting Cassirer's approach to symbolic forms in line with personalist philosophies such as Mounier's. Ortega captures the spirit of this approach when he declares, "*Man, in a word, has no nature; what has is…history.* Expressed differently what nature is to things, history, *res gestate*, is to man" (Ortega y Gasset 217-218).

From the personalist perspective it is clear that history plays an important role in defining community. Mounier goes so far as to call human history "the common destiny of mankind" (Mounier 79). All history is *our* history. Mounier argues, "If persons were no more than free and spontaneous individualities and strictly separate, they would not have *a* history, in the singular, there would only be many incommunicable histories. History exists because humanity is *one*" (ibid.) Of course, the idea of "common destiny" is a bit too fatalistic for personalism. While history is common and communal, its meaning is not made up in advance. History

might tell us who we are, but it never dictates who we must be. It opens up paths and possibilities to the future, but "history can only be the co-creation of free [persons] men, and whatever its structure or its condition may be, freedom has again to take them in hand" (ibid.).

History, then, is an empirical study of past cultures, in an attempt to better understand the self. This is what Cassirer calls the paradox of history. History presents itself as the objective knowledge of the past. But, the act of judgment by the historian means that all history is suffused with subjectivity. History that is too subjective is dangerous and misleading, yet one that is perfectly dispassionate is dead and empty. The historian works in the ground between the empirical and the poetic, bringing her "poetic spirit" to bear on the past, impregnating it with all the possibilities and personalities of her culture. "Poetry is not a mere imitation of nature;" Cassirer writes, "history is not a narration of dead facts and events. History as well as poetry is an organon of our self-knowledge, an indispensable instrument for building up our human universe" (Cassirer 206). History is enlivened and deepened by this dual nature. It provides access to the inner life of the person and at the same time insight into the culture and community of which that person is a part. And, the person is always a unique expression of a moral community and as such has a moral claim upon the whole.

In this tension between what we are, what we will be, and all our present relations, history is revelatory of the temporal structure of personhood. In history, we find the symbolic form of understanding that best represents the person's orientation as both individual and communal. A full account of personhood and community must always have an important place for history, for it is history that best symbolizes the temporal structure of the person. In the mode of the present we have access only to the person as individual. We do not have immediate access to the thoughts and emotions of our fellows.[13] History, on the other hand, is full of the experience of others. We must turn back and remember, so to speak, to have access to those persons, who contribute to our personhood, enrich our present, and add to the possibilities for our future. As such, historical narratives are necessary ground for both other-relationships and communal-relationships by providing access to the moral community in unique and essential ways.

This is the orientation of the person in time. The actions of the present are always taking up the past and moving towards the future. History follows the same pattern; it pulls from the past the entirety of the cultural possibilities it finds there and brings them full-bloom into the present.[14] In history, we find a symbolic form that gives us contact to both axes of the person: the axis of the culturally developed person who finds within herself the world of which she is a part, and the person who is free to critique and address the constraints of her culture. Through history a person both comprehends the source of many of their values and actions and is able to critique and respond to those histories.

IV: Living Traditions

History is one of the means by which a community comes to reflect upon itself, know itself, create and recreate itself. The historian in narrating, composing, and presenting a history suffuses history with personality. History is always personal—to the historian, to the community that bases its values on given historical facts, and to the persons that takes up histories as part of a unifying personal narrative.[15] Since history is essential to the integration and formation of concrete personalities it must be understood and undertaken as a deeply and profoundly ethical activity.

MacIntyre lays out clear lines for the assessment of traditions and histories on ethical lines. He takes the position that "man is in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal. He is not essentially, but becomes through his history, a teller of stores that aspire to truth" (MacIntyre 216). Narrative histories unify the person at three levels: action, personal identity, and community tradition. For MacIntyre all three have "a basically historical character" (212). This historical character is marked by *both* a feeling of unpredictability and teleology, "like characters in a fictional narrative we do not know what will happen next, but nonetheless our lives have a certain form which projects itself towards our future" (216). MacIntyre's narrative understanding of history is in line with the personalist understanding of history I have presented here.[16]

Passing moral judgment on a person's actions involves understanding the person's intentions. And the key to understanding a person's intentions is found within the framework that makes "those intentions intelligible" (MacIntyre 206). MacIntyre locates this framework in narrative history, "Narrative history … turns out to be the basic and essential genre for the characterization of human actions" (208). While intelligibility of action can be found in many contexts, the most familiar type is the conversation. A conversation, to be experienced as a conversation, must be *experienced* as a intelligible whole.[17] All personal relationships are made vital and active in the act of conversation. We converse with ourselves, with others, and with the community. And in those acts the personal relationships grow and thrive or wither and die. MacIntyre asserts, "Conversation, understood widely enough is the form of human transactions in general" (MacIntyre 211).[18]

Narrative history is a form of conversation and manifests at the level of self, community, and setting. To understand the actions of others, to render them intelligible, we must place them in historical contexts. We ask, how does the person understand what they are doing? What is the history of the setting in which they are acting? Any particular action is always understood and placed within these overlapping and nested histories. "Action," MacIntyre observes, "itself has a basically historical character" (MacIntyre 212). In our own lives and actions we are always living out a narrative and explaining our actions in terms of that

narrative. A person here is both actor and author. But, we are never solitary in our acting or creating. Our narratives are always embedded in and overlapping with the narratives of others. Each person's particular narrative history, each person, constrains others and in this struggle the communal narrative history emerges as a whole different from its parts (214) Mounier notes, "If persons were no more than free and spontaneous individualities and strictly separate, they would not have *a* history, in the singular, there would be only so many incommunicable histories. History exists because humanity is one" (Mounier 79). This unity of the community through history informs how we render actions intelligible. Any action then must always be understood within the context of a given history. "An action is a moment in a possible or actual history or in a number of such histories. The notion of a history is as fundamental a notion as the notion of an action. Each requires the other," explains MacIntyre (214).

History is an enacted narrative in which the actors are also the authors. One important consequence of this connection between action in the present and the history that renders the action intelligible is that an understanding of history is essential for an understanding of a value. The seeking of a universal good, whether by person or community, is always in relation to a particular moral inheritance. The person on this account is a unity of relations embedded in multiple nested narratives. In seeking their own good, their own end, the person is attempting to understand what makes them a unique whole. This quest for the good ties together the present, the past, the person, and the moral community. MacIntyre argues, "the good life for man is the life spent in seeking the good life for man, and the virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will enable us to understand what more and what else the good life for man is" (219).

The moral life of the person is always wrapped up with the history of the moral community. We are always free to respond to our histories, but any wholesale rejection of history can only stem from a misunderstanding of the relations between person and community. "For the story of my life," MacIntyre observes, "is always embedded in the story of those communities from which I derive my identity. I am born with a past; and to try to cut myself from the past, in the individualist mode, is to deform my present relationships" (221). A person, whether they recognize it or not (and whether they want it or not), is part of a tradition. Tradition represents a kind of sustained historical argument. And it is just on this insight that MacIntyre points to where we may lay the groundwork for an ethical evaluation of history and tradition. Traditions may be judged as living or dead. Many philosophies emphasizing tradition, such as Burkean conservatism, tends to suffer from nostalgia at best and often trends towards glorifications of the past aimed at maintaining a status quo in favor of a ruling class. Given what has been established about the relationship between persons, history, and community, MacIntyre rightly rejects this approach arguing, "Traditions, when vital, embody continuities of conflict. Indeed when a tradition becomes Burkean, it is always

dying or dead" (222). Dead traditions and histories no longer operate in the pursuit of those ends that sustain the person and the community. Those, such as the Charleston shooter, operating on the narratives presented by dead traditions, act with little context. They are depersonalized and depersonalize. On the other hand, a living tradition is "historically extended, socially embodies argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition" (ibid.). A person operating in a living tradition recognizes their actions and values are rooted in a tradition but is not limited to that tradition. Instead, it is in the encounter and critique of tradition that a history remains alive and vital. Membership in a moral community involves the recognition that our ideas, actions, desires, and values are deeply conditioned by our communal relationships. It also involves the important insight that, again, while we may be the inheritors of a moral tradition we are not limited to that inheritance. The burden of inheritance is not in mimicking the values and traditions of the community but to challenge and critique those values and in so doing *grow* the moral community and revitalize the communities' traditions.

In his distinction between living and dead traditions, MacIntyre directly relates history to his understanding of selfhood and community. He is at pains to show that modern ethical theory fails in large part because it operates on an untenable atomistic conception of the self that fails to take into account communal dimensions of personhood.[19] Against this "liquidation of the self into a set of demarcated areas of role-playing" MacIntyre argues for "a concept of a self whose unity resides in the unity of a narrative beginning to middle to end" (205). His narrative approach to the self emphasizes the interrelationships of the intentional, social, and historical in a way that eludes more popular modern approaches.

V: Hopeful History

A few things follow from this personalist approach to history. If history is tied up with personhood, and personhood with history, then this analysis points to a tool for understanding and judging the moral effects of different historical narratives (whether living or dead). We also gain insight into the importance of intelligible narratives for the person's relationship with themselves, with others, and with their communities. These relationships are always nested in a setting that is itself historically situated. In so far as persons are both inheritors and co-authors of a particular narrative history and tradition, we can judge that tradition on whether or not it is living or dead and whether not it will benefit and uplift or diminish and wither a moral community. An uplifting tradition is one that opens up possibilities and promotes values that support personal relationships. Here I add to MacIntyre's analysis. It is not enough that a history or tradition be living, but, following the integral relationship between history and personhood, we can add the dimension of moral analysis to history. A living tradition that actively engages in

depersonalization of members of a moral community is entirely possible. Such a tradition would be "vital" in MacIntyre's sense while depersonalizing and objectifying from the stance of the person-other relationship. An "immoral" or "diminishing" history of this sort distorts and harms moral communities. It depersonalizes the community, depersonalizes members of the community, and teaches the other members of the community to depersonalize others.

A history that distorts values, distorts persons and communities. We have seen one example of this with the history represented by the Confederate flag. The current understanding of the history behind the legacy of the Confederacy is influenced by what historian's call the "Lost Cause Narrative" which emerged as a dominate historical explanation of the motivations of the Confederate States of America shortly after the end of the Civil War. The Lost Cause narrative sanctified the actions of the Confederate soldier while distorting the remembrance of the role of slavery in the American south and supporting the dehumanization and depersonalization of African Americans.[20] This is but one example of an understanding of history that is, on this personalist account, morally corrupting. Any history that actively contributes to the devaluation of those worthy of dignity and respect, is an undesirable history. Approaching history through personalism gives us a tool for the evaluation of the moral dimensions of the study of history and way of understanding the growth and perpetuation of communal values.

Intentional or not, historical scholarship can influence the growth of persons and communities that advocate for destructive and impersonal values. The Charleston shooter operating on dehumanizing values expressed in the Lost Cause historical narrative is an example of just this kind of dangerous relationship between personhood and history. The relationship between person and history is an important dimension to historical work that must be navigated by the historian. As historians bring the past into the present, they can reshape how persons and communities relate to their own present and act into the future. The challenge here is this: How does the historian approach history with the ethical caution it deserves? Any answer to this must take into account at least two points. First, as we have noted, in order to properly do their work historians must personalize history. An act of critical self-reflection is necessary on part of the historian to become aware of the values advocated in a given history. Second, the work of the historian is further complicated by the fact that we cannot fully predict how ideas and symbols will manifest in action. I suggest that a personalist ethic concerned with value and value-structures would be the most efficacious when tackling these difficulties.

A personalist approach to history deepens our understanding of personhood and the structure and function of history, disclosing important avenues for the moral evaluation of historical narrative traditions. On the latter point this project presents not only a theoretical tool but suggests forms of future community engagement. The philosophical narrative I have presented here is, of course, part

of a larger project to explore the conditions in which persons and communities grow and flourish. History is an important part of this larger analysis. Saying that some history is bad for persons is like saying that some soil is bad for certain plants. Not just any soil, not just any history, will do. History, when it is vital, personal, and morally uplifting opens up possibilities for creativity and action. As Mounier puts it, "the personal life is that of freedom and self-surpassing, not of accumulation and repetition … in the heaping-up of knowledge, but in a deep transformation of the subject, enabling him to fulfill ever new possibilities in response to ever-renewed calls from within" (Mounier 118) Good history does more than explain the past; it enables and encourages creative engagement in the present—a bold grasping towards the future.

In the early morning of July 27, 2015, Brittany "Bree" Newsome scaled a 30-foot flagpole outside of the Columbia, South Carolina State House and removed the Confederate battle flag.[21] In a statement released to the press Newsome explained her actions, "We removed the flag today because we can't wait any longer. We can't continue like this another day. It's time for a new chapter where we are sincere about dismantling white supremacy and building toward true racial justice and equality" (Holley and Brown). Again we can ask, "What kind of *person* would do such a thing?" The answer now seems clearer—a person fully and completely enmeshed and acting in a positive living historical tradition; a person that understands and appreciates that their own personhood is shot-through with history. Newsome's bravery echoes MacIntyre's assertions about living traditions, "an adequate sense of tradition manifests itself in a grasp of those future possibilities which the past has made available to the present" (MacIntyre 223). Newsome, unlike the murders to which she was responding, was acting in a vital living history—a history full of hope.

NOTES

1. For example see Ta-Nehisi Coates, "Take Down the Confederate Flag—Now."
2. This latter evaluation of the past can only occur from the vantage point of the historian who witnesses the past, reports it, and most importantly judges it.
3. See, for example, David Brooks,s "Personalism: The Philosophy We Need." https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/14/opinion/personalism-philosophy-collectivism-fragmentation.html
4. Thus the study of personalism is the study of communities with an eye towards striving for a communal ideal. This striving for an ideal is both intuitively recognized and empirically observed. We are driven in our actions and political discussions by some idea of the good (whether or not that ideal is justified is another matter). The field of political science alone is enough to empirically justify the idea that the individual is always, at some important level a communal and hence personal creature.
5. While there are many different forms of personalism this general notion seems to hold true across most philosophies that hold "personality" or "personhood" as the keystone to understanding.

6. As such, personalism is opposed to both individualism and collectivism. The former ignores the fundamental relations that constitute the person and the latter makes the person a subject to the will of a society or community. Both approaches ignore what is unique and dignified about being a person.

7. Kant, for instance made this argument

8. I also reject the idea that corporations are persons. Though I do recognize that the version of personalism is actually more compatible with corporate personhood than the atomic theory of individuality. But the legality of corporate persons is never applied consistently with the notion of personhood.

9. See Buber's *I and Thou*.

10. An "atomic" individual would on this analysis be ahistorical.

11. Indeed, the driving theological and philosophical ground for the American Civil Rights movement is grounded in Martin Luther King Jr's personalist philosophy.

12. The problem with the depersonalization of philosophy is that it leads to systematic injustice—racism, sexism, and so on—in philosophy as an academic discipline and to society at large. Most of American culture may ignore philosophy but anyone with a passing knowledge of philosophy and history knows that despite this anti-intellectualism philosophical thought, both in and out of the academy, is powerfully influential in the long run.

13. This is not to say that there is no richness in the immediate purity of the present. Poetry and art offer access to those unspoken depths and emotions, to those pure forms of self-experience that pervade and give shape to the present.

14. In history the person and the community are simultaneous and one.

15. Since history is a fairly new symbolic form there are other forms of narration, in particular, the myth that also provide narrative unity for the person. While space does not permit here, I think that fruitful work could be done exploring blurring of myth and history in personal narratives.

16. While MacIntyre is not usually understood to be part of the personalist tradition his narrative understanding of history and personal identity both illustrates the relationship between person and history I wish to emphasize and sets the groundwork for an ethical evaluation of history and tradition. Some work on the relationship MacIntyre in the personalist tradition: Susan Moyn, "Personalism, Community, and the Origins of Human Rights," Deborah Wallace, "Jacques Maritain and Alasdair MacIntyre: The Person, the Common Good and Human Rights," and Domenec Mele, "Integrating Personalism into Virture-based Business Ethics: The Personalist and the Common Good Principle."

17. MacIntyre wisely draws a distinction between intelligibility and understanding. One does not have to understand the what an overheard conversation is about to recognize it as an intelligible conversation. For instance you don't need to know a foreign language to understand that you are witnessing an argument.

18. A further extrapolation of the importance and function of the conversation can be found in the work of G.H. Mead who grounds all sociality in what he calls the "conversation of gestures."

