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Dave Beisecker
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I count myself lucky to be a member of a society as supportive as the New Mexico Texas Philosophical society and to have colleagues willing to volunteer their time toward making *Southwest Philosophical Studies* successful.

CONTENTS

Hannah Arendt on Language Codes

Parish Conkling
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Presidential Address

I. INTRODUCTION

A major aspect of Hanna Arendt's thinking focuses on the notion of what she calls the "banality of evil." This is a term that refers to the seemingly paradoxical fact that acts of evil are often not committed by particularly evil people. This is pointedly illustrated by Arendt in her study of Adolf Eichmann. As it turned out, Eichmann was a reasonably sensible person who was not the monster that one might expect considering the sheer amount of evil the man perpetrated—evil that would not have been possible except for his keen bureaucratic skills. Arendt's analysis of Eichmann reveals that he was able to execute the acts of evil he did precisely because he was not "thinking."

The term "thinking" for Arendt has a specific meaning and carries with it some, to say the least, philosophically difficult problems. These problems, save for one, can be set aside for purposes of this talk. The problem to which I am referring is one in which Arendt's analysis suggests that there is some sort of perfect thinker (Arendt, "Thinking and Moral Considerations: A Lecture" 427). My philosophical interest here is that regardless of what "thinking" turns out to be, it seems to me that there is a missing step in Arendt's thought; there is something that Arendt seems to overlook in her assumptions that gets in the way of thinking and that might preclude most, if not all, humans from "thinking" in the Arendtian sense — language codes.

Language codes, as I will be using the term, are words and phrases that stand in place of and, therefore, mimic, knowledge and understanding. Once a language code has been adopted, then that code replaces any thinking and, therefore, any knowledge and understanding that Arendt would have us engage with. If I am right about language codes, then at best, Arendt's "thinking" would be much more difficult to achieve than might have been imagined; at worst, impossible.

My plan is as follows. First, I will introduce Arendt's story of Eichmann as the paradigm of the banality of evil. This will allow me to illustrate what Arendt means (even if only vaguely) by "thinking" and what is at stake when we do and do not engage in it. Second, it will also allow me to hone in on the problem of any sort of perfect thinker. Arendt herself is unclear about what a perfect thinker (a term she does not use) is aside from some mention of Socrates as an example. However, this does not pose a problem for my purposes. Whatever a perfect thinker turns out to be, there is still a problem of language codes. Third, I will introduce and discuss the concept of a language code and give some examples of what I have in mind. This will include Eichmann. I hope to show how his language codes prevented him from "thinking" in a way that Arendt misses out on. Finally, I will consider implications regarding my notion of language codes.

II. The Banality of Eichmann

In 1961, Hannah Arendt was sent by the New Yorker to cover the trial of Adolf Eichmann, one of the architects of the Final Solution. Her published articles, which became the main text for her book, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, generated significant controversy due to what many readers saw as sympathy for Eichmann and a general blaming of Jewish leaders–and later the Jews themselves for their treatment during the Holocaust. In her report, Arendt did point out that many Jewish leaders assisted the Nazis by creating lists of Jews in their areas and counseling Jews to work with the Nazis, believing, somewhat naively, that by working with the Reich, Jewish families would continue to be allowed to leave the country. However, she also noted that the seeming complacency with which many went to their deaths was due in large part to the fact that it was nearly impossible to grasp the sheer inhumanity awaiting them in the camps.

The accusation that Arendt was sympathetic to Eichmann came from her insistence that while Eichmann's deeds were monstrous, the man himself was not a monster; rather, he was bland and unoriginal. Arendt, like many others, went to Eichmann's trial expecting to see a sort of boogeyman. After all, this was the individual responsible for the transport of hundreds of thousands to death camps and gassing centers. History remembers Eichmann, along with Himmler and Heydrich, as one of the driving forces behind the mass extermination policy. Instead, she found a mild, rather boring bureaucrat, seemingly unable to speak in anything but euphemisms and party slogans. This was not due to stupidity or a deliberative attempt to mislead the prosecution, but rather an "authentic inability to think." This contradiction led Arendt to develop the theory of "the banality of evil." Simply put, Arendt wanted to know how to account for the fact that many of the most horrendous acts against humanity are committed by individuals who are not particularly evil. Eichmann's seeming inability for critical, independent thought was perplexing. By relying on stock phrases and the euphemisms of the

Nazi party, Eichmann seemed able not only to push away any meaningful mental interaction with his deeds, but also to avoid any crisis of conscience whatsoever. Was it possible, then, that the activity of thought and the development of conscience were connected, and that this connection could actually help condition one against evil-doing (Arendt, "Thinking and Moral Considerations" 418)?

This is a compelling question, but one that relies on a particular notion of "thought," or "thinking." Using a loose definition, where thinking refers to the ability to problem solve, evaluate consequences, and reflect upon experiences, then the answer would surely be no. As Lt. Col. Obersturmbannführer and head of department IV B4 for Jewish Affairs, Eichmann and his staff were responsible for the concentration of Jews into Ghettos and the orchestration of mass deportations that led to millions of deaths. Eichmann drafted plans for the evacuation and resettlement of Jews in Israel and Madagascar[1] and was a key participant in the Wanasee conference[2] where the Final Solution was first proposed. By all accounts, Eichmann had a keen mind for details. He was able to coordinate intricate travel schedules and keep track of which prisoners were sent to which of the camps. He visited the camps frequently and used his knowledge of their occupancy limit and available facilities when determining where to send the transports and how many within the camps were to be selected for transport to the killing centers. He certainly met the criteria of the aforementioned definition of "thinking," but displayed no remorse for his actions during the war. At his trial he repeatedly acknowledged that what he had done was wrong, but denied culpability by insisting he had been following orders. He seemed unable to recognize any personal responsibility for his deliberate actions. His only mention of conscience can be characterized by the remark that, "I will leap into my grave laughing because the feeling that I have five million human beings on my conscience is for me a source of extraordinary satisfaction (Arendt, *Eichman In Jerusalem* 46)." This certainly seems to put an end to Arendt's query. If thinking can work with conscience to help us avoid evil, an alternative definition of "thinking" is needed.

Recognizing this, Arendt devotes much of her essay, *On Thinking and Moral Understanding* to explaining the ways in which thought and the capacity for self-judgment could intersect with the distinction between right and wrong. Although she is quite vague when it comes to defining her terms, we can look to her descriptions of thinking to create a working definition. While Arendt agrees with Kant that thinking employs the use of reason, she also tells us that thinking is always reflective. By reflective, she means that thinking must interrupt all current activity and it must deal with objects that exist outside of our direct sense perception (Arendt, "Thinking and Moral Considerations)" 423). Once we begin thinking, we stop whatever it is that we have been doing and move into a mental world that is separate from the world of immediate experience (424). One way to describe this would be to consider the sensation we have when we come out of a deep thought and say that we have "been somewhere else." This type of separation

is essential for creating the sort of inner dialogue that allows for the faculty of judging. We must be able to enter into a discussion within ourselves where discord can be identified and remedied. However, it must also be something that all rational individuals are able to engage in. Therefore, the definition I propose looks something like this: Thinking employs the use of reason, is reflective, and is accessible to all rational individuals. This is what I will refer to henceforth as Arendtian thought.

Arendt proposes Socrates as an example of an ideal thinker; one able to employ thought in this way. This is due primarily to his approach in rousing the citizens of Athens to examine aspects of their lives they would prefer to ignore. Socrates asked people to acknowledge their pre-judgements and recognize how these pre-judgements inhibit thinking (Arendt, "Thinking and Moral Considerations" 432). He saw, Arendt tells us, the ability of thought to have an "undermining effect on all established criteria, values, measurements for good and evil, in short on those customs and rules of conduct we treat of in morals and ethics (434)." Where Arendt fails however, is in explaining how Socrates came to be an Ideal Thinker and how we can, practically speaking, follow his example. He was certainly able to push past his own pre-judgments, but the manner in which this was done remains obscure save for the fact that he was able to think, and this is hardly satisfactory.

It may be that the integration of Arendtian thought and conscience can safeguard us against immorality. However, before that claim can be tested, we must get past an important problem, and one that Arendt glosses over—our reliance on language codes.

III. Language Codes

I intend the term "language codes" to be seen as describing those rhetorical devices such as clichés, stock phrases, and buzzwords that serve as a barrier between our interactions with the world and the sort of interaction between thought, conscience and the activity of judging that Arendt is calling for. Language codes mimic rational thought and eliminate the need for mental reflection. They provide the illusion of knowledge, but may or may not be meant to reflect truth or falsity.

To see how this might work, consider you are attending a seminar sponsored by your institution meant to introduce you to a new campus-wide initiative aimed at increasing student retention. The speaker informs us that he/she is aware that "aligning our assignments with our student learning outcomes can be a moving target that requires dynamic, forward thinking planning." They may ask for input from the audience to give ideas about how to accomplish such a task. A colleague raises her hand and says that she "makes sure to include student-centered learning in her classroom." This has the appearance of a thoughtful discussion and you may even find yourself nodding in agreement. However, if you are then asked to further define what dynamic thinking is, and why you believe it to be a valuable tool in

keeping students enrolled in college, you may find yourself at a loss. In this case, these buzzwords are not meant to capture truth per se, rather to describe a business strategy.

At times, however, language codes are intended to capture some sort of truth. Often in Ethics courses, instructors find it difficult to convince students to move beyond aphorisms when discussing morality. Asking a class to attempt to define morality, for example, typically results in a student exclaiming "we should treat others to as we want to be treated." If the instructor presses and ask the student to expand on this, they might offer, "I was taught to follow the golden rule." Another student may chime in at this point and add, "Yes, do unto others as you would have them do unto you." At this point students believe that they have offered a suitable definition for morality. It can be a herculean task to convince them that all they have really given is a moral cliché. Furthermore, when the class moves on to deontology, these same students find it incredibly difficult to distinguish between the golden rule and Kant's well-reasoned categorical imperative. As long as the reliance on the golden rule remains, Kant's theory is either conflated or discounted as unnecessary.

Whether or not a language code is meant to stand for truth, a reliance on such codes creates the illusion that one is engaging in rational thought. Having long since accepted language codes as a stand in for knowledge, we can shift between them easily, and use them unthinkingly. Language codes need to satisfy one important condition if they are to be accepted. We must be introduced to codes early in our intellectual development by an individual or group that has gained our trust. If we accept our first language codes from our parents, for example, then we will further accept codes they have endorsed. We will rely on the same clichés and stock phrases when confronted with an issue we need to explain that we have assimilated from our exposure to our parents. As we progress intellectually, we will adopt new codes based on how well they fit with these first codes. Likewise, they must also result in acceptance by individuals or groups we identify with. We tend to align ourselves with those language codes that reinforce our first codes. We find it easier to accept new language codes if they seem to build upon previous ones. For example, if I have been given the language codes of Christianity since infancy, it will be far easier to adopt the language codes of the Christian right.

There are certain benefits that come with the acceptance of language codes. For one, language codes bypass inconsistencies. If I find myself in a situation where I must display concern for humanity, then I would access the language codes of morality associated with compassion and perhaps respond with the saying "we should always help those in need." If, however, I later find myself in a competitive situation in which I need to display strength, I can switch to a different set of language codes associated with and respond by saying "it is a dog-eat-dog world where only the strong survive." These do not seem to conflict since they each belong to a different set of language codes, meant to be employed in different

situations.

One of the pitfalls of language codes is that they can cause us to believe that we have more knowledge about, and feel more strongly about, certain issues than may really be the case. It is worthwhile to mention that Eichmann had no special dislike for the Jewish people. Indeed, he considered himself somewhat of an expert in Jewish affairs and spoke during his trial of positive relationships he formed with many Jewish leaders, as if this could excuse his actions (Arendt, *Eichman in Jerusalem* 57). He had no particular desire to be a key player in the mass murder of nearly 11 million individuals. What he did have, however, was a deeply ingrained respect for the rules and order of institutions. After years spent in various associations, each with their own set of language codes, (he was involved in the YMCA and German Youth as a child, and was a mid-level salesman in a vacuum company before the war) he was able to exchange codes easily and once he had given his allegiance to the institution of the Reich, he was had no trouble assimilating and using their "language rules."

So long as he was acting in his official life, Eichmann was adept at navigating the mass bureaucratic system of the Nazi's and saw no issue with such distancing terminology as "the final solution," "evacuation," "special treatment," and other phrases and terms used to refer to the transport of camp prisoners to the gassing centers. These were simply parts of the code of the language codes of the Reich. During his trial, however, finding himself in a situation for which he had no such language codes, he was at a loss, and his words often made no sense, as in his final statement when he claimed that his guilt was obedience and that obedience was a virtue (Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem* 247).

IV. IMPLICATIONS

Language codes act as a barrier between our interactions with the world and contemplative thought. Arendt tells us that it is contemplative thought coupled with the ability to engage the faculty of judging, that allows us to recognize the flaws in our reasoning and correct our actions. She wants to show that by engaging in such thought, we may actually be safeguarding ourselves against committing moral atrocities. If I am right about Language codes, then this might be much more difficult to achieve than previously thought. By theorizing about language codes, I have tried to identify and give some structure to the reliance on the messy rhetorical devices that masquerade as knowledge and serve as a hindrance to the type of thought Arendt had in mind. If such codes exist, we must be able to dismantle them and create tools to do so which are accessible to all rational individuals, before we can begin to answer any questions regarding thought and morality. Much more work needs to be done in this area before any definitive conclusions can be made, however, I believe the implications this has for Arendt's theory to be grounds for further investigation.

NOTES

1. Eichmann's solution to transport Germany's Jewish population to the island of Madagascar was ultimately scrapped as impractical.
2. Prior to the conference, Eichmann provided Heydrich with a detailed list of the remaining Jews in each European country as well as statistics on emigration.

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Tracking the Transformation from Benign Silence to Harmful Silencing

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The relationship between silence itself and silencing as a harmful speech act has not been fully laid out, either in feminist scholarship or in silence scholarship. Accounts of the harm of silencing tend to rely on a tacit understanding of what silence and silencing are, and this tacit understanding is not strongly connected with philosophical accounts of the phenomenon of silence itself. The connection between silence and silencing is usually not one of bare measurable audible output; instead, since silencing frequently involves a practice whereby articulated utterances are discounted, the silence must be a structural silence related to the silences that structure narratives and arguments. Structural silence itself is not harmful; thus, the harm in silencing must be connected to our tendency to take our narrative constructions of real events as perfect representations of reality itself.