19. This tendency to separate persons, and the different stages of their lives, into distinct units is an obstacle encountered by both analytic philosophy and existentialism.

20. David W. Blight's *Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory* provides an excellent example.

21. A version of the Confederate Battle flag had been flown there since 1961.

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Love and Irreplaceability

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I. Love and Irreplaceability

Ordinarily, when we speak of love between human beings, we speak of persons loving each other. The point I wish to emphasize is that the object of love is ordinarily understood to be a *person*, not the characteristics or *properties* of a person. While the beloved may have many attractive, fascinating, desirable or otherwise valuable attributes, one loves the beloved, not a set of attributes. This conception of love seems to commit one to the view that that the beloved is properly regarded as irreplaceable in a philosophically interesting sense:

> valuing an individual "for [her] own sake" seems to presuppose a recognition that no substitute will do: the beloved is not so valued if she is regarded as fungible. After all, a willingness to accept a substitute suggests that what is valued is not the particular individual after all, but some cluster of qualities that the individual happens to manifest. And if it turns out that what one is valuing is an abstract collection of qualities rather than a concrete individual, it is difficult to see how one could plausibly be said to value the beloved for [*her*] own sake (Grau, "L'amour").[1]

Thus, the lover takes the beloved to be *irreplaceable*. Being irreplaceable, in the relevant sense, does not rest on any supposed qualitative uniqueness of the beloved. That is not the sort of nonfungibility at issue. Rather, the beloved is

irreplaceable in the sense that one would reject or regret the substitution, for the beloved, of a numerically distinct, but qualitatively identical, substitute.[2, 3]

To help keep this point clearly in mind, we can use a Twin Earth thought experiment. Suppose that I love Jane. Suppose also that there is a Twin Earth that is qualitatively identical to Earth with respect to all intrinsic properties.[4] On Twin Earth, Rob* loves Jane*. Regardless of the fact that Jane and Jane* are identical in terms of their intrinsic properties, I would regard a proposed swap of Jane* for Jane as unacceptable.[5]

The claim that love presupposes the irreplaceability of the beloved will strike many as both a plausible descriptive claim in moral psychology and as specifying an important aspect of the normatively appropriate regard of the lover for the beloved. However, the operative kind of irreplaceability gives rise to an apparent paradox to the extent that one values a particular (actual or possible) existent as such. It seems to put one in the peculiar position of claiming that one "value[s] a thing other than solely on account of the amount and type of value that resides in the thing" (Cohen 148).[6] Were it otherwise, it would be replaceable by a qualitative duplicate (We will call this "the Surplus Value Problem."). Faced with this result, some may conclude that this conception of love and its object is irrational, regardless of whether "folk conceptions" of love embody or entail an irreplaceable beloved.[7] The challenge confronted by this paper is to provide a rational justification for the irreplaceability of the beloved in light of the Surplus Value Problem.

II. Prior Justificatory Strategies

To begin, we must clarify the situation by making a distinction between the basis and the object of love (Grau, "Love and History" 259-260). According to Grau, "[t]he qualities of a person that draw me to them, that is, the ground or basis of my love, need not be identical to the actual object of love. I love the *person*, not simply some of the qualities the person manifests (emphasis in original, "Love and History" 260). In this instance, we are focusing on a specific feature of love, i.e. the kind or aspect of valuing that it involves which takes the beloved to be irreplaceable. What we seek to ground our justificatory account is the basis for taking the beloved to be irreplaceable.

From what has already been said, it seems hopeless to attempt a justificatory account that takes the *basis* of the irreplaceability of the beloved to be some of her properties, for a qualitative duplicate would have all such properties. Of course, it is hopeless to try to solve the problem by adopting the absurd position that the object of love must be some sort of featureless soul or substrate that is the bearer of such properties. For such a featureless substrate is not the object of love, neither can its featurelessness be an intelligible basis for loving either it or the person with whom it is associated.

Seemingly, the only remaining possible basis for taking the beloved to be irreplaceable is her bare existence. In fact, G.A. Cohen has offered an account of how the value of a particular valuable thing or person "does not reduce to endorsing the purposes that the [thing] serve[s], or the principles that [it] exemplify[ies]" (Cohen 152). In what Cohen calls "particular valuing," the particular is valued (over and above the value of its valuable properties) because it is a particular existing thing (Cohen 148, 152-53). Cohen describes this as a "bias … in favor of existing value," (Cohen 148, 152-53) or as valuing "an embodiment of value, as such" (Cohen 160).[8] While Cohen raises many important issues, the kinds of replacement cases which he addresses are those in which an existing particular is destroyed and replaced by another particular. Having a bias toward, or specially valuing, existing valuable particulars does nothing to explain the rejection of replacement in cases like that of Jane/Jane*, where there is no issue of an existing embodiment of value being destroyed in order to effect the replacement.[9]

Grau argues, in effect, that we can solve the Surplus Value Problem by finding a basis for the irreplaceability of the beloved in the *extrinsic* or *relational* properties of the beloved. In particular, he focuses on those relational properties constituted by the historical interactions and connections between the lover and the beloved (Grau, "Irreplaceably Unique Value" 125-127). These "extrinsic historical properties" ground a kind of final (i.e. non-instrumental) value that Grau calls the "Unique Value" of the beloved ("Irreplaceable Unique Value" 125-127, capitalization added).[10] By grounding unique value in relational properties, rather than intrinsic properties, Grau takes it that the beloved is irreplaceable because those relational properties are necessarily unique to her. Even Jane and Jane* will have different relational properties.

Unfortunately, Grau's account of unique value cannot solve the Surplus Value Problem. To begin, we must take care, once again, to distinguish between the basis and the object of love. Grau often invokes history and relational properties as a means of individuating the beloved as a numerically distinct person ("Love and History"). However, our concern is not the basis for the individuation of the beloved as a numerically distinct individual. We are concerned to find the basis for taking that unique individual to be irreplaceable in the relevant normative sense. We can assume that the object of love is a person, and that all persons are numerically distinct from one another, without yet making any headway in finding a basis for irreplaceability that resolves the Surplus Value Problem.[11]

How, then, is history supposed to help? It cannot simply be that the beloved is the kind of entity with a history or that is essentially a historical entity, for these are general characteristics and, like intrinsic properties, are universals that cannot serve as a basis for irreplaceability. Nor can it be just that the beloved has *some particular history or other*, for this is also a general characteristic, and is as true of Jane* as of Jane. Unique value must, then, be specially determined by each

numerically distinct history of each numerically distinct person. There could be, so to speak, a limitless number of unique modes of Unique Value. But then we must ask: Why should we be unwilling to replace one person, with her *sui generis* Unique Value, with another person, i.e. a duplicate, with her equally *sui generis* Unique Value? It is hard to see how Unique Value, whatever it may be, could, on its own, make this refusal intelligible.

One could argue that any two instances of Unique Value are incommensurable or incomparable in a way that rationally grounds irreplaceability. However, if one person has no more Unique Value than any other, some further argument is required to show why it would be irrational to countenance such a replacement. After all, we are often required to choose between incommensurable goods, such as health and career advancement, so such choices are possible. Moreover, in this case, both instances of Unique Value are specifically the kind of value that attaches to persons as such. In some sense, the two Unique Values are the same kind of value. Thus, it is hard to see how invoking Unique Value grounds or explains irreplaceability.[12]

Of course, one could take it as definitionally true that Unique Value just is a valuable property which, when present, grounds irreplaceability. But, of course, such a stipulation is no explanation at all, and merely posits the presence of a metaphysically unique entity or property to do whatever is needed to fill the explanatory gap. Indeed, there seem to be no independent criteria for what is to count as Unique Value apart from its ability to ground irreplaceability. For, as Grau indicates, there are cases where an entity has final value based on relational properties, but the entity is, nonetheless replaceable ("Irreplaceably Unique Value" 125).[13] Thus, if Unique Value were simply a name for final value based upon relational properties, it could not support irreplaceability. Hence, some other explanation as to the nature of Unique Value, or at least some independent criteria for making true claims about its presence or absence in a particular case, are needed. Yet, the very possibility of such an account seems ruled out in advance. For if we are pushed to specify which such historical connections generative of final value give rise to Unique Value and which do not, it seems that we have no recourse but to general features of such connections. If it is these general features that matter, then Unique Value turns out to be fungible after all.

One might resist the foregoing attempt to rule out the possibility of independent criteria of Unique Value in advance by arguing that it is not the generally specifiable features alone that ground irreplaceability, but, rather, these in conjunction with the actual occurrence of causal connections of the type that give rise to Unique Value. These actual historical-causal connections between myself and my beloved are numerically unique and these are required to create the Unique Value that my beloved has *for me*.

Yet, in due course, I would come to have actual causal connections with Jane* after the replacement had occurred. These, too, would be actual causal

connections. Past causal connections are not destroyed by the swop since they remain safely tucked away in the past. Ongoing patterns of causal interaction would continue just the same as before, even if the substitution is made, without missing a beat.[14] Future causal interactions of the same kind will occur whether the swap transpires or not. Hence, it remains unclear why a substitution would involve a loss in value. It is not clear why it would be important, in terms of creating value, that these causal connections be with the same person—unless it is the numerical distinctness of the persons involved, rather than the numerical distinctness of the causal connections, that makes a difference. But our whole take has been to explain why the numerical distinctness of persons matters in such a way so as to underwrite irreplaceability. Hence, we cannot use this numerical distinctness alone to explain irreplaceability (Nonetheless, in what follows, I shall argue that it does figure intelligibly in the context of a different kind of explanation of irreplaceability that does not involve the kind of ontologizing instincts that underwrites strategies that posit such things as Unique Value).

Perhaps one last move is open. We might argue that certain kinds of causal connections do give rise to our unwillingness to countenance the kind of replacement we have been considering. Here we move from rational justification to causal explanation. But then our justificatory project has failed. Surd causation alone cannot serve as a reason. We have departed from what Sellars calls "the space of reasons."

In the end, this seems to be where Grau winds up. For he also says that the kind of valuing that goes on in loving another person, wherein we consider the beloved to be irreplaceable, is so fundamental to our moral lives or our lives as persons, that it cannot, in some ultimate sense, be rationally grounded in something deeper. This is not because such valuing is irrational, but because it is arational—it neither has, nor stands in further need of a yet deeper, normative or justificatory foundation ("Love and History" 263-270).

While we might not be able to rule this move out entirely, we must keep in mind that the causal connections must be taken as surd in their operations. I think that Grau's no-justification-needed approach loses whatever plausibility it may, initially, seem to have, when we remain clear about the fact that there is no feature of these connections that rationally grounds them as the appropriate kinds of connections that serve as a reason for taking the beloved to be irreplaceable. Strictly speaking, having one kind of history, rather than another, cannot make a rational difference in grounding irreplaceability—if it is, indeed, actual causal connections that matter, and not their characteristics. If bumping into Jane on two consecutive Tuesdays caused me to take her to be irreplaceable, then there would be no rational-normative avenue for arguing that this is not the right kind of basis for my taking her to be irreplaceable.

III. Love, Commitment, and *De Jure* Irreplaceability

I think that all the preceding efforts have gone astray in presuming that we must ground the irreplaceability of the beloved in *something about the beloved*. I propose that we explain the unique value of the particular, specifically, of the beloved, as being expressed in terms of a kind of *de jure* irreplaceability. This is because the explanation of irreplaceability lies in a commitment, on the part of the beloved, *to regard the beloved as irreplaceable*.[15] Irreplaceability is at bottom *de jure*, not *de facto* (i.e. where the latter ultimately rests on some characteristic of the beloved).

This resolves the Surplus Value Problem in that we can explain how the beloved can be appropriately valued beyond that valuation which is responsive to "the amount and type of value that resides in the [person]."[16]

Taking things a bit further, we can see that, for the relevant kind of regard to be a constitutive element of love, it must be stable over time and it must involve a *commitment* to persist in such regard. First, it must be stable because, if it is to qualify as love, the relevant regard for the beloved must be ongoing over a significant and continuous period of time. Second, duration alone is not enough if it is merely, so to speak, accidental. If the lover regards the beloved as irreplaceable until and unless a more appealing candidate happens to come upon the scene and bring about a "change of heart" in the lover, such that his regard for the beloved as irreplaceable simply lapses, this would not seem to be love, or, if it is love, it is a rather impoverished form of it. Such is, in effect, to regard the beloved as irreplaceable—except in the actual event that a good replacement happens along and the lover, so to speak, gets an upgrade in his love object. Even if both lover and beloved knew in advance that no such duplicate (or other potential substitute) would become available for such a switch at any time in the future, this would not be enough for love in the fullest sense, for the right sort of commitment is lacking. One imagines the beloved would not be satisfied with a supposed lover whose fidelity in love ultimately rested on luck, where "love" was a hostage to fortune.

None of this implies that such a commitment cannot be overridden, or, better, revoked. If the beloved, for example, begins to physically abuse or aggressively and repeatedly demean the lover, the lover may naturally and rightly break off the relationship. In so doing, he may revoke or abandon any commitment of fidelity to the beloved that is premised upon a loving relationship, including the kind of fidelity of thought and emotion involved in regarding the beloved as irreplaceable.[17] However, it is one thing to effect a principled abandonment of the commitments that are partially constitutive of love, after which the beloved is no longer regarded as irreplaceable. It rather something different affect a commitment to the beloved until and unless a "better model" happens upon the scene.[18]

We should also keep in mind that the commitment to regard the beloved as irreplaceable need not be an overtly articulated commitment. It need not be, for

instance, a vow or any other speech act. Rather, it may be implicit in the stance one takes toward the beloved. Fully defending this claim would take more space than is available here. However, we can at least note that there is nothing especially mysterious about the concept of an implicit commitment. For example, an intention to act seems to involve a kind of commitment to action, but rarely does such commitment get expressed in the form of an articulated vow or resolution (Bratman 1-13). There is another instructive analogy with intentions to act. Once one has formed such an intention, reconsideration of other options ceases, at least within certain practical limits (Bratman 60-75). This is akin to ceasing to consider alternative actual and possible objects of affection to replace the beloved once one has committed to regarding her as irreplaceable (again, subject to certain limitations).[19] Consistent with the commitment involved in *de jure* irreplaceability, merely entertaining these possibilities for replacement is already a kind of betrayal.

Thus far, I believe that I have gone some way to show that an account of irreplaceability in terms of a commitment to regard the beloved as being such is both plausible and provides an explanatory justificatory depth beyond the point where Grau's account seems to bottom out in a sort of surd human responsive to the historical particularity of the beloved. I think the present account offers the further advantage of explaining the sense of betrayal that the beloved would feel were the supposed lover to regard her as replaceable. This sense of betrayal can be explained in terms of the mere pretense of a commitment being revealed as such, or of an actual commitment being revoked, abandoned, or transgressed on inappropriate grounds. The normativity of the grounding commitment involved in irreplaceability explains these phenomena better than does the supposition of a mere surd responsiveness to the historical particularity of the beloved. My approach is more ontologically parsimonious in that it doesn't require us to posit special, metaphysically unique properties, such a Unique Value, in order to construct the account. Such an ontological posit is especially suspect where, as in Grau's account of Unique Value, it has no identity criteria independent of the role it is called on to play in the theory—for it was tailor made to fill an explanatory gap in the account. Finally, as we have seen, even if we posit Unique Value, it remains unclear *how* it would be able to rationally ground irreplaceability given that all persons would have Unique Value.

Notes

1. The gender of the lover and the beloved has no intrinsic significance in my analysis. However, for convenience I will use a single gender rather than always referencing both genders. Given that I will often be alternating between speaking in the first and the third person, I find it most convenient, and least artificial, to use the masculine pronoun for the lover and the feminine pronoun for the beloved.

2. Moreover, it is typically the case that one would reject such a substitution even if

the possible replacement exceeds the original in terms of her valuable properties (at least up to some significant threshold).

3. To say that a beloved is not fungible is not to say that one may have only one beloved. A father, for instance, may love each of his three children and take each to be irreplaceable in the relevant sense.

4. See also note 10 and accompanying text regarding internal and external properties.

5. To exclude extraneous considerations, we can assume that neither Jane, Jane*, nor Rob* would know that the switch had occurred and that, were I to agree to the switch, I would immediately thereafter have slight retrograde amnesia such that, post-switch, I would not be aware that the switch had occurred.