Competing narrative accounts of the same event frequently rely on mutually agreed-upon elements: participants, events, sequence, result. Disagreement arises regarding relative importance, meaning, and causality. In some cases, an account is simply inaccurate or wrong, but those cases I set aside. In more difficult cases, the problem is that each account represents a genuine attempt to offer a responsible, just depiction and analysis of the situation and yet each sides' arguments rely upon the necessary falsity of the argument on the other side. I shall argue that the problem stems from an implicit overreliance on narrative understanding. Each side offers compelling evidence for their claims, and that evidence is arranged to form a roughly narrative understanding of the world in general and of the given situation in particular. Narrative cohesiveness depends upon the logical arrangement of causes and events to present a particular

experience or viewpoint; material that does not support that experience must, for the sake of coherence, be rejected. Thus, every narrative depends upon the silencing of material identified as extraneous to the particular account presented.

I will show how this benign structural silence, present in every narrative, can become a harmful instance of silenc*ing*. This, in turn, reveals a tension in all narratives, such that even verifiably true narratives may yet commit harms by suppressing details that are in fact irrelevant to the telos of the particular narrative. Thus, we have good reason to be a little skeptical of every narrative, and we ought to adopt an attitude of sincere humility when constructing narratives, no matter how true they are. We may not be able to avoid some of the acts of silencing we commit, but we can learn to see our understanding of all true accounts as necessarily limited, fluid, and, at bottom, characterized by a fundamental ineffability.

I start with an overview of the phenomenon of silence itself before describing the structural role silence plays in narrative and in argument. Then I provide an overview of the extant feminist work on the phenomenon of silencing. Last, I explain why the practice of silencing must involve structural narrative silence. This establishes the ground for further study of the connection between silence and silencing and for positive political projects that aim to repair the harms of silencing both by altering and by resisting narrative representations.

Silence is a neutral phenomenon ontologically distinct from and equiprimordial with the realm of utterance (Dauenhauer Silence 5). Silence is neither inherently destructive or harmful, just as utterance is neither inherently destructive nor harmful. There is no such thing as absolute silence, and there is no practice or instance of silence that can be identified as such universally. To the ancient Greeks, refusing food at a host's table signaled silence, but for us, such a refusal would not (Montiglio 48). This can be seen in the realm of utterance as well: one can use words to humorous effect, but what counts as humorous depends upon the audience; moreover, the kinds of utterances that make others laugh differ across cultures and time periods. So too with silence: the literature shows a broad range of events that uphold or break silence and these may have only a secondary connection to a lack of measurable sound.

There are three main classes of silence: quiet silence which has to do with measurable auditory stimulus; narrative silence, which has to do with information that drops out of narrative presentation; and the deep or ineffable silence that grounds experiences that resist discursive articulation. My argument in this paper is restricted to claims about narrative silence. Many of these silences are harmless. For example, the reader never learns the name of Prue Ramsay's groom in Virginia Woolf's *To The Lighthouse*, whether or not the Macbeths had children, or whether or not Sir Gawain was ever able to forgive himself his own human frailty (Cavell 232, Woolf 131). These silences are necessary to the structure of any narrative as such, as they give the story or argument its particular character. The information

about the characters and events in *To The Lighthouse* could have been given quite differently: rather than skipping over the ten years of the war and its aftermath, Woolf could have created a sweeping drama of the family's suffering juxtaposed against the suffering of the war. One might wonder why Woolf focused so heavily on something so apparently trivial as a lighthouse when there was a war going on. My point here is not to criticize Woolf's novel but to make it clear that the same characters, events, and items can be described and explained quite differently in the hands of different authors. In order to present just the artistic creation intended, the author makes the choice to give just these details and not others, and the omitted details are passed over in silence.

Silence in the structure of a narrative is most strongly correlated with the presentation of narrative time. This is noteworthy for (at least) two reasons: (1) Informal invocations of silence rarely refer to time, typically restricting themselves primarily to the realm of logocentric discourse.[1] This means that popular understandings of silence miss one of the defining characteristics of silence, which is its unique temporality (Dauenhauer 5–16, 75–77). (2) The regularity with which narratologists associate time and silence undergirds Bernard Dauenhauer's phenomenological claim that silence has its own temporality, a claim he uses to support his larger argument for the phenomenon-status of silence. Although the experience of time in narration and the experience of time in lived silence may not be identical, they are nevertheless structurally similar, and attention to one gives insight to the other.

The relation between discourse-time and narrative-time give a narrated account its particular character. Narrative time is the amount of time covered by the narration; discourse time is the amount of time it takes to deliver the narrative. In the Woolf example above, ten years—a lengthy narrative time—is delivered to the reader in a mere eighteen pages, whereas the preceding 121 pages cover less than one full day. The longer discourse time covers a shorter narrative time in parts one and three of the novel and the reverse holds in the central section. The decisions made about which details to give, and where, lend the book its unique particularity. In an analytical project, the process is similar: a theory cannot present every true statement. Instead, some true claims must be taken as more significant than other equally true claims because they are more directly relevant to answering the question that guides the inquiry (Haslanger 35). This means that every fictional and non-fictional narrative as well as every theory depends upon the suppression or relinquishment of claims and details that are true. This process, wherein "a good deal of information which would overburden the narrative is simply filtered out, is called *ellipsis*" (Fludernik 33).

I believe that narrative ellipsis is at the bottom of the mutually contradictory narratives and arguments of, for example, many contemporary political conflicts in the US: for the sake of expediency, apparently minor details that would overburden the narrative and prevent it from arriving at its conclusion are filtered

out. One problem is that in real time, we may be ill-equipped to discern which details are minor and which are essential. Another problem is that social and political expediency may not be identical with truth, narrative or otherwise. I move now to discuss the practice of silencing before connecting narrative ellipsis with the structural silences in arguments and then offering some notes toward an account of how structural silence can become harmful silencing.

Silencing refers to an oppressive act whereby a person or group with more power makes it difficult or even impossible for a person or group of persons with less power to articulate central aspects of their lives or experiences (Saul, "Feminist Philosophy of Language"). How one goes about making it impossible for someone else to convey those aspects can vary, but the list would include versions of the following: persons can be silenced through death or the threat of death, torture or the threat of torture; through exile, banishment, or imprisonment; through gaslighting, *ad hominem* attacks, and other forms of discrediting; through marginalization, diversion, and distraction. With the exception of death and some torture, the person silenced is not rendered physically incapable of speech. When we say someone has been silenced, it may be more accurate to say that that person's speech has been emptied of its power to make meaning or effect change.

By the early 1990s, feminist philosophers of language connected J. L. Austin's work on the performative function of utterances to feminist anti-pornography philosophical activism. Pornography had been protected by free speech laws. Thus, even though pornography is not always created using verbalized words, it made sense to investigate whether Austin's work on the active function of some utterances could extend to pornographic discourse. Austin claimed that statements did not simply explain or describe reality; they also play a role in constituting reality. There are three kinds of temporally-bound activity an utterance can perform: The locutionary act comprises the words said, for example, "I confer the degree of doctor of philosophy." The perlocutionary act is the effect that follows from the locutionary act: the reception of the degree and the recognition of its conferral. What Austin and his feminist followers argued was missing in philosophy was sufficient recognition of what happened in the middle to cause the change in status: this he termed the *illocutionary act*. This is the force the words have to cause the confer*ing* of the degree, the marry*ing* of the two persons, the warn*ing* in the shout of "Fire!"—it is the activity that I highlight in the italicization of the "-ing" emphasizing the active force the words represent (Langton 295–96, Austin 103). Somehow, the shouting of the word "Fire" in a room filling with smoke does not merely describe to the persons present what must be happening; it also functions as an active warning urging and persuading those persons to leave the room immediately.

If someone heard the warning "Fire!" and thought it was merely an apt description and nothing further, and so did nothing further, then we would say that the warning failed. The person was not warned by what was meant to have warned.

This is the argument offered by feminist philosophers Rae Langton, Jennifer Hornsby, Mari Mikkola, and others, who took up MacKinnon's work on pornography and civil rights, combined it with Austin's claims about the action-producing force of language, and argued that pornography denies women the perlocutionary power to refuse consent to unwanted sex. Pornographic depictions of sex present women's refusals of consent as exciting foreplay, and this, the authors claim, structures men's reception of actual women's refusals outside of pornography such that "No" is interpreted to mean "keep going" and so the locutionary act (the "No") does not have the perlocutionary effect (the cessation of attempts to engage in sexual acts) because the woman has been illocutionarily silenced.

Calling ineffective speech acts a form of silence is somewhat surprising and it is not obvious that actual silence is involved, at least not at first glance. After all, women who deny or refuse to consent are not literally silent whether by their speech or in their bodies—they often do and say much in their refusals (as is noted in the literature). They might be compared with Cassandra who, because she dared refuse Apollo's advances, was cursed to prophesy truly and never be believed. Cassandra was not silent, and it is not clear that ancient Greek audiences would have seen her as such. She was, however, ineffective—Cassandra's words lacked perlocutionary force, and not because she failed to say the right words or to say them correctly. Rather, she herself, in her person, became seen as one whose words could not be seen as authoritative.[2]

It is tempting to say that the silence in silencing arises because in the case of speech acts that don't do what they are meant to do, it is as though the speech act was never made, and so it is as though the speaker had been genuinely silent. However, if there is to be any silence in silencing, this cannot be the case. First, the speech act *was* made; second, even if it did not have the intended effect for the intended audience, in many cases, there is someone who understands the meaning and intention of the utterance: the audience knows Cassandra's words to be true; the authors of the feminist work on speech acts and silencing understand the refusal of consent that did not work.

If silencing is phenomenally related to silence, then it may be because silencing produces something akin to a structural narrative ellipsis. The act of silencing might be seen as the "filtering out" of data that appears to overburden the narrative or muddy the argument. What one person decides is a trivial detail may be essential from the perspective of the person whose safety or well-being depend upon just that detail, and this can take place in a narrative account of a lived experience as well as in an argument that interprets experiences or data.

Silencing, as a harmful practice that epistemically discredits some speakers because of their membership in a non-privileged group, is not an instance of silence itself. It does, however, appear to be strongly connected with structural narrative silences. As a constitutive element of all narratives *qua* narrative, structural

silences are necessary and frequently helpful. Lived experience, however, is not itself a narrative. Reality as all that is the case does not require for its existence structural silences of any kind. Our understandings of reality are frequently organized in narrative form, and we make sense of the world in story and argument. This means, minimally, that we must be aware that our narrative organizations of lived experience are never equivalent to reality itself. Moreover we are, more frequently than we know, complicit in harmful practices of silencing, particularly to the extent that we make meaning according to unexamined privilege.

I end with the brief statement that narrative is unable to convey the entire truth about the reality in any manifestation. We may not be able to help our creation of narrative accounts of real events; when we take the narratives for reality itself, that is where we go wrong. Far from excusing the moral and ontological blindness that results from unthinking adherence to unexamined narrative representations of reality, my notes toward an account of the shift from silence to silencing should indicate that we are responsible for what must be understood as a refusal to break open our pet stories about reality.

NOTES

1. A note listing all the article, essay, and book titles that include the phrase "breaking silence" would be too long for our purposes; "breaking silence" generally seems to indicate "saying something that has been repressed, denied, or discredited, and saying it with new authority." Recent quests for silence tend to search for areas with minimized human noise or for practices not speaking.
2. I'm relying on the *Oresteia* of Aeschylus for my understanding of Cassandra.

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Using Moral Foundations Theory to Understand Environmental Aesthetic Reactions: A Brief Exploration

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The purpose of this brief paper is to illustrate that the machinery and assumptions in moral foundations theory can further inform our understanding of environmental aesthetic experience and reactions. Moral foundation theorists employ emotions to explain moral intuitions and motivations. They do so by focusing on the types of things that elicit emotions and categorizing these into groups–what they call "foundations—rather than focusing on individual emotions themselves. They argue that the foundations emotions were originally developed to be set off by have been elaborated in different, sometimes highly symbolic ways, and that the intuitions to which they give rise can explain motivations for action. Similarly, I want to say that aesthetic evaluations about the environment are affectively driven, the emotions at the center of such evaluations have often been culturally elaborated in complex and symbolic ways, and this affective element explains our motivation to protect certain environments while avoiding others. In both cases, we will not always be aware of the foundation that gives rise to our reactions and judgments. The thoughts I offer in this paper are preliminary at best, but I hope to spark a serious interest in the viability of using frameworks like moral foundations theory in our theorizing about reactions to the environment (both aesthetic and sometimes moral—for as I shall illustrate, the two are sometimes difficult to parse out).[1]

Moral foundations theory argues that how people morally view and react to the world is the product of intuitions and these are based on five basic psychological foundations. The psychological foundations that it proposes are

understood as innate, and so universal. Each foundation includes some basic concept along with its opposite (meant to capture both positive themes we evolutionarily developed and the negative traits we try to avoid). The five foundations are: care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and purity/degradation. The theory found its origins from an intersection of inquiry into the evolutionary basis of morality as well as cross-cultural similarities and variability in virtues (Haidt and Joseph).

Jonathan Haidt and Craig Joseph, who first developed the theory, argue that it is more explanatorily adequate to examine the notion that morality can be both evolutionary and culturally based. They do so by positing a relationship between intuitions, which they argue are innate, and virtues, which are social constructions. The idea is that human beings have an innate readiness to feel flashes of dis/approval toward displays involving other humans. Intuitions are judgments that pop into our heads without cognitive awareness of the mental processes that gave rise to them. At the heart of their explanation is the role of affective mental states: each foundation includes a characteristic emotion(s) used in the intuition (although these paradigm emotions are not meant to be taken as necessary or sufficient for their foundation). The emotions do have an original set of things they were developed for (their "proper domains"), but are culturally elaborated to be elicited by new things (their "actual domains"). For example, the care/suffering foundation originally developed to be triggered by one's own children and their vulnerability (the emotion at its base is compassion), and now can be elicited by fetuses, animals, etc. I propose that the foundations of purity/degradation, harm/care, and perhaps even loyalty/betrayal are responsible for some of our aesthetic judgments about nature. I will explain each of these in turn.