6. The literature often discusses, in tandem, the valuing of a particular person, a particular object, and a particular institution or other entity as raising the same problems concerning the special value of a numerically distinct particular as such (Cohen; "Irreplaceably Unique Value"; "Love and History"). Thus, one *loves* a particular person, *cherishes* a particular object, or *reveres* a particular entity, organization, normative ordering, or being. These modes of valuation are taken to involve valuing numerically distinct particulars in a way potentially raises issues of irreplaceability. I will suggest, without elaborating, that the operative factors in these different kinds of valuing might be different from one another.

7. Grau states that Plato, Pascal ("Irreplaceably Unique Value" 114-18), and Parfit ("Love and History" 251) hold that rational reflection shows that the proper object of love is the beloved's valuable properties *as such*, though they may come to our focus as instantiated in a particular person. With respect to objects (*see supra* note 6), Aries claims that, in the Middle Ages, objects were valued as unique concrete particulars, but that the move toward modernity involves conceiving them more as mere abstract repositories of value (128-139). Given recent discussion of valuing particular things, this is clearly too sweeping a generalization.

8. I suggest that the latter is a better formulation.

9. Cohen also discusses what he calls "personal valuing," wherein a particular thing has value for a person "because of the special relation of the thing to that person" (Cohen 148). This seems to be much the same thing that Grau has in mind.

10. Grau identifies two orthogonal distinctions in values. The first is that between intrinsic value and extrinsic value. Intrinsic value is based on a thing's intrinsic or internal properties, while extrinsic value is based on the thing's external or relational properties. The other contrast is between instrumental value and the non-instrumental value that a thing can have such that we value it for its own sake. In the latter case, we say the thing has "final value" ("Irreplaceably Unique Value" 122-124).

11. Moreover, the individuation of persons is a general philosophical problem. It remains to be seen whether we need to accept any particular account in order to facilitate a solution to the Surplus Value Problem.

12. I acknowledge that the issues of incommensurability and incomparability warrant a more detailed treatment than I am able to give here.

13. "Consider the set of guitars owned by Jimi Hendrix. … One might … value the entire set of guitars he played, and freely accept the substitute of one guitar for another. (This is a case where *history* matters, but several objects share the relevant history.)"

("Irreplaceably Unique Value" 125).

14. Keep in mind, there will be no *experience* of a loss of love or connection after the switch.

15. Clearly, such commitment makes sense only in the context where the lover takes the beloved to at least pass some minimal threshold in having desirable qualities. A specific theory as to the relationship between the valued qualities of the beloved and the commitment to regard the beloved as irreplaceable is beyond the scope of this paper.

16. Of course, once the beloved is regarded as irreplaceable, is held in that kind of regard, new possibilities arise as to the kinds of interactions, projects, and experiences the lovers can share, particularly if this love is mutual.

17. Obviously, the former beloved might remain forever irreplaceable in the sense of having been involved in a qualitatively unique way in the life of the lover.

18. Between the extremes addressed in this paragraph lie innumerably many and complex kinds of cases. To properly address them, we would have to develop an account of the normative principles governing the revocation of the relevant commitment, what we might reasonably expect in terms of capabilities and limitations of human efforts and motivations, and various other kinds of factors. Such an account is well beyond the limited scope of this paper.

19. See *supra* note 18.

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From Truth to Application: Peirce and "Mastery of Our Meaning"

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I.

In a 1907 letter to FW Frankland, CS Peirce insists that "Pragmatism is not a doctrine about what the *truth* of ideas consists in, but about what their meaning consists in." Despite this admonishment, prominent commentators on Peirce have continued to enlist the notion of truth in their explications of the pragmatic maxim. In *The American Pragmatists*, for instance, Cheryl Misak tells us that

> [Peirce's] contribution to the debate is to add "a far higher grade" of clarity to the standard two: knowing what to expect if hypotheses containing the concept are true. (Misak 30)[1]

Similarly, Christopher Hookway tells us that pragmatism holds that "propositions are distinguished by the 'consequences' of their being true" (188). Adding that the maxim is properly clarified "in the subjunctive mood," Hookway contends that it directs us to attend to "a general habit of expectation which traces systematic connections between action and experience if the conception or proposition we are trying to clarify is true" (189).[2]

. Admittedly, such construals of the pragmatic maxim accord well with at least a few of Peirce's formulations. For instance, in a manuscript entitled "The Architectonic Construction of Pragmatism" (CP 1904), Peirce tells us:

> In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception one should consider what practical consequences might conceivably result by necessity from the truth of that conception; and the sum of these consequences will constitute the entire meaning of the conception. (CP 5.9)[3]

Formulations like this emphasize what Hookway has called the 'verificationist dimension' of pragmatist accounts of meaning. They focus upon the (predominately sensible) effects that possible states of the world have upon us (and hence what we should expect). Indeed, in the first chapter of *Truth and the End of Inquiry*, Misak further avers that "Peirce's pragmatism is indeed identical, for all practical purposes, with the physicalist interpretation of the verification principle" (11-12). On this understanding, the pragmatic maxim directs us to attend to the sensible effects we should expect of a certain thing were it to be present or state of affairs were it to obtain.[4]

. However, there is a difficulty with construing the pragmatic maxim in quite this fashion, which I think Peirce comes to appreciate later on, and which accounts for striking differences in the tenor of his formulations after 1904. Here's a first pass at the difficulty. Suppose that a certain (type of) state of affairs Q generally follows another P. Then we ought—that is, it is generally to our advantage—to conform our habits of conception to this regularity. We should take our conceptions of P to imply our conceptions of Q. But even though our conceptual habits would ideally conform to the way things are in the real order, when we direct our attention specifically to the *meanings* of our conceptions, then we must restrict ourselves to the implications *we take* those conceptions to have, not those that the conceived states of affairs might actually happen to have. There is a plethora of implications in a conception, either were it to be true or were it to be false, much of which is likely beyond our current clue. So rather than spelling out the pragmatic maxim in terms of the consequences of the world's being (or not being) a certain way, Peirce directs us instead to consider simply the implications of our *takin*g a conception to be true along with those of our *taking* it to be false. As he tells us in "Issues of Pragmaticism" (1905), meaning resides (wholly) in "implication" (and non-implication).

> In another sense, honest people, when not joking, intend to make the meaning of their words determinate, so that there shall be no latitude of interpretation at all. That is to say, the character of their meaning consists in the implications and non-implications of their words; and they intend to fix what is implied and what is not implied. (CP 5.447)

That is, it's the implications of a conception's *application*—in speech acts such as affirmations and denials - that matter to its meaning, rather than the consequences

of its truth or falsity. Stripping truth out of the pragmatic maxim allow *us* to fix what *we* mean by a conception, and so retain—as he puts it in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear"—a mastery of our own meaning. (CP 5.393)

Consequently, the understanding of pragmatism which emphasizes the (sensible) effects of the *truth* of a conception accords less well with several of Peirce's later articulations of the maxim, which focus, not so much upon the consequences of a conception's *truth*, but rather upon the implications of *applying* it. Hence in a 1900 review in *Science*, Peirce characterizes "a doctrine I called Pragmatism" as the view "that the meaning and essence of every conception lies in the application that is to made of it," (Peirce, *Selected Writings* 332) and in "Issues of Pragmaticism" Peirce simply tells us that:

> The entire purport of any symbol consists in the total of all general modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of a symbol. (CP 5.438)

Rather than calling upon the verificationist dimension of pragmatist thought, characterizations like these place greater emphasis on what Hookway dubs its "pragmatist dimension" (and what I prefer to call its "conduct strand").[5]

Here the consequences that the pragmatist directs us to consider are not so much the sensible effects of *states of affairs*, as they are the consequences upon our thoughts and actions *of applying a concept* in thought and inquiry. It is this shift, and its implications, that one is apt to miss, if one construes the maxim in terms of the consequences of truth. In the next section, I will argue that those who defend a truth-centered conception of the pragmatic maxim actually promote a conception that accords more with a Jamesian understanding of pragmatism than that eventually favored by Peirce.

II.

Let's revisit the characterization of the pragmatic maxim that centers around the truth of conceptions, with an eye toward exposing its infelicity. Recall the formulation (CP 5.9) where Peirce directs us to consider the consequences of the truth of a conception. What, then, are the implications of a conception, *were it to be true*? If it *is* true, then according to a Peircean conception, it would be accepted (or at least not rejected) by a hypothetical community of inquirers pushing inquiry to ideal limits. Already, this introduction of an ideal community of inquirers poses a potential hazard for the proper understanding of the pragmatic maxim. For in ultimately accepting a claim, those hypothetically ideal inquirers might well have an understanding of the claim's implications that differs from ours in rather dramatically different ways. As mentioned above, the truth of a conception will

likely have a host of implications for which we have little current appreciation. We now have two separate sets or books of implications to consider. Should we take the implications that are supposed to constitute a conception's meaning to be those that we take it to have, or those that our imagined ideal inquirers take it to have (or those that it actually has, for which we have no current clue)? The versions of the pragmatic maxim that direct us to look to the implications of a conception's truth suggest that we should go for one of the latter options. However, if we do so, then insofar as we are unable to anticipate what implications ideal inquirers would draw from a claim under consideration, we threaten to take the meaning of our conceptions out of our own hands and place it into those of those ideal inquirers. We would no longer be the "masters of our meaning" that Peirce urges us to be at the beginning of "How to make Our Ideas Clear" (CP 5.393). We should be troubled by such a possibility.

To see why, consider the situation if the claim in question happens to be false. For now, when we ask what the implications of a claim would be, were it to be (counterfactually) true, then it begins to look as if a formulation of pragmatism centered around subjunctive truth asks us to consider implications (and correspondingly ideal inquirers) troublingly detached from reality. By forcing us to consider matters, so to speak, in an alternate reality, the mental gymnastics required in order to determine a claim's meaning would be made all the harder, and we would be even less the masters of our own meaning. It is implausible that we should hold the meanings of our conceptions hostage to the implications that would be drawn by hypothetical inquirers investigating an alternate reality, no matter how ideal they may be, and it would be uncharitable to interpret Peirce as recommending that that is what we do. But that is what happens when we take literally the idea that the pragmatic maxim tells us to identify the meaning of a conception in terms of its subjunctive truth.

Moreover—and perhaps more significantly—if indeed a conception is false, then accepting it has implications *in reality* that we should find objectionable. Indeed, those objectionable implications are precisely the ones that would lead ideal inquirers in the actual world to *reject* the claim in question! However, those same objectionable implications are the ones that would most stand to be swept under the rug, if we were really envisioning a claim's implications *were it to be true*. Instead of that non-actual world, we should rather be envisioning a world that matches the implication *we take* our claims to have. For this reason most of all, one should not unpack the maxim merely in terms of subjunctive truth. The implications of a claim, *were it to be false*, are also crucial to meaning and inquiry. To say that we should focus upon the implications of a claim, were it to be true, gives us an insufficiently one-sided account of conceptual meaning.

The message so far is fairly straightforward: the implications of a conception's falsity are every bit as important as those of its truth. That we must often *deny* conceptions demonstrate that we need to consider applications of a conception

independent of its truth. It's not so much the implications of a claim, *were it to be true*, then, that matters for the pragmatic maxim. Rather, it's the implications that a claim actually has, were it *either* to be true *or* false. The subjunctive reading is trying to get at applications of a conception in the face of its falsity, but here we cannot identify a claim's meaning literally in terms of its implications *were it to be true*. Instead, we should be identifying the implications that *we take* a conception to have, and then use those in order to reject the conception in question.

Interestingly, William James might have been the first to appreciate this point. In a contribution that James provided to Peirce for the 1902 *Baldwin Encyclopedia* entry on "Pragmatic" and "Pragmatism" James characterizes pragmatism as follows:

> The doctrine that the whole "meaning" of a conception expresses itself in practical consequences, consequences either in the shape of conduct to be recommended, or in that of experiences to be expected, of the conception if true, which consequences would be different if untrue, and must be different from the consequences by which the meaning of other conceptions is in turn expressed. (CP 5.2)

There is much to be said about this characterization. For one thing, observe how the disjunction in this formulation brings together both the "verificationist" and "conduct" strands of pragmatism in a disjunction. The meaning of a conception is to be unpacked, either in terms of the "experiences to be expected" (verificationist) or in the "shape of conduct to be recommended" (conduct). For present purposes, however, observe further that this characterization asks us to attend not only to the consequences of the truth of a conception, but also to those it would have if *untrue*. Elsewhere, I have called such formulations of the pragmatic maxim "bilateral." Indeed, the passage above could well be the very first explicit expression of a bilateral account of conceptual meaning altogether.

Shortly after James's entry, Peirce gives us his own bilateral version of the maxim in the opening essay of his *Monist* Series of 1905-6 ("What Pragmatism Is"):

> Endeavoring, as a man of that type naturally would, to formulate what he so approved, he framed the theory that a *conception*, that is, the rational purport of a word or other expression, lies exclusively in its conceivable bearing on the conduct of life; so that, since obviously nothing that might not result from experiment can have direct bearing on the conduct, if one can define accurately all the conceivable experimental phenomena which the **affirmation or denial of a concept could imply**, one will have therein a complete definition of the concept, and *there is absolutely nothing more in it.* (CP 5.412, my bold)

Even though Peirce's announced aim in this series is to distance himself from "usurpers" of his original doctrine, he nevertheless incorporates the bilaterality of James' formulation. In so doing, he reinforces the point made earlier - that since claims may have consequences that ultimately lead to their rejection, we need to attend to the consequences of claims we take to be untrue.

However, Peirce's bilateral version is pointedly different from James's, in that it trades in the consequences of a conception's *truth or untruth* for the implications of its *affirmation or denial*. There is a world of difference between the *kinds of consequences* to which these alternate formulations appeal. Though we might well take truth to be a norm of assertion (and falsity a norm of denial), by no means do truths and affirmations of those truths share the same consequences. As Peirce occasionally bemoaned (e.g., CP 2.113), merely attesting that one has $500 in the bank is a far cry from actually having that sum in reserve. Fallible (and alas, occasionally duplicitous) creatures that we are, the consequences (or rather, effects) of a claim's being *true* (or false) is very different from those of its being *affirmed* (or denied). Indeed, it is key to understanding Peirce's account of assertion that the assertion of some conception has significant consequences if that conception turns out *not* to be true or defensible. (CP 5.546)[6] Specifically, to assert some claim is to take responsibility for it. (R 420, 25-6)

For this reason, I contend that those commentators who unpack pragmatism in terms of the consequences of a claim's *truth* are actually giving us a conception of pragmatism that is more Jamesian than Peircean—a somewhat surprising and ironic twist, given how these same commentators generally take themselves to be defending a more Peircean conception of pragmatism against Jamesian excesses. That's the misreading Peirce warns Frankland to avoid in the passage with which I opened up this paper. In the next section, I will explore the consequences of Peirce's shift in focus from truth (and falsity) to affirmation (and denial), and see how it might illuminate the significant differences Peirce saw between his and James' respective understandings of pragmatism.

III.

So what lessons are we likely to miss out on if we gloss over Peirce's shift from truth to affirmation? For starters, this shift signals that a tune that had originally been played in a predominantly alethic key has now been transposed into a deontic one; normative concerns now play a more central role than causal ones. The formulations of the maxim from the 1905-6 *Monist* series emphasizing the implications of affirmation and denial come at a time in which Peirce is increasingly concerned with habit and self-controlled conduct and a purported "proof" of the pragmatic maxim. In "Issues of Pragmaticism," Peirce stresses that such conduct is one of the chief characteristics of his particular understanding of

the pragmatic maxim: "Pragmaticism consists in holding that the purport of any concept is its conceived bearing upon our conduct." (CP 5.460; see also CP 5.422).[7]

In short, conduct is much more deeply embedded into the pragmatism of the *Monist* series and thereafter. By shifting focus from truth to application, the consequences that matter for meaning are not just those *upon* our practical conduct, but also those that *flow from* such conduct. In this sense, the account expresses a more thorough-going pragmatism, in which meaning is grounded not so much in truth, but rather in the speech *acts* of affirmation and denial. Instead of pragmatics being grafted onto semantics, semantics is now rooted in pragmatics. The important thing is not how conceptions correspond to reality (which is not to say that they don't!), but rather how they can be arranged together to form conceptions, the significance of which in turn is to be understood in terms of the actions and thoughts that those conceptions do or do not license and imply. This is clearly a functionalism about meaning, though a normative functionalism rather than a brutely causal one.[8] The consequences that constitute the meaning of our intellectual conceptions are not so much the causal consequences of states of affairs, but rather the consequences that redound to a speaker or thinker in affirming (or denying) a claim, including especially the further claims that such applications thereby oblige or permit one to affirm (or deny).

In short, Peirce's comes to an understanding of the pragmatic maxim whereby meaning is unpacked more in terms of the implications of speech acts, and less in terms of the sensible effects of the world's being a certain way. Consider the striking way in which Peirce explicitly minimizes the role that sensation plays in the constitution of meaning in the characterization of pragmatism Peirce gives in his 1904 review of Nichols' *Treatise on Cosmology*:[9]

> The word *pragmatism* was invented to express a certain maxim of logic, which, as was shown at its first enouncement, involves a whole system of philosophy. The maxim is intended to furnish a method for the analysis of concepts. A concept is something having the mode of being of a general type which is, or may be made, the rational part of the purport of a word. A more precise or fuller definition cannot here be attempted. The method prescribed in the maxim is to trace out in the imagination the conceivable practical consequences, —that is, the consequences for deliberate, self-controlled conduct,—of the affirmation or denial of the concept; and the assertion of the maxim is that herein lies the *whole* of the purport of the word, the *entire* concept. The sedulous exclusion from this statement of all reference to sensation is specially to be remarked." (CP 8.191)

One would certainly be hard pressed to square this statement of pragmatism with his earlier claim that "our idea of an object is our idea of its sensible effects" (CP

5.402)! Here we can see that Peirce was clearly moving away from the verificationism that predominated in his initial presentations of the maxim. What is important in not so much that a certain effect does (or does not) obtain. Rather, what is crucial to a conception's meaning is that its application should lead one to *expect* it to occur (or not). The meaning of a conception lies in its place within a web of (habitual) expectations.

We can now see that a chief point of contention between Peirce and James is that Peirce comes to emphasize proprieties of conduct, rather than effects of experience. Hence in a late (1908-9) letter, Peirce repudiates James for disjoining the conduct and verificationist strands of pragmatism together in his Baldwin definition:

> The essential principle of pragmatism, as I conceive it, may be stated in this form: Kant's division of concepts into the constitutive and the regulative is faulty in that concepts are in their essence regulative only. The term I invented, "pragmatism," to name my doctrine sufficiently shows that the point I wished to make as supremely important in philosophical inquiries was that an idea which cannot conceivably result in a general effect upon conduct can have no intellectual significance whatsoever. You deliberately erase this distinction in your definition in Baldwin's Dictionary by lumping those which have such effect with others which you assume may exist which merely are, in your not very lucid phrase, "experienced to be expected," by which I suppose you to mean expectations of experience (but I should like to have the whole sentence construed for me, for I do not see exactly what it is that you seek to express)…. (CSP to WJ, 1908 5-8.)[10]

As exemplified in his "Will to Believe" cases, James takes a mere effect of accepting a belief or conception to be conditions that warrant it. By contrast, Peirce comes to focus upon the rational implications that the application of those conceptions in turn warrant. The difference here between the two founding pragmatists couldn't be more stark, yet it is largely occluded if one unpacks the pragmatic maxim in terms of the consequences of truth rather than acceptance.

Notes

1. Misak is echoing the opening lines of the first chapter of her *Truth and the End of Inquiry*. There she declares that pragmatism's "central insight is that there is a connection between knowing the meaning of a hypothesis and knowing what experiential consequences to expect if the hypothesis is true." (3). Later on, she clarifies: "So the consequences with which pragmatism is concerned are predictions; we can predict that if H is true, then if you were to do A, B would result."
2. See Hookway, *The Pragmatic Maxim*.

3. Here I follow the convention of citing passages from Peirce's *Collected Papers* by identifying the volume and paragraph number separated by a period. I will identify passages from manuscripts not appearing in the *Collected Papers* by their Robin numbers.

4. This assimilation of pragmatism to some flavor of verificationism is characteristic of Peirce's earlier characterizations of pragmatism, and are perhaps encapsulated by Peirce's oft-quoted remark that:

> I only desire to point out that how impossible it is that we should have an idea in our minds which relates to anything but conceived sensible effects of things. Our idea of anything *is* our idea of its sensible effects. (CP 5.401)

that thought in turn ramifies into Peirce's first explicit attempt to articulate the pragmatic maxim in print:

> It appears, then, that the rule for attaining the third grade of clearness of apprehension is as follows: Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object. (CP 5.402)

5. This strand also has origins in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," for instance, when Peirce tells us that:

> The essence of belief is the establishment of a habit; and different beliefs are distinguished by the different modes of action to which they give rise. If beliefs do not differ in this respect, if they appease the same doubt by producing the same rule of action, then no mere differences in the manner of consciousness of them can make them different beliefs." (CP 5.398)

6. See Howat, Andrew. "Hookway's Peirce on Assertion & Truth."

7. This association of pragmatism with conduct endures to the very end of his career, as evidenced by a proposed introduction to an Open Court reissuance of his *Illustrations of the Logic of Science*, "Namely, so far as my pragmatism is a doctrine, it is a doctrine that the significance of any intellectual thought consists in the particular manner in which it tends, and will tend, to regulate the thinker's conduct." (R 620, reprinted in Cornelis de Waal's [2014] reconstruction of the *Illustrations of the Logic of Science*, 192-3). Koopman has also argued that Classical Pragmatism is best framed around conduct, though he centers his "conduct pragmatism" around James. My argument here is that Peirce turns out to be the more thoroughgoing "conduct pragmatist."

8. Here Peirce is continuing a theme first expressed in his 1871 Critical Review of Berkeley's Idealism: "A better rule [than Berkeley's] for avoiding the deceits of language is this: Do things fulfil the same function practically? Then let them be signified by the same word. Do they not? Then let them be distinguished." (CP 8.33)

9. Peirce also appears to minimize the role of sensation in the definition of pragmatism later on in "What Pragmatism is." (CP 5.428), as well as in "Issues of Pragmaticism" (CP 5.458).

10. See also Peirce's own remark in the *Baldwin Encyclopedia* to the effect that James has expanded the scope of pragmatism to include "expectations of experience."

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Conceptual Analysis and Naturalism about Knowledge

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1. INTRODUCTION

Metaphysical naturalism about knowledge[1] (NK) is the thesis that knowledge is a natural kind[2] as opposed to an artificial one. It is usually (but not always[3]) defended side by side with methodological naturalism, the claim that epistemology should be carried out (to some degree) using the empirical methodology of the relevant disciplines (usually within cognitive science). Hence, methodological naturalists reject the routine practice of traditional epistemology—armchair philosophical analysis.

Methodological naturalism is often a source of support for NK. If some natural kind corresponding to our pre-theoretical notion of knowledge has been identified by any particular science, we should be informed by its empirical results instead of dwelling in our pre-theoretical intuitions—just as our idea of what truly constitutes gold has little relevance after the emergence of chemistry. Someone who holds this view in particular is Hilary Kornblith, a main proponent of NK (Kornblith 2002, 2007). According to this view, a methodological naturalist will pay attention to the fact that cognitive ethology uses "knowledge" as a theoretical term and will seek to identify folk or pre-theoretical notion of knowledge with its reference.

The folk concept only serves an initial purpose in identifying a reference, just as our pre-theoretical classification of substance samples only plays an initial role in a chemical classification of them. Though there is a role for conceptual research

for the study of natural kinds, this is merely the conceptual refinement of theoretical terms that takes place in any scientific undertaking. According to the naturalist view that I have in mind, there is still a modest role for philosophers regarding the study of knowledge, for instance, in questions about epistemic normativity. Philosophical work is also needed to assure us that a correct reference is identified within a natural science, but the content of "knowledge" is to be provided mainly in an empirical way.[4] The "antecedent" (pre-theoretical) term can be safely abandoned once there is a "consequent" (scientific) term available (Tiel 1999).

Against this view, I will argue that identifying an empirical counterpart of "knowledge"—its referent with a corresponding scientific term—does not remove the need for conceptual analysis for methodological and metaphysical naturalism about knowledge. The type of conceptual a posteriori analysis I have in mind is similar in spirit to the one proposed by Graham and Horgan (1994), but I will not give a detailed treatment. However, I should stress it is not centered or limited in the analysis of folk concepts, nor is it an attempt to make traditional armchair epistemology compatible with methodological naturalism (as in Ahlstrom 2008). A posteriori conceptual analysis involves coining new terms for unification or clarification purposes, as well as stipulating new ones when they are needed to perform empirically informed theoretical work. Some naturalistic minded philosophers even engage in conceptual analysis thus understood without calling it by that name. Hence, when Ruth Millikan states: "My program is far removed from conceptual analysis; I need a term that will do a certain job, and so I must fashion one" (Millikan 1984), in my own terminology, she is engaging in a posteriori conceptual analysis.

Since not all methodological naturalists share Millikan's attention to concepts and careful definitions, and coining philosophical terms might seem alien to a naturalistic methodology, in this work I will make a case for conceptual analysis. In sections 2 and 3 I will show how conceptual analysis contributes to the content of "knowledge," and hence to our understanding of the constitution of knowledge as a natural phenomenon. The focus of section 4 will be on the ways in which conceptual analysis can advance naturalistic research on knowledge.

2. Analysis for Theoretical Unification

Kornblith's main claim is that because cognitive ethologists use "knowledge" as a theoretical term (hence, a natural kind that can satisfy normative epistemic concerns) we have very good reasons to conclude our folk and/or philosophical notion of "knowledge" is this same natural kind. Once NK has been established, there seems to be little reason in engaging in conceptual analysis (Kornblith 2002).

A good reason to call for an explicit conceptual analysis is that there is a problem of proliferation—a wide variety of candidate theoretical terms are

available. Besides the examples from cognitive ethology cited by Kornblith (Ristau 1991, Herman and Morrel-Samuels 1990, etc.), the term "knowledge" is used in cognitive and developmental psychology (Cfr. Nagel 2013) as well as a wide variety of disciplines (Cfr. Engel 2007). That is, used in an epistemic normative sense, which suggests more than mere homonymy. But the use is not exactly uniform, even when we restrict ourselves to one of these disciplines.

Suppose we find a considerable number of uses (K_1, K_2…) satisfying from the point of view of epistemic normativity. Should we accept all and say that knowledge is either K_1, or K_2… etc? A class consisting in an immense or "wild" disjunction of natural kinds, without a unifying account looks suspiciously like an artificial kind—e.g. a bug is either an insect, or an arachnid, or a small crustacean, or a small worm,[5] etc. So, even if we suspect $K_1 \ldots K_n$ can be grouped under a more general type, without an explicit analysis it is merely a hunch.

One should also be ready to find "knowledge" under a completely different term, perhaps one that does not appear to be related at first sight. Even before proper philosophical elucidation, a good deal of second order work might come in use for scientific purposes. For instance, by coining the term "core knowledge," different converging studies—without strict terminological unity— have come into view as describing the same type of phenomena.[6]

Core knowledge is specified as four—and a hypothesized fifth— special purpose systems that are innate, universal, present in pre-linguistic infants and non-human primates (Spelke 2000). However, this term is a second order proposal. The first order literature is constituted by disciplines different in methods as developmental psychology, neuroscience, primatology, linguistics. Also four very different domains (objects, actions, number, and space). Thus the rubric "core knowledge," helps achieve some theoretical unification. This might be a guide for further empirical research, which in turn might be used as an input for more theoretical unification. Perhaps the notion of core knowledge will be revised or abandoned in light of future research. Notice this is a way of concept testing that does not depend on an a priori methodology.

Aside from core knowledge as a proposed unifying program, there are several research programs that seem epistemologically relevant without using an epistemic theoretical vocabulary. Work on cognitive abilities such as face recognition very likely produce robust epistemic states. It seems too stingy to deny at least to consider them as candidates for knowledge simply because the term is not used (certainly a contingent matter!).

3. Analysis for Terminological Clarification

Naturalists using the reference fixing strategy, will demand a reductive identification such as water $=_{ID}$ H_2O (or at least the weaker claim that even if folk and scientific "knowledge" are not exactly co-referent, the latter is preferred[7]). It

is not merely an a posteriori identification, but an asymmetric one: paraphrasing Rayo, knowledge *just is* ethological knowledge (2003). Nevertheless, even if this might be overlooked in the initial stages, what we ultimately seek in successful scientific reductions is that the more fundamental term is distinctly understood. If this is one of the naturalist's motivations, she should make sure the reducing concept is well defined.

Depending on the target kind proposed by the naturalist, there might not be a clear, agreed definition of "knowledge." For instance, cognitive ethologists deliberately use anthropomorphic language to attribute intentional states to non-human animals when describing observations in the wild (Burghardt 2013). The meaning of the term "knowledge" comes from the ordinary use, sometimes it is vaguely specified, as when Herman and Morrel-Samuels (1990) speak of the necessary information dolphins need to navigate the world and fulfill their needs. In other instances, a definition of the term is simply absent (Ristau 1991). Isn't this circular? Not completely, since cognitive ethology does not simply consist in mental attributions. Indeed, intentional attributions are part of the endeavor, but causal, nomological, and explanatory relations between representations and behaviors are posited, tested, etc.

Perhaps as cognitive ethology matures we will see the folk concept of knowledge become a well-defined theoretical one. But not necessarily. Cognitive ethologists might not need epistemic terms of art to study behaviors and representations. Cognitive ethology might be well served by epistemic terms in their everyday sense. After all, natural language is used by lots of valid[8] scientific endeavors. But we, as philosophers, might be interested in going beyond the folk use of epistemic terms relying on cognitive ethology. We could stipulate a definition of knowledge and test it not against our intuitions, but against the literature. We might make adjustments to our philosophical term of art, or perhaps even be bold enough to ignore a small number of knowledge attributions that fall outside our philosophical concept, considering them outliers.[9]

4. Going Beyond Scientific Theoretical Terms

Perhaps knowledge does not correspond to some natural kind/s, but it is somehow grounded in it in a non-trivial way. The scope of human knowledge is vast and varied. It involves innate dispositions, but very likely also some produced by modularization (Cfr. Karmiloff-Smith 1994), it may rely on acquired symbolic systems (such as mathematical logic) or aided by instruments. Two related challenges are the fact that human knowledge also covers unusual domains (think abstract mathematics) and sources unbeknownst to other species (think books). So perhaps not even a unification strategy will be enough. It could be that a naturalist should be content to explain how the body of true beliefs grouped under knowledge elegantly arises from several natural capacities operating iteratively in the

appropriate contexts.[10] This is basically Engel's cursory proposal, appealing to the fore mentioned core knowledge systems.

Compare with naturalism about human sociality. It would be strange to claim "sociality" simply corresponds to a natural kind. But social naturalism is not a trivial claim; someone holding this position thinks that human social behavior—for the most part—is not the product of contingent historical constructs, ideology, convention, etc. Hence, a constructive strategy is called for in explaining how a broad defined capacity is more natural than artificial. This might be a case by case undertaking (reminding the work of cognitive anthropologists) or with a general account. Millikan's ambitious proposal is an example of the latter. I cannot give the details here, but her account is achieved by using stipulated knowledge-related concepts that do not come from unification.

There is an additional advantage of the clarity and succinctness that comes from conceptual analysis and concept stipulation. Given the complexity of the explanandum (knowledge), metaphysical naturalism is a hard task as it is. Weighting candidates for identification against normative concerns in an exercise of "reflective equilibrium" (Kornblith 2002) is a good starting point, but it promises to get unmanageable as epistemologists with different views on normativity and different preferred candidates for reduction (or grounding) tackle this problem. Philosophical precisification is thus critical.

If we perform this type of analytic work on some of the available proposals to defend NK (Vázquez-del-Mercado, 2018) we find interesting combinations of the following elements:

A. Reliability.
B. Appeal to functions.[11]
C. Teleology.[12]
D. Ecological validity.
E. Dispositional stability.
F. Appeal to mechanisms.
H. Attainment of goals.
I. Epistemic sensitivity.

An analysis presents us an opportunity to establish dependence relations and to question the compatibility of these elements. For instance, if we reconstruct an analysis of knowledge from Kornblith's views, we find that, among other elements, both reliability and teleology (from an evolutionary historic perspective) are both present. Nevertheless, there is a tension between both elements, since there are selected mechanisms for representation that produce a great number of false positives; like a predator detection mechanism that triggers flight in a mouse running after hearing the sound of a moving branch (Brown 2012). Does this lack of "reliability" mean the mouse doesn't know a predator is present in cases when

its belief turns out to be true? There is no prima facie reason to reject functional cognitive mechanisms that are calibrated in a way that turns out to give many false positives, unless the naturalist has some previous commitment to reliability (the kind of armchair commitment dissuaded by methodological naturalism).