The foundation that focuses on harm is connected to our evolutionary history as mammals—and in particular the trait developed as feeling attachment to others. We feel a positive attachment to others and react negatively to their pain. Those interested in moral explanations claim this foundation is responsible for the virtue of kindness. This compassion has been expanded so that it includes reactions to harm to animals. We can, and in certain cases have, further extend our care reactions to include the environment in general. And theories within environmental ethics hypothesize and use these reactions. In "The Land Ethic," Aldo Leopold asks us to consider the biotic community (soil, water, organisms) as entities that can be harmed and so deserve care. The belief that we can harm the environment is not radical, even if we have not quite worked out what harm might *look* like. Aldo Leopold famously stated that "a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise" (Leopold, 262). There is evidence that philosophers and naturalists see a direct relation, perhaps even an identity relation between negative aesthetic value and harm.

Environmentalists have conflated (perhaps collapsed) aesthetic and ethical value in explanations concerning them. Some theorists even take beauty as an ethical concern regardless of human preoccupation with it. Beauty *can* be seen as a mark of the health of a place; yet sometimes beauty is not treated merely as a litmus of other values, and is instead counted among the very aspects of health, much like a rosy countenance is counted as a healthy quality. If this is the case, then visible harm to an environment will be interpreted as ugliness and vice versa. People will feel compassion for some visual change due to perceived harm, want to avoid having environments look that way, and so view such changes as ugly. And persons will have a negative reaction to some environmental change, evaluate the change as ugly, and in turn interpret it as harm. Perhaps the same negative emotion can drive both evaluations simultaneously.

Consider the negative reaction to littering. Why do many people have this … intuition? If you ask a child why one should not litter, you may get a response about the ugliness of it. However, they also might say it *harms* nature. I certainly believed such things as a child. And yet, the existence of a Styrofoam cup in a park does not quite constitute harm like dumping several quarts of used motor oil does. But it certainly *feels* like it is harmful. If this is the case, then it is a concern for harm that seems to drive our aesthetic judgments about the ugliness of highway dumping. There is an old public service campaign against littering, the very purpose of which seemed to be to invoke the emotions at the center of the harm/care foundation, called the "Keep America Beautiful" campaign. This campaign might very well be partially responsible for engendering the American view that litter is ugly, and further linking that ugliness to harm. Most famously, there was a commercial that depicted many different scenes heavily identified with pollution and litter, in which a Native American is shown looking over a veritable wasteland, crying.[2] Crying elicits compassion and the commercial implies that these highly visible forms of pollution are a form of disrespect to be identified with harm. Social mechanisms like these internalize a link between visible pollution and ugliness, and pollution as harm.

It is interesting that Leopold should include beauty in his holism. One way to interpret his notion of aesthetics is that it arises out of a concern for care/harm. Perhaps the perception of beauty is just a positive emotional reaction to a landscape, the perceptual qualities of which symbolize an environment that is healthy. And a negative reaction to an obviously degraded ecosystem will be the result of a combination of perceptual qualities that symbolize harm.[3] And Leopold was a champion of the importance of aesthetic experience in our environmental education—"Our ability to perceive quality in nature begins, as in art, with the pretty" (Leopold 102) We ought to learn to appreciate nature aesthetically for it is the gateway to seeing other qualities in nature that lead to a holistic ethical approach. He may have realized that some of our aesthetic reactions are driven by a deep-seated concern for harm and care. We start with a superficial reaction, only

to develop a deeper understanding of the causes of those reactions, or a proclivity to note the environmental harm that causes these reactions, which hopefully leads to further concern not for the experience of beauty itself, but rather for nature and its citizens.

Other naturalist writers lace their descriptions and arguments with thick evaluative terms related to aesthetics. Holmes Rolston III argues that, when looking at the world from an ecological perspective, the values are automatically built in (100-01). Looking at nature through ecology, our very description implies value: "harmony" and "order." But while we do value these things, and use them in our understanding of nature, he claims we don't impose this on nature. There is harmony and order in nature. We notice it due to our valuing it, and the existence of it in nature then informs our valuing it. In this way, Leopold may have seen the qualities that make nature beautiful as the very same qualities that we must use in our ecological descriptions of it, and that we are able to first see these qualities in aesthetic experience. This seems to suggest that to the extent that we can see instability and disunity in an environment, we will react negatively to it, and this reaction might initially best be regarded as aesthetic.

And this brings us to the core foundation of purity/degradation. Disgust, which underlies this foundation, is considered a basic emotion. Like others, this foundation can be meted out in highly conceptual ways. It is not just a reaction to contamination of our food source or living space that drives this foundation (although that is its evolutionary root). We have re-conceptualized purity within our lives in deeply complex and symbolic ways. The manner in which things become contaminated is also symbolic. How we conceptualize our living space—ultimately the natural world around us—is similarly symbolic. Fouling the water of a lake is an obvious case of contamination—and oftentimes one that can be seen. But we can conceptualize many forms of natural resource extraction as a defilement of its surroundings. People describe the industrial machine as "raping the earth." This type of reaction may be a response to harm rather than defilement. However, it can also be explained as a violation of purity.

The actual domain of the purity/degradation foundation now ranges over cultural taboos having to do with personal hygiene or sex. But sometimes moral disgust reactions are the products of taboo ideas, such as communism or bigotry. These last examples are quite interesting, given their highly cognitive nature. Disgust is usually elicited by sensory experiences. We can be told about a dish that produces a disgust reaction in us (chocolate covered raw fish), but to *see* the dish being made usually causes a much more robust reaction. The same is the case in our descriptions of a polluted waterway. Some people may think "Now that's disgusting!" but being assaulted by the sensory experience is quite a different thing. Examples of this phenomenon abound. It is simply easier to experience a disgust reaction from direct sensory stimuli than from having something verbally described to you.

Conceptually speaking, the actual domain of this moral intuition (embodied by disgust) does not wander far from the proper domain of things that could possibly trigger disgust in aesthetic reactions. An obviously polluted environment often triggers a negative aesthetic reaction. While this reaction can be the product of the perception of harm, I believe that it is often rooted in a disgust response. Haidt and Joseph argue that "culturally widespread concerns with purity and pollution can be traced to a purity model evolved to deal with adaptive challenges of life in a world full of dangerous microbes and parasites" (Haidt and Joseph 60). One can see pollutants as a mere extension of the dangerous contaminants in our environment. Where once disgust was reserved for water fouled by excrement or animal decay, we now recognize oil slicks and the acetone smell of a factory as disgusting. Additionally, many disgust reactions to the environment are symbolic in nature.

Metaphorically, Western culture feminizes much of the natural world. We speak of "mother ocean" and "mother earth"…"virgin" woods, and the "defilement" of nature. As a culture we are more preoccupied with the sexual purity of women compared to men such that the word "virgin" is more often used with reference to women. To call something "defiled" seems to presuppose a former purity now gone. Metaphors are pervasive in language and are apparent in both thought *and* action. For example, the direction "up" is associated with an afterlife, and we release birds at funerals. Using metaphors to describe the environment is not merely a rhetorical or poetic device; such language reflects the manner in which we comprehend, think, and act in the world.

Mark Johnson and George Lakoff argue that metaphors are an integral part of our perceptual system. These concepts are not merely subjects of our intellect; rather, they guide some of the very operations of our intellect—they help define our realities. Johnson and Lackoff contend that "metaphors as linguistic expressions are possible precisely because there are metaphors in a person's conceptual system" (6). Granted, our conceptual system is not something that we constantly assess; we often think and act habitually, being only slightly conscious of the metaphors we use. And yet, I want to argue that the language we use can help determine the way we actually perceive the world. We constantly operate on a system of metaphors when speaking about our relationship with the environment, how we perceive the environment, and changes to it. Metaphors can be understood as a deep conceptualization about how we think and, more importantly, feel about the environment. If we can conceptualize the environment as a pure thing that can be defiled or even violated in ways that can be described as "rape," then we conceivably experience the attendant feelings about such states of affairs. To conceptualize and perceive something as defiled surely causes or is caused by a relevant affective response.

Much of highly visible human extraction and development is interpreted as a defilement on the order of rape. And one can easily see how this is the case. There is visible and forced penetration into the surrounding earth. In fracking, the

operation includes forcing water under great pressure into the earth. But not all negative purity reactions are so dramatic. Often it is simply a concern for order. When a building is erected, a drainage ditch dug, a monoculture planted, or a highway constructed in some sort of natural expanse, people often interpret such changes as unharmonious. And the perceptual judgments made about such a scene can be highly cognitively influenced. For some, the view of a neatly planted cornfield is aesthetically pleasing, due to the order of it. But adding a "pioneer test field" sign can ruin it. Knowing that the crop in front of you is genetically modified elicits a negative reaction in some, and this reaction is due to a deep-seated concern for natural purity and order, a highly cognitive one that relies on a conception of what genetic modification entails.

Examples like the above point to the existence of sometimes highly cognitive and conceptual variants of what are nevertheless plausible aesthetic reactions. Things can *look* orderly in a purely formalist sense, while conveying the notion of disorder. Many of the examples of this rely on an accepted notion of what is "natural" for an area, landscape, or the flora and fauna within it. For example, a uniform forest of slash or loblolly pines often seen in Southern Alabama might seem quite orderly and so aesthetically good to some. Yet, the knowledge of the history of forestry in the area yields quite different results for me. While these trees are native, the uniform nature of their planting points to silviculture, which reminds me that these forests were once dominated by long leaf pines, the destruction of which led to the endangerment of many species. The "order" is actually a symbol of human domination and economization of the landscape—of disorder in the natural system.

Arguably, the same is the case with negative reactions to invasive species. If people are aware of such species, and can further perceptually recognize them, then negative reactions to the perceptual experience of their existence in an environment can be explained by a concern for purity and order in an environment. Even to call a species "invasive" belies a clear connotation of an invader occupying a space where they do not belong. Interestingly, the way we conceptualize and react to invasive species may also have its roots in a concern for loyalty. Political philosophers/scientists explain that often the way that loyalty is conceptualized is as a concern for in-group safety. There is an identity and trust for those we are familiar with, and any interruption by those viewed as outsiders is met with a negative response. It is not that large of a conceptual leap for people to view plants and animals as outsiders in their familiar natural environment. To be sure, ecologically informed reactions to invasive species can also have their root in a concern for harm.

As you can see, it is sometimes difficult to parse out aesthetic reactions from moral ones. Consider cemeteries and how intertwined the aesthetic presentation *of* them is with our moral reactions *to* them. Despite a debilitating, historic drought in California, people were enraged by the dry-brown grass in cemeteries—

particularly National cemeteries devoted to the interment of veterans. As one citizen put it "We have a real purpose and a mission here at the cemeteries to create a place that's worthy of the people that rest here" (qtd. in Potter). In this case, aesthetic value is symbolic of our moral consideration (the respect/loyalty foundation) for the dead.

I have argued that environmental aesthetic judgments can immediately lead to moral ones, and moral judgments often precede aesthetic ones. This is plausibly because the intuitions and emotions that give rise to such experiences come from the same source. Understanding the sources of environmental aesthetic reactions and knowing how they motivates may be a useful tool in garnering support for environmental projects. Political psychologists have illustrated that acceptance of a political cause as contentious as climate change can be influenced by the very foundational evaluatively-thick words used to describe it (Feinberg and Willer 34-38). And so why not use the ugly and the foundations we rely on for it?

NOTES

1. A note is in order. I rely on a relatively rudimentary understanding of what counts as "aesthetic" reaction/experience. Due to space, I do not have time to defend this. I also understand the drive to keep moral and aesthetic values conceptually distinct, but think this drive is mistaken in that such a distinction fails to capture many aspects of both moral and aesthetic evaluation—particularly of the environment. I also don't have the space to defend the notion that aesthetic experience is affectively driven. I aim to offer what I hope is a compelling *explanation* of these reactions. And even if some might argue that the phenomena that I purport to explain is not purely *aesthetic*, I believe it will be of theoretical interest nonetheless.

2. I would be remiss if I did not point out that this campaign is widely considered greenwashing. The campaign was bankrolled by the disposable beverage container industry to deflect criticism for the proliferation of such containers, which inevitably ended up spilling over into the environment. Furthermore, the Native American at the center of the commercial turned out not to be native at all, and was an Italian-American actor passing as a native.

3. Certain authors (Yuriko Saito, Allen Carlson, etc.) within the field of environmental aesthetics clearly think that a degraded ecosystem ought to be aesthetically judged as negative. Yuriko Saito even claims that this needs to be the case for *moral* reasons.

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Toward a Functionalist Account of Blame

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In this paper, I argue that blame ought to be understood as a function rather than a mental state or an activity. Any plausible account of blame must satisfy two desiderata. First, it must be consistent with the intension of blame. In other words, it must get the ordinary connotations of *blame* right. I call this the *intensional desideratum*. Second, the account must be consistent with the set of instances of what we would ordinarily identify as blaming. I call this the *extensional desideratum*.[1] After discussing these desiderata in more detail, I offer an overview of different accounts of blame's nature. I then argue that non-functionalist accounts of blame fail to meet one or both desiderata. Next, I argue that functionalist accounts are better equipped to adequately meet these desiderata. It follows that we ought to explain the nature of blame in terms of its function rather than mental states or activities that putatively constitute blame.

THE DESIDERATA

Any philosophical theory that attempts to explain the nature of some phenomenon ought to take care not to misrepresent that phenomenon in its explanation. Otherwise, the theory misses its mark and is inadequate. To avoid this mistake, the account needs to be consistent with the intension of the concept representing the phenomenon. Simply put, the intension of some concept is the ordinary connotation of that concept. Specifically, the intension of C is the set of platitudes of C. By *platitudes* I mean judgments and inferences language users are disposed to make regarding C that would indicate a mastery over the use of the term C (Smith 30). For example, a platitude of praise is that it's an appropriate response to someone having done something admirable.