This problem arises when we understand reliability in the usual sense used in epistemology, as the rate of true beliefs over total beliefs (Goldman 1979, 1986). As it turns out, Kornblith understands reliability precisely in this sense (Kornblith 2002, Goldman 2005). This shows that besides the advantage of having a clear view of the theoretical elements present in a claim for NK, there is a need in turn to have a sufficiently well-defined meaning of the constituting elements. (Some could be taken as primitives if they are deemed to be clear enough, or terms merely in need of an elucidation instead of a clear-cut definition).

I do not claim that this is a mere exercise in stipulation. For instance, if goals are a constitutive element of knowledge, there are further questions to be asked about them. Should they be taken to be individual goals, as represented by an organism? Should this representation be "on-line"?[13] Or perhaps goals are "objective," and should be understood from the species point of view instead of the individual (Okrent 2007). But even if conceptual, there is no reason why this controversy needs to be solved on a priori grounds. A review of cognitive mechanisms which are candidates to be knowledge producing, might give us reason to prefer one view over the other; and even if goals are really a constitutive element of knowledge. Are these mechanisms better understood when viewed as "goal producing"? Is any of these two notions of goal more fruitful and/or illuminating than the other? Or suppose we seemingly can make sense of knowledge without appealing to goals. But our proposed analysis depends on a different notion (i.e. function, mechanism, etc.) which itself turns out to require a notion of goal. Hence, even if we have a good idea on what types of processes count as knowledge exemplars, it might not be obvious from a first glance which elements are constitutive of knowledge.

5. Concluding Remarks

Recovering conceptual analysis as a tool does not mean resorting again to armchair methods that limit research to pre-theoretical notions. Hopefully, I have shown how conceptual analysis makes a substantial contribution towards understanding the nature of knowledge. A search for theoretical terms in the natural sciences is a necessary step, but it is insufficient. Conceptual analysis allows us to go beyond the limits of disciplinary-bounded research in the ways previously stated. Perhaps methodological naturalists will agree with many of the points I made, and the difference is a matter of degree and/or terminology. Nevertheless, the role of conceptual analysis has been insufficiently stressed, and its potential for fruitful research has not been sufficiently explored.

Presumably, some of the points I made can be extrapolated to the study of other natural kinds of philosophical interest, in cases where simple reductive identification is unfeasible. One of the advantages of methodological naturalism is that it increases our methods and scope of research. These advantages do not disappear when we engage in conceptual analysis but enhance an empirically sound study of natural kinds.[14]

NOTES

1. The debate is about propositional knowledge, ascribed in the sentences falling under the form "S knows that 'P'."

2. The thesis need not be strictly spelled out in terms of natural kinds—degrees of naturalness or other devices might serve the purpose (Lewis 1989). Nevertheless, I will follow this convention as it has been the usual framing of the debate in the literature

3. For a defense of the compatibility of metaphysical naturalism and traditional armchair methodology, see Ahlstrom 2008 and Goldman 2007.

4. This may be an implicit or explicit commitment to an external semantics regarding natural kinds.

5. I am aware polyphyletic groups such as worms would not count as natural kinds in a cladistic view of taxonomic kinds.

6. Authors do not claim knowledge = core knowledge, though Engel (2007) suggests the possibility.

7. This is an externalist account in the line of Kripke (1980). An account from an internalist semantics perspective would be somewhat different. For instance, according to an internalist the term "gold" used before the birth of chemistry did not denote the chemical element 79, but a yellowish ductile metal. Nevertheless, once the chemical concept of gold (Au) is available, the previous concept is abandoned since the reference is roughly the same and the chemical concept works better in predictions, explanations, inductions, etc.

8. Unless one thinks all mature science must eventually be composed by axiomatized theories, formulated with mathematical precision.

9. [1] If there is mathematical revisionism, perhaps there is a place in the world for ethological revisionism.

10. [1] Contexts are usually defined from an evolutionary perspective.

11. [1] Usually "proper function," hence evolutionary determined. But as I have argued elsewhere (Vázquez-del-Mercado, 2018), a systemic capacity view of functions such as Cummins' (1975), might serve better for epistemic evaluations and arguably determine "natural" functions, in a non-trivial sense (Davies 2003).

12. Ethiological theories are more common, but propentionist views do not depend on evolutionary history.

13. That is, do we demand that the individual actively represents the goal when seeking true belief related to that goal?

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Inconsistent Reasoning in the Sciences and Strategic-Logical Pluralism

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1. INTRODUCTION

The *Principle of Explosion* is one of the most characteristic principles of classical logic (and of any other explosive logic). It says that any (explosive) theory will trivialize if it contains at least one contradiction. A *contradiction* is a pair of propositions, where one is the negation of the other—sometimes contradiction is defined as the conjunction of both propositions. A theory is *trivial* if it is possible to derive any proposition from it. Therefore, any inconsistent (explosive) theory will be trivial.

In light of the above, an important question in the philosophy of science is whether science could be inconsistent and non-explosive at the same time; that is, *can science be inconsistency tolerant?* If science could in fact be tolerant of contradictions, philosophers of science should also address the questions: *How is it possible to make sense of the use of inconsistent theories in science* and *is such a use an indication of scientific irrationality*? With the latter question in mind, philosophers and logicians of science have argued that a study of sensible inconsistent reasoning in the sciences, if possible, could be crucial in the search for a general theory of scientific rationality (Carnielli and Coniglio). Unfortunately, a large number of the philosophical projects that aimed at addressing the possibility of sensible inconsistent scientific reasoning lost sight of the original goal and ended up exclusively "proposing alternative logics that *might*

lurk in the background of scientific reasoning" (Brown and Priest, "A Paraconsistent Inference Strategy" 299. My emphasis), missing actual scientific inferential practices and focusing on more general philosophical projects regarding logical pluralism.

Logical pluralism is, sometimes, understood as the recognition that "different kinds of situations, and different logics (or consequence relations) may be appropriate for *reasoning* about them—in the sense that if you know (or assume) that certain things hold in these situations, the logic is guaranteed to give you other things that hold in the situation" (Priest 331. My emphasis). All this in the absence of the assumption that a single correct approach to reasoning exists. For the case of inconsistency toleration in the sciences, philosophical projects on logical pluralism have aimed at pointing out the logics that allow reasoning to be inconsistent and non-trivial at the same time, without paying much attention to the actual cases of alleged inconsistent science.

Considering the apparent failure of many philosophical programs when explaining actual sensible inconsistent reasoning in the sciences, this paper submits a novel approach to the formal analysis of inconsistency in science. My main concern here is methodological, namely: to respond to the question *How can we study and explain cases of inconsistent science from an inferential point of view without losing sight of the actual cases.* In order to do so, here I present a novel type of paraconsistent approach to inconsistent reasoning and argue that such approach could help to deepen our understanding of sensible reasoning in inconsistent contexts.

I introduce a paraconsistent approach to reasoning, namely, the *Paraconsistent Reasoning Strategies Approach* (PRSA), and I argue that the PRSA could, in the long run, ground a theory of scientific rationality and that is, at first, compatible with different views on logical consequence. The plan for this paper goes as follows: First, in Section 2, I briefly describe the phenomenon of inconsistency toleration in science and I enunciate some of the most important requirements for its philosophical understanding. In Section 3, I introduce a case study that illustrates inconsistency toleration in empirical sciences. Section 4 is devoted to characterizing the formal approach to inconsistent scientific reasoning, and to presenting the PRSA and argueing that it can account for inconsistent scientific reasoning. Finally, in Section 5, I explain how the PRSA could allow for a special type of logical pluralism, and in Section 6, I draw some conclusions.

2. Inconsistency Toleration in Science

While consistency in science has been untiringly pursued by philosophers of science and inconsistency has often been seen as negative, the history of science has shown that, at some point in their development, many of our most important theories have been inconsistent. Some of the most famous examples of this are:

Aristotle's theory of motion, early calculus, Bohr's theory of the atom, and classical electrodynamics.

Considering the above, philosophers, historians, and logicians of science have pointed out that contradictions are (safely) ubiquitous in scientific activity, that is, while frequent, they (almost) never threaten the scientific enterprise (Lakatos Laudan, Smith, Meheus 2002, Carnielli and Coniglio). Therefore, nowadays, there is a common agreement on the fact that not all contradictions are equally malign for scientific practice. So, contrary to what the traditional views might suggest, inconsistent theories do not always have to be rejected and inconsistent reasoning is not always an indicator of irrationality.

Inconsistency toleration is a phenomenon which takes place once epistemic agents who believe contradictions are malign are able to identify a contradiction in a relevant part of their reasoning and still reason sensibly from such an inconsistent set of information, that is, they are still able to distinguish between the products of their reasoning that are sensible, given a particular context, from those that are not (Meheus 2002, Carnielli and Coniglio).

Inconsistency toleration does *not* necessarily involve any of the following: (a) the final solution of the contradiction, nor (b) a *real* contradiction 'in action'. One the one hand, when facing a contradiction, scientists could try to solve it and fail at doing so, and we can still call this "inconsistency toleration." Additionally, they also could be using an inconsistent set of propositions without focusing on the contradiction, but if they are aware of its presence and can still prevent triviality, we can keep calling it "inconsistency toleration." On the other hand, if, at a particular time (*t1*), a scientist identifies a contradiction in a particular set of propositions, regards it as not dangerous and remains capable of having sensible reasoning, and later, at a time (*t2*), she discovers that the original set of propositions did not contain a *real* contradiction (but only apparent), we can still call the processes that she followed for the avoidance of triviality, in *t1*, "inconsistency toleration."

Considering the complexity of the phenomenon of inconsistency toleration, philosophers of science have developed three different types of research programs for its study:

> **Historical programs**: these types of programs have a deeply descriptive approach to contradiction in science, "which concerns the question whether inconsistencies commonly appear in science, and whether scientists sometimes accept and reason from inconsistencies" (Šešelja 2).

> **Logical programs**: these programs have a more "normative perspective, which concerns the questions whether we can rationally reason from an inconsistent set of premises without ending up in a logical explosion, and if so, how" (Šešelja 2).

> **Methodological programs**: these types of programs have "a normative perspective, which concerns the role of the standard of consistency in evaluations of scientific theories" (Šešelja 2).

Initially, these programs were superficially combined. For instance, a logical approach to inconsistency toleration would develop an analysis of a consequence relation that allows for the tolerance of some contradictions (without rendering logical triviality). And such an approach would test the effectiveness of this consequence relation by providing a formal model of a particular historical case study—without being necessarily meticulous with the historical details of the case. If the consequence relation was shown to be robust enough to explain the proposed case, then some methodological conclusions would be drawn, for instance, the non-explosive character of some contradictions in the sciences (depending on the chosen consequence relation that underlay the reasoning in the scientists).

Nonetheless, and as a result of the most recent discussions on the possibility of inconsistent science (Vickers, Davey), it has become clear that any attempt at the philosophical understanding of the phenomenon of inconsistency toleration should put all these programs together in a more significant way. A satisfactorily approach to inconsistency toleration should allow for a way to understand how it is possible to reason from inconsistent information in science without arriving at arbitrary conclusions, but it should also allow for some insights about the status of consistency in science, and finally, it should help us to describe and explain *actual* cases of inconsistency toleration in science (if any).

In what follows I introduce a case study from nuclear physics that illustrates inconsistency toleration, and I argue that cases like this one deserve an explanation in terms of inferential mechanisms that allow for *good* predictions despite inconsistency and for the avoidance of triviality despite the presence of a contradiction.

3. The (Inconsistent) Nuclear Realm

Some preliminaries: The nucleus of an atom is the small region in which 99.9% of the total mass of the atom is located. The nucleus consists of protons and neutrons bound together. The behavior of the nucleus is explained by appealing to two different forces: the strong nuclear force and the weak nuclear force. The strong nuclear force is what binds nucleons (protons and neutrons) into atomic nuclei, while the weak force is responsible for the decay of neutrons to protons. The *binding energy* of a nucleus is what in large part determines the stability of the nucleus. Any atomic nucleus (of any chemical element) will exhibit binding between protons and neutrons and decay of neutrons and protons. Finally, our current nuclear physics has provided us with, at least, 31 nuclear models that allow

us to, at least, describe, predict and measure this type of behavior of atomic nuclei (Cf. Cook, Morrison Chap. 5).[1]

On the one hand, the *Liquid Drop Model* (LDM) is one of the most successful nuclear models. It was formulated under the assumption that the nucleus of an atom exhibits classical behavior (protons and neutrons strongly interact with an internal repulsive force proportional to the number of nucleons). On the other hand, the *Shell Model* (SM) is a nuclear model according to which a shell represents the energy level in which particles of the same energy exist, and so, the elementary particles are located in different shells of the nucleus. According to the SM, the nucleus itself exhibits quantum-mechanical behavior (Heyde 58), that is, for this model "nucleons are assumed to be point particles free to orbit within the nucleus, due to the net attractive force that acts between them and produces a net potential well drawing all the nucleons toward the center rather than toward other nucleons" (Morrison 185).

To measure binding energies of different nuclei, physicists have always preferred LDM, as it is extremely simple and highly accurate. However, while this model is efficiently used for predicting binding energies and fission of many elements, LDM faces serious difficulties when addressing the behavior of atoms of Helium (He), Oxygen (O), Calcium (Ca), Nickel (Ni) and Lead (Pb). Such elements' nuclei are bound more tightly together than predicted by the LDM depending on the number of nucleons that they possess. This is the so-called "magic numbers" phenomenon. Yet, SM can predict binding energies of nuclei with magic numbers (and, oddly, only nuclei of magic numbers). So, if physicists want to measure binding energies of all elements' nuclei they have to, sometimes, see the nucleus as classical and, at other times, as a quantum object. To assume that the atom is describable as a classical entity as well as a quantum object is at its best, problematic, and at its worst, inconsistent.[2]

It is well known that nuclear physicists do not take both models as candidates for the partial truth, they only use them (and combine them) in order to get accurate predictions and measurements, but they do not believe that both models put together realistically describe the empirical domain they "talk about." Nonetheless, this case study demands an explanation about how an inconsistent combination of information—interpreted realistically or not—could *entail* accurate predictions and how scientists could avoid triviality at the same time. Cases like this one require an analysis in terms of inferential procedures that are useful (or needed) for the avoidance of triviality while tolerating inconsistencies, i.e., an explanation in terms of logic.

With that in mind, in the following section I briefly describe two different ways for giving a formal account of inconsistency toleration in science.

4. Paraconsistent Approaches

Logic, understood from an epistemological point of view, is mainly focused on increasing our understanding of human reasoning through the analyses of certain inferential patterns that agents could actually employ (Corcoran). Such a view has provoked critical discussions on a formal and philosophical level. On the one hand, some philosophers have been strongly skeptical regarding the normative role of formal logic in human reasoning (Margáin), while others have accepted that it is not clear if logic can describe the norms of human inferential processes, yet it could still be explicative of some common inferences (Harman). On the other hand, some other logicians have maintained that certain logics could ground a theory of human rationality (Carnielli and Coniglio Chap.1). The latter approach consists in identifying a paradigmatic element of human rationality and analyzing the inferential patterns that are involved in it (which logical principles play a role in that particular type of reasoning, which are clearly avoided, and so on), and then selecting a logic or a group of logics that can describe and explain such inferences. Ideally, the result of such analyses will provide us with, at least, a deeper understanding of human rationality (Carnielli and Coniglio Chap.1 (give specific page numbers).

Following a similar intuition, some schools of *paraconsistent logics*[3] have persistently aimed at providing logics that are supposed to describe and articulate norms for—actual—human reasoning in inconsistent contexts. Let's call these types of programs the *Paraconsistent Logics Approach* (PLAs). The PLAs project is mostly focused on the analysis of different types of logical consequence that could describe sensible reasoning in inconsistent contexts (regardless if they are associated with scientific practices). As part of this approach one could recognize a certain application of the Logic of Paradox (Priest 1984, 2006 specify these in terms of brief title and page numbers), some branches of the Adaptive Logics project (Batens 2002, 2017; Meheus 2002 see above)), and some branches of the Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs) project (Carnielli and Coniglio Chap. 8, 9), among others.