Like any concept, many platitudes constitute blame's intension. Much of the debate about the nature of blame is concerned with identifying the platitudes that distinguish blame from other forms of criticism. Identifying any set of platitudes is rarely an uncontroversial matter. Nevertheless, most believe that blame involves something psychological and phenomenological—there is something about what it is like to blame. This suggests that to avoid misrepresenting blame, an account ought to be psychologically and phenomenologically accurate (McGeer 163). Thus we are led toward an important platitude of blame. When we reflect on the psychological and phenomenological character of blame, we find that it is often experienced alongside a negative emotion that runs along the spectrum of anger, such as indignation or resentment. For an account of blame to be adequate, then, it must be consistent with the following platitude: *Blame paradigmatically involves a negative emotion along the spectrum of anger.* If an account of blame is not consistent with this platitude, then it misrepresents what blame is and consequently fails to meet the intensional desideratum.[2]

A plausible account of blame also needs to meet what I call the *extensional desideratum*. The extension of a concept is the set of things to which the concept applies. The extension of blame, then, is the set of instances that would count as blaming. Evaluating the plausibility of an account of blame often involves assessing whether the account applies to cases that we would intuitively call blaming. If a theory of blame cannot explain why a clear instance of blame counts as blame, then the theory may be inadequate. For example, if a theory states that X counts as blame if it meets necessary and sufficient conditions C, but we identify an intuitive case of blame that doesn't meet C, then the theory may be inadequate. Perhaps, it is not feasible to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for something to count as blame (Fricker). If so, then the concept *blame* may be like the concept *game.* I do not take a stand on this issue here, so I leave this possibility open. Rather, it will suit my purposes to propose that an account of blame is plausible to the extent that the account applies to the set of instances we would intuitively call blaming. This is to say an account of blame is adequate to the degree that it meets the extensional desideratum.

Constitutive Accounts of Blame

Most accounts of blame attempt to identify the essence of blame with a mental state (or states) and an activity. I call these *constitutive accounts*, since they attempt to identify some content—a mental state and activity—that constitute blame. For example, some accounts claim that blame consists in belief in which one judges that a person did something bad. Functionalist approaches, however, attempt to identify the essence of blame with what it *aims to do* rather than what it is constituted by. These approaches try to explain the nature of blame in terms of its function rather than some mental state(s) and activity.

Coates and Tognazzini have categorized four general accounts of blame: cognitive, conative, Strawsonian, and functional. The first three fall under what I'm calling constitutive accounts. In the rest of this section I will argue that these three are unable to adequately meet the intensional and extensional desiderata.

Cognitive accounts emphasize the evaluative dimension of blame. Generally speaking, according to these accounts, blaming consists in a belief in which we judge that a person acted wrongly or acted in a way that displays some kind of ethical fault (Zimmerman). Accordingly, cognitive accounts see blame as essentially a private matter. Purely cognitive accounts of blame have generally fallen out of favor for a number of reasons. For my purposes, it should be fairly clear that cognitive accounts do not meet the intensional desideratum since they are not consistent with the platitude that blame paradigmatically involves having a negative emotion along the spectrum of anger. While these accounts can admit that blaming may often coincide with experiencing anger or resentment, they do not admit that blaming ever *involves* these emotions. Since experiencing negative emotions is merely incidental to blame according to cognitive accounts, they are not able to meet the intensional desideratum.

Conative accounts claim that blame is at least partly constituted by mental states involving desires, dispositions, expectations, or intentions. George Sher has developed an account that emphasizes what he takes to be the conative dimension of blame.[3] According to Sher, blame consists of two things: (A) a set of dispositions to have certain attitudinal and behavioral response to (B) a belief that an agent acted badly or has a bad character and a desire that the agent had not acted badly or not have a bad character. This account is consistent with the intensional desideratum, since the belief-desire pair in (B) can show why it is appropriate to be disposed to respond with negative emotions such as anger or resentment.

Sher's account, however, doesn't fare as well with meeting the extensional desideratum. Recall that an account of blame meets this desideratum to the extent that it applies to all instances of what we would intuitively call blame. Sher's account has difficulty fulfilling this desideratum because there are instances of blaming in which the blamer fails to have the belief-desire pair cited in (B) above. Consider an example given by Angela Smith of a politician who is pleased to blame his political opponent for a scandal (Smith 35). In such cases the politician would probably not desire that his opponent not have acted badly, since his opponent acting badly is to his political advantage. Sher's theory, then, is unable to account for the full extension of blame.

According to a widely accepted view stemming from P. F. Strawson, blame consists in experiencing a negative reactive emotion, such as indignation or resentment, directed toward the person being blamed. Strawsonian accounts are appealing, in part, because their emphasis on reactive emotions captures the interpersonal character of blame. As Strawson puts it, reactive emotions aim to express "an expectation of, and demand for, the manifestation of a certain degree

of good will" (Strawson 13). Strawsonian accounts are also appealing because they get the psychological and phenomenological character of blame right. Recall that the intensional desideratum states that blame paradigmatically involves experiencing a negative emotion along the spectrum of anger. Strawsonian accounts clearly fulfill this desideratum since they claim that blame is constituted by having a negative reactive emotion.

Like conative accounts, however, Strawsonian accounts have difficulty adequately fulfilling the extensional desideratum. There are, I believe, instances of blaming in which negative reactive emotions such as resentment or indignation are not felt. Consider these examples cited by Sher: we often blame historical figures of the distant past or complete strangers we read about in the newspaper for performing wrongful actions without feeling resentment or indignation toward them. As Sher notes, "We simply do not have the emotional resources to muster even a twinge of hostility toward each of the innumerable miscreants, scoundrels, and thugs – many of them long dead – whom we blame for what we know to be their bad behavior or bad character" (Scher, *In Praise of Blame* 89). Like conative accounts, Strawsonian theories are also unable to account for the full extension of blame. If an alternate theory is able to come closer to accounting for the full extension of blame, while meeting the intensional desideratum, then this theory is preferable. Next, I argue that functionalist theories are equipped to accomplish this.

FUNCTIONALIST ACCOUNTS OF BLAME

We have seen that a problem with two prominent constitutive accounts of blame—conative and Strawsonian—is that there are cases of blame in which the mental states they claim to constitute blame are not present. And I've suggested that this renders them extensionally inadequate in light of a better alternative—functionalist accounts. According to functionalist accounts, blame ought to be identified with the purpose or function it serves, rather than a mental state or activity that constitutes it. As an analogy, consider how we might explain the nature or the essence of the type of thing we call a radio. One approach is to explain the nature of *radio* in terms of its constitutive parts and what it does. This may prove problematic, however, since not all radios have the same arrangement of parts and many defective radios do not do what they are supposed to. Another approach is to identify the nature of *radio* with the activity *it is supposed to perform*, that is, its function. It is important to distinguish activity from function. While X may perform an activity to fulfill its function, the function and the activity are distinct. A heart functions to circulate blood throughout the body. However, there are some defective hearts that have this function even though they fail to undertake this activity. Similarly, there are defective radios that function to receive and emit sound from radio waves, even though they are not able to perform this function. The upshot is that there is a distinction between something having a function and

something performing that function.

Recall that Strawsonian approaches meet the intensional desideratum head on, but at the cost of falling short of the extensional desideratum. Functionalist accounts can meet this desideratum indirectly by emphasizing the function of blame rather than any particular mental state that constitutes blame. This enables functionalist accounts to accommodate a variety of mental states through which blame's function is exercised. A functionalist account would be able to meet the intensional desideratum by showing how, paradigmatically, the function of blame is performed through having an emotion along the spectrum of anger while maintaining that blame's function is not necessarily exercised through such an emotion. For example, Angela Smith's account states that blame ought to be identified with protest (Smith 29). On a functionalist reading of this account, we identify blame with its function to protest the blamee's conduct. This is consistent with claiming that moral protest is paradigmatically exercised through negative emotions such as indignation or resentment. Functionalist accounts, then, are well equipped to meet the intensional desideratum.

Criticisms of particular theories of blame often implicitly invoke the extensional desideratum by attempting to give a counterexample to the theory under consideration. For example, Angela Smith's case in which blame lacks the desire that an agent had not acted badly provides an objection to Sher's account of blame. Constitutive accounts tend to be problematic because they are plagued by counterexamples. Functionalist accounts can avoid this problem.

As we saw, functionalist accounts can accommodate a variety of mental states that could serve as blame's function. A functionalist account, then, could apply to all instances of what we would intuitively count as blame. Each instance having some specific function F makes it the case that it counts as blame, even if instances involve different mental states.

That something as has some function F means that it is supposed to perform some task—it has a particular purpose. Activity and function are conceptually tied. Accordingly, functionalist accounts of blame emphasize the activity that blame is supposed to undertake to achieve a purpose. As I noted above, however, it is important to distinguish the function of a thing from its activity. If functionalist accounts were to identify the nature of blame with some activity, these accounts would run into the same problem constitutive accounts face with meeting the extensional desideratum: for every proposed activity that blame is identified with, one could cite a clear case of blame in which this activity is not performed. However, functionalist accounts state that X counts as blame if and only if it has some function F. This is consistent with the claim that there are instances that count as blame in which the activity of carrying out F is not undertaken. In other words, blame having some function F doesn't require that all instances of blame carry out F.

Speech-acts can serve as a helpful analogy. Take declarations. A declaration

is a kind of speech-act that functions to make it the case whatever is being declared. Sam's utterance, "I now pronounce you husband and wife," is a declaration that functions to make it the case that two people are married. As it happens, however, Sam has no legal authority to perform a marriage. Thus, even though Sam utters a declaration, this particular occurrence of declaring is unable to perform the function of making it the case what is being declared. Sam's declaration falls flat. This suggests that there are declarations that occur, which do not perform their function even though they are identified in terms of their function.

Functionalist accounts of blame can be similarly understood. These accounts state that blame—as a kind of thing—ought to be identified with and explained in terms of some function F. Accordingly, all instances of blame would have this function while not necessarily performing F just as all instances of uttering a declaration have a declarative function while not necessarily carrying it out.

Since functionalist accounts can accommodate (1) a variety of mental states through which blame performs its function and (2) the fact that some instances of blame do not perform its function, these accounts can apply to all instances we would intuitively count as blame. Since this is not the case for constitutive accounts, functionalist accounts are better able to meet the extensional desideratum.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, I argue that blame ought to be identified with its function rather than mental states and activity that constitute it. I argue this by showing that the constitutive accounts of blame – cognitive, conative, and Strawsonian – are unable to satisfy both desiderata that any account of blame ought to meet. I then show that functionalist accounts are better suited to meet both desiderata. It follows that functionalist accounts of blame's nature are more promising than constitutive accounts.

NOTES

1. I draw this use of extensional and intensional conditions from Southwood (8-9).
2. There are, of course, other important platitudes that an account of blame needs to be consistent with and explain. For example, a theory of blame must also account for the unique significance of blame as a form of criticism. For my purposes, I suggest that in order for a theory of blame to account for blame's intention, it is necessary for the theory to be consistent with the single platitude described above. If a theory fails on this account, then that is all I need to show that it does not meet the intensional desideratum.
3. T. M. Scanlon has also developed what can be considered a conative account. For Scanlon, blame consists in the modification of one's relationship—which includes expectations and intentions – to the person who is judged blameworthy (Scanlon 128). Sher objects, claiming that Scanlon is unable to account for blaming people with whom we have

no relationship (Scher, "Wrongdoing and Relationships"). This suggests that Scanlon's account has difficulty meeting the extensional desideratum.

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Dream Skepticism and the Problem of Evil

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I. INTRODUCTION

Is there anything new to be said about the problem of evil? Theists who defend the reasonableness of belief in both God and evil typically try to offer a plausible theodicy, a set of reasons why God would allow or cause pain and suffering. Hick and Swinburne offer theodicies. Some theistic critics of arguments from evil, such as Plantinga, propound a defense, a possible state of affairs whereby God and evil co-exist. Wykstra and Alston argue that advocates of evidential arguments from evil such as Rowe make the overly ambitious claim to have justified belief that some evil is pointless. They think that even justified belief (and thus also knowledge) that some evil is pointless is beyond our ken.

This might seem to cover all possible replies theistic critics of arguments from evil could make. Apparently, it is not. In a recent article Gabriel Citron proposes to attack the premise about the very existence of horrific suffering instead. He tries to undermine arguments from evil by arguing that suffering might not be real after all. Citron thinks that this is an effective reply to all arguments from evil. Is it?

I shall argue that the answer is "no." I have a few objections to the argument, and I will argue for a handful of conclusions. First, there are three ways whereby the arguments from evil need not be committed to knowledge for certain that there is horrific suffering. Second, the premise about waking life being always indistinguishable from dreams is either unknown, false, or not even justifiably believed. Third, the premise connecting indistinguishability to ignorance invokes a too-strong concept of knowledge by requiring infallibility. Fourth, what we might discover when we wake up favors arguments from evil, rather than Citron's

skeptical theism. Last, theists should abandon dream skepticism in favor of theodicies, defenses, and arguments for God's existence.

There are several arguments from evil, and Citron cites a generic one:

> A1. Horrific suffering occurs (horrific in amount, kind, and intensity).
> A2. Without a morally justifying reason, a perfectly good, omnipotent, and omniscient being would not allow horrific suffering to occur.
> A3. There is (probably) no morally justifying reason for a perfectly good, omnipotent, and omniscient being to allow horrific suffering to occur.
> AC. By A1, A2, and A3, it follows that there (probably) does not exist a God who is perfectly good, omnipotent, and omniscient. (Citron 248)

Citron argues against A1 this way:

> B1. For any experience that one actually undergoes, it is possible—in a phenomenally indistinguishable manner—to dream that one is undergoing it, including experiences of the very worst sufferings.
> B2. If it is possible for a dream to be phenomenally indistinguishable from one's waking life, then one cannot know whether one is dreaming or awake.
> B3. From B1 and B2 it follows that one cannot know whether one is dreaming or awake, and therefore it is always epistemically possible that one is dreaming.
> B4. It is possible for a dream of suffering even of the very worst sufferings to entail no actual horrific suffering for the dreamer (or even very little actual suffering at all).
> BC. From B3 and B4 it follows that it is epistemically possible that no horrific suffering occurs (or even that very little suffering occurs at all). (Citron 249-250)

II. Not Necessarily Committed to A1 as Known

There are several problems with this argument and the defense of it. Let's begin with Citron's claim that all arguments from evil state that it is certain that horrific suffering exists. He writes: "The reason that my defense has such power is because it undermines a premise which both logical and evidential arguments take to be absolutely—rather than merely probably—true. Logical and evidential

arguments...agree that it is certain that horrific suffering occurs (i.e. A1)" (Citron 263).

But this is not necessarily so. Although philosophers who advocate arguments from evil typically do think that it is evident that horrific suffering exists, their argument need not have that commitment. Instead, atheists can challenge theists about the consistency of their beliefs. Even if it were not certain that horrific suffering exists, theists believe that it does. That theists believe there is horrifying suffering is the only reasonable, straightforward explanation of the fact that they typically address the problem of evil, taking it to be a challenge to their beliefs. Therefore, the dream argument is not a successful reply to several arguments from evil, namely, all those that are not committed to the knowledge of real existence of horrific suffering. Citron misstated many atheists' arguments. There is a different proposition that would suffice, namely, theists believe that there is horrific suffering.

What about those arguments from evil that, instead of challenging the consistency of theistic beliefs, argue straightforwardly for the non-existence of God on the basis of horrific suffering? Is Citron's argument successful there? Even here atheists can postulate a different and more modest claim. Rather than "It is certain that there is horrific suffering," atheists can use the premise "It is a justified belief that there is horrific suffering." Let me try to show why.

Will justified belief fairly depict evidential arguments from evil like those William Rowe and Bruce Russell advocate? It might be objected that Rowe and Russell regard cases such the fawn (Bambi) and little girl (Sue) as known certainties. I point out only the more modest claims their arguments require, not what they actually believe.

This reply reminds me of a criticism I once heard leveled against an argument Peter Geach advanced. Geach had argued for the conclusion that if there is personal survival after death, it consists in literal resurrection of the same body. Someone attacked Geach's argument for the (alleged) unreasonable belief in personal survival. When I pointed out Geach's argument did not commit him to personal survival after death, the reply was that Geach believed it.

Well, yes, Geach did believe it, but his philosophical argument was altogether different. Only Geach's argument, its premises, conclusion, and the relations between them should be criticized, not Geach himself. Since his argument did not include the statement, there is literal bodily resurrection, the argument cannot be criticized on that ground.

Analogously, it is of course true that Rowe and Russell think they know cases like the ones they cite. However, the necessary commitments of their arguments are another matter. The same rules apply to believers and atheists. Thus, Citron's dream skepticism is unsuccessful reply to evidential arguments from evil that do not require the known certainty of cases of horrific suffering.

There is a third problem with premise A1. Some arguments from evil do not entail that there is horrific suffering. Those that argue that God would abolish all evil whatsoever fit this description.

Take Mackie's, for example:

> In its simplest form the problem is this: God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; and yet evil exists. There seems to be some contradiction between these three propositions, so that if any two of them were true the third would be false. But at the same time all three are essential parts of most theological positions: the theologian, it seems, at once must adhere and cannot consistently adhere to all three. (The problem does not arise only for theists, but I shall discuss it in the form in which it presents itself for ordinary theism.) However, the contradiction does not arise immediately; to show it we need some additional premises, or perhaps some quasi-logical rules connecting the terms 'good', 'evil', and 'omnipotent'. These additional principles are that good is opposed to evil, in such a way that a good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can, and that there are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do. From these it follows that a good omnipotent thing eliminates evil completely, and then the propositions that a good omnipotent thing exists, and that evil exists, are incompatible. (Mackie 200-201)

Let us sum up the argument thus far. There are three ways whereby the arguments from evil need not be committed to knowledge for certain that there is horrific suffering. For one, atheists can challenge theistic belief by pointing out that theists themselves believe that there is horrific suffering. For another, atheists can appeal to the justified belief (rather than the known certainty) that there is horrific suffering. Third, some arguments from evil entail only that there is evil, but not that there is horrific suffering. Even Citron grants that nightmares are themselves bad (evil).

III. Know Dreams Indistinguishable from Waking Life?

The criticism of arguments from evil might be qualified (scaled back) in order to cover only those that entail that it is known for certain that there is horrific suffering. In itself that is a significant retreat. But the problems are not limited to the statement of the arguments from evil. They are not limited to premise A1. There are also objections to the skeptical defense itself.

Consider:

> B1. For any experience that one actually undergoes, it is possible—in a phenomenally indistinguishable manner—to dream that one

> is undergoing it, including experiences of the very worst sufferings.

Can Citron consistently maintain that he knows that B1 is true? B1 is an introspective premise about being unable to distinguish dreaming from actually witnessing or undergoing horrific suffering. But if even ordinary perception never amounts to knowledge, then less reliable introspection does not constitute knowledge, either. My point is that Citron's own argument relies on knowledge he apparently rejects.

Is premise B1 true? I shall argue that B1 is true if the possibility is merely theoretical or logical, but not if the possibility is epistemic, not in a way that supports his skeptical argument. The interpretation of B1 that Citron needs is at best dubious and at worst false.

If we acknowledge that—sometimes—we cannot distinguish being awake from being asleep, it is because we correctly remember, while awake, that we had taken a dream to be wakeful experience. It is noteworthy that this observation presupposes that we are awake. Only on that basis could we know, or justifiably believe, the true but very qualified version of B1 that we sometimes cannot tell the difference.

Is it really true that we cannot distinguish being awake from being asleep and dreaming? One major problem with premise B1 is that it states something that is or can be true while a person is asleep and generalizes it to waking life, too. Under what circumstance is it possible for a dream to be indistinguishable from waking life? When a person dreams. But it does not follow from the assumption that dreams are sometimes taken to be real wakeful experience that no distinction can be made while awake. B1 is ill-supported.

B1 is also inconsistent with points Citron makes and must make. We readily distinguish waking life from dreaming while we are awake, and Citron himself repeatedly does so throughout his article. Here is one example: "Dreams are often unlike waking life in many ways—even in their phenomenal aspect. Sometimes they are hazy and patchy, sometimes bizarre, and sometimes even impossible in ways that waking life is not (Citron 250). Here's another: "I remember an 'epic' dream that I had one night as a young teenager, in which I dreamed almost an entire life-narrative" (251). The only way to know or reasonably believe such statements is to be able to distinguish being awake from being asleep. Thus, the inference from "while asleep it is possible to mistake a dream for real waking life" to "for any experience (wakeful or not) it is possible to dream one is undergoing it" is invalid.

That last inference might appear to be valid, but that is an illusion. I think it is only because the standards for possibility have been liberalized from epistemic to logical ones. Even if we grant that it is a logical (merely theoretical) possibility that someone can dream the content of wakeful experience, that does not entail that

we do not know we are awake when we are. It is a mere theoretical or logical possibility, not an epistemic one. This is especially striking when we consider, not a momentary experience, but the suggestion that dreams might last an entire lifetime (251). We know we are awake much of the time throughout our lives, although it is a mere logical possibility that we dream it all. The trouble for Citron's argument is that he needs the stronger claim that it is epistemically possible that all of life is but a dream, that we do not know that it is not a dream. The inference trades on an equivocation.

Is B1 even a justified belief? It can and probably would be replied that Citron's argument requires only justified belief (not knowledge) that its premises are true.

This is a good but at best inconclusive reply. It is good, since it avoids the contradictory reliance on knowledge of the premises while undercutting that very knowledge. However, it is inconclusive and ultimately self-defeating.

Citron appeals to the reader to consult his experience in order to verify the inability to distinguish dreaming from wakeful experience. We are tacitly asked to remember individual cases where we took a dream to be real. It is reasonable to contend that we know (and thus justifiably believe) that there are such individual cases. But isolated cases are one thing. Every case is another. B1 is much stronger. B1 has consequences for every claim to have justified belief on the basis of perception, not just about horrific suffering. Thus, it would undermine several claims Citron himself makes, including B1. Are you merely dreaming that you cannot distinguish being awake and perceiving and actually perceiving? Thus, if we shift from knowledge to justified belief, dream skepticism means that B1 is an unjustified belief. Dream skepticism cannot be invoked selectively.

Let's summarize. In part 1 I argued that Citron's statements about A1 are false. He has misstated the necessary commitments of arguments from evil. In part 2 I argued that Citron's own criteria for knowledge entail that B1 is neither known nor a justified belief. I also argued that B1 is true only in a way that does not help his argument based on dream skepticism.

IV. Truisms about Knowledge vs. B2: Is B2 true?

Let's begin with a truism about sleep and perceptual knowledge:

> T: If someone is asleep, she does not know that her perceptions are of real events;

and its contrapositive:

> CT: If someone does know that her perceptions are of real events, then she is not asleep.

There are no explicit modal operators in T and CT. T states a condition under which someone would lack perceptual knowledge of real events. CT, on the other hand, states a condition that must be met for perceptual knowledge. I write "no explicit modal operators," since there are implicit ones. The scope of the modal operator in T is over the entire conditional, not its antecedent or consequent. The same is true of CT.

The acceptability of B2 pivots on conceptual truths about knowledge. But note how it and its contrapositive differ from T and CT:

> B2. If it is possible for a dream to be phenomenally indistinguishable from one's waking life, then one cannot know whether one is dreaming or awake.

and its contrapositive:

> CB2. If one can know whether one is dreaming or awake, then it is impossible for a dream to be phenomenally indistinguishable from one's waking life.

I think there is a problem with the modal operators can, must, and impossible and their scope. Let's begin with the concept of knowledge. Take the truth condition for knowledge: If S knows that p, then p must be true. This does not mean that the consequent is necessarily true, but that the entire conditional is. Thus the concept of knowing allows for the possibility of knowing contingent truths. Likewise, consider empirical knowledge, a reworded statement of CT: If S empirically knows that p, then S is awake. We might put it this way: If S empirically knows that p, then S must be awake. Again, this does not mean that the consequent is necessarily true, but that the entire conditional is. Further, if we expand the consequent, so that the conditional is "if S empirically knows that p, then S must be awake and know she is awake," the words "must be" do not, despite its placement in the statement, apply to the consequent in isolation from the antecedent. Thus, the conceptual truth about empirical knowledge is consistent with the contingent fact that one is awake. Thus, empirical knowledge does not rule out the possibility of being unable to distinguish being awake from being asleep. Empirical knowledge precludes actually being asleep. On this interpretation B2 and CB2 are both false.

Let's contrast the pairs T and CT with B2 and CB2 again:

> T: If someone is asleep, she does not know that her perceptions are of real events;

and its contrapositive:

CT: If someone does know that her perceptions are of real events, then she is not asleep.

Note how these differ from B2 and CB2:

B2. If it is possible for a dream to be phenomenally indistinguishable from one's waking life, then one cannot know whether one is dreaming or awake.

and its contrapositive:

CB2. If one can know whether one is dreaming or awake, then it is impossible for a dream to be phenomenally indistinguishable from one's waking life.

Note that CB2 and B2 both require the infallibility of perception, the impossibility of making a mistake, for there to be perceptual knowledge. T and CT, on the other hand, require that there not be a mistake, but not the impossibility of making one. T and CT are in line with an ordinary concept of perceptual knowledge. We all know that perception is not infallible. We readily recognize that there are conditions under which it is unreliable or even mistaken. This includes some, but not all, circumstances when a person is awake. But we do not regard those facts as precluding all perceptual knowledge whatsoever. CB2 and B2, on the other hand, do regard those facts as precluding all perceptual knowledge whatsoever.

V. Criteria for Knowledge and Justified Belief?

I suspect that the reason behind the repeated self-reference problems with Citron's criteria for knowledge and justified belief is that they are too strong. Consider the alternative that allows for justifications on the basis of perception while allowing for error. Even if we cannot tell we are asleep when we sleep, when we dream, it does not follow that we cannot ever tell we are awake (not asleep) when we are awake. Selective skepticism can be employed only on the basis of the justified belief that there are justified beliefs.

I expect the challenge to prove that I know I am not dreaming. Well, I need not claim to know when I am awake; I only have to point out that Citron has not proven that it is epistemically possible that life is but a dream on the basis of a mere logical possibility that it is. Thus, Citron's central argument is unsuccessful.

VI. Possibilities When We Wake Up

The dream skepticism Citron employs has unwelcome consequences for his theism, since everything depends on what turns out to be true when we wake up. He refers to waking up and discovering that "everything is actually completely fine" (Citron 249). But this speculation cuts both ways. There is nothing in Citron's argument to rule out the possibility that everything is as bad, or worse, or much worse, than a nightmare. Consider an example he cites of an Auschwitz prisoner having a nightmare, and a fellow prisoner (Viktor Frankl) not waking him up because "no dream, no matter how horrible, could be as bad as the reality of the camp" (247). However, if things were as bad, or worse, or even better, but not sufficiently better to rule out horrific suffering, Citron's argument collapses.

Citron can reply that we do not know there are cases of horrific suffering. However, his argument entails that no apparent horrific suffering constitutes knowledge. But even in the absence of knowledge that there is horrific suffering, we could and still do know that there are countless more possibilities of Citron's skeptical premise being false than true about the existence of horrific suffering. So, we can know that it is more probable, even if not certain, that some apparent cases of horrific suffering are real. Thus, his speculation hinders, rather than helps, his case.

It might be objected that these are metaphysical possibilities, rather than epistemic ones. Granted, but the metaphysical possibilities are related to epistemic ones. We know that there are many more possibilities that entail the existence of horrific suffering. It is logically possible that there are zero real instances of horrific suffering, but that is only one possibility.

VII. Conclusion

I have only suggested criteria for knowledge and justified belief that can be attained. A determined skeptic could dispute them and insist on very strong conditions. However, I think I have shown that theists would pay a price for that skepticism that many would be unwilling to pay. It would undermine many of their own arguments.

What options are open to theists? The attempt to undercut the justified belief that there is horrific suffering is a failure. Therefore, if there is any argumentative case for theism or against atheism, it will have to be with defenses, theodicies, and arguments for God's existence.