While this enterprise has produced many interesting formal results, it also has been accused of overlooking the actual phenomenon of handling inconsistency in scientific reasoning. This is partially because the type of analysis that this view holds requires strong commitments with very specific (some of them even peculiar) logical consequences, which might not be part of human reasoning at all. In addition, these projects have not yet been able to agree in their explanations of which are the inferences that scientists should follow in order to avoid explosion when reasoning with inconsistent information. Even more alarming, for the same case studies, different and rival explanations have been provided by the supporters of PLAs. And so far it has seemed that either there is no core of shared elements that could explain how certain scientists have dealt with certain contradictions at a

particular moment, or there are way too many alternative explanations, so that it is not clear that any of those is actually an explanation for the particular cases.

In the majority of instances, the PLA-explanations of cases of inconsistency toleration are reinforced by specific applications of particular paraconsistent logics. And so, it has been argued that, PLAs draw the attention away from the actual premises and arguments offered by scientists by privileging discussions on which particular notion of logical consequence is, for instance, more virtuous (Brown and Priest, "Bohr's Hydrogen Atom"). For example, in Meheus (2002) the case of Clausius's derivation of Carnot's theorem is presented as a case of inconsistent scientific reasoning, and it is explained by stating that the logic that satisfactorily models this type of reasoning is an Adaptive Logic, in particular, the adaptive logic ANA. In a similar way, Priest (1987, 2006) analyzes the—physical—phenomenon of motion as a contradictory one and provides an understanding of it that suits the basic structures of some dialethic logics. The fact that PLA-explanations tend to privilege very specific logical consequences which further applications to scientific reasoning are not yet clear, makes it less surprising that PLA-explanations face some harsh critiques from the history and philosophy of science. For instance, it has been constantly pointed out that the adoption of only PLAs to historical episodes tends to threaten the understanding of the actual phenomenon (as it was claimed for the case of the Priestian theory of motion, by Boccardi and Macias-Bustos, and by Vickers (186-90) for some other interesting cases of alleged inconsistency toleration).

In the face of these kinds of allegations, a more general type of formal approach to inconsistency toleration has been suggested: general formal tools that do "not focus on identifying or proposing alternative logics that might lurk in the background of scientific reasoning. Instead it focuses on a more directly observable feature of reasoning, viz., how and where different premises are invoked in the course of arguments" (Brown and Priest 299). The result is a type of analysis of inconsistency in (scientific) reasoning through the use of some reasoning strategies; let's call this *the Paraconsistent Reasoning Strategies Approach* (PRSA). Considering that this methodological view makes no assumptions about which is the underlying logic of scientific reasoning, it is considered to be 'minimal' (Brown, "Paraconsistency, Pluralistic Models and Reasoning" page) when used to model specific cases from the history of sciences.

Paraconsistent Reasoning Strategies are specific technical procedures that help to achieve the avoidance of triviality in an optimal way—what is "optimal" would depend on the constrains of each of the cases that are being studied. These strategies suggest ways in which information could be broken apart and transmitted while following some inferential patterns. Even though these strategies often substantiate the general dynamics of certain logics; they are, most of the time, also logic-independent—that is, they are compatible with many and diverse logics.

Paraconsistent reasoning strategies do not necessarily focus on the structure of

the scientifically inconsistent theory (or model) itself, but they pay special attention to both the information that epistemic agents often employ to identify the contradiction and the ways in which agents use such information in scientific problem solving and still avoid triviality. This minimal approach to inconsistent scientific reasoning was first sketched through the Rescher-Manor mechanisms and is nowadays incarnated in the strategies that substantiate the dynamics of the so-called Adaptive Logics, *reliability strategy* and *minimal abnormality strategy,* among others (Verdee 2009, Straßer 2014, Batens 2017, and in *Chunk and Permeate* Brown 2016, 2017; Brown and Priest 2004, 2015; Friend 2013; Benham et al. 2014; Priest 2014 (see above)).

In the following section, I briefly sketch how the PRS Approach can allow for a type of logical pluralism when explaining specific cases of scientific inconsistent reasoning.

5. PRSA Logical Pluralism

Usually *logical pluralism* is understood as "the view that there is more than *one correct logic*. Logics are theories of validity: they tell us, for different arguments, whether or not that argument is of a valid form. Different logics disagree about which argument forms are valid" (Russell). If adopting this very general view on pluralism, one could think that the PLAs has, in a sense, reinforced a pluralist perspective on logics applied to scientific reasoning. Nonetheless, the large multiplicity and the irregularity of types of logical consequences that the PLAs has associated to specific cases of inconsistent scientific reasoning, suggest than more than a logical pluralism, this could be close to *logical relativism*.

Logical Relativism is the view that there can be as many *correct* logics as inferential subjects (either individuals or collectives) (Baghramian and Carter Sec. 4.4). This, of course, could diminish the normative component that, intuitively, logics possess. The fact that for the study of inconsistent scientific reasoning, the PLAs have not yet satisfactorily identified a core of shared elements that could explain how certain scientists have dealt with specific contradictions at a particular moment, joined with the fact that the supporters of the PLAs have proposed many rival logical consequence relations to explain each particular case of inconsistent reasoning, suggest that, via PLAs, we have not yet gained much understanding of the inferential mechanisms that underlie human reasoning in inconsistent contexts.[4] While, allegedly, the PLAs have shifted their objects of study from scientific reasoning itself to logical consequence relations in general, and while doing this have gotten close to logical relativism (regarding logics applied to scientific reasoning), the same did not happen to the PRSA.

As the PRSA is mostly interested in analyzing general procedures that help to attain reliable information through the use of inconsistent data in specific cases, and because paraconsistent reasoning strategies are—most of the time—also logic-

independent, this allows for a particular kind of logical pluralism, namely:

> **PRSA Logical Pluralism**: exhibits the absence of the assumption that a single correct approach to the logical consequence that underlies the inconsistency toleration processes exists. One specific Paraconsistent Reasoning Strategy (for instance, Chunk and Permeate), can be compatible with many and very different logical consequence relations (from classical logic to a dialethic logic). Each Paraconsistent Reasoning Strategy can be used to explain a diversity of case studies from science by appealing for each of them to specific inferential procedures, for instance, fragmentation (as Chunk and Permeate does) and, at the same time, each strategy leaves room for particular logical consequence relations to rule the reasoning that underlie each of the specific cases.
>
> For an exemplar of the versatility of a Paraconsistent Reasoning Strategy one could look at the many applications of Chunk and Permeate : [Brown 2016, 2017; Brown and Priest 2004, 2015; Friend and Martínez-Ordaz; Priest; Sweeney], and conclude that while all these applications are determined by the procedures of chunking sets of information and the allowance of such information to permeate between chunks, they are also explained by the use of different logics that ruled the corresponding chunks and therefore, the reasoning of the scientists.

A pluralist-PRSA view suggests that there is a finite number of equally successful paraconsistent strategies that help to handle contradictions in human reasoning. While these strategies guide very general procedures of information management, such as to *separate the information in maximally consistent sets*, or to *distrust certain types of results*, they are also compatible with different types of logical consequence relation (explosive or paraconsistent, among others).

Now, one could fear that this logical pluralism is actually a type of *logical relativism*. However, I think, that this might not be the case, as, while all Paraconsistent Reasoning Strategies could be abstractly compatible with extremely many and diverse logics, when being employed to model specific cases of scientific reasoning, only some of them would be relevant and suitable for doing this job—depending on the particular cases to be modeled. In addition, even if the different strategies that could be used for formally reconstructing specific cases of inconsistency toleration provide different reconstructions of the same phenomenon, it is very likely that such reconstructions reveal different components of the same episode of scientific rationality, and while doing so enrich our understanding of both the reasoning that took place at that particular moment, as well as the general phenomenon of scientific rationality.

Finally, considering that the PRSA takes into account general elements

involved in the most common practices of inconsistency toleration in science, this approach also permits that, depending on the particularities of each case of inconsistency toleration, different logics are used in order to transmit, select, and neglect certain type of information. In order to provide a successful approach to inconsistency toleration a paraconsistent reasoning strategy should describe the use of the most natural information-transmitting inferences into, at least, conditional operations (Meheus), and if doing so, a PRSA could, in the long run, shed light on the basic elements for the preservation of sensible reasoning and scientific rationality in inconsistent contexts.

6. Final Remarks

Inconsistency toleration is a phenomenon that takes place once epistemic agents who, after identifying a contradiction, can still reason sensibly from it. It is possible to identify many instances of inconsistency toleration in science (one of them was presented in Section 3). There are two different formal approaches to inconsistency toleration in science: the *Paraconsistent Logics Approach* and the *Paraconsistent Reasoning Strategies Approach*, while the former faces many difficulties (one of them being to overlook the actual phenomenon of inconsistency toleration), the latter could, through a type of pluralism, maintain the virtues of the Paraconsistent Logics approach and at the same time, give an account of the particularities of each case of inconsistent reasoning in science.[5]

Notes

1. The diversity of models itself is not problematic, especially if "each model has its particular successes, and together they are sometimes taken as complementary insofar as each contributes to an overall explanation of the experimental data" (Morrison 179). However, the case study that I am presenting here illustrates how the basic assumptions required by one model contradict those required by another model.

2. A more detailed description of this case study can be found in [Friend and Martínez-Ordaz Sec. 8].

3. In general terms, a logical consequence relation is said to be "paraconsistent" if it is not explosive, this is, if it does not validate the Principle of Explosion.

4. An important remark: While I consider that the PLA has had significant results on philosophical and formal issues related to logical pluralism and logicality, among other subjects of philosophical study, some philosophers (me included) have struggled in identifying the actual philosophical import of the PLA-views for the understanding of specific cases of inconsistency toleration in the sciences. That said, the philosophical and methodological worries that I express in this section (Sec. 5) are strictly concerned with the formal and philosophical analyses of actual cases of inconsistent scientific reasoning.

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"The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth." So, Help Us…Aquinas? Why is Truth an Adaequatio?

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Even though throughout his works Aquinas uses at least ten different words to talk about the nature of truth, his preferred way of defining truth is *adaequatio,* as in his classic definition *adaequatio rei et intellectus.* Why does he prefer this one? This paper gives two possible reasons: 1) the connection between *adaequatio* and equality, understood as a mean or middle between more and less, and 2) the connection between *adaequatio* and the second act of the intellect. The paper will thus be divided into two parts.

I. The Connection Between *Adaequatio* and Equality

Aquinas prefers to speak about truth more as an *adaequatio*, which he understands to involve an equality. What does this mean? At first, it may seem implausible to think of truth as an equality. Does this mean that a statement or thought is true because it is equal to the way things are? The statement "I am sitting" is true because it is equal to reality? How can the statement be equal to reality?

Throughout all his major treatises on truth, Aquinas elaborates on what this means. Truth is an *adaequatio* because it is a middle or a mean between more and less, that is, it is neither more nor less. In the following text, Aquinas basically argues that the intellectual virtues consist in a mean because the good of the intellectual virtues or of the intellect itself is truth, but truth, which is an

adaequatio, consists in a mean between two extremes.

> The good of the intellectual virtues consists in this, that the true is said. Now truth consists in a certain adequation [*adaequatio*] of the intellect and spoken word to a thing. And because equality [*aequalitas*] is a mean/middle between more and less, therefore it is necessary that the good of the intellect consist in a mean, when, namely, it is said about a thing that which it is. If, however, it exceeds either in more or in less, there will be the false, which is related to the intellectual virtues, just as vice is related to the moral virtues. (*Super Sent.*, lib. 3 d. 33 q. 1 a. 3 qc. 3 co)[1]

To understand truth as an *adaequatio,* it is crucial to grasp notion of equality and the corresponding notions of more and less. That is equal to another which is neither more nor less than it. Etymologically, contained in the Latin word "*adaequatio"* is the word "equality" or "equal," which perhaps takes one back to mathematics. "Equal" brings to mind neither more nor less. One quantity is equal to another because it is neither more nor less than the other. If I have eleven oranges and you have ten, I have more than you. If I have nine and you have ten, I have less than you. However, if I have ten oranges and you have ten oranges, I have an *equal* number of oranges to yours, i.e., neither more nor less. Likewise, if one line is equal to another, it is neither shorter nor longer than the other line.

In the same text, Aquinas defines the mean in accordance with what the intellect recognizes to be the case about reality. He adds that when the intellect makes a quantitative judgment of "more or "less," we have the opposite of truth–namely falsity. Truth, therefore, is an equality, (a neither more nor less) and falsity is an inequality (an either more or less). To further clarify what he means, he adds a comparison of falsity to moral vice. So, for example, just as courage lies in the mean between two vices–foolhardiness (the vice of excess) and cowardice (the vice of deficiency), so truth lies in the mean between two extremes, namely, more and less, both of which constitute falsity. So, truth is like a moral virtue, and falsity is like a moral vice.

Within the same text, in the reply to the third objection, Aquinas gives a more detailed account as to what it would mean for there to be an excess and a defect, and how truth is a mean between these extremes:

> To the third it ought to be said that the extremes in the intellectual virtues are not taken according to a great and small intelligible thing: but the extreme is in [there being] more, when something is attributed to something which is not in it; and the extreme is in less, when something is removed from it which *is* in it. Now the false occurs in either way; but the true, when what belongs to something is said to belong to something, or what does not belong to something is said not to belong to something; and

> these extremes corrupt not the substance, but the truth of the intellect. (*Super Sent.*, lib. 3 d. 33 q. 1 a. 3 qc. 3 ad 3)[2]

So, "the more" or "excess" is when something is attributed to something which is not in it. For example, if I were to say right now that "I am standing," I am attributing to myself something which is not in me, namely, standing. Now, "the less" or "defect" is when something is removed from something which *is* in it. For example, if I were to say right now that "I am not sitting," I am removing from myself something which indeed *is* in me, namely, my sitting. Now, both the statement "I am standing" (the more or excess) and the statement "I am not sitting" (the less or defect) are false. Aquinas says that the false occurs in either of these two ways. In this text, Aquinas also gives more details regarding the mean itself which is between the more and the less, the two ways of being false. It is basically the opposite of each of the extremes. So, if "the more" or "excess" is when something is attributed to something which is NOT in it, the "mean" would be when something is attributed to something which IS in it. Likewise, if "the less" or "defect" is when something is removed from something which IS in it, the "mean" would be when something is removed from something which is indeed removed from it. So, if both of these ways of being true are put down together, they would together be between the two ways of being false, and thus truth is a mean between two extremes.

Aquinas repeats this same idea in the following text from the *Summa*:

> "The good of the speculative intellectual virtue consists in a certain mean, through conformity to a thing itself, according as it says to be what is or not to be what is not; in which the notion of the true consists. But excess is according to a false affirmation, through which what is not is said to be: but defect is taken according to a false negation, through which what-is is said not to be (*ST* I-IIae, q. 64 a. 3 co. 415).

Aquinas goes on to add that the excess happens when there is a false affirmation, and defect when there is a false negation. So, to sum up, truth is a mean between a false affirmation and a false negation. This idea of truth being a mean between more and less does not seem to belong solely to Aquinas. Rather, it appears that some awareness of this idea lies behind the courtroom practice whereby a witness is asked to "swear to tell the truth, the *whole* truth, and nothing *but* the truth." If I am called to testify who was at the crime scene, and I say that Robert and Jonathan were there, when in reality neither of them were there, rather, only Mark and Todd were there, then what I say is not true. This is one very obvious way in which what I say does not agree with things, when there is absolutely no element of truth in what I say. Truth or agreement would be to say that Mark and Todd were there.

Now, let's say that instead of saying that Robert and Jonathan were there, I

had said that Mark, Todd, and Robert were there. Well, this statement is also false; what I say does not agree with things either. However, this false statement is not completely like the former one. Mark and Todd were indeed there, and I have said that Mark and Todd were there; however, I have added Robert. And therefore, my statement becomes false even though there is an element of truth, unlike the previous statement which had no element of the truth in it.

Let's say again that instead of saying that Robert and Jonathan were there, I had said that ***only*** Mark was there, leaving out Todd. Again, this statement is also false. However, this statement is closer to the second statement than to the first. Mark was indeed there, and I have said that he was; however, I have left out Todd, thus making my statement false even though there is an element of truth in it. So, in the second statement (Mark and Todd and Robert were there) I have added to the truth, in the third (***only*** Mark was there), I have subtracted from the truth. Therefore, the true statement, "Mark and Todd were there" is in a way in between the second and third statements. The true statement neither adds nor subtracts from the truth; in other words, the true statement says neither more nor less than the truth. So, when the witness swears to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, they are swearing to not speak falsely by either subtracting from the truth or adding to the truth.

In speaking of truth as a mean between more and less, Aquinas is not speaking improperly or figuratively. Aquinas actually thinks that it must be so. To see this, it is necessary to understand contrariety, that it can be found in the intellect, and how. That contrariety is a necessary element for understanding truth as an *adaequatio* seems to be what Aquinas says in a text from the *Disputed Questions on the Virtues* where he shows that the intellectual virtues consist in a mean because truth consists in a mean. Aquinas says, "If therefore in the intellect there were not some proper contrariety besides the contrariety of things, a mean and extremes would not be taken in the intellectual virtues (*Disputed Questions on the Virtues,* q. 1, a. 13, co.)."[3] In the *Summa theologiae* text on the same issue, one of the objections for there being no mean in the intellectual virtues is that there seems to be no contrariety in the intellect. The objection reads:

> a mean is properly among contraries; as is clear by the philosopher in Metaphysics Bk. X. But in the intellect, there does not seem to be any contrariety, since even contraries themselves, according as they are in the intellect, are not contrary, but are understood at the same time, as white and black, healthy and sick. Therefore, there is no mean in the intellectual virtues (*ST* Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 arg. 3).[4]

Regarding things as they are externally to the mind, one contrary excludes the other. White excludes black, health excludes sickness, and virtue excludes vice. However, within the intellect, the idea of white does not exclude the idea of black

nor does the idea of health exclude the idea of sickness, nor virtue the idea of vice. The complete opposite occurs. There is actually the *same* knowledge of opposites. For example, the medical art is a knowledge of health and sickness. The doctor does not just know about health; he knows also about illness. Ethics is a knowledge of virtue and vice. One contrary is actually necessary for understanding the other and thus can be understood *with* the other. Understanding what health is, for instance, helps me to understand what sickness is. Knowing what normal blood pressure is helps me to understand abnormal blood pressure. Thus, it would seem that there was no contrariety in the intellect.

However, Aquinas points out, following what Aristotle teaches in the *peri Hermeneias*, the contrariety in the intellect concerns affirmation and negation.[5] They are furthest apart in the genus of statements. For example, the affirmation "Socrates is sitting" is contrary to the negation "Socrates is not sitting." But what does this have to do with truth as an *adaequatio*? Well, truth as *adaequatio* is a mean between two extremes, namely, the two ways of being false, saying that what is, is not, or that what is not, is. But in the first case, there is a negation, in the second case an affirmation. In other words, the two ways of being false are contraries, just as in ethics, the two vices, one concerning excess and the other defect, are contraries. Thus, truth as an *adaequatio* truly stands between contraries. Contained, therefore, in the notion of *adaequatio* is the idea of something being between two extremes.[6] *Adaequatio* is said of truth because it is a mean between two ways of being false: adding to the truth or subtracting from the truth. Though it has not been explicitly mentioned earlier, when Aquinas spells out in detail what the two ways of being false look like, as well as the mean between them, he has in mind Aristotle's definition of the false and the true: "To say that what is, is not or that what is not is, is false; to say that what is, is and that what is not, is not is true" (*Metaphysics,* Bk. IV, ch. 7, 1011b25-28).

II. The Connection Between *Adaequatio* and the Second Act of the Intellect

It turns out that the word "*adaequatio"* also speaks better to the very nature of truth which is constituted by an *act* of the intellect. It is true, as was seen, that Aquinas often speaks of truth as an *aequalitas*, an equality. However, very rarely does Aquinas define truth simply as an *aequalitas*. He almost always prefers the word "*adaequatio*." Why is that? "*Aequalitas"* is the noun form of the adjective "*aequalis*," which means equal.[7] "*Adaequatio"* is the noun form of the verb "*adaequo*," meaning to make equal to, to equalize, to equate, to equal. So, "*aequalitas"* does not imply or include action, but rather a quality. "*Adaequatio,"* on the other hand, does imply an action, or something resulting from an action.

Now, according to Aquinas, and following Aristotle, truth is constituted *in part* by something that the intellect *does*, an *operation* of the intellect, as Aquinas

calls it, namely, the second operation of the intellect, which he calls composition and division. Aquinas explains this very clearly in his main treatises on truth.[8] He sees the intellect as performing three fundamental operations: The first is understanding what a thing is, the second act he calls composition and division, and the third act is reasoning. So for example, the human intellect would first understand what an odd number is or what an even number is. The intellect secondly takes things as they were understood in the first act and either combines them in an affirmative statement or separates them in a negative statement. For example, after understanding what odd and even numbers are, the intellect may separate them in the negative statement, "no odd number is even." In the third act, the intellect takes the affirmative or negative statements it has secondarily made as bases from which to generate new statements. The focus of this paper has been that of the second act of the intellect.

Truth arises, formally speaking, with the second act. In other words, we can start speaking about true and false when we have a statement but never prior to this. "Unicorn," or "odd number," or "dog" are neither true nor false. It is when the mind puts them together with other things in an affirmative or negative statement, that we begin to have something true or false. For example, "an odd number is not an even number" would be true, "dogs have wings" would be false. Aquinas, following Aristotle, sees this "putting together" in an affirmative statement or "separating" in a negative statement as acts of the intellect itself.[9] So, if truth is formally constituted by something that the intellect *does*, namely, this putting together and separating, the second act of the intellect, it seems that truth would be defined better by a word that itself implies a doing or an act. Therefore, the noun form, "*adaequatio,"* derived from the verb "*adaequo"* is more fitting to define truth since it implies action, which is what truth involves on the side of the intellect.[10] So, though "*aequalitas"* works well to speak of truth since it does speak to the nature of truth as a mean between two extremes, "*adaequatio"* works better, for it speaks both to the nature of truth as a mean between two extremes and also to the nature of truth as brought about by an operation or action of the intellect. So, "*adaequatio"* says what "*aequalitas"* says and something more.

CONCLUSION

Truth for Aquinas is an *adaequatio* because truth is a mean between two ways of speaking falsely, and truth is constituted in part by an act of the intellect. Both of these essential features seem to be well expressed by the word *adaequatio*. Unfortunately, Aquinas's definition of truth is usually categorized in books on truth theory as a correspondence theory of truth. I say "unfortunately" because though Aquinas does describe truth as correspondence only once in all his works,[14] it seems that the notion, especially as it is commonly understood, does not seem

to do justice to the essential features examined above. Thus, the *adaequatio* nature of truth remains somewhat hidden.[15]

NOTES

1. *Ad tertiam quaestionem dicendum quod bonum virtutum intellectualium consistit in hoc quod verum dicatur. Veritas autem consistit in quadam adaequatione intellectus et vocis ad rem. Et quia aequalitas est medium inter majus et minus, ideo oportet quod bonum virtutis intellectualis in medio consistat, ut scilicet dicatur de re hoc quod est. Si autem excedat vel in plus vel in minus, erit falsum; quod se habet ad virtutes intellectuales, sicut vitium ad morales; et hoc inquantum intellectus absolute aliquid considerat; inquantum vero de uno in aliud discurrit, accipitur medium non solum secundum commensurationem ad rem, sed secundum commensurationem conclusionum ad principia, vel eorum quae sunt ad finem in operativis.*

2. *Ad tertium dicendum quod extrema in virtutibus intellectualibus non accipiuntur secundum magnum et parvum intelligibile; sed extremum in plus est, quando attribuitur aliquid alicui quod non inest ei; extremum autem in minus, quando removetur ab eo quod ei inest. Utroque autem modo falsum contingit; verum autem, quando dicitur inesse quod inest, aut non inesse quod non inest; et haec extrema corrumpunt non substantiam, sed veritatem intellectus*.

3. *Si igitur in intellectu non esset aliqua propria contrarietas praeter contrarietatem rerum, non esset accipere in virtutibus intellectualibus medium et extrema*.

4. Cf. *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, lib. 7 l. 6 n. 25. "Now, the existence of one contrary is destroyed by the existence of the other contrary; but the knowledge of one opposite is not destroyed by the knowledge of the other,but is rather helped. Hence, the forms of opposites are not opposite in the soul. In fact, the substance, i.e., the what it is, of a privation is the same as the substance of its opposite, just as the *notion* of health and sickness is the same in the soul. For sickness is known through the absence of health. Also, the health which is in the soul, is a certain notion through which health and sickness is known, and it is found in the science, i.e., in the knowing, of both."

5. *ST* Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 ad 3. "*Ad tertium dicendum quod ipsae res contrariae non habent contrarietatem in anima, quia unum est ratio cognoscendi alterum, et tamen in intellectu est contrarietas affirmationis et negationis, quae sunt contraria, ut dicitur in fine peri hermeneias.*" *Disputed Questions on the Virtues,* q. 1, a. 13, co. "*Contraria autem intellectus sunt opposita secundum affirmationem et negationem, ut patet in II Periher. Inter affirmationes ergo et negationes oppositas accipitur medium virtutum intellectualium speculativarum, quod est verum*."

6. This aspect of the notion of *adaequatio*, as understood by Aquinas and applied to the nature of truth, seems to be almost entirely absent from current literature on truth theory as well as studies on Thomas Aquinas. Wolfgang Künne, for example, who among truth theorists seems to have the most complete account of Aquinas does not mention this essential aspect of truth in Aquinas. Neither does Fr. Wippel or Jan Aertsen, who among Thomistic scholars, has perhaps one of the most complete textual accounts of truth in Aquinas. I was made aware of this aspect by Duane H. Berquist. Some truth theorists seem in some remote way to see that truth can for some involve this aspect. For example, Engel seems to have this in mind when he is explaining our ordinary notion of truth, but he seems

to limit this aspect to 'true' as it is said of things. "We apply, however, this predicate also to concrete things, such as pictures, artefacts, pieces of currency, or even living animals. For instance we say that this is a true drawing by Poussin, that this is a true copy of a document, a true 50 euro banknote, a true piece of artillery or a true Irish setter. In such cases, the meaning of "true" seems to be the same as "authentic," "real," "faithful," "exact," or **"conforming to" a model or a type"** [my emphasis] (Engel, *Truth* 9). Alasdair MacIntyre seems to also have this aspect in mind when he asks, for instance, "What is it to attain truth? The perfected understanding in which enquiry terminates, when some mind is finally ***adequate*** [my emphasis] to that subject matter about which it has been enquiring, consists in key part in being able to say how things are, rather than how they seem to be from the particular, partial, and limited standpoint of some particular set of perceivers or observes or enquirers." (MacIntyre 58). *τὸ μὲν γὰρ λέγειν τὸ ὂν μὴ εἶναι ἢ τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι ψεῦδος, τὸ δὲ τὸ ὂν εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν μὴ εἶναι ἀληθές.*

7. See DeFerrari 20.

8. *Commentary on the Sentences* Bk. 1, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1. *Quaedam autem sunt quae habent fundamentum in re extra animam, sed complementum rationis eorum quantum ad id quod est formale, est per operationem animae, ut patet in universali. Humanitas enim est aliquid in re, non tamen ibi habet rationem universalis, cum non sit extra animam aliqua humanitas multis communis; sed secundum quod accipitur in intellectu, adjungitur ei per operationem intellectus intentio, secundum quam dicitur species: et similiter est de tempore, quod habet fundamentum in motu, scilicet prius et posterius ipsius motus; sed quantum ad id quod est formale in tempore, scilicet numeratio, completur per operationem intellectus numerantis.* ***Similiter dico de veritate, quod habet fundamentum in re, sed ratio ejus completur per actionem intellectus, quando scilicet apprehenditur eo modo quo est.*** *Unde dicit philosophus, quod verum et falsum sunt in anima; sed bonum et malum in rebus*.

9. *DV* 1, 8, ad. 3: *Ad tertium dicendum quod secundum Philosophum in VI Metaphysicae veritas non consistit in compositione quae est in rebus, sed in compositione quam facit anima*. p. 28.

10. Aquinas actually does sometimes use the verb form *adaequare* when speaking of truth: *bonum enim intellectus nostri est verum, quod quidem sequitur intellectus noster quando adaequatur rei. Disputed Questions on the Virtues,* q. 1, a. 13.

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A Dilemma for Luck Egalitarians

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This article presents a dilemma for luck egalitarians.[1] The dilemma is that luck egalitarians can either allow secession and emigration to regimes that do not enforce egalitarian outcomes or prohibit secession from political regimes crafted in accordance with luck egalitarian principles.[2] If the luck egalitarian allows such secession, she must abandon her commitment to the claim that luck egalitarianism (LE, henceforth) is the only accurate theory of justice. If the luck egalitarian prohibits secession, she must abandon a commitment to many of the concerns motivating liberalism in general and LE in particular. The paper concludes by considering and rejecting some responses on behalf of the luck egalitarian.

Two notes are necessary before moving on. First, I confine my remarks to a very specific version of LE. The version I focus on is comprehensive in that it identifies the underlying commitments of LE as the only principles of justice. This version of LE is contrasted with a hybrid theory that upholds a commitment to eliminating the role undeserved bad luck plays in an individual's life with some other principles of justice. One might see Richard Arneson as a proponent of the comprehensive form of justice while John Rawls might be something like the latter.

Second, the comprehensive LE I focus on is global in nature. It is global in that it applies to all individuals, even if they never interact with one another. I can have an obligation to offset the bad luck an individual in some remote village endures, even if I do not interact with that individual. This is distinct from a social-interactionist theory that holds that, whatever obligations of justice exist, they exist only when individuals interact in justice-initiating ways. Trade is the most obvious means of social interaction, but it is by no means the only one. This paper will

focus on the global comprehensive variant of LE.

1. Luck Egalitarianism

While there are many versions of LE, those who endorse the position commonly hold that "it is morally bad if some are badly off through no fault or choice of their own." (Arneson "Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism" 340) Richard Arneson says "[T]he aim of justice as equality is to eliminate so far as is possible the impact on people's lives of bad luck that falls on them through no fault or choice of their own." (340) LE is egalitarian in its commitment to the view that we ought to design institutions to limit, as much as is feasible, the role luck – especially bad luck - plays in people's lives. More precisely, justice demands that all enjoy equality of opportunity, equality of opportunity for advantage, or the like; and bad luck should not prevent people from doing so (Cohen, "On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice").

Luck functions in LE to alter the strength of the moral reasons for ameliorating the condition of an individual. If an individual is badly off through little or no fault of her own, then there are good reasons to improve her condition. If the individual is badly off as a result of own's own free choices, then there are only weak reasons to improve her condition. Arneson holds that "if one is considering taking wealth from one person in order to benefit a less wealthy person who needs the money more, one might hold that the moral reasons that favor this expropriation diminish if the wealth to be taken derives from earned rather than unearned income." (Arneson, "Luck Egalitarianism Interpreted and Defended" 1) Luck egalitarians do not need to say that individuals who suffer through their own choices do not deserve aid. They need only hold that the force of the reasons justifying the aid strengthens if the person is suffering through no fault of his own, instead of from choice he has made.

Some examples aid in illustrating the luck egalitarian position. Arneson observes that two plausible views of luck reach the conclusion that "it is morally more important to aid the prudently responsive armed robbery victim than the imprudent victim (1)." Consider also consider the following scenario from Arneson:

> Bert, a young adult, has available to him a course of conduct that over the course of his life would render him no worse off than others. He then engages in a brief spurt of self-destructive, viciously imprudent behavior. He drives a car recklessly, say, on an abandoned road (no one is endangered except him), and he has neglected to purchase accident insurance. He has bad luck and suffers a bad accident…in the end, Bert is far worse off than others. (6-7)

Luck egalitarians tend to agree that suffering like Bert's is not the *fundamental* concern of justice. Bert, to some degree, is responsible for his suffering. (Arneson 7-8) It may be desirable to ameliorate the condition of individuals who are responsible for their own suffering.[3] However, it is more valuable—or perhaps just morally better—to aid those who are not responsible for their own suffering.

Luck egalitarians tend to hold that their theory of justice should influence the social institutions in place in society.[4] Institutions should aim to make up for bad luck. Public education, public housing, government run healthcare, and the like may be required to reduce the bad luck of being born into poverty does not importantly bear on the individual's condition. Interestingly, many luck egalitarians do not hold that *individuals* have particularly robust obligations to attempt to achieve luck egalitarian aspirations in their private lives. Instead, people just ought to support institutions aimed at achieving those goals.[5] But it is unclear how strong this obligation is. Luck egalitarians have at least suggested that people may opt out of these obligations via secession. The permissibility of secession challenges the luck egalitarian analysis of justice. The impermissibility of secession is otherwise problematic for the luck egalitarian.