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Infinite Analysis and the Connectedness Problem in Leibniz

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Leibniz's rationalism leads him to hold the conceptual containment theory of truth, that is, in any true proposition, the concept of the predicate is contained in or a part of the concept of the subject. Thus all truths for Leibniz are analytic in this sense of analyticity. Of course, the problem is that analytic truths are usually associated with necessary truths, so Leibniz's conceptual containment theory of truth seems to lead to the Spinozistic conclusion that all truths are necessary truths. If the concept of the predicate is in the concept of the subject then it appears that an analysis of the subject will reveal this conceptual connection between subject and predicate concept. Leibniz's famous solution is to say that while in necessary truths the conceptual connection between subject and predicate can be revealed by a finite analysis, in contingent truths, finding the conceptual connection requires an infinite analysis, that is, an analysis that will never end. Thus in *On Freedom* from around 1698 Leibniz writes:

> But in contingent truths, even though the predicate is in the subject, this can never be demonstrated, nor can a proposition ever be reduced to an equality or an identity, but the resolution proceeds to infinity, God alone seeing, not the end of the resolution, of course, which does not exist, but the connection of the terms or the containment of the predicate in the subject, since he sees whatever is in the series. (AG 96)

The kinds of analyses Leibniz has in mind are where the concept of the subject and the concept of the predicate are replaced by equivalent sets of concepts until

one has reduced the true proposition in question to what Leibniz calls the form of an identity, explicitly revealing the conceptual containment in question. When one can do this in a finite number of steps Leibniz says there is a demonstration of the proposition, and in what follows I will speak of finite and infinite proofs, reserving the term 'demonstration' for finite proofs. This, of course, is all fairly well-trodden ground in Leibnizian metaphysics of truth.

Some Proof Problems

One problem with all of this, dubbed the Lucky Proof by Robert Adams, is that one wonders why, in the analysis of a contingent truth, one couldn't luckily start the analysis off in such a way that one discovered the predicate in the subject in a finite number of steps (34). A more damning problem, originally stated by Patrick Maher and dubbed the Guaranteed Proof by Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra and Paul Lodge, is that if the predicate is actually in the subject, then one will be guaranteed to discover it in a finite number of steps, no matter how "far off" it is in the analysis (Maher 239, Rodriguez-Pereyra and Lodge 222).

To see why the Guaranteed Proof works one can think of an analogy with the natural numbers. If one thinks of a Leibnizian analysis as the setting out of all the component concepts of a subject in a string, one after another, then, like the natural numbers, that string of concepts will be infinite. However, any given natural number in the infinitely long string will be finitely many steps away from the beginning. Similarly, any predicate in the decomposition string will be finitely many steps away from the beginning of the analysis. So, the Guaranteed Proof reasons, any given true predicate will show up after a finite number of steps in the analysis of its subject.

The Lucky Proof and the Guaranteed Proof, or what I will call the Connectedness Problem, together constitute a serious tangle for Leibniz's infinite analysis account of contingency and it would be nice if there was a way around them. Before proposing my own solution, I want to look at some of the attempts that have been made at a work-around.

Non-Containment Containment Theories

Maher gets around connectedness by denying that the predicate is literally in the subject. Thus in the true contingent proposition "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" what is literally in the subject concept is not the predicate "crossed the Rubicon," but instead the predicate "appearing best to cross the Rubicon" (241). According to Maher, the predicate is "contained" in the subject in the sense that crossing the Rubicon can be derived from appearing best to cross the Rubicon along with the Principle of Perfection—that God has set things up in such a way that substances will freely choose what seems best to them (241). Infinite analysis enters the

picture when we ask ourselves about the status of the Principle of Perfection. According to Maher, God chose a world that instantiated the Principle of Perfection because God chose the best possible world, but the predicate, "chooses the best" is not found within the concept of God. Instead, an infinite series of predicates of the form "it seems best to God to choose the best," and "it seems best to God that it seems best for him to choose the best," etc. are contained in God (241).

Another solution, due this time to Cover and Hawthorne, shares a feature of Maher's solution to connectedness, namely, the denial that the predicate is literally in the subject. According to Cover and Hawthorne, macro-predicates like crossing the Rubicon are not literally in the subject. Instead, what are in the subject concept are an infinite number of micro-inclinations (159). A macro-predicate is "contained" in the subject in the sense that one can deduce from all the micro-inclinations what macro-predicate is true of the subject. Infinite analysis enters the picture when one considers that in deducing a given macro-predicate, one has to take account of the infinite number of micro-inclinations that tend toward and against the macro predicate in question, a task that clearly requires an infinite analysis (159).

If the idea behind non-containment theories is to get around connectedness then I think there is little theoretical motivation for them. To see why, consider some true contingent predicate P. The non-containment theorist will say that you will not find P in a finite number of steps because the true contingent predicate will show up nowhere in the analysis of the basic concept, even though the analysis will provide the resources for deducing it.[1] The opponent of the non-containment theorist can reply that one can just take the deductive closure of the basic concept and call that the CIC in some extended sense. Each deduction will then show up as a step of the analysis of this fuller concept and we are faced with the Connectedness Problem all over again. It seems to me that the only thing for the non-containment theorist to do at this point is to deny that deductions should count as steps of an analysis, a move that strikes me as *ad hoc*.

The real work being done to get around connectedness in non-containment theories is not done by the non-containment of the predicate in the subject, but instead by infinitistic considerations. Maher does it by employing an infinite series of reasons for reasons within God for choosing the best, while Cover and Hawthorne do it by having an infinite premise set of micro-inclinations required in order to do any deductive work. While I think that each of these accounts may work, given the lack of textual evidence and the fact that non-containment is not doing any of the real lifting here, I think there is reason to see if we can get around connectedness within the theoretical context of full-blown containment theories.

INFINITE COMPLEXITY OF CIC

Another very interesting attempt around these difficulties, and in the context of full-blown containment, is due to Rodriguez-Pereyra and Lodge. Their basic idea is that connectedness presents no problem because even if one can deduce some true contingent proposition in a finite number of steps, one hasn't proved S is P unless one simultaneously has a proof that the subject concept S is consistent, something that would require a full decomposition of S and therefore could not be accomplished in a finite number of steps (223). This possible solution was considered by Maher originally and again by Cover and Hawthorne and rejected because, among other things, it makes all truths about substances contingent (Maher 239, Cover and Hawthorne 155-56). Rodriguez-Pereyra and Lodge accept this non-intuitive solution and argue that even properties like self-identity are contingent for Leibniz (229).

Rodriguez-Pereyra and Lodge cite passages from *Critical Thoughts on the General Part of the Principles of Descartes* and from *Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas* that seem to support their view of how infinitistic considerations enter into Leibniz's containment theory of truth and avoid the Connectedness Problem (228-29). In both of these texts Leibniz argues that the standard Ontological Proof of God's existence is flawed because one has not proved the possibility of a perfect, necessarily existing, being. Hence one cannot safely infer the existence of such a being because the concept might be impossible by secretly containing a contradiction.

It is true that Leibniz insists on this critique of the Ontological Proof many times. Yet I don't find in it any support for Rodriguez-Pereyra and Lodge's thesis. Leibniz insists on the distinction between nominal definitions and real definitions. Nominal definitions merely enable one to distinguish one concept from another, while real definitions establish the possibility of a thing. In *Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas*, Leibniz claims that real definitions come in two flavors, a priori and a posteriori. A real definition is had a priori when we have a causal definition of the thing, by which we give the means by which it can be produced mechanically, or we fully analyze it into the primitive attributes of God. A real definition is had a posteriori when we have experience that it exists.[2] The reason that Leibniz insists that we need an a priori proof that the concept of a perfect being is possible is, of course, that none of us has an a posteriori real definition of such a being because none of us has had an experience of the existence of such a being. This is relevantly different than the case of a created being like Caesar. The reason we don't need an a priori proof that the concept of Caesar is consistent is because we have an a posteriori real definition of Caesar, presumably based on the historical records of humans that did have an experience of the existence of such a man.

NON-STANDARD ARITHMETIC

I now want to develop a solution to the Connectedness Problem within a full-blown containment context and, furthermore, avoid such non-intuitive results as making all propositions about created substances contingent. I take my inspiration from some thoughts of Adams. Adams, in trying to make sense of how a contingent predicate could be literally in a subject concept without the denial of that predicate creating a contradiction, appeals to the mathematical notion of ω-inconsistency (26-7). A system that proves for each natural number that it has some property F, and yet also proves that there is a number such that it doesn't have F, is consistent but not ω-consistent.[3] Adams explains that in the same way that a system can be consistent and yet not be ω-consistent, we can view the claim that the denial of a contingent predicate does not generate a contradiction as the view that the denial is consistent but not ω-consistent. He concludes that, "Leibniz reserves 'implies a contradiction' to express a proof-theoretical notion rather than the notion of conceptual falsity" (27). I think this line of thought deserves to be developed.

The notion of ω-consistency is tightly connected to non-standard arithmetic.[4] One way of generating a non-standard model of the Peano axioms is to start adding axioms to the effect that some number 'a' is greater than n, starting with 1 and working one's way up. For each n, this extended system of axioms is, of course, satisfied by the standard model of the natural numbers. This process can be infinitely extended, adding an axiom for each standard natural number. Because of compactness, which states that if every finite subset of an infinite set of sentences has a model, the entire infinite set does, we know that there must be some non-standard model that satisfies the infinitely extended Peano axioms. The reason that you can have a distinction between consistency and ω-consistency is that in this non-standard model, you can prove both that each natural number has some property F and that some non-standard natural number 'a' doesn't have F.

I believe this notion of non-standard arithmetic holds the key to solving the Connectedness Problem. First, the non-standard natural numbers have a non-standard ordering, that is, they are of order type other than ω. In less technical terms they have an ordering that goes 1, 2, 3… and then something more.[5] The other thing to note is that this non-standard ordering of something other than ω means that, in terms of graph theory, they are not connected. Because connectedness is the "mechanism" by which the Guaranteed Proof is being generated, it follows that a non-standard ordering of the predicates in a subject concept is a simple way to solve such difficulties within the context of a full-blown containment theory.

The question remains whether a non-standard ordering is a Leibnizian solution to the Connectedness Problem. I think there is evidence that Leibniz certainly thought that concepts had some kind of internal ordering or structure among their constituent concepts. The following is from the *New Essays*:

> someone who said *The triangle and the trilateral are not the same* would be wrong, since if we consider it carefully we find that the three sides and the three angles always go together…However, one can still say in the abstract that *triangularity is not trilaterality*, or that the formal causes of the triangle and of the trilateral are not the same, as the philosophers put it. They are different aspects of one and the same thing. (NE 363)

Here I take it that Leibniz is saying that although the concepts of triangularity and trilaterality are extensionally equivalent and pick out all the same things, they are intensionally, viewed as concepts, distinct. Given that they don't differ in the objects that they pick out, I think it is fair to conclude that they don't differ in their constituent concepts. The best way for accounting for the difference between the two that I know of is to claim that there is a distinction in the internal ordering of those constituent concepts. So I take this to be textual evidence that Leibniz did believe that concepts had an internal ordering.

The next question I want to ask is whether this solution, which introduces the notion of a non-standard ordering, is, not a solution Leibniz proposed, but rather, whether it is an un-Leibnizian solution. I will close with one last piece of text.

> Thus if you say that in an unbounded series there exists no last finite number that can be written in, although there can exist an infinite one: I reply, not even this can exist, if there is no last number. The only other thing I would consider replying to this reasoning is that the number of terms is not always the last number of the series. (RA 101)

Leibniz is wickedly close by approximately 200 years here to the decoupling of the concepts of cardinality and ordinality that is essential to transfinite arithmetic and the discoveries of Georg Cantor.

NOTES

1. There is one other kind of non-containment theory lurking in logical space, what I will refer to as limit theories. The limit theorist maintains that true contingent predicates are not in the subject, but denies that any analysis of the basic concept will provide the resources for deducing the predicate. Instead, the limit theorist maintains that the analysis of the basic concept will infinitely approach the predicate as a limit point. What I say above does not apply to this kind of non-containment theory.

2. See AG 26.

3. That is, the system proves, F1, F2, F3… for each natural number n, and also proves ~Fa for some non-standard natural number a.

4. I am deeply indebted to Richard Grandy for what follows. Any mistakes are my own.

5. In more technical terms they have an ordering that runs 1, 2, 3…, …a-1, a, a+1…, …b-1, b, b+1…, where there are an infinite number of non-standard chunks, …x-1, x, x+1…, which are themselves densely ordered.

ABBREVIATIONS

AG *Philosophical Essays*. Eds. and trans. by R. Ariew and D. Garber. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989.

NE *New Essays on Human Understanding*. Ed. and trans. by P. Remnant and J. Bennett. NY: Cambridge UP, 1996.

RA *The Labyrinth of the Continuum: Writings on the Continuum Problem, 1672-1686*. Trans. and ed. by Richard Arthur. New Haven: Yale UP, 2001.

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Hempel's Raven Paradox: On Confirmation and Infinities

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Hempel's paradox of confirmation can be formulated as the following argument:

> *Nicod's Condition* (NC): For any object *x* and any properties *F* and *G*, the proposition that *x* has both *F* and *G* confirms the hypothesis that every *F* has *G* (Nicod 219).
>
> *Equivalence Condition* (EC): If hypotheses *H1* and H*2* are logically equivalent, then any evidence *E* that confirms *H1* also confirms *H2*.

Together, these two principles entail the following conclusion:

> *Paradoxical Conclusion* (PC): an object *a,* which is a non-black non-raven (*~Ba & ~Ra)* confirms the hypothesis (*H*) that all ravens are black.[1]

This argument is valid. From NC, it follows that *~Ba & ~Ra* confirms the hypothesis that all non-black things are non-ravens. This hypothesis is the contrapositive of *H* and therefore logically equivalent to *H*. So by EC, *~Ba & ~Ra* confirms *H*. But this seems counterintuitive—a white shoe seems irrelevant to whether all ravens are black. Thus, we have an argument that starts from apparently obvious premises and proceeds through valid reasoning to an apparently unacceptable conclusion—a paradox.

A solution to Hempel's paradox should be sufficiently general. Hempel's paradox is about confirmation, not ravens (Clarke 427). It uses ravens only to make

the paradox more vivid. Thus, a good solution to the paradox would be applicable not only to black ravens, but also to white swans, cubed dice, and so on. Further, a solution must give us an answer by telling us whether to accept PC, reject NC, or reject EC. But it should also give us an explanation apart from the argument itself for why we should accept its answer. It would not do to merely say that we should accept PC because NC and EC are true. The purported solution should give us a deeper explanation for why we should accept PC.

My aim in this paper is to offer a revision of Nicod's Condition and, in so doing, offer a solution to the raven paradox. First, I explore how Bayesians have observed that NC is insensitive to the role of background information in confirmation. Next I explore a revision of NC that Bayesians have proposed, as well as the standard Bayesian solution to the raven paradox.[2] I argue, however, that the Bayesian revision of NC is still not stringent enough; it fails if there is an infinite number of unobserved *F*'s. In its place, I revise NC by restricting it to apply only to finite classes. Thus, my answer to Hempel's paradox is to accept PC by defending a qualified version of NC. My defense of this qualified NC will also function as a deeper explanation for why PC is true.