2. A DILEMMA

Imagine that a regime pursues LE principles. All the individuals within this system were born into the system, say; they did not willingly establish it. Imagine that there is a nearby regime that does not pursue LE's goals. This non-LE regime has massive inequality. However, even the poor in the non-egalitarian regime do better than the wealthy in the luck egalitarian regime. This is not merely imaginable; there is empirical evidence that it happens.[6] Add the more controversial assumption that the luck egalitarian society does badly off *precisely because* it pursues egalitarian outcome. May some of the members of the LE regime emigrate?[7] There are two obvious answers, both of which are problematic for LE.

A LE might deny that individuals may leave a regime that embodies LE principles. This position is at odds both with principles proponents of LE endorse and with the broader liberalism that is usually associated with LE. As it pertains to principles that egalitarians endorse, recall that Richard Arneson holds that "[T]he aim of justice as equality is to eliminate so far as is possible the impact on people's lives of bad luck that falls on them through no fault or choice of their own." (Arneson, "Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism" 340) Surely preventing an individual from moving to economic systems that increase her prospects of doing better is a way of inflicting bad luck on that individual. After all, *ex hypothesi,* the individual we are discussing was merely born into the LE regime. This person now wishes to leave in order to do better. This person wishes to take responsibility for his or her greater welfare.

What is more, blocking secession or emigration is at odds with liberal

principles that many LE find attractive. Arneson actually makes this case. The rationale for the right to secession comes from the "standard liberal presumption of liberty including liberty to renegotiate past commitments and begin life anew." (Arneson 2011: 160) There are ostensibly two values identified here: the value of renegotiating past commitments and the right of self-determination. Of course, the former might be rooted in the other. Whatever the case, the standard presumption of liberty that Arneson mentions poses an obstacle to "anything like a blanket prohibition on secession and secession." (Arneson, "Luck Egalitarianism: A Primer" 160) Similarly, G.A. Cohen argues that socialist regimes might allocate an area for those who insist in engaging in capitalist activities. This would presumably be something like emigration via expatriation. (Cohen Self-ownership, freedom, and equality 30)

The two problems of denying that individuals may secede then are internal to LE and internal to liberalism. The internal egalitarian cost is that it requires reshaping LE's commitments so that they are compatible with forcing people to live in regimes that require them to do worse than they otherwise might. Perhaps luck egalitarian could hold that what is crucial is that people do not suffer *comparatively*, even if they do worse off than they otherwise might on an absolute scale. However, this is a doubly problematic move. First, the intuition that people ought not to do badly through bad luck is at least sometimes used to argue for LE. If that intuition is entirely comparative, it follows pretty easily that people may not leave egalitarian regimes. Second, and more importantly, those skeptical of LE would need a wonderful explanation of why comparative suffering is crucial while absolute suffering is not. Finally, once people are aware that they could do better, there is no obvious reason why they may not compare themselves to those doing better. Indeed, even if they do not know that they could do better, others could look at their comparative position and wish to allow them to enter arrangements that are more propitious.

Alternatively, LE may hold that it is permissible to leave regimes that pursue the goals endorsed by luck egalitarians. The obvious cost here is that LE ceases, even for the LE, to be a unique analysis of justice. At best, LE could be a default theory of justice – a theory that is correct provided that people make no arrangements to nullify the principle. Alternative arrangements may be just only if entered in whatever the proponent of LE regards as the right way.

3. Responses

This second point allows me to begin responding to some objections to the general argument raised here. One simply embrace this last point. LE is just a default analysis of justice. It is an analysis of social justice. However, there are perfectly permissible ways for people to get out of egalitarian arrangements. Why do I think that it is more than that?

One the one hand, this objection is well taken as a sociological claim. After all, I have used Arneson 2011 and, to a lesser degree, Cohen 1995, as a wedge into the first half of the dilemma I constructed here. So there are some luck egalitarians who do not claim to be offering the only proper analysis of justice. However, there are plenty of proponents of LE who write as if no other arrangement could be just. What is more, some famous criticisms of rival regimes make no sense unless the authors of those criticisms believe that those regimes could never be just. I think that, despite Cohen 1995, Cohen 1989 and 1997 are examples of works that aim to show the impossibility of non-egalitarian regimes' justice. He denies both that principles apply to the basic structure of society and that market transactions exhibit enough equality producing features to count as justice-preserving. Justice, Cohen argues, applies fundamentally to interpersonal transactions; and justice demands (rough) equality.

There are more important problems with this response though. One is that the LE owes an explanation of why egalitarian principles are the *default*. I will merely note that no such explanation exists in the literature. The other is that, once we have principles that justify leaving egalitarian regimes, it then becomes possible that inequality could be justified even within an egalitarian regime. To be clearer, for any principle P that justifies an individual in entering a non-egalitarian regime, it is possible that some unequal holdings will be justified in accordance with P even within the LE regime.

Here is an illustration: Suppose we have an egalitarian regime. Suppose also that people may leave it provided they do so in a fully voluntary manner, whatever that means to the reader. Perhaps they have to give up their claim to be compensated for harms that result from bad luck and they have to do so in a manner that is fully voluntary. Well, it is at least possible that some individuals will exactly this within a regime embodying LE's principles. I might abdicate my claims to compensation for undeserved harms and only interact with others who do the same. Likeminded folks might do the same. After we engage in some kind of private trades, some of us might have far more than the demands of egalitarian justice permit. But now what?

Now the proponent of LE must hold either that the new holdings are just or deny that they are. If they are just, LE is not a unique analysis of social justice. If they are not, then we need a good explanation for why different *societies* can be just. After all, *ex hypothesi*, the transactions within the regime occur in accordance with the principle that allows one to leave the regime. Notice also that individuals in different regimes can come to have market power over individuals in other regimes, unless the two isolate themselves.

Similarly, it will not do to say that everyone in society must agree to allow inequality to arise. That sort of move undermines the case for secession in the first place. This is because when people leave one society for another, if they must ask for permission to leave, they do not have a right to leave. Also, if enough people

leave the egalitarian regime, the regime they enter could come to have market power over the egalitarian regime. Whatever the case here, I do not wish to hang too much on this point. Even if it is impossible for the case for secession to spill into a case against internal equality, LE would still be arguing for an abandonment of LE as a unique analysis of justice.

As an alternative, the luck egalitarian might deny that secession is permissible. The advocate of LE might hold that the principles underpinning LE are inescapable. Those principles might support ultimately valuable ends. If their preservation requires violating some standards liberal values, then so be it. Perhaps self-determination, the freedom to renegotiate prior commitments, and so on, are always contingent on their supporting the ability to prevent individuals from suffering through no fault of their own. Thus, no rival regime can be just.

Some proponents of LE occasionally do endorse just this sort of move. G.A. Cohen seems to embrace both forced labor and forced organ transplants. (Cohen Self-ownership, freedom, and equality 243-250) He also seems to support the violent suppression of capitalism on a small scale within a socialist regime. (Cohen 1995: 29-30) Given this, it would not be overly surprising if he precluded emigration. Other luck egalitarians could follow suit.

This maneuver preserves the internal coherence of LE. However, it does so by losing any broad attractiveness that it might have. I am not saying that no one could find LE attractive if it requires forcing people to stay in arrangements when they could do better elsewhere. Surely, they could. I am saying that people not already strongly committed to LE outcomes above most other traditional liberal values will not find LE attractive. This huge swath of liberals will need to hear the sort of case that luck egalitarians have yet to offer: a case to show that LE values trump most other standard liberal values.

It is difficult to canvass all the potential responses one might make on behalf of LE. One could chip away at the strength of the standard liberal rights to negotiate prior commitments and lead the sort of life one wishes. One could do this with an eye toward holding that LE is compatible with liberalism. One could simply grant that LE is not the only just arrangement. One might do any number of things to respond to the difficulties that I have raised here. As it stands, though, the possibility of legitimate secession and emigration pose a dilemma for proponents of LE.

Notes

1. I benefitted greatly from comments Danny Scoccia offered on an earlier version of this paper.

2. This essay is motivated by an observation Richard Arneson makes toward the end of his “Luck Egalitarianism: a Primer” in Carl Knight and Zofia Stemplowska, eds., *Responsibility and Distributive Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 24-50. I run the case for emigration and secession together in what follows. I do not think that

this is a problem for the general argument of this paper. As long as people are emigrating to non-egalitarian regimes, the fundamental argument of this paper stands.

3. Luck egalitarians who seek to avoid the 'Harshness Objection" grant that people who are responsible for their own suffering may deserve aid. The claim is just that people responsible for their own suffering deserve aid less than those who are not responsible for their own suffering. See Voigt 2007.

4. Luck egalitarians who explicitly endorse this position are Arneson 2004 and Michael Pendlebury, Peter Hudson, and Darrell Mollendorf 2001. Cohen 1989 and 1997 are exceptions.

5. Arneson 2000; Michael Pendlebury, Peter Hudson, and Darrell Mollendorf 2001. G.A. Cohen is a notable dissenting voice. See Cohen 1989; 1997.

6. Paul Krugman wonderfully observes that the poor in American in 1996 were doing better than the wealthy in much more egalitarian 1950s America. See his Slate article available here: http://www.slate.com/articles/business/the_dismal_science/1996/12/ the_ cpi_and_the_rat_race.html. But also, notice that middle-class individuals emigrate from relatively successful welfare states to nations with massive inequality. See this report from The Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2012/nov/06/british-brain-drain-skills-shortages.

7. Richard Arneson explores this question in Arneson 2011: 159. Arneson cites, with apparent approval, the case for secession found in Wellman 2005.

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Program of the 70th Annual Meeting of the New Mexico Texas Philosophical Society

April 5-6, 2019

Friday Afternoon Session 1

Scott Gelfand, Oklahoma State University
"The Nocebo Effect and Informed Consent"
Comments: **Dustin Tune**, San Antonio College

Paul Carron, Baylor University
"Against Empathy: Disinterestedness, Norm Following, and the Veneer of Human Morality"
Comments: **Apple Igrek**, Oklahoma State University

Karl Aho, Tarleton State University
"Exemplars Need Theories: A Response to Zagzebski's Exemplarist Moral Theory"
Comments**: Nicholas Smith**, Lone Star College – University Park

Friday Afternoon Session 2

Nicholas Smith, Lone Star College – University Park
"Knowing by Testimony that God Exists"
Comments: **Peter Hutcheson**, Texas State University

Eric Gilbertson, Texas State University
"Disagreement and Deep Agnosticism"
Comments: **Mark Walker**, New Mexico State University

Marshall Naylor, St. Mary's University
"Precision in the Mind of God"
Comments: **Robert Tierney**, University of Houston – Downtown

Vanessa Voss, Lone Star College – University Park
"God's Not Laughing: Incongruity, Humor, and Divine Knowledge"
Comments: **Marshall Naylor**, St. Mary's University

Friday Afternoon Session 3

Jeanette Joy Harris, Independent Scholar
"Suzanne Lacy as Rortyan Strong Poet"
Comments: **Tad Bratkowski**, McKendree University

Tad Bratkowski, McKendree University
"Aesthetics & Anesthetics of Video Game Achievements & Achievement Hunting Culture
Comments: **Charles LaMendola**, Houston Community College

Jackson Hoerth, Temple University
"Re-Imagining Kant's Aesthetics"
Comments: **Vanessa Voss**, Lone Star College – University Park

Timothy Cleveland, New Mexico State University
"On Saying the Unsayable"
Comments: **Kyle Bromhall**, Independent Scholar

Friday Afternoon Session 4

Lamont Rodgers, Houston Community College
"A Dilemma for Luck Egalitarians"
Comments: **Danny Scoccia**, New Mexico State University

Danny Scoccia, New Mexico State University
"The Kantian Objection to Paternalism"
Comments: **Lamont Rodgers**, Houston Community College

Robert Tierney, University of Houston – Downtown
"Love and Irreplaceability"
Comments: **Douglas Gilmore**, University of the Incarnate Word

Saturday Morning Session 1

Robert Farley, Hillsborough Community College
"Casullo on Experiential Justification"
Comments: **Alejandro Vazquez del Mercado**, National Autonomous University of Mexico

Mark Walker, New Mexico State University
"Moore's Proof, Theory-Ladenness of Perception, and Many Proofs"
Comments: **Peter Hutcheson**, Texas State University

Alejandro Vazquez del Mercado, National Autonomous University of Mexico
"Conceptual Analysis and Naturalism about Knowledge"
Comments: **Nelson Ramirez**, Sam Houston State University

Saturday Morning Session 2

Hilary Yancey, Baylor University, and Anne-Marie Schultz, Baylor University
"The True Medical Art: Healing Citizens and City in Plato's Charmides and Apology"
Comments: **Jean-Paul Vessel**, New Mexico State University

Jean-Paul Vessel, New Mexico State University
"No Phronesis without Sophia – Not Even for Socrates"
Comments: **Zenon Culverhouse**, University of the Incarnate Word

Robert Hahn, Southern Illinois University Carbondale and **Chava Hahn**, Independent Scholar
"Were the First Philosophers Source and Substance Monists?"
Comments: **Nelson Ramirez**, Sam Houston State University

Saturday Morning Session 3

Dustin Tune, San Antonio College
"The Virtues of Forgetting"
Comments: **Christopher Edelman**, University of the Incarnate Word

Charles LaMendola, Houston Community Colege
"Anger Mangement: A Rejection of Susan Wolf's Account of Angry Blame"
Comments: **Allison Fritz**, Chadron State College

Allison Fritz, Chadron State College
"Velleman, Practical Reasoning, and the Reification of Gender"
Comments: **Paul Carron**, Baylor University

Saturday Morning Session 4

David Beisecker, University of Nevada Las Vegas
"From Truth to Application: Peirce and 'Mastery of our Meaning'"
Comments: **Justin Bell**, University of Houston – Victoria

Sergio Tarin, University of Missouri
"The New Frontier: Pragmatic Inquiry and the 4th Amendment Analysis of Historical Cell-Site Location Information"
Comments: **N. Mark Rauls**, College of Southern Nevada

Kyle Bromhall, Independent Scholar
"Are Feelings Intentional?"
Comments: **David Beisecker**, University of Nevada Las Vegas

Saturday Afternoon Session 1

Maria Del Rosario Martinez Ordaz, National Autonomous University of Mexico

"Inconsistent Reasoning in the Sciences and Strategic-Logical Pluralism"

Comments: **Mary Gwin**, San Diego Mesa College

Zach Thornton, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

"Distinctness as Possible Difference"

Comments: **Eric Gilbertson**, Texas State University

Saturday Afternoon Session 2

Nathan Smith, Houston Community College

"The Role of Mathematics in Descartes's Argument for the Existence of the External World"

Comments: **Paul Lewis**, University of the Incarnate Word

Nelson Ramirez, Sam Houston State University

"The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth. So, help us … Aquinas?"

Comments: **Nathan Smith**, Houston Community College

Junyeol Kim, University of Connecticut

"The Horizontal in the Begriffschrift"

Comments: **Timothy Cleveland**, New Mexico State University

Saturday Afternoon Session 3

Logan Wigglesworth, Rice University

"Moral Deference, Ground Projects, and the Moral Web of Belief"

Comments: **Parish Conkling**, Houston Community College

Derek Haderlie, The University of Texas at Austin

"Normative Grounding and the Role of Normative Principles"

Comments**: Robert Farley**, Hillsborough Community College

Ali Abasnezhad, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich

"Moral Realism and Semantic Accounts of Vagueness"

Saturday Afternoon Session 4

Apple Igrek, Oklahoma State University, and Mariah Harvey, Independent Scholar

"Foucault and the Critique of Instrumental Rationality"

Comments: **Merritt Rehn-DeBraal**, Texas A&M University – San Antonio

Stijn Talloen, Rice University

"Is This What I Can Stand For? Normative Disruption in Friendships

Comments: **Jeanette Joy Harris**, Independent Scholar

Parish Conkling, Houston Community College

"Where the Women Are: Against a Gendered View of Political Violence"
Comments: **Sarah Woolwine**, University of Central Oklahoma

President's Address

Anthony Cashio, University of Virgina's College at Wise
"We Are Who We Were: A Case for Understanding History through the Lens of Personhood"

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