I. Nicod's Condition and Background Information

According to Bayesians, confirmation is a three-part relation between a hypothesis, a set of evidence, and background information. If they are right, then NC is flawed for it says nothing about background information. Indeed, it has been shown that NC cannot be true relative to all possible background information (Good 322).[3] Due to this flaw, Bayesians have offered revised versions of NC (e.g. Rinard 84, and Horwich ch. 3). For now, we will use the following revision:

> *Bayesian Nicod's Condition* (BNC): For any randomly sampled object *x* and any properties *F* and *G*, if we know nothing else about *x,* the proposition that *x* has both *F* and *G* confirms the hypothesis that every *F* has *G* (Rinard 84).

BNC is more plausible than NC because it is more stringent. The additional qualifiers—that the object be randomly sampled, and we know nothing else about it—are meant to rule out gerrymandered pieces of information in our background knowledge that might prevent confirmation. In other words, if we have no other special information about the object, then its having *F* and *G* confirms the hypothesis that all *F*'s are *G*'s. In my view, BNC is not sufficiently stringent because though it blocks off pieces of information about *x*, it says nothing about what pieces of information we can have about the world. In particular, I will argue that BNC does not hold if there is an infinite number of unobserved *F*s in the set from whence we are sampling.

II. THE STANDARD BAYESIAN SOLUTION TO THE RAVEN PARADOX

Proponents of the standard Bayesian solution (e.g. Alexander 233, and Mackie 275-76) argue that a non-black non-raven confirms *H*. But they also claim that the degree of confirmation is minute. A non-black non-raven confirms *H* to a much smaller degree than a black raven would. This is because there are many more non-black objects than ravens. Consider the following application of Bayes' theorem on the effect of observing *~Ba & ~Ra* on *H*:

$$P(H|{\sim}Ba\ \&\ {\sim}Ra) = \frac{P({\sim}Ba\ \&\ {\sim}Ra|H)P(H)}{P({\sim}Ba\ \&\ {\sim}Ra)}.$$

From this it can be proven that:

$$P\big(H\,\big|\,{\sim}Ba\ \&\ {\sim}Ra\big) - P(H) = P(H)\left[\frac{P(H)}{P({\sim}Ba)P({\sim}Ba)} - 1\right].$$

Proponents of the standard solution assume that (1) $P(H) = P(Ra)$, and equivalently, $P(\sim Ra|H) = P(\sim Ra)$. Likewise, they assume that (2) $P(\sim Ba|H) = P(\sim Ba)$. Let us apply these assumptions to the derived formula. Given (2), $P(\sim Ba|H)$ and $P(\sim Ba)$ cancel each other, which entails:

$$P\big(H\,\big|\,{\sim}Ba\ \&\ {\sim}Ra\big) - P(H) = P(H)\left[\frac{1}{P({\sim}Ba)} - 1\right].$$

Thus, so long as $0 < P(\sim Ra|\sim Ba) < 1$ and $P(H) > 0$, it will follow that $P(H|\sim Ba\ \&\ \sim Ra) > P(H)$. In other words, it will follow that *~Ba & ~Ra* confirms *H*.

However, accepting (1) and (2) has an undesirable effect: *Ba & ~Ra* disconfirms *H* (Rinard 88-90, Maher 61, Vranas 551, and Horwich 58-9 have also made this claim). Consider the following chart representing our initial credences.

Initial Credences

	Ra	*~Ra*
Ba	*k*	*l*
~Ba	*m*	*n*

Suppose we have non-zero initial credences for each of the four possibilities represented in the chart, and the sum of the initial credences (*k, l, m,* and *n*) is 1. Now if we learn that all ravens are black, our credence for observing *Ra & ~Ba* will be 0. But this means our initial credence for it, *m,* must be somehow redistributed among the other three possibilities. If we accept both (1) and (2), then our credences for *Ba & Ra* and *~Ba & ~Ra* must each increase by *m,* otherwise $P(Ra) \neq P(Ra|H)$ and $P(\sim Ba) \neq P(\sim Ba|H)$. If that is all we do in updating our credences, the sum of our credences would be $1 + m$, which is unacceptable unless $m = 0$. So it follows that our updated credence for *~Ra & Ba* must decrease by *m.* The following table shows what our updated credences must be given (1) and (2).

Credences on *H,* (1), and (2)

	Ra	*~Ra*
Ba	$k + m$	$l - m$
~Ba	*0*	$n + m$

Two absurdities follow. First, a black non-raven disconfirms the hypothesis that all ravens are black. In fact, if our initial credence for observing a non-black raven is equal to our initial credence for observing a black non-raven, it follows that a black non-raven disproves *H* (because $l - m = 0$). Second, our initial credence for observing a non-black raven cannot be greater than our initial credence for observing a black non-raven, otherwise $l - m < 0$.

These consequences seem absurd, so we should reject (1) or (2). My own contention is that we should reject both. In the next section, I explore the logic behind Nicod's Condition and show that "all ravens are black" should not decrease *P*(*Ba & ~Ra*).

III. Nicod's Condition and Infinities

"All ravens are black" is true iff there are no non-black ravens in the world. Why does finding a black raven make it more likely that there are no non-black ravens? Why would the existence of a thing of a certain type be evidence for the non-existence of things of another type?[4]

Suppose there are exactly 10 objects in the world and we are testing the hypothesis that all ravens are black.[5] We can construe these objects as 10 opportunities to find a non-black raven that would falsify "all ravens are black." Each observed object that is not a non-black raven is tantamount to one fewer

opportunity to falsify the hypothesis. So, each object we observe that is not a non-black raven confirms *H.*

More formally, we know that $P(\sim\exists x(Rx \,\&\, \sim Bx)) + P(\exists x(Rx \,\&\, \sim Bx)) = 1$.[6] Now suppose that $a_1, a_2, a_3, \ldots, a_{10}$ each uniquely denotes the 10 objects in the world. If there is a non-black raven, it must be one of these 10 objects.[7] So either one of the 10 objects is a non-black raven, or there are no non-black ravens. Thus, by the second axiom of probability theory, it follows that:

$$P((\sim Ba_1 \,\&\, Ra_1) \vee (\sim Ba_2 \,\&\, Ra_2) \vee (\sim Ba_3 \,\&\, Ra_3) \vee \ldots \vee (\sim Ba_{10} \,\&\, Ra_{10})) + P(\sim\exists x(\sim Bx \,\&\, Rx)) = 1.$$

For the sake of vividness, suppose that each object has an independent initial probability of 0.5 for being $(\sim Ba \,\&\, Ra)$ and an independent initial probability of 0.5 for being $\sim(\sim Ba \,\&\, Ra)$. This generates the following results:

$$P((\sim Ba_1 \,\&\, Ra_1) \vee (\sim Ba_2 \,\&\, Ra_2) \vee (\sim Ba_3 \,\&\, Ra_3) \ldots (\sim Ba_{10} \,\&\, Ra_{10})) = 0.999;$$
$$P(\sim\exists x(\sim Bx \,\&\, Rx)) = 0.001.$$

Now suppose we learn that a_1 is not a non-black raven. This piece of evidence allows us to deduce that if there is a non-black raven, it is among the remaining 9 objects in the world. So we update our credence in the following way:

$$P((\sim Ba_2 \,\&\, Ra_2) \vee (\sim Ba_3 \,\&\, Ra_3) \ldots (\sim Ba_{10} \,\&\, Ra_{10})) + P(\sim\exists x(\sim Bx \,\&\, Rx)) = 1.$$

Updating based on the evidence generates the following results:

$$P((\sim Ba_2 \,\&\, Ra_2) \vee (\sim Ba_3 \,\&\, Ra_3) \ldots (\sim Ba_{10} \,\&\, Ra_{10})) = 0.998;$$
$$P(\sim\exists x(\sim Bx \,\&\, Rx)) = 0.002.$$

Thus, each object observed that is not a non-black raven increases the probability that there are no non-black ravens, i.e. that all ravens are black.[8] Consider the following analogy. Suppose a particular baseball player has a 0.5 probability of failing to hit any particular pitch. So upon walking up to the home plate, he has a 0.125 probability of striking out. If he fails to hit the first pitch, the probability that he will strike out increases to 0.25. In the same way, observing $\sim(\sim Ba_1 \,\&\, Ra_1)$ confirms "all ravens are black."

Now suppose that in addition to knowing that there are 10 objects in the world we also know that 3 of these objects (say, a_2, a_3, and a_4) are ravens. So either a_2, or a_3, or a_4 is a non-black raven, or there are no non-black ravens. This implies:

$$P((\sim Ba_2 \,\&\, Ra_2) \vee (\sim Ba_3 \,\&\, Ra_3) \vee (\sim Ba_4 \,\&\, Ra_4)) + P(\sim\exists x(Rx \,\&\, \sim Bx)) = 1.$$

Again, assume that each raven has a 0.5 probability of being black. This yields the following results as our prior probabilities:

$$P((\sim Ba_2 \,\&\, Ra_2) \vee (\sim Ba_3 \,\&\, Ra_3) \vee (\sim Ba_4 \,\&\, Ra_4)) = 0.875;$$
$$P(\sim\exists x(\sim Bx \,\&\, Rx)) = 0.125.$$

In this case, $P(H)$ increases more significantly upon learning Ra_2 & Ba_2 than upon learning $\sim(\sim Ba_1 \,\&\, Ra_1)$. Here are the posterior probabilities after updating on Ra_2 & Ba_2:

$$P((\sim Ba_3 \,\&\, Ra_3) \vee (\sim Ba_4 \,\&\, Ra_4)) = 0.75;$$
$$P(\sim\exists x(\sim Bx \,\&\, Rx)) = 0.25.$$

Now suppose that instead of knowing that there are 3 ravens, what we know is that there are 3 non-black things. In this case, learning $\sim Ba_5$ & $\sim Ra_5$ raises the probability of H just as much as learning Ra_2 & Ba_2 did in the previous case. Under the specified conditions, the evidential import of $\sim Ba_5$ & $\sim Ra_5$ is, logically speaking, no different from the evidential import of Ra_2 & Ba_2.

To generalize, where n is the number of unobserved F's, the evidential import ($\Delta P(H)$)[9] of Fx & Gx can be calculated as the difference between the prior probability ($P(H)_i$) and posterior probability of H ($P(H)_f$):

$$\Delta P(H) = P(H)_f - P(H)_i$$
$$\Delta P(H) = P(Gx|Fx)^{n-1} - P(Fx)^n$$

So we see how BNC works: if there is a finite number *F's*, then each time we observe an instance of F that is a G, that is one fewer opportunity we have to disprove the hypothesis that all *F's* are *G's*. But what if there is an infinite number of unobserved F's?[10] Suppose this is the case. Let $a_1, a_2, a_3, \ldots$ denote objects in the world. By the second axiom of probability theory, we know:

$$P((Fa_1 \,\&\, \sim Ga_1) \vee (Fa_2 \,\&\, \sim Ga_2) \vee (Fa_3 \,\&\, \sim Ga_3) \vee \ldots) + P(\sim\exists x(Fx \,\&\, \sim Gx)) = 1$$

Now if each F has a non-zero probability of being $\sim G$, then the probability that at least one F is $\sim G$, given an infinity of *F's*, is 1.[11] The logical consequence is that given an infinity of *F's*, the initial value for $P(\sim\exists x(Fx \,\&\, \sim Gx))$ is 0.[12]

Imagine now that we learn Fa_1 & Ga_1. This does nothing to change the value of $P(\sim\exists x(Fx \,\&\, \sim Gx))$. The value of $P((Fa_2 \,\&\, \sim Ga_2) \vee (Fa_3 \,\&\, \sim Ga_3) \vee (Fa_4 \,\&\, \sim Ga_4) \vee \ldots)$ is equal to the value of $P((Fa_1 \,\&\, \sim Ga_1) \vee (Fa_2 \,\&\, \sim Ga_2) \vee (Fa_3 \,\&$

$\sim Ga_3$) v …). This is because in both cases, we have an infinite number of unobserved *F's*.[13]

Recall our formula for $\Delta P(H)$. The claim here is where n approaches infinity, $\Delta P(H)$ approaches 0.

$$P(Gx|Fx)^{n-1} - P(Fx)^n = 0$$

So,

$$\Delta P(H) = 0$$

This is true because $0 \leq P(Gx|Fx) \leq 1$. Where $0 \leq P(Gx|Fx) < 1$, $P(Gx|Fx)^{n-1} - P(Gx|Fx)^n = 0 - 0$. Where $P(Gx|Fx) = 1$, $P(Gx|Fx)^{n-1} - P(Gx|Fx)^n = 1 - 1$. So, in the infinite cases, BNC does not work. At least, there is no *logical* reason to think that BNC is true in cases where we have an infinite number of unobserved *F's*. There may be other reasons to believe that BNC holds even with an infinite number of *F's* left to observe. For example, one may think that each *F* that is a *G* confirms the hypothesis that there is a law of nature that all *F's* are *G's*. However, setting aside such possibilities, there is no logical reason for BNC to be true given an infinite number of unobserved *F*'s. For this reason, we should revise BNC. I propose the following revision:

> *Finite Nicod's Condition* (FNC): For any randomly sampled object *x* (which we know nothing else about) and any properties *F* and *G*, the proposition that *x* has both *F* and *G* confirms the hypothesis that every *F* has *G* only if there is a finite number of unobserved objects that have *F*.

IV. Further Applications and Corollaries of Finite Nicod's Condition

In the previous section, I propose a revision of Nicod's Condition, FNC, to restrict confirmation to the domain of the finite. So the question, for Hempel's paradox, is whether one believes that there is infinitely many unobserved non-black objects (infinitely many non-G's). For example, an Epicurean may think that a white swan does not confirm "all non-black things are non-ravens." However, if one believes there is only finitely many unobserved non-black objects, FNC allows the observation of a white swan to confirm *H*.

The relationship between Nicod's Condition and infinities is especially instructive because infinities are limiting cases. The greater the number of non-black things, the weaker the evidential import of $\sim Ba$ & $\sim Ra$ will be ($\Delta P(H) = 0$). Consider a mathematical example to illustrate this. Goldbach's conjecture states that every even integer greater than 2 can be expressed as the sum of two

primes. We have neither found a proof nor a counterexample for Goldbach's conjecture. Every even integer greater than 2 we've "observed" thus far can be expressed as the sum of two primes. But there are infinitely many even integers we have not observed. So, if FNC is true, Goldbach's conjecture is not confirmed via Nicod's Condition when we observe even integers that can be expressed as the sum of two primes.

The example of Goldbach's conjecture complicates matters for us. Initially, it seems unsurprising that where we have an infinite number of unobserved *F'*s and $P(Gx|Fx) < 1$, Fa_1 & Ga_1 would not confirm "all *F*'s are *G*'s" because the *P*(all *F*'s are *G*'s) = 0. But it is not irrational to have a non-zero initial credence for the truth of Goldbach's conjecture, due to the possible existence of an undiscovered proof. If so, then even in a case where the prior probability of "all *F*'s are *G*'s" is greater than 0, Fa_1 & Ga_1 would not confirm "all *F*'s are *G*'s" given an infinite number of unobserved *F'*s.

So we have a case where there is an infinite number of *F*'s (meaning, no confirmation via Nicod's Condition), the initial probability of Fa_1 & Ga_1 is less than 1, but somehow the prior probability of "all *F*'s are *G*'s" is greater than 0. This is puzzling, for if $P(Gx|Fx) < 1$, then *P*(all *F'*s are *G'*s) given an infinity of *F*'s should be 0. Perhaps the only plausible way out is to deny that $P(Gx|Fx)$ is static. Upon observing that some even integer 2k can be expressed as the sum of two primes, we become more confident that 2k + 2 can also be expressed as the sum of two primes. So, *"*2k conforms to Goldbach's conjecture" and *"*2k + 2 conforms to Goldbach's conjecture" are not independent. The interdependence between the two events can be accounted for by allowing the possibility that there is an undiscovered proof for Goldbach's conjecture. Since "2k conforms to Goldbach's conjecture" confirms the hypothesis, "there is an undiscovered proof for Goldbach's conjecture," it increases our credence for "2k+2 conforms to Goldbach's conjecture." Analogously, a black raven confirms "all ravens are black" and it also confirms "there is a law nature that all ravens have to be black." Thus, observing a black raven would make us more confident that the next raven we observe will be black. A non-black non-raven, however, confirms only "all ravens are black" but not necessarily the law of nature governing ravens. Plausibly, this is why we are initially inclined to reject PC and why we tend to think black ravens carry more evidential weight for *H* than non-black non-ravens.

NOTES

1. Technically, confirmation is a relation between sentences. So it is false to say that an object confirms a hypothesis. That being said, I will depart from official practice in much of this paper. It is often simpler to say that a black raven confirms *H* than to say that the sentence, "*a* is a black raven" confirms *H* and most readers, in my experience, prefer a pleasant reading experience rather than conformity to this particular practice.
2. Though labeled as "standard," the standard Bayesian solution has received many

criticisms from Bayesians (e.g. Rinard, and Vranas) who, in their critique, continue to consider it the standard Bayesian solution.

3. For example, our background information may include, "if there is a black raven, then there is a non-black raven." Under this condition, a black raven would falsify *H* instead of confirming it.

4. Popper and others in favor of falsificationism may reject NC, claiming that the observation of a black raven—a failure of falsification—does not generate confirmation at all. So the rest of us who are less pessimistic about confirmation could use a defense of NC, lest we be convinced by Popper.

5. Here, and for the rest of the paper, all the objects I discuss are stipulated as observable objects. Unobservable objects have no chance of being observed, so their existence or lack thereof should not affect our probabilities before or after observation.

6. This is just an instance of the axiom that $P(H) + P(\sim H) = 1$.

7. Formally, $\exists x(Rx \ \& \sim Bx) \equiv ((\sim Ba_1 \ \& \ Ra_1) \text{ v } (\sim Ba_2 \ \& \ Ra_2) \text{ v } (\sim Ba_3 \ \& \ Ra_3) \text{ v } \ldots \text{ v } (\sim Ba_{10} \ \& \ Ra_{10})$.

8. Even in a case where the object is replaced after being observed, so that we cannot be sure whether the second observed object is not identical to the first, the probability that all ravens are black increases.

9. I am borrowing scientific notation here where $\Delta\Phi$ means "change in Φ," which is the difference between initial Φ (Φ_i) and final Φ (Φ_f). (Double check with the author about the use of the variable phi here.

10. This is not a trivial distinction; one might claim that it is possible to observe an infinite number of things. For example, perhaps when one looks at a ruler, one observes all the points (an uncountable infinite, in this case) between one end of the ruler and the other.

11. In fact, so long as each *F* has some non-zero probability of being $\sim G$, the probability that one of them is $\sim G$, given an infinity of *F's*, is 1.

12. In a case where we replace the sampled object, we still get confirmation with repeated observations of $Fx \ \& \ Gx$. This is because repeated observations get us closer to observing a larger portion of the class of *F*'s. For example, if there are 10 *F's* and we observe one *F* at a time with replacement, we can be pretty confident we have observed all 10 after 100 observations. But this is not true with an infinite number of *F*'s. We are no closer to observing all the *F*'s if there is an infinite number of unobserved *F*'s.

13. Even if one holds that the initial value of $P(\sim\exists x(Fx \ \& \sim Gx))$ is not zero, but infinitesimal, the argument goes through so long as $P((Fa_2 \ \& \sim Ga_2) \text{ v } (Fa_3 \ \& \sim Ga_3) \text{ v } (Fa_4 \ \& \sim Ga_4) \text{ v } \ldots (Fa_n \ \& \sim Ga_n)) = P((Fa_1 \ \& \sim Ga_1) \text{ v } (Fa_2 \ \& \sim Ga_2) \text{ v } (Fa_3 \ \& \sim Ga_3) \text{ v } \ldots (Fa_n \ \& \sim Ga_n))$.

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Program of the 68th Annual Meeting of the New Mexico Texas Philosophical Society

March 24-26, 2017

Friday Afternoon Session 1

Justin Pearce, University of New Mexico
"Nancy on Love and Mystery"
Comments: **Francisco Gallegos,** Georgetown University

Joseph Gamache, Boston University
"Friendship vs. Universal Epistemic Norms: A False Dilemma"
Comments: **Mary Gwin,** San Diego Mesa College

Ryan Hubbard, New Mexico State University
"Toward a Functionalist Account of Blame"
Comments: **Irwin Chan,** University of British Columbia

Irwin Chan, University of British Columbia
"'And You, Brutus?': Blame in Personal Relationships"
Comments: **Ryan Hubbard,** New Mexico State University

Kristina Grob, Spring Hill College
"Tracking the Transformation from Benign Silence to Harmful Silencing"
Comments: **Joseph Gamache,** Boston University

Friday Afternoon Session 2

Daniel Grosz, University of Oklahoma
"The Irrationality of Pluralistic Ignorance"
Comments: **Paul Wilson,** Texas State University

Nathan Smith, Houston Community College
"Pascal's Wager as Non-Rational Appeal"
Comments: **Daniel Grosz,** University of Oklahoma

Mark Walker, New Mexico State University
"Epistemic Hubris as Explanation for Philosophical Disagreement"
Comments: **Peter Hutcheson,** Texas State University
Peter Hutcheson, Texas State University
"Dream Skepticism and the Problem of Evil"
Comments: **Mark Walker,** New Mexico State University
Brian A. Woodcock, University of Texas Rio Grande Valley
"Peirce and 'The Scientific Method' as Epistemic Stance"
Comments: **David Beisecker,** University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Friday Afternoon Session 3

Gaetano Venezia, Georgia State University
"The Liberal Ironist and the Other"
Comments: **Inigo Ongay,** Leon Guanajuato Mexico
Yunus Prasetya, Baylor University
"Hempel's Raven Paradox: On Confirmation and Infinities"
Comments: **Emil Badici,** Texas A&M-Kingsville
Emil Badici, Texas A&M-Kingsville
"The Unpredictable Trojan Fly"
Comments: **Yunus Prasetya,** Baylor University
Ioan-Radu Motoarca, University of Virginia
"A Bad Theory of Truth of Fiction"
Comments: **Mary Gwin,** San Diego Mesa College
Allan Hazlett, University of New Mexico
"Correctness and Involuntariness"
Comments: **David Liakos,** University of New Mexico

Friday Afternoon Session 4

Bradley Warfield, University of South Florida
"In Praise of (Awkward) Silence: A Critique of Charles Taylor's Conception on the Dialogical Self"
Comments: **Jonathan Lollar**, Texas State University
Troy D. Williamson, Texas State Technical College
"Should Robots Look Like Robots?"
Comments: **Justin Pearce,** University of New Mexico
Francisco Gallegos, Georgetown University
"Surviving Social Disintegration: Jorge Portilla on the Phenomenology of Zozobra"
Comments: **Susanne Claxton,** Southern New Hampshire University

Sung Jun Han, Queen's University
"Pragmatic and Deliberative Approach to Human Rights"
Comments: **Maria Svedberg,** University of California Riverside/Stockholm University
Angela Bischof, Duke University
"Human and Animal Mental Causation"
Comments: **Nathan Smith,** Houston Community College

Saturday Morning Session 1

John M. Gist, Western New Mexico University
"Boethius' Ladder: Pragmatics, Poetics, and the Apophatic"
Comments: **Vanessa Voss,** Houston Community College
Jacob Mills, Houston Community College
"Infinite Analysis and the Connectedness Problem in Leibniz"
Comments: **Brian A. Woodcock,** University of Texas Rio Grande Valley
Gary Santillanes, Northland Pioneer College
"Hegel's Lockean Theory of Property"
Comments: **Tyler Haulotte,** University of New Mexico
Lamont Rodgers, Houston Community College
"Egalitarianism, Marxism, and Alienation"
Comments: **Sung Jan Han,** Queen's University

Saturday Morning Session 2

Arthur Krieger, Temple University
"Cassirer's Theory of Dipolar Perception"
Comments: **Chengquan Xiang,** Colorado College
Inigo Ongay, Leon Guanajuato Mexico
"Weismann's Three Critiques of the Inheritance of Acquired Characters"
Comments: **Arthur Krieger,** Temple University
Michael Morales, City College of San Francisco
"The Sufficiency of Isomorphism in Scientific Representation"
Comments: **Timothy Cleveland,** New Mexico State University
Kari Hanson, Western Michigan University
"Explicability and Inference to the Best Explanation"
Comments: **Michael Morales,** City College of San Francisco

Saturday Afternoon Session 1

Abigail Klassen, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
"Ameliorative Social Constructionism and the Hegemony of the Status Quo"
Comments: **Anthony Cashio,** University of Virginia's College at Wise

Jonathan Lollar, Texas State University
"Problems in Pornography: How Camgirls Can Reshape Porn Culture"
Comments: **Kristina Grob,** Spring Hill College
Anthony Cashio, University of Virginia's College at Wise
"Lessons from the History of Birmingham, Alabama"
Comments: **Abigail Klassen,** University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Saturday Afternoon Session 2

Vanessa Voss, Houston Community College
"God's Not Laughing: The Superiority of Theory of Humor"
Comments: **Daniel Guentchev,** Bemidji State University
Perry Hendricks, Trinity Western University
"Challenge Accepted: Answering Law's Evil-God Challenge"
Comments: **Patrick X. Monaghan,** Doane College
Patrick X. Monaghan, Doane College
"On the Possibility of an Omnipotent and Omnibenevolent God"
Comments: **Peter Hutcheson,** Texas State University

Saturday Afternoon Session 3

Chengquan Xiang, Colorado College
"On Time"
Comments: **Morgan Davies,** Virginia Tech
Morgan Davies, Virginia Tech
"The Theoretical Fruitfulness of Pluralistic Constitution Theory"
Comments: **Landon D.C. Elkind,** University of Iowa
Landon D. C. Elkind, University of Iowa
"Against Sense-Data as Structured Universals"
Comments: **Ana Andrei,** Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi

Saturday Afternoon Session 4

Timothy Cleveland, Mark Walker, and Jean-Paul Vessel, New Mexico State University
"The X-Men on 'Ought Implies Can'"
Comments: **Paul Wilson,** Texas State University
Jean-Paul Vessel, New Mexico State University
"Desert-Adjusted Utilitarianism, People and Animals"
Comments: **Lamont Rodgers,** Houston Community College
Maria Svedberg, University of California, Riverside/Stockholm University
"Consequentialism and Free Will: The Conditional Analysis Resuscitated"
Comments: **Gaetano Venezia,** Georgia State University

Presidential Address

Parish Conkling, Houston Community College
"The Triumph of Trump: Hannah Arendt on Language Codes"

Sunday Morning 1

David Beisecker, University of Las Vegas
"Consequences, Consequences: Semantic Inferentialism in the Later Works of Peirce and James"
Comments: **Justin Bell,** University of Houston, Victoria

Julian Katz, Tulane University
"Kant's Bund" A Voluntary Reading"
Comments: **Parish Conkling,** Houston Community College

Richard Galvin and **John R. Harris,** Texas Christian University
"Causal Impotence, Collective Action Problems, and Virtue Ethics"
Comments: **Julian Katz,** Tulane University

Zane Bischof, Colorado State University
"On What 'Is' Good?"
Comments: **Troy Williamson,** Texas State Technical College

Sunday Morning 2

Daniel Guentchev, Bemidji State University
"The Artistic Visions of Langer and Merleau-Ponty"
Comments: **John M. Gist,** Western New Mexico University

Alison Fritz, Auburn University
"Using Moral Foundations Theory to Understand Environmental Aesthetic Reactions: A Brief Exploration"
Comments: **Perry Hendricks,** Trinity Western University

Panel Discussion:
The Subjective in Science: The Modern Idea of Progress and Social Movements:

Eric Chavez, University of Texas, El Paso
"A (re) Evolution of Science via the Return to Nature"

Luiz Cepeda, Philosophy of Liberation Association-Mexico
"Do 'Historical Subjects' Exist? Inter-subjectivity and Social Mobility"

Comments: **Allan Hazlett,** University of New Mexico

Institutional affiliations reflect the institutions of the participants at the time of the conference.